START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001042 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VII): (U) MEETING OF THE TREATY TEXT AND DEFINITIONS WORKING GROUP, NOVEMBER 11, 2009 REF: STATE (SFO-GVA-V-026) Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-012. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: November 11, 2009 Time: 10:00 A.M. - 1:00 P.M. Place: Russian Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) A meeting of the Treaty Text and Definitions Working Group (TTDWG) was held at the Russian Mission on November 11, ¶2009. The TTDWG discussed Articles I, VII, and XIV. For Article I, the Russian Delegation agreed to drop its proposed language on openness and accept the U.S.-proposed wording for the paragraph. The Russians also indicated their proposed language on missile defense might soon be removed from the text in favor of recording the offense-defense relationship in a joint statement or other suitable format. The sides also agreed to include a pointing reference in Article I to Treaty Terms and Definitions that were included in the Treaty, the Protocols and their Annexes. ¶4. (S) The Russian Delegation could not agree to the U.S.-proposed joint draft text (JDT) for the article on elimination (Article VII) due to differences with the U.S. Delegation on whether fixed structure foundations for mobile missiles would need to be destroyed when the facility was converted to another use. The Russians also differed with the U.S. Delegation on whether or not notifications were a part of verification and needed to be recorded in the treaty Articles The U.S. side asserted that notifications were necessary for verification, but that an event could not be verified by means of notification. ¶5. (S) The U.S. Delegation indicated U.S. acceptance of the term "Parties" in lieu of "States" regarding the ban of transfer of strategic offensive arms (SOA) in Article XIV, thereby broadening the prohibitions and the text of that Article was therefore completely agreed. However, at the last minute, the Russian Delegation insisted on bracketing the entire Article to allow for further non-substantive polishing. ¶6. (U) Subject Summary: Article VII - Paragraph 1, Article VII - Paragraph 2, Article I, and, Article XIV - Agreed, Or Not. -------------- ARTICLE VII - PARAGRAPH 1 -------------- ¶7. (S) Mr. Koshelev expressed his appreciation to members of the Conversion and Elimination (CorE) Working Group for being present to participate with the TTDWG in the discussion of Article VII. Discussion began on the U.S.-proposed draft for the Article on Elimination and initially focused on the objects of the conversion or elimination procedures. At issue was whether the focus should be on the Russian-proposed "Strategic Offensive Arms (SOA)" or of the U.S.-proposed "items subject to the limitations of this Treaty" as a means of including both SOA and fixed structures. Colonel Ryzhkov argued for a definition of whichever term was used, and suggested the TTDWG undertake to write one. Ambassador Ries reminded all that the previous version of the U.S.-proposed Joint Draft Text contained language referring to fixed structures and SOA, to which the Russian side had not agreed. She noted the word "item" had been proposed by the U.S. as a compromise to reflect both sides' concerns. ¶8. (S) Ryzhkov explained the Russian concerns. He felt "items" to be a broader term than the Russian side desired. He agreed training models of missiles (TMOM),driver training vehicles, and even fixed structures would be appropriately addressed in the CorE Protocol. The U.S.-proposed wording in the Treaty Article would require that all support equipment be eliminated or removed. For fixed structures, the Russian side was reluctant to eliminate the buildings and wanted to retain the pad or foundation. They felt it was an unnecessary expenditure of resources to destroy something that could no longer be used for its intended purpose, but which could be used for other purposes such as storage. ¶9. (S) Ryzhkov illustrated his point on fixed structure pads by citing the fixed structures located in Belarus. He stated that the buildings had been destroyed, but the pads remained. The U.S. side could verify by national technical means (NTM) that they were not being used in a manner inconsistent with the START Treaty. Mr. Taylor reminded Ryzhkov that Belarus continued to declare in its Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) submissions that it possessed fixed structures because the pads had not in fact been eliminated under the START Treaty. Ryzhkov downplayed the value of the pads for launching missiles. He noted that when the START Treaty was written, the pads had been necessary to provide the precise location for launching the missile. He reported advances in military technology now allowed for Russia to quickly launch a mobile ICBM from any location. As a result, Russia wished to retain the fixed structures, not so much for missile-related activities, but to provide for other uses of the existing space and to save expenses and reduce damage to the environment. ¶10. (S) Ryzhkov offered another example in the elimination of a heavy bomber base. He said there was no need to blow up the runway, which both sides should be able to agree was totally unnecessary. Mr. Elliott reminded Ryzhkov the intent of the language in the elimination article (Article VII) was not to describe the process but merely to provide for one. Ries added that there was a need nonetheless for the word "items" to establish the activities to be carried out. Ryzhkov changed his line of reasoning to point out that fixed structures were not subject to the limits of the treaty, nor were the stairs for heavy bombers. When bombers were eliminated, the stairs (Begin comment: Ground support equipment to assist aircrew into the airplane. End comment.) are not eliminated. He asked why the fixed structures should be eliminated. Mr. Smirnov also said he wondered whether cranes should be eliminated when a submarine base is converted or eliminated. ¶11. (S) Mr. Dean in turn reminded Ryzhkov that the words in Article VII needed to correspond with the activities proposed by the CorE Working Group. Article VII would describe the goals of CorE. The purpose of Paragraph 1 was to establish that CorE applied to an item within the purview of the treaty, hence the use of "items and facilities." ¶12. (S) Admiral Kuznetsov suggested "means" in lieu of "items." He rationalized the choice by linking it to things which would be accountable, but not counted against the limits of the treaty. He argued if one were to use "items," a submarine would have to be eliminated. However, if "means" were used, conversion would be possible. When Ries asked whether a pad was considered as "means," Kuznetsov replied in the negative. Ries also noted that "items" were used in the title of the CorE text of the Protocol. (Begin comment: U.S. Delegation determined the word "items" in the English text and the word "means" in the Russian had been conformed in the START Treaty as having the same meaning in this phrase. End comment.) -------------- ARTICLE VII - PARAGRAPH 2 -------------- ¶13. (S) Ryzhkov was not in agreement with the U.S.-proposed language for paragraph 2 because it did not offer the word "or" to allow for any one of the possible means of verification to be selected. He also wanted to add notifications as means of verification, offering up a submarine accident as an example of something that would be notified but not separately verified. Elliott explained that the U.S. understanding of verification did not include notifications. Notifications were provided to the other Party about an event taking place, but verification provided the supporting facts to substantiate the statement. He indicated the value of notifications, but indicated it could not be considered a complete form of verification. Ries agreed, arguing verification also required concrete evidence. ¶14. (S) Smirnov provided and explained the Russian-proposed version of the Article on Elimination (Article VII),which described verification as combining any two methods chosen from notifications, inspections, and NTM. As an example, a missile launched for any reason would cease to be counted. Its elimination could be confirmed by a combination of notifications and NTM. In other cases, the verification might be achieved through a combination of notifications and inspections. ¶15. (S) Ries responded notifications were certainly necessary, that was agreed, but did not fit within the definition of verification. Verification, either NTM or inspection, was normally preceded by notifications. Ries also pointed to the inconsistency in the Russian-proposed language which stated that CorEs would be of the SOA facilities "where they are located." This would create a situation in which the SOA could be removed and obviate the need for elimination of the site, since SOA were no longer located there. ¶16. (S) Ries suggested the need for broad language for the treaty consistent with law and appropriate for a solemn undertaking. She proposed using "conversion and elimination of items and facilities," and continuing with the article wording using the proposed Russian text. Kuznetsov reiterated his belief that SOA required a definition. Ries stated the United States did not think a definition for SOA was necessary. Koshelev responded that he would take the language away to think about and proposed moving on to Article I. -------------- ARTICLE I -------------- ¶17. (S) Ries reviewed Article I and observed how the Russian-proposed addition to paragraph 1 on strengthening trust and openness sounded like language was positive but more appropriate for placement in a preamble. She noted similar language could already be found in the proposed preamble, as well as the Russian-proposed Article IX. Koshelev stated that the first article of a treaty was especially important, as many people never read past it when looking at a treaty. However, he recognized how political statements, such as that found in the Russian-proposed text for paragraph 1, were better located in a preamble, and Article I was meant for enumerating obligations. With that, he agreed to drop the Russian-proposed language in favor of the U.S. proposal. ¶18. (S) Looking at paragraph 2, which contained language related to missile defense, Koshelev reported the Heads of Delegation were working on the question of how missile defense language would be addressed in this treaty. He suggested leaving the text of paragraph 2 in brackets, but he anticipated a forthcoming solution in which this text would be removed and located in another document, such as a joint statement. ¶19. (S) Concerning paragraph 3, which referred to the location of terms and definitions, Koshelev lobbied for this paragraph to be retained. He said it was the only reference in the treaty to the terms and definitions, and he thought it was important there be a reference somewhere to guide the reader. Ms. Melikbekian pointed out how other articles, such as Article VII which was discussed earlier in the meeting, made a reference to information contained in the protocol. Dean replied Article VII made such a reference because both Parties were agreeing to be bound by certain obligations, and the procedures for such were spelled out in the protocol. Ries proposed compromise language in which the language in paragraph 3 would be broadened to note the use of terms and definitions, not only in the treaty but in the accompanying protocol and annexes, and agreed to provide draft language to that effect at the next meeting. -------------- ARTICLE XIV - AGREED, OR NOT -------------- ¶20. (S) Ries asked the Russian Delegation to briefly return to Article XIV. She noted that this text was virtually agreed, with exception to a single bracket of text concerning the question of transfers of SOA to Russian-proposed "third parties" in lieu of the U.S.-proposed "third states." She recognized how the Russian-proposed version contained the broader language of "third parties." Ries agreed that broadening the language to prohibit transfers of SOA to non-State recipients was a constructive idea, and she accepted the Russian-proposed version. With the removal of this last bracket, Article XIV was agreed. ¶21. (S) At this point, after a lengthy discussion within the Russian side, Koshelev wondered, at the behest of his lawyer, if the agreed text could not be "made more beautiful." He thought repetitive wording, especially the use of the phrase "the Parties agree" in each of the sentences could be eliminated by restructuring the article to contain a chapeau with sub-paragraphs. In response to Dean's question as to whether the intent was to change the substance of the text, Koshelev replied his intent was to streamline the document and make it shorter and easier to read. Dean urged Koshelev not to change the text. He pointed out that this text had been drawn from language that had been ratified in the START Treaty. He explained that when ratified language was changed in a subsequent treaty, the ratifying bodies would focus on these changes with a view to discern if there was a change to the treaty obligations. He also voiced concern that the use of a chapeau could introduce a risk of uncertainty as to the meaning of the language. ¶22. (S) Ries expressed her appreciation for Koshelev's concern for brevity in treaty text, and she offered to keep this in mind when conducting subsequent discussions of treaty articles. As the number of meetings was limited in this negotiating session, she felt better use of the remaining time could be made in discussing the other treaty articles and sending Article XIV to the Conforming Group. Koshelev indicated he preferred that the text not go to conforming yet. ¶23. (S) Ries provided a new U.S.-proposed Joint Draft Test of Article IX in preparation for the next meeting of the TTDWG ¶24. (U) Documents exchanged. - U.S.: -- U.S.-proposed JDT of Article IX (in English and unofficial Russian),dated November 9, 2009. ¶25. (U) Participants: U.S. Amb Ries Lt Col Comeau Mr. Connell Mr. Dean Dr. Dreicer Mr. Elliott Dr. Fraley Mr. Rust Mr. Taylor Mrs. Zdravecky Mr. Sobchenko (Int) RUSSIA Mr. Koshelev Ms. Fuzhenkova Adm Kuznetsov Mr. Luchaninov Ms. Melikbekian Col Ryzhkov Mr. Smirnov Ms. Evarovskaya (Int) ¶26. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS