START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001061 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VII): (U) ADMIRAL MULLEN'S OPENING MEETING WITH GENERAL MAKAROV, NOVEMBER 22, 2009 Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-045. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: November 22, 2009 Time: 5:30 - 6:40 P.M. Place: Russian Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen met with Russian Federation First Deputy Defense Minister and Chief of the General Staff Nikolay Makarov at the Russian Mission in Geneva on November 22, 2009, to assist in resolving outstanding issues in the START Follow-on Treaty negotiations. Mullen presented U.S. positions on the minimum requirements for the verification of mobile ICBMs and their launchers, telemetry, limits on strategic delivery vehicles (SDVs),and counting rules for heavy bombers. Mullen throughout emphasized the obligation of the Parties, as well as his personal desire, to work through differences on key issues and conclude a satisfactory treaty for both sides. ¶4. (S) Makarov's preliminary response, cut short by time constraints, reflected continuing resistance to tailored verification provisions for road-mobile systems and to transparency on telemetry. ¶5. (S) Subject Summary: Outlining the Objectives of the Visit; Admiral Mullen Introduces U.S. Approach; U.S. Position on Mobile ICBMs and Their Launchers; U.S. Position on Telemetry; U.S. Position on SDV Limits; U.S. Position on Counting Heavy Bombers; and, General Makarov's Response. -------------- OUTLINING THE OBJECTIVES F THE VISIT -------------- ¶6. (S) Admiral Mullen met with General Makarov at the Russian Mission on November 22, 2009. Mullen was accompanied by representatives of the National Security Council, Department of Defense, and members of the delegation in Geneva. Makarov was joined largely by members of the Russian delegation in Geneva and several officials from the Ministry of Defense who had accompanied him from Moscow. ¶7. (S) Makarov opened the meeting by explaining the nature of his objectives in coming to Geneva. He recounted that the work of the delegations had clarified many issues between the Parties, but that some technical questions had arisen that directly related to the security of the two countries. He sought to illuminate the reasons underlying the two sides' positions on these problematic issues. His party had not, however, come to Geneva to substitute for the standing delegations but, instead, to understand the technical essences of the outstanding differences and, if possible, to help. He emphasized that many people in Russia were interested in the treaty, and underlined that it should take into account the interests of both sides. He concluded by stating that he hoped for an open and sincere conversation that would help to clarify Russian positions and the rationales behind them. ¶8. (S) After thanking Makarov and the respective delegations, Mullen pointed to the increasing importance of the U.S.-Russian relationship and the impact the treaty would have on future security. He noted that some significant differences remained between the Parties, but that progress on these issues offered an opportunity to move the two nations closer together. ¶9. (S) Referencing their telephone call of November 20, Mullen reminded Makarov that they had discussed keeping the talks at the strategic level, but pointed out that there were difficult technical issues that merited their attention as well. Mullen emphasized his sense of personal responsibility to do all he could to close these gaps. In this light, he was very anxious to listen to, and to understand, the Russian side's positions and their rationales. He also referred again to the weighty implications the results of the treaty negotiations would bear for the coming ten years and beyond. The Parties, he concluded, had no greater common interest than in this treaty. ¶10. (S) Jocularly judging their introductory segment successful, Makarov then reinforced that many problematic issues remained. The following day would offer a very important opportunity to find areas of agreement. He reported that he had received directions to provide a detailed description of what he could offer so as not to infringe the interests of either country, and agreed that the two sides bore great responsibility. He also noted that his Duma was a major factor in the Russian calculus, and Mullen pointed to a similar situation with the U.S. Congress on the American side. The two then agreed to use the remainder of the meeting to begin substantive discussions. -------------- ADMIRAL MULLEN INTRODUCES U.S. APPROACH -------------- ¶11. (S) Mullen explained that he had been dispatched by President Obama to resolve the remaining issues such that the Parties could sign the Treaty by December 5, the date the START Treaty would expire. In this light, Mullen stated that he had brought some ideas on how the sides might move ahead. ¶12. (S) Before delving into the substantive positions, Mullen underlined that the relationship between the two countries was fundamentally different than it had been during the Cold War. The two were no longer adversaries, which bore significant consequences for how the Parties should proceed. The United States had previously looked at arms control treaties with Moscow as opportunities to limit the threat of the opposing arsenal. Now, however, the Parties were engaged in a cooperative effort to reduce their arsenals in a way that would preserve strategic stability. He noted that the United States and Russia together possessed 90 percent of the world's nuclear weapons. He, therefore, believed that they had a responsibility to reduce these arms, and that he and Makarov, as leaders of their respective militaries, were under a special obligation to lead this effort. The United States and Russia served as an example to the nations of the world, and both countries should therefore bring their nuclear postures into alignment with the new world environment and the new relationship between the two powers. ¶13. (S) Mullen emphasized that trust in the relationship was critical. The United States, therefore, needed a treaty that would provide for effective verification and transparency. These would serve as critical elements of strategic stability. During the Cold War, he contrasted, information regarding the other side's strategic posture was often fragmentary and partial, which compelled the sides to make educated guesses that forced them to hedge conservatively and therefore resulted in a "cycle of fear." This cycle of lack of trust and worst-case scenario planning resulted in the large build-up of nuclear stockpiles. Mullen stated that he hoped this treaty would send a very strong message to the rest of the world that the negative cycle no longer existed and, instead, that there currently existed a positive cycle. ¶14. (S) Mullen continued that, although the Parties were no longer adversaries, transparency was still necessary for building trust and confidence between them. There were still some who would base their assessments on worst case scenarios. This treaty, he contended, should invalidate that view. He reiterated that the Parties would not want to find themselves less sure about the other side's forces ten years in the future, which was not a long period in planning terms. -------------- U.S. POSITION ON MOBILE ICBMS AND THEIR LAUNCHERS -------------- ¶15. (S) Mullen turned to the issue of the verification of mobile ICBMs and their launchers, noting that he viewed it as very important to give the reasoning behind the U.S. view that a strong verification regime and transparency measures for these systems was required. The verification regime, he began, should provide not only assurance that the other Party is observing the treaty limits, but also transparency and trust required to support the overall relationship between the two nations. He commented that the rest of the world was watching these negotiations, not only with respect to numerical reductions, but also regarding how transparent the sides would be. START, he continued, with its complex verification regime represented the gold standard by which the new treaty would be judged. He noted that this perspective would also inform the ratification process in the United States, which was very much on his mind. ¶16. (S) Mullen stressed that because the new treaty would be simpler than START, so too should the verification regime be simpler. He conceded that, in this light, the initial U.S. verification proposal was perhaps still too complicated. The U.S. side had listened to the Russian side's arguments and had tabled a significant simplified proposal. By contrast, the Russian side's initial proposal was much too lean. The negotiating teams had been working to bridge the gap but remained far apart. The Russian proposal not to include special provisions for mobile systems was simply not a basis for finishing the treaty. As President Obama had explained to President Medvedev in Singapore, the U.S. side was very mindful of what it would take to ratify the treaty, namely, very effective verification and transparency measures. Turning to Ambassador Antonov, Mullen noted that Antonov had met with Senators Kyl and Feinstein during their visit to Geneva, and emphasized that their concerns about verification were representative of the broader opinion in the U.S. Senate. Mullen underlined that he was not just making up these ratification concerns; they were very serious. ¶17. (S) Mullen stated that he had heard the Russian side's arguments that the U.S.-proposed verification regime was too costly and burdensome. He commented that the U.S. military, like Russia's, was not enthusiastic about the costs and operational burdens associated with the verification regime, but argued that in this area the militaries would need to be willing to bear the cost in order to ensure that verification and, ultimately, broader nuclear arms control issues were set on the right track. Mullen specifically noted the importance of contacts among young officers in the two militaries, even those resulting from the formal inspection process. ¶18. (S) Returning to the specifics of the mobile ICBM issues, Mullen recounted that both the United States and the Soviet Union had recognized the special verification challenges associated with mobile ICBMs and their launchers when negotiating START. It remained a problem for the United States for the simple reason that Russia fielded these systems while the United States did not. Reiterating that the U.S. side had heard the Russian cost and burden concerns, Mullen reinforced that the U.S. delegation had introduced a streamlined set of verification measures the previous week that would meet U.S. concerns while recognizing the nature of the new relationship between the Parties. ¶19. (S) For instance, Mullen continued, the United States had incorporated Russian concerns regarding perimeter portal continuous monitoring at the Votkinsk Final Assembly Plant and had, therefore, proposed as an alternative requiring only 60 hours advance notification of the exit of a missile from Votkinsk ICBM Production Facility, emplacement of unique identifiers (UIDs) on ICBMs for mobile launchers, and had offered reciprocal rights for Russia at two U.S. facilities. Yet, Russia had rejected these simple measures, which was something the U.S. side could not understand. The U.S. side was therefore interested in the rationale behind this resistance. ¶20. (S) Noting that the U.S. side had worked very hard within its Government to provide a streamlined package and that much of the package had been presented previously in Geneva, Mullen then presented the minimum measures the U.S. side could accept on mobile ICBMs and their launchers. First, advance notice of the exit of ICBMs for mobile launchers. The United States was prepared to extend this notification requirement to all missiles limited by the treaty. Second, UIDs on each ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs and each associated launch canister. Third, a limit on the number of non-deployed ICBMs for mobile launchers at maintenance facilities. Fourth, requirements for ensuring mobile ICBMs and their launchers declared at an operational base are available for inspection. Fifth, cooperative measures for deployed mobile ICBMs and their launchers. Sixth, a limited set of special procedures for the elimination of mobile ICBMs, their launch canisters, and mobile ICBM launchers. That was, Mullen underlined, a list of all the United States needed. ¶21. (S) Mullen stated that an additional element of the U.S. proposal was to drop the separate limits on non-deployed mobile ICBMs and their launchers, with several provisos. The United States would accept, as part of a package agreement that resolved all issues, that ICBMs and SLBMs would count as deployed only when loaded in launchers, and would only then count as SDVs. In return, the United States wanted Russia to accept a separate limit on the number of non-deployed launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs of about 150, with the exact limit to be negotiated. Mullen emphasized that this limit would apply to all missiles covered by the treaty, not just those for mobile launchers. This would reduce the extent to which the treaty would single out mobile systems, which Mullen said he knew was important to the Russian side. -------------- U.S. POSITION ON TELEMETRY -------------- ¶22. (S) Turning to telemetry, Mullen recounted that the strategic arms control treaties between the Parties had banned the encryption of telemetry since SALT II in the late 1970s. START, he continued, recognized that telemetry was important both for ensuring compliance and also for transparency, particularly through the exchange of tapes allowing for the analysis of missile tests. START's suite of telemetry provisions were important for verifying compliance with the treaty's specific requirements. Equally, and perhaps more importantly, he argued that the telemetry provisions had helped each country understand the characteristics of each other's missiles. At the heart of the telemetry discussion, therefore, was transparency and the new relationship based upon that. ¶23. (S) Mullen stated that he had listened to the Russian side's arguments that the telemetry provisions proposed for the new treaty favored the United States because only Russia was developing new missiles while the United States was not. He countered this by arguing that the existing telemetry arrangements had put the Parties in a good position to understand each other technically, and that changing those provisions would be a complete departure from the past. He also averred that, as the U.S. arsenal ages, the United States would face future requirements for new capabilities in approximately ten years. Russia should consider, he advised, what precedent the new treaty would hand-off to the succeeding set of negotiators. If the U.S. side were to develop new systems in ten years, the situation could reverse itself, he pointed out. Even today, he continued, it was surely valuable for the Russian side to see that tests of U.S. missiles are consistent with the past. ¶24. (S) Therefore, Mullen concluded, he did not have a new proposal for Russia on telemetry. The United States believed START's telemetry provisions were still relevant and thus proposed including them in the new treaty. In order to work through this matter, however, Mullen emphasized that it was important that he personally hear directly from Makarov the arguments for omitting the telemetry provisions. He also commented that this was another vital issue for Senators Kyl and Feinstein, and would be important for the ratification process. -------------- U.S. POSITION ON SDV LIMITS -------------- ¶25. (S) Mullen turned to the matter of numerical treaty limits, noting that this was a difficult issue. He reported that the U.S. Government had reviewed President Medvedev's proposal outlined in Singapore that Russia might consider negotiating a limit of 600-700 for SDVs. These numbers, Mullen stated, were too low for the United States. He explained that such a limit would require a significant change in U.S. force structure and thus the United States just could not agree to the proposal. As President Obama and Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller had stated, the U.S. offer to establish a limit of 800 on SDVs was connected to U.S. willingness to count conventionally-armed ballistic missiles and the warheads on them under the treaty. -------------- U.S. POSITION ON COUNTING HEAVY BOMBERS -------------- ¶26. (S) Mullen turned lastly to the issue of how to count heavy bomber nuclear armaments. As the sides attempted to strengthen their relationship, he explained, the U.S. side believed it was important to increase transparency in all facets of the respective arsenals, including weapons storage areas for heavy bombers, air-launched cruise missiles, and gravity bombs. The U.S. side continued to believe that the treaty should provide for the actual counting of warheads associated with heavy bombers, but he underlined that the U.S. side had already shown flexibility and was prepared to listen to the Russian side's arguments in order to find a way forward. ¶27. (S) Mullen concluded his presentation by underscoring the importance of the themes of trust, a new relationship, transparency, and the importance of leadership in seizing the opportunity to stabilize the relationship from a strategic perspective while demonstrating this dynamic to the rest of the world. -------------- GENERAL MAKAROV'S RESPONSE -------------- ¶28. (S) Makarov thanked Mullen for the latter's sincere presentation, and expressed his agreement that times had changed and that greater understanding, mutual trust, and the need to move forward were key themes in the Parties' relationship. He noted that a number of the U.S. proposals were new and, therefore, the Russian side would like to discuss these in detail. ¶29. (S) Makarov then explained that President Medvedev and the Russian military were proceeding from a set of premises. History had developed in such a way that the nuclear arsenals of each country endowed the sides with the ability to destroy each other. As President Medvedev had outlined in Singapore, one missile should not destabilize all humanity. Makarov continued that the technical parameters of the treaty, however, needed serious discussion. He acknowledged that Russia understood that the U.S. position was that a limit of 600-700 on SDVs was too low, and that 800 would be appropriate for the United States. He suggested that the sides should develop a means to increase confidence. But, he countered, the number proposed by Mullen would allow the United States to maintain its current force, and this would present a problem for Russia. ¶30. (S) Regarding verification and inspections, Makarov stated that he thought the Parties could find common ground because many of the sides' proposals were similar. Consensus could be reached that would allow for greater understanding for each side's positions, and provisions could be made simpler. ¶31. (S) But, Makarov continued, how would the Parties define mobile systems? Would the term mobile only apply to road-mobile ICBMs? Or would it also apply to all mobile systems, including submarines? Mullen responded that this was an issue that had been discussed at length. He noted that both sides deployed submarines, which were mobile, but pointed out that there were appropriate verification measures associated with these systems. Similarly, there were verification measures tailored for road-mobile systems, which were especially important because the United States had no other way of verifying compliance with respect to road-mobile systems other than through the treaty regime. Broadening the point, he continued that the two sides had to recognize that there were differences between the two sides' arsenals. In this light, it was important not to try to match those different aspects in a way that would not allow the Parties to come together and conclude an agreement. He emphasized that the Russians knew a great deal about U.S. submarines, while the United States knew very little about Russia's road-mobile systems, especially its new mobile ICBM system. (Begin comment: This was a reference to RS-24. End comment.) Mullen rhetorically queried whether the relationship was built on transparency. He noted that, since the United States knew little about Russia's new mobile ICBM system, a new treaty built on transparency was even more important. He also reinforced that the verification of mobile systems would be a huge issue for ratification. Mullen concluded by stating that the United States was looking for measures to apply to systems without prejudice. He emphasized that it was not realistic to look for a complete match of measures for submarines and road-mobile systems. ¶32. (S) Makarov then queried whether UIDs would apply only to ICBMs for mobile launchers or to all missiles? Mullen replied that, for the present, the U.S. position was that the UID requirement would apply only to mobile ICBMs. ¶33. (S) Makarov stated that the telemetry issues were very important. He explained that, when the ABM Treaty was in force, the Parties were equally vulnerable and protective measures were prohibited and, therefore, the issue of telemetry was very important for transparency into the other Party's missile developments. Makarov reminded Mullen that the United States had withdrawn from the ABM Treaty, not Russia, and that this decision had affected the entire strategic relationship. He suggested that the U.S. side consider resurrecting the ABM Treaty. Failing that, the telemetry regime would constitute a unilateral sacrifice for Russia, he argued. He added that Russia also had a Duma, which was a major factor for the Russian side. He concluded by repeating President Medvedev's statement that the best transparency is mutual confidence. ¶34. (S) Mullen responded by acknowledging the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, noting that there existed provisions for unilateral withdrawal in all such treaties. He contended that the sides should move ahead, but that he would consider Makarov's proposal. ¶35. (U) Documents exchanged. None. ¶36. (U) Participants: U.S. CJCS Mullen A/S Gottemoeller Mr. Elliott Dr. Kass Dr. Look Dr. McFaul Dr. Miller Amb Ries Mr. Siemon Mr. Trout Dr. Warner VADM Winnefeld Mr. Buttrick (Notetaker) Mr. Colby (Notetaker) Mr. Shkeyrov (Int) RUSSIA Gen Makarov Amb Antonov Col Ilin Col Knyazeva Mr. Koshelev Gen Kublo Adm Kuznetsov Mr. Leontiev Gen Orlov Gen Poznikhir Col Ryzhkov Mr. Trifonov Col Zaytsev Col Zudin Ms. Evarovskaya (Int) ¶37. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS