START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001062 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VII): (U) MOU WORKING GROUP MEETING, NOVEMBER 10, 2009 REF: GENEVA 0976 (SFO-GVA-VI-037) Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-010. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: November 10, 2009 Time: 3:30 - 6:10 P.M. Place: Russian Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) This was the first meeting of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Working Group (WG) for this session and the eighth meeting of the MOU WG overall. The WG conducted a review of the MOU Joint Draft Text (JDT) and its Annexes to update and confirm the current positions of both Parties. There were no substantial changes to the number of brackets that exists in the documents, but both sides came away with a better understanding of the other's current position. ¶4. (S) The Russian side agreed to move three items (two of them related to the Russian third counting rule of deployed and non-deployed launchers) currently in the "Aggregate Numbers" section to the "Additional Aggregate Numbers" section of the document. They also agreed to provide coordinates for a mobile launcher "base," and stated that a base is roughly equivalent to a deployment area under START, although they left open the relationship between what the United States had understood as a re stricted area and what they are now calling a basing area, saying they would clarify the relationship later. ¶5. (S) The Russian side still considers B-52G's, and by example the Peacekeeper, as existing types, declarable in the MOU, notwithstanding the package deal and counter offer provided to the U.S. ¶6. (U) Subject Summary: MOU Review, Discrimination, Not Transparency--and Tail Numbers, Back to the MOU Review, Heavy Bombers and Existing Types; Bases, Deployment Areas, Basing Areas, Re stricted Areas, And Fixed Structures; and, Closing. -------------- MOU REVIEW -------------- ¶7. (S) General Orlov opened the meeting, saying the Ad Hoc Group meeting earlier in the day was a good one and he agreed with Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller that we are in the final stages. He mentioned that any agreements on MOU matters that could not be reached here in Geneva would have to be taken to higher levels to resolve and implied it would be much more desirable to be able to work things out here. He stated that Ambassador Antonov agreed with Gottemoeller on the new treaty structure and Orlov demonstrated to Mr. Trout that he was familiar with that structure. ¶8. (S) Orlov began the review of the MOU, starting with the chapeau, noting the bracketed text in the first sentence. The focus of discussion was the use of the text, "items subject to the limitations provided in this Treaty," by the United States to characterize the contents of the MOU, vice the Russian term "strategic offensive arms" (SOA). Orlov inquired what was meant by the term "items," and Trout explained that not everything addressed in the MOU was an SOA (for example, certain facilities, fixed structures, etc.) and that is why the United States was using the more general term "items." Although Orlov said he did not agree with the U.S. brackets, he also said he was not going to be stubborn about it. However, Orlov did not remove the brackets at the table. Colonel Pischulov mentioned that, in the Conversion or Elimination (CorE) WG, the United States initially used the term "items and facilities," but has since agreed to use the term SOA instead. (Begin comment: This statement by Pischulov was not entirely correct. The CorE WG still maintains their verbiage and has bracketed the Russian text referring to SOA. End comment.) Trout agreed that we should be consistent across the treaty, and said that he would consider how this was being addressed in other places in START Follow-on text. ¶9. (S) Orlov moved to Section I (Aggregate Numbers) of the MOU, and questioned the U.S. words that link "associated launchers" with ICBMs and SLBMs. Trout mentioned that we had to retain that linkage in the text, as we have received nothing that has changed our current position and guidance. Orlov accepted this, noting that the differences would not be resolved at this meeting and moved to the next U.S. bracket, which was the word "nuclear" in front of "warheads." Orlov said that Russia had accepted the U.S. proposal to count and verify conventional SOAs and, therefore, the United States should agree to drop the word "nuclear" prior to warheads in this SOA limit. Trout responded that there was no agreement on the package solution; therefore, there was no agreement on any individual element of the package. Also, the United States had agreed to count non-nuclear warheads as nuclear warheads. So the word "nuclear" would have to remain bracketed. ¶10. (S) Orlov moved down the text to the last three items in paragraph 1 of Section I (Aggregate Limits),which were Russian-proposed items, namely: "Deployed Launchers of ICBMS and SLBMS", "Non-Deployed ICBMS, Non-Deployed SLBMS and Non-Deployed Heavy Bombers", and "Non-deployed Launchers of ICBM's and SLBM's." He stated that they were moving those three items to paragraph 2 of Section I (Additional Aggregate Numbers),because paragraph 1 was meant to reflect the aggregate limits called for in Article II and those three items did not relate to Article II limits. Continuing, Orlov noted that remaining in paragraph 2 of Section I were six bracketed U.S. items. He asked whether there was any change in the U.S. position, and Trout stated there was not. -------------- DISCRIMINATION, NOT TRANSPARENCY--AND TAIL NUMBERS -------------- ¶11. (S) Orlov asked Trout whether agreement would be reached on mobile launcher issues, to which Trout responded that he believed the decision would have to be made at higher levels. Orlov replied: "Mr. Trout, with all due respect, providing any additional information on mobile launchers is not transparency, it is discrimination." He stated that the United States wanted to put "red flags" on mobile launchers, and drew a comparison to an experience he said a Russian citizen had when crossing the monitoring territory at Votkinsk. Orlov said that this person had said that the way the Americans were staring at him, when he walked by, he felt as though he was naked. ¶12. (S) Trout mentioned that the United States had made an offer to back off its position on Votkinsk if Russia would agree to provide notifications prior to the departure of missile motors from the production facility and unique identifiers. In trade, the United States had offered to provide tail numbers of U.S. heavy bombers (HB). Orlov dismissed the provision of tail numbers as a meaningless gesture. He mentioned a "big boss" asked him if it was important to know tail numbers, to which Orlov responded that it would be good, but the aircraft were already known to them and what was important was the quantity of aircraft. Orlov did not consider the U.S. offer to provide tail numbers to be an equal exchange for the notification that the United States requested for impending deliveries at production facilities. -------------- BACK TO THE MOU REVIEW -------------- ¶13. (S) Orlov returned to the earlier discussion regarding moving three items from paragraph 1 of Section I to paragraph ¶2. Since the Russian side had moved them to the second paragraph as the United States had requested, Orlov asked whether the United States would now remove the brackets from these items. Trout mentioned that at the moment it was not acceptable, as these three items were contrary to the current guidance from Washington. Orlov stated that he understood, and he would not ask Trout to "sell his country." ¶14. (S) The discussion then proceeded to the wording of the title of Section II: "ICBMS, ICBM Launchers, and ((Nuclear))1 Warheads on ICBMS." After some discussion, it was understood by both sides that the English use of the word "on" and the Russian words "located on" had exactly the same meaning. Trout noted that the State Department experts on conforming treaty text and the U.S. delegation lawyer, Mr. Brown, had reviewed this language and agreed these English and Russian terms conformed. ¶15. (S) Orlov explained that the brackets on the opening chapeau in Section II could mostly be removed, with only "and their associated launchers" remaining bracketed. He also said that the Section III chapeau would have the same brackets. ¶16. (S) In Section IV, Pischulov did not agree with the addition of the U.S.-bracketed text "or associated with." The United States added this to the title so that the MOU section on heavy bombers accounted for not just the warheads actually located on the bombers, but warheads in storage areas "associated with" the heavy bombers. Trout stated that this related to the issue discussed in the morning Ad Hoc Group meeting regarding warheads in storage areas. Trout mentioned that if we solve the counting rules with respect to heavy bombers, then we will solve the brackets. Nevertheless, Orlov complained that while Russia was removing brackets the United States was adding brackets. ¶17. (S) In that light, Trout noted to Orlov that maybe the category "Training Heavy Bombers" should be removed, since neither the United States nor Russia had training heavy bombers. Orlov stated Russia did not have such heavy bombers and agreed to drop the category. ¶18. (S) Turning to Space Launch Facilities, Section V, Orlov noted that the addition of this section was a U.S. proposal, and he said the Russian side was "working on it" and would provide an answer, although no timeframe for a response was discussed. ¶19. (S) Orlov inquired why the signature block at the end of the MOU was bracketed. Trout mentioned that it was simply because this was just one section of the Protocol and at this time neither side knew if Presidential signatures would appear on this section. Orlov said he understood. This led to a discussion of the structure of the START Follow-on treaty. ¶20. (S) Trout explained that the three-tiered structure of the new treaty, which Gottemoeller and Antonov had agreed to that morning, would require changing what we are calling the subsections of the sections to the Protocol and the Annexes. At the moment, it appeared we would call them subsections. However, the contents of what we were discussing would not be affected. Orlov agreed. -------------- HEAVY BOMBERS AND EXISTING TYPES -------------- ¶21. (S) Orlov asked what our proposed title was for Annex C, and Trout said it was "Heavy Bomber Nuclear Armaments Technical Data." Orlov said he felt he could accept that, but would think about it. Orlov said he wanted to confirm what the U.S. side had told him the last time about agreeing to include data on eliminated facilities in Annex D, "Other Data Required by the Treaty," was still true, and Trout confirmed that it was. ¶22. (S) Trout returned to the Annex B title, and said that the United States wanted to use "Heavy Bomber Distinguishing Features" vice "Heavy Bomber Technical Data." Trout explained that the only heavy bombers which exist in both nuclear and non-nuclear configuration are the B-1Bs. The B-52H and B-2B type heavy bombers only exist in a nuclear configuration. Therefore, the only aircraft for which distinguishing features matter is the B-1B. And, the only information needed to distinguish between the nuclear and non-nuclear versions of the B-1B are the three categories the United States listed: "Externally Observable Features," "Distinguishing Features Under Wing/Fuselage," and "Distinguishing Features of Weapons Bay." Orlov would not agree to the changes so the brackets on the Russian text remain. ¶23. (S) This discussion raised the issue of what would be considered "existing types" under the treaty. Orlov made it clear that Russia expected the United States to continue to count the B-52G as an existing type, subject to all applicable provisions of the treaty, until they were all eliminated. Trout stated that this was not consistent with the package offered by the United States in Moscow. The United States would acknowledge the existence of the B-52G and that they would be eliminated through a joint statement, side agreement, or declaration. He stated that they would be eliminated in seven years using the simplified elimination procedures detailed in this treaty and, in the interim, would not be considered a treaty-accountable item. ¶24. (S) Orlov vigorously objected, commenting he could not explain to his superiors that, although the United States had launchers when the treaty entered into force, the United States would not count them and not include technical data for them. -------------- BASES, DEPLOYMENT AREAS, BASING AREAS,RE STRICTED AREAS, AND FIXED STRUCTURES -------------- ¶25. (S) Trout asked Orlov to confirm something the U.S. side had heard at a previous meeting, namely, the concept of a mobile ICBM launcher base, within which was a basing area, maintenance area, and some fixed structures. He asked whether the mobile launchers assigned to that base would have to stay within the boundary of that base. Orlov immediately understood the underlying issue and said that coordinates for the mobile ICBM base would be provided. Orlov stated that what was decided previously was that the previous deployment area was equal to the proposed mobile ICBM bases. Trout asked Orlov to confirm that a basing area would be the same as a re stricted area under START. Orlov said no, not quite, and that they were working on this and would inform us later of the answer. ¶26. (S) A discussion then ensued regarding fixed structures on a mobile launcher base. Trout asked how the United States would know what structures should be inspected if there were no mobile ICBM launchers in the re stricted area. Orlov asked whether Trout thought the inspectors would not know what to inspect. Trout said overhead imagery identifies fixed structures so it was important to keep track of these items. Orlov said it was his responsibility to explain to "my authorities" what we were asking for, and Trout said anything that could hold a missile. -------------- CLOSING -------------- ¶27. (S) Trout asked whether the Russian side had developed their version of a JDT. Orlov replied that they had, and passed a Russian language version to the U.S. side. Trout agreed to study the document and look to see if more brackets could be removed, although he believed most remaining brackets were related to issues being addressed in the package deal. Depending on the outcome of the review of the Russian JDT and further review of subjects discussed at this meeting, Trout said he would let Orlov know whether he believed a short follow-up meeting was in order. ¶28. (U) Documents exchanged. - Russia: -- Section II, Database for Strategic Offensive Arms ¶29. (U) Participants: U.S. Mr. Trout Lt Col Blevins LTC LaGraffe LCDR Brons Mr. Broshar Mr. Coussa Mr. Dwyer Col Fryer Mr. Hanchett Dr. Hopkins (Int) RUSSIA Gen Orlov Col Pischulov Ms. Vodopolova Mr. Voloskov Mr. Shevchenko Ms. Evarovskaya (Int.) ¶30. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS