START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001059 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VII): (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP (IPWG) MEETING, NOVEMBER 10, 2009 Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-009. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: November 10, 2009 Time: 3:30 - 6:30 P.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) A meeting of the Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG) was held on November 10, 2009. The U.S. Delegation reviewed the general procedures contained within the U.S.-proposed Section VI of the Inspection Protocol entitled, "Inspections of ICBMs and SLBMs at Operational Bases and the Nuclear Warheads on Them." This proposal was tabled for the first time and introduced the concept of a combined inspection for ICBMs and SLBMs which included elements of a Nuclear Warhead Inspection (NWI) and a Data Update Inspection (DUI),and which would entail inspecting both deployed and non-deployed items of inspection. The Russian Delegation continued to express concerns about any provisions specific for mobile ICBMs. It also expressed concerns over the level of effort to conduct this type of inspection and the overall time needed to conduct it. The Russian Delegation agreed to study this new approach and consider how it would apply to non-deployed systems. ¶4. (S) Subject Summary: General Theme of Section VI; Beginning the Walk Through the Document; An Inspection Discussion; How Many Launchers Are We Going to Inspect; RV Covers Are Still a Problem; and, Review and Wrap Up. -------------- GENERAL THEME OF SECTION VI -------------- ¶5. (S) Dr. Warner opened the IPWG meeting by explaining that his intent was to go through the general flow of events in the U.S.-proposed joint draft text for Section VI of the Inspection Protocol entitled, "Inspections of ICBMs and SLBMS at Operational Bases and the Nuclear Warheads on Them." He noted the approach taken within Section VI was that of a combined inspection which included elements of both a NWI and a DUI. Colonel Ilin acknowledged that the sides had already recognized some differences in inspection approaches and that it was important for the sides to understand the combined approach so that there will be no room for misinterpretation about the process. He also questioned the title of the section asking why the term "nuclear warhead" was used rather than just "warhead." He opined that the term nuclear should not be used. Warner noted that the United States had proposed to count non-nuclear warheads as nuclear but, since that issue had not been fully agreed to, the term "nuclear" should be included in the title until the issue of the central limits is resolved. -------------- BEGINNING THE WALK THROUGH THE DOCUMENT -------------- ¶6. (S) Warner explained that paragraph 1 described the purpose of this type of combined inspection, which was to inspect both silo and mobile ICBMs as well as SLBMs and that, in accordance with paragraph 2, the inspections would be conducted at ICBM and SLBM operational bases. He noted the differences between the Parties in paragraph 2 regarding the number of inspections to be conducted. The Russian position was that five such inspections would be conducted annually, while the U.S. position was that the annual quota should be ¶14. He further explained that, despite the difference in the numbers for the quotas, the United States and the Russian Federation had agreed that the final quota for Type 1 and Type 2 inspections should be moved to Article XI of the treaty. ¶7. (S) Warner continued to describe the general flow of events discussed in Section VI, pointing out the similarities between the U.S. proposal and the standard practices for NWI and DUI conducted under START. He noted that he was well aware that the Russian Federation did not agree that mobile ICBMs should be subject to recall to their re stricted areas so that they could be inspected, as was described in paragraph four. Ilin noted that Warner had a good grasp of the Russian position and pointed out that it was the U.S. view that such recall provisions would not apply to SLBMs. Warner took note of Ilin's point, stating that it would be impossible to recall submarines within 24 hours and, in any case, such recall of SSBNs was totally unacceptable. Ilin also asked if SLBMs would be affixed with unique identifiers and reminded everyone that it was important to the Russian Federation not to include special provisions for mobile ICBMs within the treaty. -------------- AN INSPECTION DISCUSSION -------------- ¶8. (S) Ilin expressed concern about the paragraphs referencing items of inspection that might be missing from a site and had to be returned to the inspection site to be inspected. He asked why items would be absent if the inspection was all about deployed systems and their warheads. Mr. Rust explained that the combined inspection included aspects of a DUI and that it was possible that an item of inspection might be in transit on roads between the inspectable areas of a site, and this provision ensured that an item of inspection was returned to the site and did not remain on the road so that it could not be inspected. Warner emphasized that it was important to remember that both deployed and non-deployed items of inspection would be subject to inspection using this combined approach. He reminded Ilin that three weeks ago the approach being proposed was to conduct separate deployed and non-deployed inspections of deployed and non-deployed SOA, but the United States had moved to a combined approach which included the inspection of both deployed and non-deployed items within the Type I inspection. -------------- HOW MANY LAUNCHERS ARE WE GOING TO INSPECT? -------------- ¶9. (S) During the discussion of those paragraphs related to NWIs, Ilin asked how many launchers U.S. inspectors would want to inspect. He understood that Russian bases would have to allow the inspection of two launchers to confirm the number of RVs, as well as one empty launcher if one was declared at the base. Warner (incorrectly) acknowledged that this was correct and that such an inspection would be lengthy, but that the inspection of an empty launcher would not take much time. Colonel Petrov cautioned that if the inspection of three launchers was conducted at one of Russia's SS-18 ICBM bases it would be a difficult task in the winter, since the SS-18 front section had to be removed from the missile and taken a long distance back to the base for inspection. (Begin note: Warner subsequently told Ilin that he had been mistaken regarding the maximum number of launchers to be inspected under the U.S. NWI proposal. The U.S. proposal calls for the inspection of up to two launchers during an NWI. The U.S. inspection team could designate two launchers loaded with missiles carrying RVs or one launcher with a missile carrying RVs and one launcher that was empty. End note.) ¶10. (S) Petrov also asked whether he scope of the inspection site would be the same at a U.S. submarine base and would also include seeking to confirm data on SLBM first stages in the missile storage bunkers. Warner stated that it would include both the RVOSI and DUI elements, but the expectation would be that inspectors would conduct parallel inspection activities to make the inspection less time-consuming and more efficient. He used the example where, during an NWI at a U.S. submarine base while the front section was being prepared, inspectors could look at those areas close to the wharves while a subgroup observed the submarine being prepared for inspection. Once the NWI was complete the entire team could then complete the DUI part of the inspection. -------------- RV COVERS ARE STILL A PROBLEM -------------- ¶11. (S) Warner began the discussion of paragraph 18 of Section VI, related to the use of RV covers during the NWI, by explaining that 15 years of START experience had been taken into account, as well as some of the problems the sides had experienced during START. He noted that covers were used to protect sensitive elements of the RVs, but that they should not inhibit an inspector's ability to accurately determine the number of RVs on a front section. Ilin asked how an inspector could accomplish this task if a single hard cover which covers the entire front section could be used as stated in the U.S. proposal. Warner called Ilin's attention to the rest of the paragraph, which stated that the cover would consist of a base portion with individual towers to cover the RVs. Ilin expressed concern over the use of such hard covers on U.S. SLBM front sections as had been done under START. His inspector colleagues had told him that the covers should be soft and conformal because it was hard for inspectors to determine how many RVs were present during an inspection when a hard cover was used. Warner countered that the towers were conformal and were more like cones and that the single issue that had arisen related to hard covers that had been resolved within the context of the JCIC under START. Petrov asked whether the covers would be changed so that the number of towers would be equal to the number of RVs on the front section, to which Warner responded in the affirmative. Both Warner and Ilin acknowledged that the details of types of RV covers to be used during an NWI would require additional discussion. -------------- REVIEW AND WRAP UP -------------- ¶12. (S) Ilin thanked Warner for the general overview of the U.S.-proposed combined inspection of ICBMs and SLBMs. He noted that he was not sure that the sides had a common understanding and that the issue would require further study. From his viewpoint, there were three configurations within a launcher whether it was one for silo ICBMs, mobile ICBMs, or SLBMs. There is a deployed missile in the launcher with RVs on it, a missile in the launcher without RVs, and an empty launcher. Warner agreed and explained that the U.S. proposal would treat the first two configurations in the same way so that NWIs would be conducted on either of these configurations and an empty launcher would be inspected to simply confirm that it was empty. ¶13. (S) Warner reviewed the combined inspection proposal pointing out that, for any ICBM or SLBM during an NWI, the steps were the same. The launcher would be designated, the front section would be prepared at a site and in a way of the inspected Party's choosing, covers can be applied in a way that allows for the confirmation of the number of RVs, the front section can be viewed by each inspector for 15 minutes, and a report will be completed. The big difference is the inclusion of DUI elements, that is, non-deployed items and selected support equipment, which make this an inspection of deployed and non-deployed items of inspection. Ilin asked why heavy bombers had not been included in the combined approach. Warner noted that there were still significant differences between the sides on heavy bombers which had to be resolved but, beyond that, trying to combine heavy bombers into the combined approach would make things too complex and that heavy bomber inspections lent themselves to being conducted as a single inspection. ¶14. (S) In conclusion, Warner asked for Ilin's impressions. Ilin replied that the Russian side has been thinking in terms of two types of inspections, one for deployed items and one for non-deployed items. We will need to consider how your Section VI would apply to non-deployed items. Ilin also stated that exhibitions should be conducted on a voluntary basis and not be considered mandatory. ¶15. (U) Documents exchanged. - U.S.: -- U.S-proposed Joint Draft Text for Inspection Protocol Section VI, Inspections of ICBMs and SLBMS at Operational Bases and the Nuclear Warheads on Them ¶16. (U) Participants: U.S. Dr. Warner Mr. Buttrick Mr. DeNinno Mr. Feliciano Maj Johnson LTC Leyde Ms. Pura Mr. Rust Mr. Sims Mr. Smith Mr. Shkeyrov (Int) RUSSIA Col Ilin Mr. Ivanov Col Petrov Ms. Komshilova (Int) ¶17. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS