START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001063 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VII): (U) AD HOC GROUP MEETING, NOVEMBER 12, 2009 Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-016. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: November 12, 2009 Time: 10:00 A.M. - 12:20 P.M. Place: Russian Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) At the Ad Hoc Group meeting chaired by Secretary of Defense Representative Dr. Warner and Russian Ministry of Defense Representative General Orlov, the entire meeting, at Russian request, was dedicated to heavy bomber (HB) nuclear armaments counting rules. The U.S. side described its proposed concept for counting nuclear armaments for HBs. It explained that the concept included declaring and recording deployed and non-deployed HB nuclear armaments in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU),locating non-deployed long-range nuclear-armed ALCM (LRNA) bodies at a declared central storage facility that could be subject to inspection, and inspecting nuclear armaments stored in weapons storage areas (WSA) associated with HB bases for HBs equipped for nuclear armaments. The U.S. side also discussed the unrealistic Russian 550 strategic delivery vehicle (SDV) limit. ¶4. (S) The Russian side commented on Russia's inability to implement the concept discussed by the U.S. side based on the cost to Russia for an additional storage facility, and their inability to create the separate infrastructure needed to support the additional storage facility for non-deployed LRNA bodies. ¶5. (U) Subject Summary: Counting Rules for HB Nuclear Armaments; Deployed and Non-Deployed Nuclear Armaments; Concept of Inspection; Clarifying the Concept; The Concept is Practical; Practical Does Not Involve Spending Money; Double Jeopardy; Let Me Set You Straight; and, Re-Direct to Realistic SDV Limit. -------------- COUNTING RULES FOR HB NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS -------------- ¶6. (S) Orlov began the meeting with the assertion that the warhead counting rules for deployed ICBMS and SLBMs were clear. However, further discussion was needed on the counting rules for HB nuclear armaments. Warner stated the U.S. side would discuss the potential inspection activity and the concept of non-deployed LRNA as related to its concept for counting HB nuclear armaments. ¶7. (S) Warner noted both the U.S. and Russian counting concepts recognized the fact that nuclear armaments on or associated with deployed HBs should be counted. However, discussion in the Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG) revealed there were differences in how the inspection activity to verify these armaments would be conducted. The Russian side said it would allow the inspection of only one HB uploaded with nuclear armaments to verify the HB nuclear armaments declared for an air base. This was irrespective of the number of HBs uploaded with nuclear armaments. Since this concept did not reflect the reality that both sides did not load nuclear armaments on its HBs on a day-to-day basis, the U.S. side proposed a different concept for counting HB nuclear armaments. To reflect the reality of both sides, the U.S. concept included inspection of not only the nuclear armaments loaded on the HBs, but also inspection of nuclear armaments stored in the WSA associated with the air base. -------------- DEPLOYED AND NON-DEPLOYED NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS -------------- ¶8. (S) Warner explained that the U.S. concept included both deployed and non-deployed nuclear armaments. Nuclear armaments located on an air base would be considered to be deployed. Under the U.S. concept, deployed nuclear armaments would include LRNA and nuclear gravity bombs, both those loaded on the HBs and those stored within the WSA associated with the bomber base. Excess LRNA would have the warheads de-mated and would be removed from the air base to be stored at a declared central storage facility, located hundreds of miles from the HB base. These LRNA bodies would be considered to be non-deployed armaments. Warner noted that the U.S. concept recognized the Russian concept for counting nuclear armaments loaded on a deployed HB and also the Russian practice of storing its LRNA with the nuclear warhead de-mated from the LRNA and stored at a separate nuclear weapons storage area located off the air base. Warner made clear this non-deployed concept focused on the ALCM body that is stored in a separate storage area located on the air base without its nuclear warhead, since this was the crucial component in delivering the warhead to a target. The focus was placed on the cruise missile body for both the purpose of accountability and counting. -------------- CONCEPT OF INSPECTION -------------- ¶9. (S) Warner described potential inspection procedures under the U.S. concept. He noted the U.S. practice of storing its LRNA on pylons and rotary launchers. These pylons and rotary launchers were stored in bunkers within the base WSA. Proposed inspection procedures could include the principle of sampling, under which inspectors could view the armaments within a specified number of designated bunkers in addition to those that were loaded on HBs. Warner noted that the procedures for these inspections could be discussed in the IPWG. He envisioned the sides would declare the number of deployed HB nuclear armaments located at each base for HBs equipped for nuclear armaments within the MOU. During an inspection of a U.S. HB base for example, the base would identify the bunkers which contained nuclear armaments and the number of such armaments contained in each bunker. Russian inspectors would then be permitted to verify the number declared for a specified number of designated bunkers. He noted that these procedures were similar to what was currently used to inspect non-deployed SLBMs during data update inspections for submarine bases under START. He added that these were just his thoughts which still required approval. -------------- CLARIFYING THE CONCEPT -------------- ¶10. (S) Orlov was concerned with a potential requirement to relocate all the non-deployed cruise missile bodies to a separate storage facility. He stated that Russia could not accomplish this type of movement in the short term. Warner acknowledged the number of non-deployed LRNA would initially be quite large. However, movement of non-deployed LRNA to the central storage facility could be made over the first seven years of the treaty as the sides reduced to the agreed limit for deployed nuclear warheads. ¶11. (S) Warner described how the inspections might be conducted at U.S. bases for HBs equipped for nuclear armaments. Since B-2s only employ nuclear gravity bombs, at Whiteman AFB only nuclear gravity bombs would be inspected in the WSA. Although the B-52H was once capable of employing nuclear gravity bombs, the only nuclear armament employed from the aircraft currently was the LRNA and, therefore, only LRNA would be inspected within the WSA at the B-52H bases in a manner which he had previously described. -------------- THE CONCEPT IS PRACTICAL -------------- ¶12. (S) Mr. Elliott noted that, in considering this concept, two options had arisen. The first was to remove the nuclear warheads from the LRNA and then move the warheads to a separate storage facility. This option complicated verification of the declared numbers at the facility, since the warhead was small and would be difficult to prove their absence in a WSA. The second option would be to separate the warhead from the ALCM body and move the excess cruise missile bodies to a separate central storage facility hundreds of miles from the air base. The missiles at the central storage facility would be considered to be non-deployed and not count toward the central nuclear warhead limit. Each side's declared non-deployed and deployed LRNA could then be verified. This option presented a realistic option for counting HB nuclear armaments and acknowledged the Russian concern over upload capability. ¶13. (S) Elliott noted the proposed U.S. concept for counting HB nuclear armaments was similar to the current practice used in counting deployed and non-deployed strategic ballistic missiles under START. Parties declared the number and location of deployed and non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs in the MOU. The number of non-deployed missiles are verified when a Party conducted a data update inspection and ballistic missile movement was monitored via notifications. Warner noted under START Follow-on this would be a Type 2 inspection of non-deployed items. An important feature of the potential U.S. concept was that LRNA movement was easily observable by national technical means since the security required to move a nuclear-armed LRNA was different than that required to move cruise missile bodies. Warner added that the storage concept for storing non-deployed LRNA bodies and their extracted nuclear warheads in separate central storage facilities, which was being proposed in the U.S. concept, was actually the current Russian storage practice for LRNA and their warheads at HB bases. ¶14. (S) In responding to a question by Orlov, Elliott stated that the U.S. concept might require a distinguishability exhibition of the nuclear and non-nuclear ALCMs. Warner added another way to discriminate between nuclear and non-nuclear ALCMs could be through the use of radiation detection equipment. -------------- PRACTICAL DOES NOT INVOLVE SPENDING MONEY -------------- ¶15. (S) Orlov stated the Russian concept for attributing each HB with one nuclear warhead came directly from Presidential instructions. The Russian side admitted it had more cruise missile bodies than warheads. It was not possible to move excess/non-deployed cruise missile bodies to a separate central storage facility because of the great financial burden involved. The U.S. concept would require Russia to construct both additional storage facilities and generate the manpower infrastructure to support the new storage facilities. In addition, he believed the appropriate distance the storage facility was to be from the air base would be difficult to negotiate. Orlov also questioned the idea of a mandated inspection of the LRNA central storage facility and whether the warheads would also be susceptible to inspection. Elliott noted the inspection would be a Type 2 inspection of a storage facility for non-deployed items. The inspection would be a right of the sides but would not be mandatory. Warner stated that in no case would the warheads be susceptible to inspection. If verification could be accomplished without an inspection, that would be acceptable to the United States. The United States was not committed to the idea of an inspection of the central storage facility containing non-deployed LRNA. ¶16. (S) Warner addressed Orlov's comments on the potential difficulties in implementing the storage of non-deployed cruise missiles in the near future by reminding Orlov that the concept could be implemented anytime during the first seven years of the new treaty, that is, during the period of reductions. A side may choose to move the excess cruise missile bodies toward the beginning of the seven-year period or may decide to delay the movement to the end of the seven-year reduction period. Elliott reminded Orlov that the concept of storing non-deployed HB armaments referred only to LRNA. The U.S. concept would also consider deployed nuclear gravity bombs inspectable at an HB base, if such weapons were declared for the HBs based there. -------------- DOUBLE JEOPARDY -------------- ¶17. (S) Colonel Zaytsev questioned the need for Russia to move toward a U.S. concept that would require Russia to spend additional money when the United States could move toward the Russian concept of simply counting one nuclear weapon for each deployed HB that was essentially free. The Russian delegation would not only be moving away from its instructions, but also committing itself to spend more money. He believed the U.S. side had ulterior motives for proposing its counting concept for HB nuclear armaments. Elliott stated that Zaytsev was correct, the United States did have an ulterior motive for proposing its concept for counting heavy bomber nuclear armaments and that was that the United States was attempting to explore ways to further reduce strategic offensive arms as was the core purpose of the new treaty. ¶18. (S) Zaytsev stated that technical data for LRNA and nuclear gravity bombs, among other things, would be required to implement the U.S. concept and did the United States propose to provide this technical data. Photos would also be required. Warner agreed that the sides would need to record the number of deployed and non-deployed items and may also be required to conduct exhibitions of items not previously exhibited under START. Mr. Trout reminded Zaytsev that the proposed MOU provided this data, as well as the requirement to provide photos necessary for the implementation of the treaty. ¶19. (S) Colonel Ryzhkov stated that the Russian side did not oppose the U.S. concept because it did not hear and understand the U.S. explanation. It opposed the U.S. concept because it did not reflect reality. The Russian concept to declare zero HB nuclear armaments reflected reality. This was the same situation that existed under START for SLBMs. When the SLBM was stored without the warhead, it did not count toward the aggregate limit on warheads. The Russian side knew the U.S. practice of storing its LRNA. It suggested that the United States accept the Russian compromise to attribute each heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments with one warhead in order to move the issue forward. The U.S. concept did not reflect the new relationship between the two nations and countermanded the agreed objective of making the new treaty less complicated to implement. The U.S. concept was in effect double jeopardy for Russia; the concept not only required new procedures, but also new procedures that would cost Russia more money to implement. Russia would not allow U.S. inspectors in its WSA and it could not move its "excess" cruise missiles to central storage facilities. -------------- LET ME SET YOU STRAIGHT -------------- ¶20. (S) Warner acknowledged that the U.S. concept would involve additional expenditures and also involve the effects resulting from the requirement to maintain an additional storage facility. He had trouble believing that even the Russian LRNA stored in a separated condition could not be brought to an operational state and loaded aboard Russian HBs in a matter of a few days. The potential of the HB was still significant, even though it was not considered a first-strike system. The idea of zero-declared HB nuclear armaments just did not appear sensible. Warner reminded the Russian side that Senate ratification of the treaty in the United States was a political process. Senate ratification required a two-thirds vote to pass. This was 67 votes and when one considered that 6 of these votes came from three states with missile bases, the concept of realistic counting rules was important for ratification. -------------- RE-DIRECT TO REALISTIC SDV LIMIT -------------- ¶21. (S) Warner re-directed the discussion on counting ules for HB nuclear armaments based on reality t SDV limits that similarly need to be based on rality. He reminded the Russian side that both Paties based their negotiating positions on their plans for future strategi force structure. The U.S. side had stated that it planned to go to an ICBM force of 450 silos al equipped with a single warhead, 12 Trident II SBNs and approximately 100 heavy bombers equippedfor nuclear armaments. So, reality was the Russan-proposed SDV of 550 was impossible for the U.S. to attain. Bottom line was that Russian proposal had to be realistic or there would be no U.S. Snate ratification. Orlov responded by asking theU.S. side to consider how the sides could implement a one warhead attribution for HB for nuclear armaments. ¶22. (U) Documents exchanged, - U.S.: -- U.S.-proposed JDT Conversion or Elimination Section, Sections II, V and VI, dated November 11, 2009. ¶23. (U) Participants: U.S. Dr. Warner Mr. Elliott Mr. Hanchett Amb Ries Mr. Siemon Mr. Trout Dr. Hopkins (Int) RUSSIA Gen Orlov Mr. Koshelev Col Pischulov Gen Poznihir Col Ryzhkov Col Zaytsev Ms. Komshilova (Int) ¶24. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS