START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001025 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VII): (U) CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION WORKING GROUP MEETING, NOVEMBER 9, 2009 REF: GENEVA 0978 (SFO-GVA-VI-039) Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-003. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: November 9, 2009 Time: 3:30 - 5:30 P.M. Place: Russian Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) The first meeting of the Conversion or Elimination (CorE) Working Group (WG) for Session VII of the Start Follow-on (SFO) Treaty was held at the Russian Mission on November 9, 2009. The U.S CorE WG Chair, Mr. Elliott, provided and discussed the General Provisions Section of the U.S.-proposed CorE Protocol. Elliott also provided and explained a revised U.S.-proposed treaty text for Article VII. The WG was bogged down discussing specific English and Russian terms and ultimately decided to bracket most of the text in the General Provisions Section of the CorE Joint Draft Text (JDT). ¶4. (S) The WG did agree that Section VI of the CorE JDT (Other Procedures for Removal from Accountability) could be sent to the Conforming WG, as it had been agreed on the last day of the previous SFO Session (REFTEL). ¶5. (U) Subject Summary: General Provisions; and, Treaty Article VII. -------------- GENERAL PROVISIONS -------------- ¶6. (S) Elliott opened the meeting and described U.S. proposals for the content of Subsection I on General Provisions for the CorE Protocol. The U.S. side explained it had included most of the ideas that the Russian Delegation had proposed, but used fewer words. Colonel Ryzhkov said he wished to review the proposed chapeau for the overall Annex or Protocol, to determine whether the CorE Section required its own chapeau. Elliott suggested deferring discussion of the overall chapeau to the Treaty Text and Definitions WG. ¶7. (S) Ryzhkov sought clarification on the U.S. term "item" vs. the Russian term "strategic offensive arm (SOA)," which 
would be followed by the phrase "and facilities subject to the limitations of the Treaty." The Russian side felt SOA added certain necessary specificity. Elliott replied that the term "item" was more inclusive. (Begin comment: The United States has sought to employ this terminology to address fixed structures as the term SOA does not encompass fixed structures. End comment.) Both Parties discussed and tentatively agreed to delete repetitive usage of this phrase from the paragraphs in the "General Provisions" Section, since it would be included in the chapeau. ¶8. (S) The delegations generally agreed on the content of the General Provisions paragraph one on CorE notifications. They noted that the U.S. reference to a Protocol and the Russian reference to an Annex had to remain bracketed pending a decision on what to call the overall Tier 2 document. ¶9. (S) For paragraph two, on where CorE shall be carried out, Ryzhkov said Russia continued to prefer its proposed phrase "at a site determined by the Party carrying out CorE." He noted that SOA may be located only at declared facilities in any event, and recalled he had agreed to the term "at declared facilities" at the October 29 CorE WG meeting (REFTEL),but he still needed to obtain his delegation's approval. ¶10. (S) Concerning paragraph three of the General Provisions Section, Ryzhkov felt that Russia's phrase "rendered inoperable to preclude use for original purpose" was more complete and precise than the U.S.-proposed language of "rendered inoperable." Elliott explained that to render something inoperable meant that it could no longer be used for any purpose and therefore was eliminated, while the Russian phrase applied more to conversion than to elimination. Ryzhkov used the example of an eliminated mobile launcher of ICBMs, which later might be used as a crane. Under the Russian proposal, the launcher was eliminated but still usable for a purpose other than its original purpose. Ryzhkov continued that he was unsure what Russia would do with eliminated items, but wished to have the United States review the language. Elliott stated that the phrase would remain bracketed until mobile launchers had been discussed. (Begin comment: The U.S. CorE WG is awaiting guidance on a new proposal to introduce the concept of conversion for mobile launchers of ICBMs. Elliott did not want to continue discussion on a subject that could have new terminology in just a few days. End comment.) Mr. Smirnov argued further that it was not necessary to state in paragraph three that an eliminated item shall cease to be subject to the provisions of the treaty, because Russia had proposed to include such a provision in Treaty Article III. Elliott concluded that the provision should be retained in brackets until it was confirmed that it was covered in the treaty text. ¶11. (S) On paragraph four, Elliott sought clarification of the Russian statement, "Converted item must have either external or functional differences from the item prior to its conversion." He noted that external differences would be easy to confirm but functional differences might be more difficult. The U.S.-proposed language tried to capture the idea by stating that the other Party must be able to confirm the differences. ¶12. (S) Ryzhkov introduced the topic of exhibitions of converted items, asking whether they were necessary in all cases. Ryzhkov said the U.S. side had explained the principles the United States had for the first conversion of a type using procedures developed by a Party. He added that this led to the realization that both sides envisioned the same procedures, but were getting confused by the different wording used. The United States would seek to record the new procedures in the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC). An exhibition might also be necessary. Ryzhkov and Smirnov explained that Russia's vision was that some new procedures, such as exploding a missile, would not require further explanation. In other cases, the other Party might ask for clarification, so the Party carrying out the CorE would show slides and explain in the BCC how the procedures would be carried out. If accepted, a document would be finalized in the BCC. If the demonstration was considered insufficient, agreement could be reached in the BCC to conduct a one-time exhibition of the item. ¶13. (S) Elliott pointed out that the Russian sentence, "In this case, the Party, which received notification from the Party conducting the conversion or elimination about the use of such discussed procedures, shall not object to their use." could be interpreted to mean that the Party conducting the CorE could proceed without the other Party's acceptance of the procedure, leaving the Party receiving the notification without further recourse. However, since he now understood the Russian intent, the U.S. side would propose new language that expressed the intent of both sides. Ryzhkov requested that Russian paragraphs three through six and U.S. paragraphs four through five be bracketed for now, and that the U.S side consider that Russian paragraph five stipulated very clearly the tasks set forth in the treaty; specifically that, in any case, it would be required of both Parties to conduct exhibitions to confirm the completion of conversion. Elliott agreed with the concept that some form of confirmation was needed, but stated that the United States believed the provisions for such confirmation should be included in the other subsections on CorE, since they could vary depending on the item being converted or eliminated. For instance, the use of national technical means (NTM) for confirmation might be appropriate in some cases but not in others. -------------- TREATY ARTICLE VII -------------- ¶14. (S) Elliott provided the Russians with the latest U.S.-proposed text for Treaty Article VII. Ryzhkov expressed pleasure with the brevity of the proposed text. After Elliott presented the proposed text, Ryzhkov stated that the Russian version of paragraph 2 was clearer in reference to verification of CorE, while the U.S. version of paragraph 2 included only references to other parts of the treaty, including Article IX of the treaty. Ryzhkov pointed out that the U.S. version did not include verification by NTM. (Begin comment: Treaty Article IX will cover NTM. End comment.) While Ryzhkov reminded the U.S. side that Russia had agreed to remove all references to NTM throughout the CorE Protocol and include such a reference only in Article VII, he emphasized that NTM was a key mode of verification in the Russian proposal. Elliott noticed the confusion and replied that he felt it was important that Ryzhkov review Treaty Article VII carefully. It would be discussed at the next meeting of the Treaty Text and Definitions Working Group on November 11, 2009. ¶15. (U) Documents exchanged. - U.S.: -- U.S.-proposed Joint Draft Text, Section I. General Provisions of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, dated November 9, 2009; and -- U.S.-proposed Joint Draft Text, Article VII, dated November 9, 2009. ¶16. (U) Participants: U.S. Mr. Elliott Mr. Broshar Mr. Brown Mr. Dwyer LCDR Feliciano Lt Col Goodman Mr. Hanchett Mr. McConnell Ms. Purcell Dr. Hopkins (Int) RUSSIA Col Ryzhkov Mr. Ivanov Ms. Vodopolova Mr. Smirnov Mr. Shevchenko Ms. Komshilova (Int) ¶17. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS