START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001017 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VII): (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION ONE-ON-ONE MEETING, NOVEMBER 9, 2009 REF: A. GENEVA 976 (SFO-GVA-VI-037) ¶B. STATE 115348 ¶C. GENEVA 1013 (SFO-GVA-VII-002) Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-004. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: November 9, 2009 Time: 3:30 - 5:00 P.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) On November 9, 2009, Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller met with Ambassador Antonov at the U.S. Mission. The Heads of Delegation (HODs) discussed details of the upcoming U.S. CODEL visit (Senators Feinstein and Kyl),the Russian counter-proposal on the U.S.-proposed package solution (REF A),and provisions for a potential bridging agreement (REF B). Antonov also gave details on the reports from the Russian chairs of the working groups, which included the Russian view on what major issues were still outstanding in the negotiations. ¶4. (S) Subject Summary: Upcoming CODEL Visit; More on the Russian Counter-Proposal; The Bridging Agreement; Chairs of Russian Working Groups: What Delegations Will Not Solve by December 5; Scheduling For The Week; and, Draft Outline of the Treaty. -------------- UPCOMING CODEL VISIT -------------- ¶5. (S) Gottemoeller opened the meeting by providing biographies of Senators Feinstein and Kyl to Antonov. Antonov said he would like to talk to them both during the working lunch the Russian Delegation would host on November 12, and later at the U.S.-hosted reception. Gottemoeller confirmed that the lunch would be from 1:00 to 3:00 P.M. on Thursday, November 12, and should not run any later than that because of briefings the CODEL would receive from the U.S. Delegation in the late afternoon. -------------- MORE ON THE RUSSIAN COUNTER-PROPOSAL -------------- ¶6. (S) Gottemoeller said there were two issues she would like to discuss in detail concerning the Russian counter-proposal that was made earlier in the day (REF C). The first were comments on the Russian counter-proposal to the U.S.-proposed Package Solution. ¶7. (S) Gottemoeller stated that the two sides were supposed to be working toward a reasonable compromise, thus the U.S. Delegation was "shocked" at the Russian-proposed 550 SDV limit. It was very close to what the Russians offered in July. Gottemoeller asked how the Russian side arrived at their numbers. Antonov answered that he did not participate in the President's meeting at which the Russian position was decided; it was a closed meeting. All he received was the official document reporting on the meeting's outcome, and he counted himself fortunate that it was signed by the President himself. ¶8. (S) Antonov stated that U.S. upload capability factored significantly in determining the Russian-proposed 550 SDV limit. Antonov stressed the need for predictability, and the best way to achieve that was to "grab the bull by the horns" and limit SDVs. ¶9. (S) On the interrelationship between offense and defense, Antonov said the Parties should strive to find a solution, and the details could be worked out later in separate documents. He had shown his minister, Sergei Lavrov, the draft exchange of letters that the U.S. side had prepared in the preceding round, and the minister had said that they could be the basis for a solution. He and Gottemoeller agreed that they would resume discussion of this approach on November 10. ¶10. (S) On conventionally-armed ICBMs and SLBMs, Antonov stated that Russia was more concerned with future such systems and, therefore, was willing to let the matter of a ban drop for this treaty. He said Russia did not intend to convert nuclear-armed missiles to conventionally-armed missiles. ¶11. (S) Antonov said the second big issue concerned mobile missiles and it was the most sensitive issue. He said the two Presidents may have to decide on this issue either by telephone or when they meet in Singapore on November 15. He continued that because there is so little time to finish the treaty, if the Russian President refers any matter back to his experts, it would have to be considered dead for this treaty. There would not be time to complete the interagency work in Moscow. ¶12. (S) Concerning telemetry, Antonov stated it was unfortunate that National Security Advisor General Jones did not have an opportunity to talk directly with the Minister of Defense on this issue, as only the Ministry of Defense understood the issue and cared about it. ¶13. (S) On SSGN reconversion, both Heads of Delegation agreed that this issue should not be difficult to solve. ¶14. (S) Gottemoeller pointed to a contradiction in the language of the Russian counter-proposal, in that it called for a "real picture" of warheads associated with heavy bombers, but then called for an attribution of one warhead for each deployed heavy bomber. The issue of how verification of nuclear armaments in the ALCM storage area could be accomplished is one that will not be resolved, noted Antonov. He had not even referred it for interagency consideration because not enough time is available to work it. Antonov said the U.S. proposal to continue monitoring at Votkinsk was one-sided, although the military men on his delegation had considered the idea of taking up the U.S. offer to begin continuous monitoring at Promontory, Utah, and a second site, the name of which he could not remember. However, he said, after some consideration, they decided it was not worth it. ¶15. (S) Antonov opined that if time was adequate, the joint draft text (JDT) of the treaty could be thoroughly discussed and that some solutions to points that might be dismissed due to lack of time could be found. He said he has never had to work under such time constraints. -------------- THE BRIDGING AGREEMENT -------------- ¶16. (S) Antonov inquired about the Bridging Agreement, noting that United States Ambassador to Russia Beyrle had handed it to Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov in Moscow that very afternoon. He asked if it was meant to take the place of the treaty currently under negotiation. Gottemoeller responded that it was simply an agreement to put in place general confidence-building measures for the period from when START went out of force until the new treaty could be brought into force. (Begin comment: The Russians might be slightly confused by the use of "Bridging Agreement" for this interim arrangement, since the U.S. HOD has consistently described the new START treaty as providing a bridge between START and further nuclear reduction negotiations. End comment.) Antonov asked about provisional application of the new treaty. Gottemoeller stated that provisional application of the new treaty could only be done if the treaty had been signed. She gave a copy (in English) of the proposed Bridging Agreement to Antonov, who sent it for immediate translation. Gottemoeller suggested that Karin Look could go to Moscow to work this agreement, since both Geneva delegations were so busy completing the treaty. Antonov said it would most likely be his own group in Geneva that would work the Bridging Agreement, as all of their experts were in Geneva. He said much of it could be worked out between the lawyers and suggested that Mr. Lobach' and Mr. Brown could take the lead as Ms. Kotkova is working on other matters in Moscow. He asked that all matters affecting the START negotiations be passed to the Russian START Delegation in Geneva. -------------- CHAIRS OF RUSSIAN WORKING GROUPS: WHAT DELEGATIONS WILL NOT SOLVE BY DECEMBER 5 -------------- ¶17. (S) Antonov stated that he had held a meeting with the chairs of the Russian working groups, who reported their own take on the issues they felt could not be resolved at the delegation level by December 5. Gen Maj Orlov, Memorandum of Understanding Working Group Chairman, reported their main issues were the counting rules and the ceilings on SDVs. Antonov said only the Presidents could resolve this issue, either by telephone or in Singapore. The Inspection Protocol Chairman, Col Ilin, had reported that their main issue was monitoring of mobile missiles. Ilin reported that he felt all other issues could be resolved. Col Ryzhkov, Conversion or Elimination Working Group Chairman, reported that their main issues were elimination of mobile missiles and the intrusiveness of the verification regime. ¶18. (S) Gottemoeller noted that Antonov had mentioned no particular issues with the treaty text itself but, for the U.S. side, Article V and the bans that it contained on modes of deployment and new kinds of weapons were very important. She suggested that she and Antonov take up this issue directly in their one-on-one discussion on November 10. Antonov agreed. Gottemoeller said she agreed that the delegations can solve all of the issues themselves, except for the SDV ceiling and monitoring of mobile missiles. -------------- SCHEDULING FOR THE WEEK -------------- ¶19. (S) The HODs confirmed the schedule for the remainder of the week. At 3:30 P.M. on November 10, they would discuss the issue of the relationship of offensive and defensive strategic offensive arms, which Gottemoeller believed could be resolved at the delegation level. Treaty Article V could also be discussed. -------------- DRAFT OUTLINE OF THE TREATY -------------- ¶20. (S) Gottemoeller gave Antonov a notional outline (text follows bnlow) of the treaty and said the United States had based it on the Russian-proposed format. She said that if the issue of the outline was resolved, many items of bracketed text could be resolved. Antonov stated that the outline looked good and logical, but fell short of accepting it outright, saying he wanted to check it with his lawyers. Begin text: Notional Outline of the Complete START Follow-on Treaty Structure Treaty 17 - 18 Articles - Including central limits, counting rules, verification obligations, etc. Protocol to the Treaty Sections: - 1. Terms and Definitions - 2. Database and Reporting Requirements Regarding Strategic Offensive Arms - 3. Conversion or Elimination - 4. Notifications - 5. Inspections, Visits, and Exhibitions - 6. Bilateral Implementation and Consultative Commission - 7. Telemetry Technical Annexes to the Protocol Section A: Database Section B: Conversion or Elimination Section C: Notifications Section D: Inspections Section E: Telemetry Associated Documents Joint/agreed statements Unilateral statements Letters Related agreements Etc( End text. ¶21. (S) Antonov noted that the Joint Understanding from the July Moscow Summit included a range for SDVs (500-1100). He noted that he would like to settle on a single number in the actual treaty, rather than a range. ¶22. (S) Gottemoeller raised the issue of telemetry, referring to the Russian counter-proposal to the U.S.-proposed Package Solution. She asked if the Russian side was objecting to the continuation of START procedures, or to the actual ban on telemetry itself. Antonov stated that the Russian side did not want even the ban on telemetry encryption. When Gottemoeller noted that this ban had been in place since SALT II and the two Parties should not want to be seen as backsliding in this treaty, Antonov complained that a presentation by Col Novikov was ignored and that the previous Administration had done much to make the situation worse. Gottemoeller reiterated that the real issue was about the quality of this new agreement, and how the two Parties should bear that in mind, particularly as the NPT Review Conference is approaching. ¶23. (U) Documents exchanged. - U.S. -- U.S.-proposed draft Memorandum of Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation Regarding Certain Interim Measures Relating to Their Strategic Offensive Arms, dated November 6, 2009; and -- Notional Outline of the Complete START Follow-on Treaty Structure. ¶24. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS