START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001066 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VII): (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION ONE-ON-ONE MEETING, NOVEMBER 17, 2009 Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-029. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: November 17, 2009 Time: 10:00 A.M. - 12:00 P.M. Place: Russian Mission, Geneva Participants: U.S. RUSSIA A/S Gottemoeller Amb Antonov Mr. Connell -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) On November 17, 2009, U.S. Head of Delegation (HOD) Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller met with Russian HOD Ambassador Antonov at the Russian Mission. Antonov provided a heads-up about a possible visit of several Duma and other Government officials in the coming week. He also expressed his preference that a planned visit next week of other senior Russian officials to Washington be held in Geneva instead. The HODs discussed outstanding issues related to the preamble language, and a number of outstanding issues related to various treaty articles. Finally, the HODs discussed the various options and considerations related to implementing a bridging agreement or provisional application of the treaty. ¶4. (U Subject Summary: High-Level Visits in Geneva and Washington; Reviewing Upcoming Treaty Work; and, No to Bridging, But Provisional Application is Possible. -------------- HIGH-LEVEL VISITS IN GENEVA AND WASHINGTON -------------- ¶5. (S) Antonov began by discussing the forthcoming meeting of Russian and U.S. officials on treaty-related matters scheduled to take place next week in Washington, D.C. He said he had sent a "tough telegram" to Moscow against having such a meeting in Washington. To his mind, the relevant experts needed to be present to provide information and support, and they were also needed in Geneva to continue the negotiation activities. Gottemoeller replied that the meeting was scheduled for Washington because that is where the Presidents agreed it would be. She noted the meeting should be very productive and involve very senior level U.S. Government officials. She thought CJCS Mullen would meet with Russian Chief of the General Staff Makarov, and APNSA Jones would be meeting with Russian National Security Advisor Prikhodko. Be that as it may, Antonov insisted that he would send another, even more strongly-worded, cable to Moscow arguing against the value of meeting in Washington and the necessity of keeping Geneva as the focus of the negotiations and related discussions. ¶6. (S) Antonov reported that three Duma members were due to visit the Russian delegation next week in Geneva. He noted the value in having U.S. Senators come and familiarize themselves with negotiation activities, and thought it would be a good idea if members of the Duma did as well. AHe said three officials would likely be visiting next week. (Begin comment: Last names are believed to be Ozerov, Kosachev, and Dzasokhov. A review of Duma web sites revealed Duma members named Ozerov and Kosachev. Dzasokhov is a member of the Federation Council. End comment.) Returning later in the meeting to the upcoming Duma member visit, Antonov confided that he was unsure how to best handle this visit. He related how his guidance for negotiating the treaty was classified, releasable to members of the Executive Branch only. He was unsure whether he had authorization to discuss any of his guidance with the Duma members, joking "even if they are friends of Putin or Medvedev." He was also reticent to host visiting senior officials so close to the projected completion date. ¶7. (S) Gottemoeller shared with Antonov the U.S. approach to work between the Executive and Legislative Branches of Government. She explained to him how negotiators receive guidance on releasability of information to visiting members of Congress. In addition, members of Congress are sensitive to the negotiations process and will go to great lengths to ensure their visit does not impede the progress of negotiations. Antonov was appreciative of the insight and said he would continue to ponder an appropriate plan for the Duma members' visit. Gottemoeller, for her part, offered to host a lunch for the visit. -------------- REVIEWING UPCOMING TREATY WORK -------------- ¶8. (S) Gottemoeller and Antonov then conducted a review of the treaty text and discussed several issues. Looking at the Preamble, Antonov felt the draft subparagraph expressing appreciation to Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan was acceptable. He inquired whether Gottemoeller had any thoughts on how to respond to a letter from Ukrainian President Yushchenko to President Obama, in which Ukraine appealed for continued security assurances. He also mentioned a letter from Belarus asking to participate in the START Follow-on Treaty. Gottemoeller replied she had not seen either, but would inquire into both. Antonov advised that the Russian Federation was preparing responses, but he assured Gottemoeller that Russia would discuss its proposals in advance with the United States. ¶9. (S) As for the preambular reference to the Moscow Treaty, Antonov opined that the language needed to be more upbeat. He thought the last paragraph in the Preamble should finish on a high note, and he also thought the language referring to the Moscow Treaty should celebrate the accomplishments of this accord. He expressed a willingness to consider a more upbeat start of "welcoming" (reductions under SORT) vice "noting." ¶10. (S) While reviewing individual articles, the HODs discussed release of information to third parties or the public (Article VIII). Antonov thought the United States wanted this text in order to release its own data. Gottemoeller, citing the precedent from START, pushed for recognition of the presumption that information could be released unless the Parties determined otherwise. She thought the public and the international arms control community would have a keen interest in the efforts and progress of this agreement. Antonov expressed his doubts that such language would be acceptable, though he did think the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) might be able to play a role in determining what information could be released. Gottemoeller asked Antonov for consideration of more positive language that would help facilitate release of information. ¶11. (S) The HODs, also reviewed the Russian-proposed article on voluntary measures (Russian Article IX). Gottemoeller thought it was a good idea and felt it would find support from the U.S. delegation. At the same time, she cautioned Antonov not to misconstrue this to think it would be a replacement for any verification measures proposed elsewhere. ¶12. (S) This led to discussion on the use of national technical means (U.S. Article IX, Russian Article X). Gottemoeller asked why the Russian delegation would not want to support language strengthening the effectiveness of NTM by precluding the use of concealment at locations such as space launch facilities. Antonov at first was willing to defend the Russian position until it became clear to him that this provision was not referring to telemetry. He promised to take the question for study. ¶13. (S) For telemetry (Article X),Antonov recalled this was the proposed topic of the upcoming session of the Ad Hoc Group. He did not consider telemetry a useful topic, and felt it would be little more than a political discussion. Antonov reminded Gottemoeller that the telemetry issue was a red line for Russia. Gottemoeller pointed out that this was a topic of similar import to the United States, hence, the proposal to examine the topic some more. Antonov agreed, but proposed the time be kept to one hour to allow for other discussions. ¶14. (S) The HODs then examined the issue of cooperative measures (Article XII). Gottemoeller noted there was something for both sides to gain from this article. She pointed out that Russia had used this provision frequently under START to track U.S. heavy bombers, and the United States had used it to track mobile launchers of ICBMs. Antonov wondered if it would not be more appropriate for a similar arrangement between mobile missile launchers and SSBNs, to which Gottemoeller pointed out the long-standing relationship between heavy bombers and mobile launchers of missiles in the arms control calculus. ¶15. (S) Prior to concluding discussion on the treaty issues, Gottemoeller pointed out how the combined limit on deployed and non-deployed launchers was problematic in setting counting rules. She wondered about the efficacy of creating a separate limit for non-deployed launchers. Antonov quickly pointed out that this concept would run counter to what Russia had proposed for Article 2, paragraph 2. (Begin comment: This paragraph allows the Parties to determine for themselves the composition of their strategic offensive arms. End comment.) Antonov said using this article, a Party might want to have 200 deployed and 400 non-deployed systems to meet a limit of 600 strategic delivery vehicles. Under the U.S. idea, such would no longer be possible. -------------- NO TO BRIDGING, BUT PROVISIONAL APPLICATION IS POSSIBLE -------------- -------------- ¶16. (S) Turning to the subject of a bridging agreement, Gottemoeller advised Antonov that the Russian delegation may be asked about it during their visit next week to Washington. Gottemoeller reviewed four possible options: reciprocal political commitments, an executive agreement that the United States would sign and the Russian Federation would sign and ratify, provisional application of the new treaty, and ratification of the treaty itself. Antonov reported that an executive agreement would require ratification by the Duma. Antonov felt the best course of action would be, in fact, to push for ratification of the new treaty. Working on the assumption that tier three documents (Begin note: Implementation Annexes. End note.) could be completed before February 1, Antonov estimated the Duma could be persuaded to consider and ratify the agreement by as early as May 1. He recognized, nevertheless, the U.S. interest in ensuring a bridging agreement is in place, but the executive agreement proposed by the U.S. would not work under Russian law. This was the Russian side's official response to the U.S. proposal. ¶17. (S) Continuing the discussion of a bridging agreement for the new treaty, Antonov stated that it is possible under Russian law to provisionally apply a treaty for up to six months without requiring ratification in advance. He asked for a proposal of provisions that the United States was interested in seeing provisionally applied. He felt it would be useful to have this list available while working through the final points of the treaty. Gottemoeller observed that the provisions of Russian Article IX might serve as the model for a treaty provision that would address activities during the interim period between agreements. (Begin comment: This article, which appears only in the Russian draft of the treaty, addresses voluntary measures to enhance confidence, openness and predictability. End comment.) She added that a temporary article with a sunset clause could also support execution of visits as confidence- and security-building measures. ¶18. (S) While provisional application might prove to be a viable course of action, Gottemoeller cautioned Antonov that U.S. participation would be limited to the scope of what could be agreed to in an executive agreement. As a result, reductions in armaments called for in the treaty could not take place during provisional status, nor could warhead data be released or privileges and immunities be accorded to inspectors. Antonov replied that an arrangement must have reciprocal and equal application of provisions. That being said, his first reaction was to deem this a serious question worthy of further study. The two HODs agreed to ask their lawyers to meet to study the questions related to the bridging arrangement. ¶19. (U) Documents exchanged. None. ¶20. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS