START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001071 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VII): (U) CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION WORKING GROUP MEETING, NOVEMBER 16, 2009 Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-027. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: November 16, 2009 Time: 3:30 - 6:00 P.M. Place: Russian Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) The fourth meeting of the Conversion or Elimination (CorE) Working Group for the START Follow-On (SFO) Negotiations Session VII was held at the Russian Mission on November 16, 2009. The two sides discussed treaty Article VII, silo launcher elimination provisions, the number of days strategic offensive arms (SOA) would be available for national technical means (NTM) of verification or on-site inspection following completion of CorE procedures, heavy bomber elimination procedure options, and General Provisions of the U.S.-proposed CorE part of the treaty protocol. ¶4. (U) Subject Summary: Treaty Article VII, Silo Elimination Procedures, Counting the Days, Heavy Bomber Conversion Options, and, General Provisions. -------------- Treaty Article VII -------------- ¶5. (S) Colonel Ryzhkov started the discussion by insisting the working group discuss treaty Article VII--specifically, new Russian-proposed text for paragraph 3(b) addressing verification by inspection. Ryzhkov pushed for acceptance of the Russian text so that Article VII could be passed to conforming. Russia wanted to ensure that either Article VII or paragraph 6 of the General Provisions recorded that CorE could be confirmed only after completion of the procedures. Mr. Elliott demurred, stating that he was concerned that the text could contradict U.S.-proposed provisions on mobile systems that had yet to be decided; specifically, the right for inspectors to observe final elimination procedures. He suggested leaving Article VII as is, while considering bringing the language into the General Provisions Section. Ryzhkov stated that the same approach would be extended to 
all SOA, for example, U.S. heavy bomber conversions. In the Russian view, there would be no right for either Party to observe any conversion procedures. He noted that the Treaty Text and Definitions Working Group (TTDWG) were discussing Article VII as well in a concurrent meeting. Elliott reiterated that, until the mobile missile issues were resolved, the sides could not go further on Article VII. -------------- SILO ELIMINATION PROCEDURES -------------- ¶6. (S) Elliott turned to silo launcher elimination procedures--specifically U.S.-proposed text for subparagraph 2(b). Begin text: The silo door shall be removed, dismantled or destroyed and the silo shall be completely filled with debris resulting from demolition of infrastructure and earth or gravel. End text. Ryzhkov agreed with the new subparagraph, which included revised wording for the silo fill material. Elliott then asked for a clarification for paragraph 9 (conversion of an ICBM launcher for another type of ICBM) on whether the Russians wanted the word "silo" inserted. Ryzhkov stated the word had been deleted at the last meeting. ¶7. (S) The Russians clarified that they would probably use both subparagraphs 2(a) and (b) provisions to eliminate their silo launchers, and the U.S. side clarified that the United States would probably use only subparagraph 2(b) provisions. Elliott asked whether paragraph 2(c),the wild card option for silo elimination, was still needed. Ryzhkov stated that having the third wild card option would make ratification in the Duma easier; they could point to the third option as a way to develop less costly procedures, if necessary. -------------- COUNTING THE DAYS -------------- ¶8. (S) Elliott directed discussion toward the issue of how long SOA should be available for NTM verification or inspection after completion of CorE procedures. The possibility of a single timeframe of 20, 30, or 60 days had been discussed previously. Elliott said that internal U.S. CorE Working Group discussions had resulted in an assessment that 30 days were the maximum appropriate for on-site inspections, but 60 days made more sense for NTM verification. Elliott pointed out that a 60-day requirement for inspection availability following conversion would adversely impact operations. Before Elliott could finish walking through the various points within the CorE Section showing where 30-day and 60-day windows each made sense, Ryzhkov began to discuss the issue of whether and how it could impact NTM verification, indicating an understanding that a longer window for NTM verification was warranted, but changing in mid-sentence to say 45 days should be sufficient for any verification measures. Elliott provided specific instances where a 30-day window would work for inspections; Mr. Smirnov suggested that, because conversion required a demonstration or exhibition of procedures, the window for inspection or verification could be affected. Elliott stated that, in principle, the sides had agreed that an exhibition or demonstration would be required for the first conversion of a type with optional inspections thereafter, as long as the same procedures were used. Ryzhkov acknowledged Elliott's reasoning and proposed to take the idea of differing timelines to his superiors and discuss it with other members of his delegation. -------------- HEAVY BOMBER ELIMINATION PROCEDURE OPTIONS -------------- ¶9. (S) Elliott requested a review of language used in paragraph 1 of the section on procedures for elimination of heavy bombers. It was agreed that the paragraph would be changed to read: Begin text: The elimination process for a heavy bomber shall be to remove a basic design element of the heavy bomber (tail section or wing) or cut the fuselage into two pieces, at a location that is obviously not an assembly point, thereby rendering the heavy bomber inoperable. End text. ¶10. (S) Elliott suggested that the sides exchange proposed Joint Draft Texts for Section 5 paragraphs 1 through 4(b) the next day (November 17) so that the texts could be referred to the Conforming Group on November 18. Ryzhkov requested that both texts go though legal review first, preferring that the entire section be agreed and then sent to conforming. -------------- GENERAL PROVISIONS -------------- ¶11. (S) Elliott started the discussion of the General Provisions Section by pointing out that the Russian-proposed first paragraph discussed notification, the provisions for which had been incorporated in treaty Article VII. This paragraph could therefore be dropped. Ryzhkov agreed. The sides agreed that the phrase "subject to the limitations of the Treaty," although repeated on numerous occasions in the text and the chapeau, should remain in each case. Therefore, the new paragraphs 1 and 2 in the General Provisions, accepting Russian-proposed text, were agreed. Paragraph 1 covered the location of CorE, and paragraph 2 covered General Provisions on elimination. In reading paragraph 3 on conversion, Elliott pointed out two bracketed phrases and, after discussing them, suggested that he and Ryzhkov discuss these before the Ad Hoc Group meeting scheduled for the next day. (Begin comment: These provisions pertain to removal of converted items from accountability versus on-going verification following conversion of launchers or heavy bombers. The U.S. side supports the former concept and the Russian side supports the latter. End comment.) Smirnov pointed out that the two bracketed phrases are interrelated--that keeping one excludes the other. Elliott highlighted that the final paragraph was no longer needed if the sides agreed to paragraph three in treaty Article VII. Ryzhkov wished to retain the paragraph until Article VII was finalized. He indicated it should specify "the result of conversion or elimination" and that a better verb would be "confirmed" (podtverzhdyon) instead of "recorded." Elliott indicated tentative agreement with Russia's proposed paragraph 6 on exhibition of the first item of a type that is converted. ¶12. (S) Elliott requested a discussion of the concepts behind the Russian wording for wild card conversion options--specifically, what the Russians envisioned for the process of notification and demonstration of self-developed procedures. After discussing three possible paths: agreement with the process as outlined in the notification; agreement after Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) presentation and possible on-site demonstration; and disagreement requiring additional explanation, Ryzhkov stated that the Party conducting the conversion needs to adequately explain the procedure and that, as long as the Parties are willing to compromise, a solution is possible. He agreed the current wording did not adequately cover the possibility of not coming to agreement within the BCC, but suggested that the sides not attempt to cover all possible contingencies in the provision. Elliott offered to revise the U.S.-proposed paragraph addressing these points and provide it to the Russians on November 17. ¶13. (S) Ryzhkov commented on exhibitions of CorE procedures. If the other Party had questions about conversion to a new type, it would be necessary to compare it to the previous type. Regarding the U.S. conversion of B-1B heavy bombers, if the United States had done a better job of showing that it was no longer possible to attach pylons for nuclear armaments to the converted bombers, allowing measurement of the distance between the attachment joints, Russia would not have had further questions. Inspectors could not judge the distance simply by viewing. Therefore, Russia still had questions as to whether nuclear armaments could still be deployed on the converted heavy bombers. However, the recent exhibitions for RVOSI of SS-27 and MM-III ICBMs had been successful in answering the questions of both sides. It was necessary to show goodwill and think about how to convince the other Party. ¶14. (U) Documents exchanged. - U.S.: -- U.S.-proposed Joint Draft Text of CorE Section V: Procedures for Conversion or Elimination of Heavy Bombers. ¶15. (U) Participants: U.S. Mr. Elliott LCDR Brons Mr. Broshar Mr. Brown Mr. Dwyer Lt Col Goodman Mr. Hanchett Mr. McConnell Ms. Purcell Dr. Hopkins (Int) RUSSIA Col Ryzhkov Mr. Ivanov Mr. Smirnov Mr. Shevchenko Ms. Vodopolova Col Zaytsev Ms. Komshilova (Int) ¶16. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS