START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001065 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/25/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VII): (U) ADMIRAL MULLEN AND GENERAL MAKAROV MEETING, NOVEMBER 23, 2009 REF: A. GENEVA 1061 (SFO-GVA-VII-045) ¶B. GENEVA 1064 (SOP-GVA-VII-037) Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-047. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: November 23, 2009 Time: 10:00 A.M. - 1:00 P.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶4. (S) U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen, and Chief of the Russian General Staff, General Makarov met for a second time to discuss differences in the sides' approach to completion of the START Follow-on (SFO) Treaty. There were no breakthroughs, with both sides reiterating their basic positions. Makarov reaffirmed that the number of strategic delivery vehicles (SDVs) Russia could agree to, as President Medvedev has proposed, was 650. They offered to consider a number in the 600-700 range, but were steadfast in their view. The Russians also reaffirmed that they could not accept an asymmetrical verification regime associated with mobile ICBMs, nor could they accept a telemetry regime. The Russians asserted that the United States could use telemetric information obtained from Russia to aid with the U.S. missile defense (MD) system that is being developed. ¶4. (S) Mullen reinforced that, because of U.S. force structure, it was not possible for the United States to get to the number of SDVs that the Russians had proposed. The United States also had issues with regard to treaty ratification that need to be considered. The U.S. side offered a modified proposal on non-deployed launchers, offering to include in the treaty an overall limit on non-deployed launchers of nominally 150, which would include non-deployed mobile ICBM launchers. The U.S. side offered additional rationale for the inclusion of a telemetry regime, and additional rationale on counting heavy bomber armaments. ¶5. (U) Subject Summary: Greetings and Salutations; Offense-Defense Relationship; Converting Interceptors in to SOA; NPR Review; Turning to Verification; Capability of One U.S. Submarine Equals the Entire Russian Mobile ICBM Force; Heavy Bomber Counting Rules; and, Telemetry Revisited. -------------- GREETINGS AND SALUTATIONS -------------- ¶6. (S) Mullen provided Makarov with the opportunity to make remarks and respond to U.S. presentations delivered the previous evening. Mullen encouraged an open and engaging discussion that would help facilitate negotiations. Makarov said the Russian delegation listened to the U.S. presentation with great interest, analyzed the issues within the framework of the current international situation, and believed that Russian and U.S. positions were similar. Makarov explained that the Russian people are simple and that, after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia had taken numerous steps to make improvements in its policies. He noted cooperation with the United States in the realm of disarmament, stating that, despite emerging threats and changes to the positions over the years, Russia did not view the United States as threatening. Makarov said the attitude in Russia has changed since the times of the Cold War and Russia was taking steps to improve relations and pragmatically approach the state of affairs. He specifically noted that the Obama Administration gave new hope for improved relations. ¶7. (S) Makarov said that, as Mullen had stated, in order to resolve issues, the sides must engage in fair and open dialogue. In approaching SFO, Russia agreed with President Obama's notion of starting with a fresh sheet of paper, while at the same time adopting useful measures from START. The "old treaty" produced positive results and served its purpose. However, some provisions interfered with current Russian interests. Makarov emphasized that any discriminatory proposals in relation to SFO would not lead to productive dialogue. The Russian and U.S. militaries must analyze the situation in order to find solutions suitable to both Parties. Makarov agreed with statements by the Heads of Delegation (HODs) that SFO was on the world stage, and success would demonstrate that two great powers were united and capable of reaching consensus. He stressed that the treaty should be equal on all fronts and serve the mutual interests of both sides. He then thanked Mullen for the U.S. presentation from the previous evening (REF A) and offered to make presentations clarifying the Russian position. Makarov turned to Colonel Ilin who presented Russia's position on the interrelationship between strategic offensive arms (SOA) and strategic defensive arms (SDA). -------------- OFFENSE-DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP -------------- ¶8. (S) Ilin addressed Russian concerns regarding the relationship between SOA and SDA. He reiterated the Russian view that the process of reducing SOA (delivery vehicles and reentry vehicles) was interrelated with the scale and deployment of MD. Ilin said the U.S. unilateral development of MD undermines Russian strategic deterrence. He outlined a series of provisions Russia proposed to include in the SFO treaty. ¶9. (S) First and foremost, Ilin explained, Russia wanted to confirm in the treaty that there was a relationship between SOA and SDA. Second, Russia proposes an obligation not to convert MD interceptors or their silos into SOA or visa versa. Ilin said that the capability to convert such arms exists, and the United States had already done so. Therefore, in order to ensure that such measures were not taken, Russia proposed to include in the treaty methods to distinguish MD interceptors from ICBMs or SLBMs. Russia also proposed the right for the Russian Federation to unconditionally withdraw from the treaty if U.S. MD impacts Russian deterrence. Missile defense is a political concern in the Russian Federation, so absence of the stated interrelationship between SOA and SDA issues would impede ratification. Russian negotiators, Ilin said, were prepared to work with the United States to develop language acknowledging the relationship. ¶10. (S) Mullen stated that the United States had already taken steps to acknowledge the relationship between SOA and SDA in the treaty preamble. U.S. Senate ratification, Mullen said, was also an issue if the United States were to make the linkage between SOA and SDA too strong. The United States had taken significant steps when it published its MD plan. A big part of that plan was to acknowledge Russian concerns--the spirit and intent of that plan was focused on Russian issues and the broader extent of MD in relation to the SFO treaty. ¶11. (S) Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller said the United States and Russia had discussed this issue many times in both Geneva and Moscow. She emphasized the U.S. and Russian Presidents' guidance that SFO would be focused on SOA--underscoring the word "offensive." The United States had been open to a statement concerning the relationship between SOA and SDA in the preamble, Gottemoeller said, and reminded the Russian delegation that the United States was very keen on discussing MD in another venue. Gottemoeller stated that Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Tauscher would discuss cooperation in the area of MD on December 7, 2009, during meetings in Moscow. Gottemoeller expressed hope that cooperation in the area of MD would be underway by the time the SFO treaty entered into force. In preparing SFO, the sides discussed ways to reflect Russian concerns regarding the relationship between SOA and SDA outside of treaty documents. Those discussions, including legally-binding options, would occur in another setting. ¶12. (S) Ambassador Antonov attempted to clarify the logic behind the Russian position, explaining that the relationship between SOA and SDA was a key issue during the Bush Administration. Antonov said the so-called third MD site was, at the time, a source of decreased confidence and suspicion. Russia was not attempting to resolve all issues associated with MD in SFO. Antonov agreed with Gottemoeller's assessment that additional discussions should occur in a separate format. The Russian goal was to add language in SFO to reflect the influence of MD on SOA. Antonov said that President Medvedev took an important step in agreeing with the United States to reflect those concerns in treaty-associated documents which was a change to the Russian position. -------------- CONVERTING INTERCEPTORS INTO SOA -------------- ¶13. (S) According to Antonov, Russia was initially asking that points presented by Ilin be included in the treaty. President Medvedev made a decision to adopt the U.S. proposal to reflect those points in an associated document, but insisted that there be a ban on converting SOA into MD interceptors or launchers and vice versa. Antonov said U.S. military experts would agree that the conversion process was possible but not efficient. As such, Russia insisted that the point on conversion be included in the treaty, but the other points could be dealt with in associated documents. ¶14. (S) Mullen said that he understood the history with the previous U.S. Administration and the lingering suspicion, even given the change in Administrations. He acknowledged that, while not optimal, the potential existed for those weapons to be engineered for a different threat. Mullen reiterated the importance of our Presidents' agreement to focus SFO efforts on SOA. He expressed trust in Gottemoeller and Antonov to resolve the details. Mullen emphasized that there are very clear limits on what the United States considered acceptable on the MD issue for the United States to ratify the SFO treaty. Steps the United States had taken on the third site were very significant in recognizing Russian concerns. The United States, had "no plan--no plan" to convert interceptors into ICBMs. Makarov agreed that negotiators had hard work ahead, but there was a potential for resolution. -------------- NPR REVIEW -------------- ¶15. (S) Dr. Miller introduced himself and informed the Russian delegation that he was overseeing the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and reiterated that the United States had no plans to convert SOA into MD interceptors or vice versa. He said the United States had already addressed Russian concerns by reducing the number of interceptors from 44 to 30 and cancelled the multi-kill vehicle project. Miller also explained that the United States was committed to defense against the North Korean threat, as well as U.S.-Russian relations in the area of strategic stability. Makarov responded that if there were no plans for conversion, then it should be written into the treaty. Dr. McFaul responded that it would be noted, but not in the SFO treaty. -------------- TURNING TO VERIFICATION -------------- ¶16. (S) Mullen turned the table over to Dr. Warner who presented the U.S. position on mobile missiles. Due to the unique challenges in verifying mobile ICBMs and their launchers, the United States proposed a limited number of verification measures focused on mobiles. The United States sought to make verification measures applicable to all ICBMs and SLBMs wherever possible. He repeated the three measures delivered last week by the U.S. delegation and clarified by Mullen the previous evening. The United States withdrew its proposal on a limit of 80 non-deployed ICBM launchers under the condition that each side agreed on separate aggregate limits for all ICBM and SLBM launchers. The number of non-deployed launchers, Warner said, should be approximately 150, though the exact number was negotiable. He explained that the limit applied to non-deployed silo launchers, mobile launchers and SLBM launchers. Warner said the U.S.-proposed limit on non-deployed launchers was similar in nature to the Russian proposal made in the fall. He informed the Russian delegation that the United States was prepared to discuss this and other limits on mobile launchers. ¶17. (S) Makarov explained that Russia was looking for additional clarification on how the 800 SDV limit was connected to the proposal on non-deployed launchers. The previous day, he said, Russia needed clarification as to whether the 150 was in addition to the 800 limit, but now they understood. General Poznihir reiterated the Russian position that ICBMs for mobile launchers should be equivalent to all mobile systems--ICBM, SLBM and heavy bombers. There was no reason, Poznihir expounded, to speak of the special nature of mobile ICBMs as all mobile SOA had the ability to hide and survive. The new treaty would allow both sides to determine for itself the composition of its forces and would not place any limits on the number of mobile systems. Therefore, there should be no restriction on the number of mobile ICBM launchers. -------------- CAPABILITY OF ONE U.S. SUBMARINE EQUALS THE ENTIRE RUSSIAN MOBILE ICBM FRCE -------------- ¶18. (S) Poznhir underscored that Russia would not agree to ay limits on non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs. U.S. suspicion of a rapid breakout potential fo mobile systems, he continued, was unfounded. Rferring to Mullen's statement to move on from th Cold War mentality, he said, the new treaty shold not be based on hypothetical scenarios but on reality. It was important to take into account pratical isses such as economics production capabiity, military requirements and political will. oznihir stated that Russian mobile ICBMs require their own regime. The regime was unique and coud not be hidden, as it required its own infrastrcture, training, facilities and other aspects. He said the disagreement was based on the serious effect special provisionshad on combat readiness. Certain measures such as "cooperative measures" were burdensome and affeced combat readines, specifically under circumstnces of significant reductions in SDVs. He state that such provisions unilaterally limited Russin forces. Poznihir expressed Russia's concerns bout the U.S. SSBN force, stating that the Unite States had 14 SSBNs with 7 of them constantly on uty. Each of them was capable of carrying more Rs than all the Russian mobile ICBM force. He cocluded that at any given time the U.S. SSBN forc had more capability than the Russian mobile fore. As the total number of SLBMs increased, all Russian ICBM launchers would be needed. Poznihir argued that it was easier to track a mobile ICBM in the field than it was to find an SSBN on patrol. If the sides were to apply the same approach to all mobile systems, he opined, we should place limits on SSBNs and their patrol zones and have provisions to display them in the open. ¶19. (S) Poznihir then called the U.S. proposal for advance notification of missiles departing the Votkinsk production facility "senseless." He said notification would be provided upon arrival of a new missile at the operational base or storage facility. As such, the United States would have all the required information on total numbers and locations for all missiles. The amount of time for transportation is minimal, he said. Poznihir explained that unique identifiers (UID) for mobile ICBMs would only be acceptable if they were applied to all SOA, including U.S. SLBMs, and if such information would be included in the notification. ¶20. (S) Poznihir opined that elimination of mobile launchers using special procedures carried out under supervision of an inspection team would be redundant. When taking into account actual numbers of SOA to be eliminated, he said Russia would be undertaking enormous financial costs. He asserted that only Russian items would be subject to such constraints. Russia believed it was sufficient that all solid ICBMs could be eliminated by burning out the propellant and verified by national technical means (NTM). The United States would have a right within its inspection quota to confirm the results of elimination, repeating the word "results." He emphasized that unilateral provisions for Russian mobiles were unacceptable. He finished by stating that provisions must be equal across-the-board including U.S. SSBNs and SLBMs. ¶21. (S) Makarov claimed he did not understand the U.S. focus on Russian mobile systems, reiterating the concept that the nuclear potential of a mobile launcher was not comparable to that of an SSBN. Makarov said such an approach was logical when the United States was also looking to field a mobile system and the sides had mutual concerns. Now, however, it was not logical to focus on mobile systems unless U.S. systems were also captured. If all mobile systems fell under the same verification regime it would be fair. However, it was not fair to focus on one component of the force. "This approach seems like nostalgia carried over from START," he said. ¶22. (S) Warner reiterated that the U.S. proposal to withdraw separate limits on mobile ICBM launchers and the new proposal, much like the Russian proposal, covered all systems. The 150-proposed limit included silo launchers, SLBM launchers and mobile launchers. This approach was more consistent with the Russian proposal. In response to Poznihir's statement about a systems ability to avoid detection, Warner stated that a road-mobile launcher was much smaller than an SSBN or heavy bomber. Although, when SSBNs are on patrol, the goal was for them not to be found, there was not any doubt regarding the total number of SSBNs. The sides easily confirmed the total number of SSBNs using NTM and over the course of one to two years; inspectors would have the ability to verify the numbers during inspection. It was also easy to track the number of heavy bombers, Warner explained. Finally, he said, mobile ICBMs are designed to be hidden, and were successfully hidden when deployed to the field, which was a key aspect to their survivability and stability for both sides. Warner explained that the ability to obtain an accurate count in the absence of Votkinsk was why the United States needed limited verification for the total size of the Russian mobile force. ¶23. (S) At our level, Mullen said to Makarov, trust and transparency are fundamentally resident in the issue of verification. He said that Warner addressed the details which are important to achieving an accurate count. The other piece, as he understood, was based on a previous conversation which identified new opportunities for verification. While the Russian side offered additional points to study, he understood that the issues raised were consistent with historical points and views. Speaking directly to Makarov, Mullen explained that he understood his point of view from a military perspective and offered his own military perspective, in the importance of maintaining an accurate count. Mullen recognized that although each system was different, effective verification of each system should be fundamentally the same. Mullen said he was hopeful that the sides could move forward on the mobile verification issue. ¶24. (S) Makarov responded that Russia looked to create a verification regime equal for all systems. When we talk about trust, he said, "the more we verify the more we trust." Makarov said it would be logical if this adage was applied to all systems that were mobile. Information on the number and location of SOA was provided for within the verification regime, he said, so to claim it was easier to hide a ground-based mobile launcher as opposed to an SSBN, did not make sense. Makarov asked again why the United States was concentrating on Russian mobile systems. ¶25. (S) Makarov suggested applying a verification regime to all types of mobile systems or to none at all. He said it was time to depart from the old stereotypes surrounding the mobile ICBM system. Referring to U.S. comments that verification was important to treaty ratification, he explained the difficulty in explaining to the Duma why Russia had accepted unfair verification measures focused solely on Russian mobile ICBM launchers. Makarov emphasized that Russia was not attempting to depart from a verification regime, but wanted to ensure the regime was fair and equal. In regard to the U.S.-proposed limit of 150 non-deployed launchers, Makarov said it was a serious issue that required discussion within the context of limits on SDVs. ¶26. (S) Russia has no intention to cheat, Makarov continued. If the President of Russia says that there will be no cheating, then he will stick to his word. If a military man were to take it upon himself to cheat, then that person would be fired. The President's team, Makarov said, sticks to its word and there would be no reason to cheat. Mullen acknowledged Makarov's remarks and said the issue of verification was concerned more with counting than how a system was deployed. The United States was also looking to apply limitation that would be fair for all systems, and the reason for exploring a limit on non-deployed launchers was because Russia had initially proposed such a limit. Mullen clarified that the U.S. proposal applied to all systems and returning to a proposed SDV limit of 500 would be a step in the wrong direction. Mullen explained to Makarov that his guidance came from the U.S. President, and suggested continuing the discussion in a small group. He offered to provide a paper on the U.S. position to facilitate dialogue. ¶27. (S) Gottemoeller said she had provided a main portion of the U.S. minimized package on mobile missioes (REF B) presented by Mullen to Antonov, and a copy translated into Russian would be handed over to them at this meeting (Begin comment: Gottemoeller handed the points to Antonov at the end of her remarks. End comment.) Mullen, she continued, had added a new proposal regarding a limit on non-deployed launchers. She agreed that a small working group could be held to discuss the issue in more detail. McFaul sought clarification as to why Russia was against providing advanced notification for newly-produced missiles departing Votkinsk. He said the United States had agreed to provide the same notification for U.S. missiles departing U.S. production facilities. Presenting a scenario, McFaul speculated that, if relations were to sour within the next ten years, concerns could increase if the sides did not know how many missiles exited or where they were headed. ¶28. (S) Poznihir responded by saying the sides were not playing a card game looking for ways to deceive one another. He said the sides were negotiating a treaty which would provide effective verification measures and exchanges of data and information. Poznihir claimed he did not understand the problem because when a missile departs the production facility it heads to an operational base or storage facility. The United States would receive notification of this fact and changes would be reflected in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The MOU would reflect locations and numbers on all deployed and non-deployed systems which would be verified during inspections. McFaul responded that it was one thing to verify when a missile arrives but another when it does not. "Why should we just rely on trust?" he asked. Poznihir said the sides were supposed to be developing a more streamlined approach and additional notification would be burdensome to Russia. ¶29. (S) Antonov said he was confused by the conversation. The United States had stated that relations between the countries, especially between the Presidents, were improving, yet the feeling in the room was reminiscent of the Cold War. If the relations were truly improving, he said, there should be more trust. Russia could not produce missiles as easily as pencils. Judging from the conversation between our Presidents, we should be searching for a more logical approach. Antonov said there was no reason for the U.S. President not to trust the Russian President. Russia would not ask to receive special provisions that Russia was not willing to agree to itself. He finished by saying the Russian President was only looking for a treaty that would be fair. ¶30. (S) Mullen, bringing the conversation back to specifics, explained that discussions of hypothetical situations could sometimes be helpful in achieving a better understanding of each side's position. He agreed that it was important to find parity, but the U.S. and Russian systems were different, making it difficult to compare them side-by-side. "Verification reinforces trust," he said. Mullen explained that the verification regime for mobile ICBMs was important for both internal and external consumption, underscoring the bilateral relationship in connection with how it is viewed on the world stage. If we assume these positions are taken because of lack of trust, Mullen asserted, it would not be in the spirit of our negotiations to this point and we would not be able to move forward. He said the sides were dealing with a broad audience which consisted of military personnel, politicians and diplomats, and it was essential to take all views into consideration. As U.S.-Russian relations evolve, Mullen continued, there could be a time when a verification regime is no longer necessary. However, we have not reached that point. He affirmed that the verification regime had been successful in the past and it was up to the negotiators to determine the best verification regime for the future. We have spoken of trust, transparency and engagement, Mullen said, and we need to build on those concepts. ¶31. (S) Makarov agreed with Mullen and stated that the details could be worked out in smaller groups. He understood all concerns and agreed that verification should continue as long as it is clear and equal. He then turned the floor to General Orlov to discuss the Russian position on counting rules. ¶32. (S) Orlov, taking into account the high level of the military experts present, emphasized Makarov's comments that counting rules were extremely important. He referred to the Joint Statement signed in Moscow by the Presidents emphasizing that the new treaty should serve the mutual interest of both sides and provide stability and predictability with respect to SOA. He reiterated a statement made by President Medvedev that, in order to accomplish this task, both sides must reduce their SOA by several times. Such an approach would allow the sides to carry out real reductions, resolve issues surrounding upload potential, eventually leading to stability and peace. As such, the Russian position on SDVs was 500 but, after receiving the package proposal from Gen Jones, we agreed to raise the limit to 550. He noted that President Medvedev had offered to raise the limit to 600-700 during the Presidents' meeting in Singapore. At the same time, President Medvedev decided to reduce the warhead limit to 1600. He said these were very complex decisions that required a review of Russia's future force structure and objectives. He made these decisions regardless of the military's opinions and in an attempt to come to agreement with the United States. The Russian President did not mention how difficult it would be to ratify the new treaty because that is an internal problem. Orlov stated that discussions about ratification during plenary sessions, in his opinion, were not connected to the delegations' task. Russia understood the U.S. proposal of 150 non-deployed launchers. However, Russia was concerned how it would fit into the aggregate limits. He said non-deployed launchers plus delivery vehicles and the number of warheads available in reserve equated to an upload potential. He asserted that 800 U.S. SDVs could potentially be uploaded with 4500 warheads, which was more than 3.2 times the agreed warhead limit. ¶33. (S) According to Orlov, the Russian approach did not necessarily resolve Russian concerns with upload potential, but attempted to reduce them. As such, the sides needed to focus on counting rules and central limits before SDVs or SOA. Russia accepted the U.S. proposal to count as deployed only those SDVs with warheads loaded on them. This reflects the real situation of forces--if there is a missile in the launcher it would be counted. However, the U.S. side changed its position. -------------- HEAVY BOMBER COUNTING RULES -------------- ¶34. (S) Orlov shifted the discussion to heavy bomber counting rules and concluded that, according to the U.S.-proposed counting rules, heavy bombers should count for zero warheads. This was the initial Russian position but it was received negatively. Therefore, Orlov said, our President proposed to count heavy bombers as one SDV, which was a change to the Russian position. The Russian position did not propose to inspect weapon storage areas (WSAs) associated with heavy bomber bases. The U.S. proposal to remove cruise missiles from operating bases to some other area, 1000 KM away, was not a solution. Simply moving weapons to another location would not remove the capability, Orlov asserted, because weapons could be returned to the base or the bomber could be flown to them. The U.S. proposal would require significant financial expenditures by Russia. This was due to different operating procedures and the need to create separate support units for such an endeavor. Orlov concluded that this would not add to the implementation or purpose of the SFO treaty. He closed by stating that Russia was prepared to discuss a limit of 650 SDVs. ¶35. (S) Makarov said that the United States understood Russia's force structure. It consisted of fewer SDVs and warheads and, as such, posed less of a threat. When the Russian President informed the military that we needed to find a number between 600-700 SDVs, it was unacceptable from a military standpoint. Such numbers would force Russia to reconsider Russian nuclear force structure--a very expensive undertaking. Makarov said it might be more logical to ask the United States to make changes to its force structure. If we adopt the U.S. position, he said, we do not disarm but rather build up, returning to the arms race. The U.S.-proposed limit of 800 SDVs is too high and hard to reach. Even with limits between 600-700 the United States would have flexibility in its nuclear and conventional SOA force structure. Makarov cited the U.S. President's statement on the necessity to deter other states from developing nuclear arms, but was confused by the U.S. SDV numbers. He implied that proposing such a high limit on SDVs encouraged Russia to build up its nuclear forces. We are entering bilateral negotiations, he said, and need to think about decreasing our nuclear potential in order to deter others from creating nuclear arms. ¶36. (S) Mullen reiterated that the United States would not be able to reconfigure its nuclear forces under the treaty for reasons unconnected with the military, and similar to those mentioned by Makarov, such as economics and politics. Mullen added that the United States recognized the fact that both sides had made changes to their initial proposals on SDV limits and reminded Makarov that the U.S. President had made the decision to decrease U.S. SDV limits from 1100 to 800. Mullen then turned the floor to Miller to explain the U.S. approach. ¶37. (S) Miller followed up on Orlov's statements, referring to the Moscow Joint Statement, and offered to share current results of the U.S. NPR. As long as we are stuck in a situation of mutual vulnerability, he said, stability is critical. Miller said the United States had reached two conclusions regarding SDVs and force structure. The first conclusion regarding stability was that the United States required a balance between all three legs of the triad. In an effort to remove first-strike incentives, the United States planned to de-MIRV the MMIII. Miller said the United States currently possesses 450 MMIII which would be de-MIRVed to carry a single warhead. In order to do so, the platforms would be changed to accommodate the de-MIRVing such that only one warhead could be loaded. ¶38. (S) Makarov responded that a level of 650 SDVs would not need to be accomplished in one year. The treaty obligations are to be accomplished over ten years. The Russian proposal was based on a realistic Russian force structure that could not be achieved in a short period of time. Makarov then asked whether the treaty would be based on a reduction or build-up of SOA. Makarov said he agreed in principle with Miller's point that confidence was especially important. If you remember in the 1990s, Makarov said, Russia had a large number of SOA. However, Russia eliminated its rail-mobile force, which was much more dangerous than the road-mobile force, and had eliminated 40 submarines. Russia, along with the United States, eliminated its intermediate-range nuclear missiles, which were critical to Russian security, considering its geographic location, noting that no state around the United States was developing a nuclear potential. In summary, he said, this is a difficult situation from a military prospective. ¶39. (S) In response to Makarov's statement on how to characterize the SFO treaty, Mullen said he would characterize the treaty as a commitment to reductions. Miller referred to the President's emphasis on the importance of reducing nuclear weapons with the long-term goal of complete elimination. Miller stated that U.S. analysis shows a limit of 1600 warheads and 450 single warhead MMIII ICBMs would lead to a balanced triad for the United States. ¶40. (S) Warner remarked that the Russian ICBM force, both present and future, consisted of silo and mobile systems capable of being MIRVed. The sides agreed that they should have the right to determine the composition of their own forces. Warner calculated that, if Russia deployed 100 RS-24 ICBMs with 4 warheads each ICBM, Russia would have 400 warheads on launchers. Conversely, the United States would have 400 warheads on 400 launchers. Therefore, Russia would have the same nuclear potential with 100 ICBMs as the United States had with 400 MMIII launchers. Miller also added that, from a stability perspective, Russian mobiles were survivable. ¶41. (S) Makarov agreed in principle with Miller's statement of stability, but said the technological potential of the United States was greater than that of Russia, both now and in the future. This was particularly true when taking into account precision-guided weapons and advanced command and control. Therefore, Makarov concluded that for both sides, the numbers of SDVs and warheads should be lower than what we are discussing. Makarov said nuclear weapons were its only guarantor of security and the United States needed to understand that. ¶42. (S) Mullen said he understood and turned the floor to Mr. Elliott to explain the U.S. position on heavy bomber counting rules. Begin points: - Under START, all warheads were attributed to their respective strategic delivery systems. - Today we have agreed to count ICBM and SLBM warheads, and to confirm our declarations in the memorandum of understanding, which provides a sound verification mechanism for both sides. - In a similar fashion, we have proposed counting nuclear armaments on or associated with deployed heavy bombers. - We fully understand that neither side loads warheads on their heavy bombers today--this is a good thing. But we also understand that both sides have substantial numbers of long-range nuclear air-launched cruise missiles and nuclear gravity bombs stored near their heavy bombers. - We draw several conclusions from this reality: -- It is unrealistic for the sides to report they have no nuclear armaments under this treaty. -- Use of an attribution rule, as proposed by the Russian Federation, would provide no verification mechanism at all. - The U.S. side believes firmly that counting warheads associated with deployed heavy bombers is the most transparent approach for both sides. End points. ¶43. (S) Orlov responded that he and Elliott had discussed the issue many times already. The Russian proposal for verification allowed inspectors to look in the weapons bay to verify there were no weapons loaded on the heavy bomber. We know you can upload and download a bomber very quickly, Orlov asserted, therefore, inspectors would not see weapons. Makarov stated that he did not understand the U.S. logic. According to U.S. logic, he asked, would all heavy bombers on duty be loaded with weapons? If they are loaded with zero, he said, they should count as zero. The heavy bomber would count as the SDV, but there would be zero nuclear weapons. ¶44. (S) Elliott responded that the U.S. approach was based on the normal mode of operation for heavy bombers on both sides. For this treaty, the United States did not believe loading warheads on heavy bombers or returning to alert from the Cold War years was an acceptable approach. Heavy bomber crews required flight training to maintain their skills. The United States keeps weapons near the bombers, but not loaded on the bombers. Noting that both he and Orlov were former planners and understood that, if weapons are available, commanders will make contingency plans for their use. Therefore, the U.S. proposal begins with the reduction of such weapons. Makarov said Russia is not against verification measures for heavy bomber, but re-emphasized President Medvedev's proposal that they count as either one or zero. ¶45. (S) Mullen moved on to a presentation on telemetry. Referring to a conversation he had with Makarov the previous day, Mullen acknowledged that there were issues associated with telemetry and he hoped the discussion would lead to a better understanding of the Russian position. Mullen said he believed there is a possibility for compromise and would like Makarov to keep that in mind while discussing the issue. He turned the floor over to Mr. Siemon, who presented the U.S. points on telemetry. Begin points: - The START and U.S.-proposed START Follow-on telemetry provisions have six basic elements: 1) Provisions on the non-interference with National Technical Means of Verification - largely agreed in current treaty text and based on similar language in previously-signed arms control treaties, 2) A basic ban on the encryption of telemetric data - a concept that was first agreed in the SALT II Treaty, 3) The notification of flight tests under the 1988 Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement - largely agreed in current treaty text except for additional telemetry broadcast information, 4) The exchange of recorded media and associated playback equipment, 5) The exchange of Interpretative data for the missile stages and the post-boost vehicle, and 6) A provision for a limited number of encrypted flight tests each year. - The U.S. Delegation seeks to understand Russia's position on each of these elements to consider developing a potential compromise solution as mentioned by Admiral Mullen. End points. -------------- TELEMETRY REVISITED -------------- ¶46. (S) Colonel Ryzhkov responded that the telemetry issue was complex and he did not see a possibility for resolution. In the Russian view, he said, the U.S. position to include telemetry in the SFO treaty was excessive because it was not connected to the SFO verification regime. The Russian position was based on three fundamental principles. Under START, the exchange of telemetry was part of the verification regime necessary in calculating throw-weight and verifying the total number of warheads attributed to each ICBM and SLBM. Telemetry was necessary, he explained, because NTM was not capable of verifying the number of re-entry vehicles (RVs) a system could carry. ¶47. (S) Ryzhkov stated that there were no provisions in the SFO treaty requiring telemetry. Russia also believed that the criteria to determine a new type, which includes throw-weight, should be excluded from the treaty. If the goal was to count the actual number of warheads deployed on ICBMs and SLBMs then there would be no sense in having a "new type." That term would only be applicable in verifying the type of missile, not the number of RVs. Any ballistic missile of an existing type under the SFO treaty could be tested with any number of warheads and any throw-weight, Ryzhkov asserted. The actual number of RVs could be confirmed during inspection. Therefore, Ryzhkov continued, the exchange of telemetry under the SFO treaty is unrelated to provisions of the treaty. ¶48. (S) Ryzhkov explained that the second component of the Russian position dealt with the United States testing Trident II SLBMs from United Kingdom SSBNs. The United States had modernized many components of its nuclear systems over many years, he said, updating systems including the Trident II in cooperation with the United Kingdom. He said the United States had tested Trident II SLBMs from United Kingdom SSBNs, but did not provide telemetry information from those tests. This, Ryzhkov stated, created the opportunity to avoid contractual provisions concerning telemetry. ¶49. (S) The third and most important point from the Russian perspective was the relationship between MD and telemetry. Ryzhkov said that telemetry information received from Russia on ICBM and SLBM launchers could be used to support the development of U.S. MD. In this case, he said, telemetry becomes less an issue of verification and more an issue of Russian national security. ¶50. (S) In response to Siemon's reference to the relationship between SALT II and telemetry, Ryzhkov said the ban on encryption was raised under SALT II to avoid deliberate interference of information related to treaty verification. Russia is prepared to discuss this issue in a small group. ¶51. (U) Documents exchanged. - U.S.: -- U.S. Paper containing points used by Adm Mullen at the first meeting on November 22, 2009. ¶52. (U) Participants: U.S. ADM Mullen A/S Gottemoeller Amb Ries Mr. Brown Dr. Miller Dr. Warner Dr. Kass Dr. McFaul Mr. Siemon Mr. Elliott Mr. Trout Dr. Look Mr. DeNinno Lt Col Goodman VAdm Winnefeld Dr. Hopkins (Int) RUSSIA Gen Makarov Amb Antonov Gen Orlov Gen Poznihir Col Ilin Col Ryzhkov Col Knyazeva Gen Kublo Adm Kuznetsov Mr. Leontiev Mr. Koshelev Mr. Trifonov Col Zaytsev Col Zudin Ms. Evarovskaya (Int) ¶53. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS