START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001020 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VII): (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING, NOVEMBER 10, 2009 REF: STATE 115348 Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-008. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: November 10, 2009 Time: 3:30 - 5:15 P.M. Place: Russian Mission, Geneva Participants: U.S. RUSSIA A/S Gotemoeller Amb Antonov Mr. Brown Ms. Purcell -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) On November 10, 2009, Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller and the delegation Legal Adviser Mr. Brown met with Ambassador Antonov at the Russian Mission. Antonov made clear that Russia would have to submit any interim "bridging agreement" to its legislature for approval, a process that would take over six months. He noted that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Legal Department was putting together a legal evaluation of the U.S. draft (others were contributing to the political evaluation) and that he would ask the deputy chief of that department--who was arriving in Geneva on November 12--to speak with the U.S. legal advisers on the legal concerns. He also saw no benefit to Russia in such an agreement. Moreover, it would not be possible for his delegation, which would have to do all the work, to take on another negotiation at the same time as it was negotiating the new treaty. Antonov agreed that Russia could issue a unilateral statement to condition its treaty signature on the Parties' maintenance of their current level of strategic missile defenses. But he was not ready to accept the format of an exchange of Ministerial letters for commitments not to convert between offensive and defensive systems. President Medvedev had directed that such commitments be reflected in treaty text. The heads of delegation (HODs) had a preliminary discussion of Article V prohibitions, but Antonov showed no readiness to compromise before receiving a proposed text. ¶4. (U) Subject Summary: Missile Defense Opener; Negative Reaction to U.S.-Proposed Bridging Agreement; Conforming Questions; Offense-Defense Relationship; Counting Rules Again; and, Treaty Article V Prohibitions. -------------- MISSILE DEFENSE OPENER -------------- ¶5. (S) Referring to a list of potential treaty-related documents the U.S. side had provided earlier, Antonov emphasized that associated documents addressing Russia's missile defense concerns must be assigned an importance at least as high as the new treaty's Protocol, i.e., "second tier." They must not appear to be relegated to a "fourth tier" in the list of treaty documents. Gottemoeller sympathized with the concern about the optics of listing associated documents after Tier 3 documents. Antonov stated that Russia did not plan to submit the third tier documents, which he characterized as the technical annexes, for ratification, while the associated documents would be submitted for ratification. Antonov asked whether all documents and annexes associated with the treaty should be completed by February 1, 2010, and expressed his concern that some technical issues might not be solved by then. He added that perhaps after February 1 the technical working groups could continue working, but in the absence of both himself and Gottemoeller. Gottemoeller affirmed that February 1 would be the delegations' deadline for completing all the Tier 3 annexes, which led Antonov to state that it would then be necessary for the two HODs to determine the most urgent issues prior to February 1. ¶6. (S) Antonov mentioned that Ambassador Kislyak had asked for his recommendations on how to respond to Under Secretary Tauscher's proposals on missile defense cooperation, which he characterized as some sort of "affirmative arrangement." Kislyak wanted to respond to the United States by December 5. Antonov mused that it would great if a document on missile defense cooperation could be ready for signature at the same time as START Follow-on treaty signature. -------------- NEGATIVE REACTION TO U.S.- PROPOSED BRIDGING AGREEMENT -------------- ¶7. (S) Gottemoeller solicited Russia's questions about the U.S.-proposed "bridging agreement" on interim measures following START expiration (REFTEL). Antonov said that he would need to consult with MFA Legal Department Deputy Chief Dmitriy Lobach, who would arrive in Geneva on November 12. Lobach was Russian Delegation Legal Adviser Ms. Kotkova's supervisor and would be able to provide a definitive legal view of the U.S. draft on behalf of the MFA. He also needed to consult his lawyers about provisional application, which he claimed would be very difficult for Russia to do. Brown explained that the bridging arrangement was different from provisional application; the bridging measures would be temporary and therefore could be less detailed than the provisional application of certain provisions of the new treaty once signed. In addition, the bridging arrangement would not have to be ratified. ¶8. (S) Antonov interrupted Brown to assert that, for Russia, the interim arrangement would require approval by the Duma. He claimed it could not be just an agreement between heads of Government but must be an inter-state agreement subject to ratification. He then outlined the steps necessary to obtain approval of the interim arrangement: first, he had a six-month period to get an interagency approved package up to the Duma. Within that period, the MFA would send the documents to the departments and agencies most involved in the negotiations (within one month),then to the Ministry of Finance (within two months),then the Ministry of Justice (within one month),then to the legal department of the Prime Minister's office, noting that it was always possible that the whole package could be sent back to the MFA, to do it over again. After Prime Minister Putin signed off, the agreement would go to Ms. Brychyova in the Presidential State Legal Directorate ("GPU"). Finally, the President would sign it and it would go to the Duma. If the process took even a single day over six months, Antonov claimed, the Duma would reprimand him. He contrasted this process with what he admitted was a much faster route--an exchange of notes as was done under the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program--but he did not elaborate on exactly how that would work in the context of a bridging arrangement. ¶9. (S) Scanning through the text of the bridging agreement, Antonov commented that it contained some provisions that conflicted with Russia's concept for START Follow-on. These included telemetry measures, which he claimed were unacceptable and could certainly not be agreed by December 5. The inspection provisions of START Follow-on also were not yet agreed, and it was not clear what the United States had in mind for the proposed "visits" under the bridging agreement. Russian law prohibited giving inspectors access to military bases except under a ratified treaty; even the treatment of "visitors" had to go to the Duma for approval. Brown recalled there were some preliminary visits prior to START entry into force that were permitted under an executive agreement, but Antonov retorted that the legal system was different at that time. Even notifications provided to the United States were classified. Pursuant to treaties, Russia could remove the classification markings and transmit notifications to the United States, but that information could not be made public or be passed to third parties. ¶10. (S) Antonov concluded that the main point was that Russia had no ability to issue the interim agreement on December 5. He and the delegation lawyers would examine possible alternatives. Any idea approved by Lobach would be easier to submit to Foreign Minister Lavrov, as he had full authority to sign off on legal documents on behalf of the Ministry. Another option, a Government-to-Government agreement, would not be subject to ratification, but it would have to be approved interagency and analyzed by experts in the various ministries, such as the Ministry of Justice (which he noted was responsible for ensuring legal "purity") and the Prime Minister's legal department, before the Prime Minister would sign it. Such a process would take a minimum of three months. ¶11. (S) Antonov questioned what the value of the agreement would be. Gottemoeller explained it would provide a smooth transition between the expiration of START and the entry into force of the new treaty, without loss of transparency and mutual confidence. She noted in this connection also the value of the close-out exchange of Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) updates under START. She was concerned that Russia's deployment of the new RS-24 MIRVed ICBM after START expiration would produce a strong political blowback affecting ratification of the new treaty in the United States. The continuation of transparency measures was necessary to counter political arguments that might otherwise accumulate after START's verification regime expired. ¶12. (S) Antonov dismissed such concerns, claiming the deployment of the RS-24 ICBM would not, and could not, be hidden from the United States. He asked what was the real concern about a gap between December 5 and May 1: was the United States concerned about Russian violations? In that case, he suggested that the two Presidents could declare upon treaty signature that they would refrain from any acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty. Brown noted that such a commitment would likely already be presumed in accordance with customary international law, noting Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. ¶13. (S) Antonov acknowledged that the interim agreement would provide some political benefit to the United States, but said he had to write a political evaluation of the document, and he could not yet say what benefit it would provide to Russia. He noted that MFA Legal Department Chief Kolodkin was already working on the legal evaluation. He added that personally he trusted the United States to live up to its obligations and that he saw the main value of the new treaty as improving bilateral relations between our two countries. For its part, Russia was planning to implement the new treaty, not violate it. ¶14. (S) Concluding his evaluation of the U.S.-proposed bridge, Antonov stressed that it would take too much work for the Russian Delegation to deal with such a negotiation, as it would be as though the people on his delegation would be conducting two negotiations at the same time. ¶15. (S) As an aside, Antonov gave his opinion that Russia would await the U.S. lead on ratification of the START Follow-on treaty, but would ratify it as soon as the United States did so. Russia was unlikely to ratify first, because of its experience with START II. He asked how long ratification would take in the United States. Gottemoeller expressed the hope for a Senate vote on advice and consent to ratification by May 2010, which Antonov thought would require a terribly intensive work tempo to achieve. Gottemoeller noted that the United States would begin working on the ratification package immediately after signature, and Antonov promised that Russia would work equally hard on ratification. -------------- CONFORMING QUESTIONS -------------- ¶16. (S) Antonov raised questions that his delegation's Chief Translator, Mr. Artemyev, had about the Conforming Group. He provided a paper on the subject, which Artemyev had written. Antonov did not know what documents were ready for conforming yet, but sought a common understanding about the work of the Conforming Group. ¶17. (S) Begin text of Russian paper: The Conforming Group in START Treaty Negotiations The Conforming Group (as it was called) included, from each Party: the Group chair (delegation Member),senior translator-editor, legal advisor, and other translators if needed. Prior to a meeting of the Conforming Group, each Party transmits to its translators a text agreed in the relevant working group - both a U.S. text in English and our text in Russian. The translators of each Party independently conform these two texts, and afterwards take them to the meeting of the Conforming Group along with possible questions and comments for the other side. There is no proofreading aloud at the meeting. The questions and comments are discussed and agreed. The result is a finally conformed text "ad referendum" to the delegations. Question: How does the U.S. Delegation currently envision the operating procedures of the Conforming Group? After some discussion, Gottemoeller and Antonov agreed that the first meeting of the Conforming Group, to be held on Wednesday, November 11, would discuss this organization question and come to some decision on it. -------------- OFFENSE-DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP -------------- ¶18. (S) Gottemoeller turned to a set of proposed statements and side letters on the offense-defense relationship, which she had provided to Antonov in late October. Antonov said he had no problem with the unilateral statement. Russia would issue the unilateral statement and the United States would issue a statement acknowledging it. ¶19. (S) Begin text of U.S.-proposed unilateral statements: U.S. Non-Paper October 26, 2009 Statement of the Russian Federation: In connection with the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the Russian Federation states the following: The Russian Federation assumes the obligations under this Treaty under conditions that the Parties have strategic missile defense systems at the level existing at the time of Treaty signature. Statement of the United States of America: The United States takes note of the statement of the Russian Federation concerning the conditions under which the Russian Federation has assumed obligations under the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. End text. ¶20. (S) Antonov was less certain about the proposed exchange of letters between the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister containing commitments not to convert between offensive and defensive systems for which the U.S. had provided drafts on October 27. He noted that the lawyers still needed to review the texts, but the Russian side had some flexibility on the form. He suggested an additional joint statement that would address the issue of discussing the distinguishing characteristics between offensive and defensive systems within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC),explaining that the problem he faced was that President Medvedev had signed instructions that stated the issue of the distinguishing characteristics would be contained in a joint statement. However, the commitment not to convert between the two systems also had to be recorded in the treaty. Brown responded that similar commitments had been contained in letters exchanged in connection with START, and that there was no need to insist that they be recorded in the treaty itself. Antonov retorted that his proposal did not impose any limitations on missile defense within the treaty text. ¶21. (S) Begin U.S.-proposed letters: U.S. Non-Paper October 27, 2009 Exchange of Letters concerning missile defense interceptors and their launchers His Excellency Sergey V. Lavrov Minister of Foeign Affairs of the Russian Federation Moscow Dear Sergey: My arms control experts have informed me that we are making good progress in the START Follow-on negotiations in Geneva, and that many issues are on the road to resolution. However, I understand that the issue of missile defense interceptors and their launchers remains an issue at the negotiations. I know that we agree that these negotiations are about strategic offensive arms. However, havig heard the Russian Federation's stated concernsabout U.S. missile defense interceptors and their launchers, I am willing to state the following: First, the United States has no plans to covert or use ICBM and SLBM launchers for placemen of missile defense interceptors therein. Second, the United States has no plans to convert or use launchers of missile defense interceptors or placement of ICBMs or SLBMs therein. hird, the United States has no plans to give missie defense interceptors the capabilities of ICBMsand SLBMs. Finally, the United States plansto make existing types of ICBMs and SLBMs and thir launchers distinguishable from missile defense interceptors and their launchers, and will be prepared to discuss and detrmine such distinguishing characteristics withinthe framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commssion. I believe these points should allevate your concerns. Sincerely, (s) Hillary Rodham Clinton Her Excellency Hillary Rodham Clinton Secretary of State of the United States of America, Washington Dear Hillary: In response to your letter concerning missile defense interceptors and their launchers, we are prepared to accept the solution which you proposed in your letter. For its part, the Russian Federation states the following: First, the Russian Federation has no plans to convert or use ICBM and SLBM launchers for placement of missile defense interceptors therein. Second, the Russian Federation has no plans to convert or use launchers of missile defense interceptors for placement of ICBMs or SLBMs therein. Third, the Russian Federation has no plans to give missile defense interceptors the capabilities of ICBMs and SLBMs. Finally, the Russian Federation plans to make existing types of ICBMs and SLBMs and their launchers distinguishable from missile defense interceptors and their launchers, and will be prepared to discuss and determine such distinguishing characteristics within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission. In conclusion, I would like to express my satisfaction with the solution we have found to this problem. Sincerely, (s) Sergey V. Lavrov End text. -------------- COUNTING RULES AGAIN -------------- ¶22. (S) Antonov referred to the discussion the Ad Hoc Group had had that morning on counting rules. On that topic as well, even if the Russian Delegation were to agree with the U.S. logic, it could not change Russia's position because a decision had been made at the highest political level. Changing subjects, Antonov expressed concern that making a submarine accountable only when it arrived at a submarine base could create a loophole for both sides' militaries. The United States understandably had proposed limits on non-deployed mobile launchers, because that was what the United States was most concerned about. Russia had not proposed strict limits on submarines, however. ¶23. (S) Moving on to heavy bomber forces, Antonov argued that, although one weapons storage area (WSA) near an air base might be inspectable, there could be ten WSAs elsewhere where ALCMs could be hidden. It was very easy to move ALCMs between WSAs. He questioned the U.S. insistence on ALCM verification when it could not be effective. Since heavy bombers took much longer to deliver weapons than ICBMs and SLBMs, they should not be subject to identical treaty provisions. Gottemoeller noted U.S. STRATCOM's view that, when an ALCM was transferred to central storage and placed on racks with its warhead removed, it would begin to deteriorate. This was what the U.S proposed doing with most of its nuclear ALCMs. -------------- TREATY ARTICLE V PROHIBITIONS -------------- ¶24. (S) Gottemoeller informed Antonov that the United States was looking into shortening treaty Article V, since Russia had objected to the long list of prohibitions it contained and had claimed the prohibitions were contained in other existing treaties. Brown pointed out that START's Article V contained some prohibitions that went beyond those in other treaties, but he acknowledged there was some redundancy that the U.S. side was prepared to address. Antonov argued that Russia's proposed ban on the use of ICBMs or SLBMs to deliver a weapon into space obviated many of the U.S.-proposed Article V prohibitions. He proposed that perhaps the two sides could develop a joint statement that neither Party would do anything that would conflict with existing international obligations. If any questions or suspicions arose, they could be discussed in the BCC. The Parties should try to create a simplified treaty, and not repeat all the provisions contained in START. ¶25. (S) Gottemoeller explained that the U.S. Delegation was compiling a list of provisions that were not contained in any other treaties. The United States would simplify Article V, but did not want to remove all prohibitions from it. Article V needed to contain a sufficient commitment to arms control priorities to satisfy the participants in the upcoming NPT Review Conference. Antonov claimed that the Russian Federation had taken a step backwards by dropping its insistence on banning non-nuclear-armed ICBMs and SLBMs. He further remarked that there was no time left for him to return to Moscow to participate in another high-level U.S.-Russian bilateral visit seeking to resolve outstanding issues. ¶26. (S) Antonov closed by seeking Gottemoeller's views on when to issue the Joint Statement for Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine upon expiration of START. He also asked whether it should be issued jointly by the Department of State and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Gottemoeller suggested that the Presidents could issue the joint statement when they signed the START Follow-on treaty. Antonov responded with the idea that the White House and the Kremlin might issue the joint statement simultaneously upon START Follow-on treaty signature. ¶27. (S) Antonov said he had heard from reliable sources, which had been corroborated, that Ukrainian arms control official Nykonenko had claimed that the United States and Russia were going to provide Ukraine new security assurances, and he commented that he had no idea what had created the basis for such a claim. Gottemoeller said that she also had no idea where it had come from. Gottemoeller confirmed to Antonov that the United States had not provided the text of the draft joint statement to Belarus, Kazakhstan or Ukraine. Antonov indicated he would soon provide the text to representatives from these countries; Gottemoeller assented. ¶28. (U) Documents exchanged. - U.S.: -- U.S.-proposed unilateral statements on Offense-Defense, dated October 26, 2009; and -- U.S.-proposed exchange of letters concerning missile defense interceptors and their launchers, dated October 27, ¶2009. - Russia: -- Russian non-paper, "The Conforming Group in START Treaty Negotiations," undated. ¶29. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS