START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001070 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VII): (U) IPWG MEETING, NOVEMBER 12, 2009 Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-017. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: November 12, 2009 Time: 3:30 - 5:30 P.M. Place: Russian Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) A meeting of the Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG) was held at the Russian Mission on November 12, 2009, to discuss the concept of a combined approach for inspecting ICBMs and SLBMs at operational bases, which would include elements of a Nuclear Warhead Inspection (NWI) and a Data Update Inspection (DUI). The U.S. side explained that this would entail inspecting both deployed and non-deployed items of inspection during the same inspection. The Russian delegation said it was prepared only to discuss items of inspection, but focused only on the inspection of deployed items. The Russian delegation also expressed the need to understand the details of the pre-inspection briefing and inspection procedures prior to reviewing any text on a combined inspection approach. ¶4. (U) Subject Summary: What's In a Title; and, Pre-Inspection Data. -------------- WHAT'S IN A TITLE? -------------- ¶5. (S) Colonel Petrov opened the meeting and stated that the section in the Inspection Protocol setting forth the steps involved in conducting combined inspections should have an appropriate title for reflecting the data to be provided during the pre-inspection briefing and inspection. Petrov proposed the following title: "Combined Inspection at ICBM Bases, Submarine Bases, Bases for Heavy Bombers Equipped for Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs, and Bases for Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments other than Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs with Regard to Strategic Offensive Arms (SOA) Items Based at Such Bases and With Regard to Warheads on Them as well as Non-Deployed SOA Items." (Begin comment: Gravity bombs are considered nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs. End comment.) Dr. Warner stated he understood and, although the title suggested was far too long, he agreed that an appropriate title needed to be developed. -------------- PRE-INSPECTION DATA -------------- ¶6. (S) Petrov began to explain what data, in the Russian view, should be provided during pre-inspection briefings for Type 1 inspections by listing data on deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers, the launchers for ICBMs and SLBMs and warheads on them as well as non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers. Warner asked about data on non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs or selected support equipment. Petrov responded that the number of non-deployed launchers would be briefed in the pre-inspection briefings. Support equipment is minimal, he said, but he was not prepared to discuss elements associated with a DUI. Warner stated that selected support equipment should be briefed which, at a minimum, should include training models of missiles (TMOMs). Warner added that non-deployed SOA, such as non-deployed ICBMs, which include spare ICBMs or those ICBMs being worked on at maintenance facilities, should also be listed at the pre-inspection briefing. ¶7. (S) Petrov attempted to avoid discussing support equipment and focused only on deployed items under Type 1 inspections. He said that TMOMs are for training and are usually located at training areas at the ICBM and SLBM bases. TMOMs at silo facilities, for example, had never been inspected because they are in training silos. The sides could discuss TMOMs at a later date. Petrov explained that, under the Russian concept of a Type 1 inspection of deployed SOA, non-deployed ICBMs and mobile launchers at the maintenance facility would not be subject to inspection. With regard to mobile ICBMs, inspectors would have the right to select empty fixed structures to confirm the absence of a deployed ICBM and its launchers. However, non-deployed items would be inspected during a Type 2 inspection. Warner explained that such an approach was not consistent with a combined inspection at operational bases for ICBMs and SLBMs, where data on both deployed and non-deployed SOA would be confirmed. Petrov stated that Warner's comment regarding non-deployed ICBMs at the maintenance facilities required further study. ¶8. (S) Petrov explained that the Russian position was to provide the numbers regarding the following items during the pre-inspection briefing for Type 1 inspections at ICBM bases, submarine bases, and air bases for heavy bombers: For an ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs- Aggregate number of deployed silo launchers Number of deployed ICBMs loaded in deployed launchers Aggregate number of warheads on deployed ICBMs (total for the base) Number of non-deployed ICBM launchers Number of warheads on each deployed ICBM throughout the base Copy of site diagram of ICBM base annotated to show the location of each ICBM silo For an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs- Aggregate number of deployed mobile ICBM launchers (total for the base, broken down for each basing area) Specific number of deployed mobile ICBMs (by type) Aggregate number of warheads on deployed ICBMs (total for base) Specific number of warheads on each deployed mobile ICBM Copy of site diagrams of basing areas annotated to show the location of each deployed mobile ICBM on its launcher Empty fixed structures not containing a deployed mobile ICBM and its launcher Submarine base; the numbers of: Ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) assigned to the base Aggregate number of deployed launchers of SLBMs on SSBNs (total for base) Aggregate number of deployed SLBMs (by type) Aggregate number of warheads on deployed SLBMs (assigned to the base) Specific number of warheads on each deployed SLBM Aggregate number of non-deployed launchers of SLBMs Specific number of SSBNs with non-deployed launchers Coastline and Water Diagrams annotated to show the location of SOA Airbase for heavy bombers- Aggregate number of warheads loaded on heavy bombers equipped for LRNA Aggregate number of warheads loaded on heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than LRNA Location of absent heavy bombers by particular location Specific number of heavy bombers equipped for LRNA and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than LRNA that are visiting the airbase Specific number of warheads on each heavy bomber equipped for LRNA Specific number of warheads on each heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than LRNA Aggregate number of heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments Copy of site diagram of air base showing location of such heavy bombers ¶9. (S) Petrov avoided questions concerning whether the Russian delegation intended to declare items in an ICBM base's maintenance facility. He stated that discussions on maintenance facilities, submarine base weapons storage areas, and converted submarines would have to occur later as the Russian delegation was not prepared to share its thoughts on these areas at this time. ¶10. (S) Petrov stated that, for the pre-inspection briefing at a heavy bomber base, the total number of heavy bombers located at a base should include any visiting heavy bombers. Petrov added that the exact location within national territory or outside national territory of heavy bombers should also be provided. Petrov explained that the reason for the requested locational data was to compare that data to the six-month data exchange. Warner stated that the United States was prepared to provide the exact location for heavy bombers within the U.S. national territory; however the United States would only provide the general region for heavy bombers outside national territory, as was done under START. ¶11. (S) Petrov stated that he had just outlined the process, stipulated in paragraph 5, of the Russian proposal for what inspectors should expect to receive in writing during the pre-inspection briefing. Warner reiterated what was missing was the data for non-deployed items of inspection and selected support equipment. Warner explained that it was reasonable that non-deployed SOAs should be part of the pre-inspection procedures because, during a combined inspection, non-deployed SOAs would be monitored by inspectors at the maintenance facility or within storage bunkers at an inspection site, as was done during a DUI under START. Warner provided an example of how the U.S. Navy has non-deployed SLBMs within the storage area of an operational SLBM base. Warner also stated that the U.S. Navy removes missiles from the launchers on a submarine for periodic maintenance. Lastly, Warner explained that some support equipment should be included in the list of pre-inspection data briefed during pre-inspection procedures, such as TMOMs and launch associated support vehicles. ¶12. (S) Warner noted that the Parties agree on the majority of data for deployed SOA to be provided to an inspection team during a combined inspection for deployed SOA, but that the disagreement was with regard to the data to be provided associated with non-deployed items of inspection. Warner stated he would be ready to discuss more about the content of the pre-inspection procedures and the inspection process, but recommended the working group discuss them in the context of the U.S.-proposed text for combined inspections. Warner stated that differences would surface as both Parties review the text. Petrov replied that he wanted to continue general discussions of inspection procedures to gain a basic understanding before reviewing them in the proposed text. Warner asserted that if we were to take the approach proposed by Petrov, then the IPWG would need to meet everyday. Warner closed saying he believed the IPWG was very close to agreement and needed to look at the issues as they related to the text. ¶13. (U) Documents exchanged. None. ¶14. (U) Participants: U.S. Dr. Warner Mr. Buttrick Mr. DeNinno LCDR Feliciano Maj Johnson LTC Leyde Mr. Rust Ms. Pura Mr. Smith Mr. Shkeyrov (Int) RUSSIA Col Petrov Mr. Ivanov Mr. Luchaninov Ms. Melikbekian Mr. Voloskov Col Kamenskiy Mr. Vorontsov Ms. Komshilova (Int) ¶15. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS