START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001016

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE-011, MODIFIED
PROCEDURES FOR THE ELIMINATION OF MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF
INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES (ICBMS)

REF: A. STATE 99070 (SFO-V GUIDANCE-003-PART 1 OF 2)

B. STATE 99072 (SFO-V GUIDANCE-003-PART 2 IOF 2)

C. STATE 108618 (SFO-VI GUIDANCE-002)

D. GENEVA 918 (SFO-GVA-VI-004)

E. GENEVA 914 (SFO-GVA-VI-016)

F. GENEVA 951 (SF0-GVA-VI-024)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VI-056 - REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE-011.

--------------
SUMMARY AND GUIDANCE REQUESTED
--------------



2. (S) U.S.-proposed elimination procedures for mobile
launchers of ICBMs are specific and require inspectors on
site to observe the final cut of the elimination process for
the launcher. The Russian side argues that these procedures
for mobile launchers of ICBMs are overly burdensome to the
Russian Federation and excessive.


3. (S) In an effort to find common ground for negotiation of
mobile ICBM launchers, the delegation members have developed
an alternative approach for conversion and elimination of
mobile ICBM launchers. The alternate approach would provide
for more stringent elimination procedures for the mobile ICBM
launchers that could be verified by NTM only, and adds a new
conversion procedure designed to allow the converting Party
to render the launcher incapable of launching an ICBM, but in
a manner permitting the remaining vehicle to be used for
purposes not inconsistent with the treaty. The procedures
for the conversion of mobile ICBM launchers align more
closely with other conversion procedures in the U.S.-proposed
protocol. The remaining vehicle would be subject to
inspection to preclude reconversion in a manner similar to
that for converted heavy bombers.


4. (S) Background and analysis is in paragraphs 5-10. Split
recommendation is in Paragraph 11. Guidance requested is in
paragraph 12.

--------------
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
--------------


5. (S) U.S.-proposed elimination procedures for mobile ICBM
launchers are very specific and require inspectors on-site to
observe the final cut of the elimination process (i.e.,
cutting off the mountings for the stabilizing jacks, cutting
off the mounting for the erector-launcher mechanism, and
severing of the last 0.78 meters of the chassis) (REF C).
Some delegation members believe these procedures confuse the
concepts of "conversion" and "elimination" by characterizing
as "elimination" procedures designed to "convert" mobile ICBM
launchers into vehicles used for other military or civilian
purposes not inconsistent with the new START Follow-on (SFO)
treaty and such that the "conversion" is considered to be
sufficiently permanent to allow the item to no longer be
subject to the treaty. The Russian side argues that the



elimination procedures proposed by the United States are
overly burdensome to the Russian Federation. The Russian
side asserts as well that simplified elimination procedures
could effectively render the launcher incapable of launching
ICBMs; could be verified by national technical means (NTM);
and could be accomplished without requiring the presence of
U.S. inspectors during the conversion or elimination process.
(REFS E and F)


6. (S) The Russian side's most recent proposal would require
only removal or destruction of the launcher-erector
mechanism, or other procedures developed by the Party
carrying out the elimination, which would be demonstrated
only if the other Party raised an objection. Current U.S.
guidance does not include this option for mobile ICBM
launchers. The Russian proposal does not require agreement
by the other Party to one's planned conversion or elimination
procedures, only that the Party planning to implement the new
procedures attempt to persuade the other Party of its
effectiveness. The Russian side claims they intend to use
eliminated mobile ICBM launchers for various purposes,
including as cranes to support construction and to lay oil
pipe; therefore, they do not want to remove the stabilizing
jacks or cut off the last 0.78 meters off the chassis from
the residual vehicle. (REF F)


7. (S) START and both the U.S.- and Russian-proposed
approaches for SFO would allow the vehicle remaining after
"elimination" of the launcher to be used only for purposes
not inconsistent with the treaty. But, because the launcher
is "eliminated," there is no further monitoring of the
remaining vehicle upon completion of the elimination process.
Some delegation members propose to distinguish between
conversion and elimination measures to be applied to mobile
ICBM launchers similar to the U.S.-proposed conversion
procedures for nuclear heavy bombers converted to non-nuclear
heavy bombers.


8. (S) In an effort to reach agreement on conversion or
elimination procedures for mobile ICBM launchers while
maintaining an effective verification regime, some delegation
members have developed an alternative approach for conversion
of mobile launchers of ICBMs. The alternative approach would
provide a more stringent elimination procedure for mobile
launchers that could be verified by NTM, and add a new
conversion procedure designed to allow the converting Party
to render the launcher incapable of launching an ICBM, while
allowing use of the remaining vehicle for purposes not
inconsistent with the treaty, but in a fashion not
sufficiently permanent to be considered an elimination. The
remaining converted launcher would remain subject to
provisions of the treaty in order to guard against
reconversion in a fashion similar to procedures being
negotiated regarding converted heavy bombers. These
procedures would provide Russia flexibility for conversion of
mobile ICBM launchers while offering protection against any
attempt to re-convert the former mobile launcher, by
requiring the Russian Federation to: 1) report the location
of the converted launchers in the Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU); and 2) provide the opportunity for exhibitions of the
converted items. If Russia adopts this approach, we will
need to develop exhibition procedures for items that may be



at facilities not normally subject to inspections, possibly
at remote sites, and possibly under the control of
organizations that have no connection to the Russian military.

--------------
ELIMINATION
--------------


9. S) Some delegation members propose a more stringent
elimination procedure for mobile launchers of ICBMs that
would build on the current provisions calling for removal of
the mountings of the erector-launcher mechanism and the
launcher leveling supports. The new procedure would also
require the vehicle chassis be cut into two roughly equal
sections. Eliminated mobile launchers for ICBMs would remain
in the open to be verified by NTM for a specified period of
time following elimination. This approach, while
significantly more demanding than the currently-proposed
procedures, would be verifiable by NTM and should obviate the
need for any form of U.S. on-site inspection. Other
delegation members believe the current U.S.-proposed
elimination concept and procedures (removal and destruction
of the launcher-erector mechanism, cutting off the leveling
jacks, and cutting off 0.78 meters for the chassis) render
the vehicle incapable of launching an ICBM and, therefore, do
not need to be tracked in the MOU or inspected after
confirmation of elimination.

--------------
CONVERSION
--------------


10. (S) The new conversion procedure would use many of the
procedures from the current U.S.-proposed process for
elimination, including removal of the mountings of the
erector-launcher mechanism and cutting off a portion of the
self-propelled launcher chassis aft of the rear axle that is
at least 0.78 meters in length at a location not obviously a
joint. Mobile launchers for ICBMs being converted would be
subject to the central limit on strategic delivery vehicles
until the completion of the conversion process was verified
by inspector observation of the final cut removing the
erector-launcher mechanism. Converted mobile launchers for
ICBMs would remain subject to the broader limitations of the
treaty indefinitely. That is, the converted ICBM launchers
could be listed in the MOU as strategic offensive arms (SOA)
converted for purposes other than employing nuclear
armaments, and would remain subject to possible exhibition at
the request of the other Party to guard against
re-conversion. This new approach draws upon the methodology
used for conversion of SSGNs or heavy bombers to render them
incapable of being used for its original purpose while stll
allowing the launcher to be used for various ilitary or
civilian purposes not inconsistent wih the SFO treaty, but
where the procedures are no sufficiently permanent to be
considered eliminaion.

--------------
SPLIT RECOMMENDATIO
--------------


11. (S) Some delegatio members believe the revised



procedures proposed above could provide effective
verification of mobile ICBM launcher conversion and
elimination and may provide a solid basis for agreement on
these procedures with the Russians, in part because the
proposed procedures are consistent with the types of steps
that have already been accepted for the conversion of SSBNs
and heavy bombers and are responsive to the major concerns
the Russian side has raised. However, other delegation
members believe there is a risk that the proposed
conversation process for mobile launchers of ICBMs will be
difficult, if not impossible, to monitor because if the
conversion process is similar to the U.S. conversion process
for heavy bombers, there is no current requirement to list
the location of the launchers in the MOU or update the MOU
with notifications of the movement of the converted
launchers. Even if the launchers were listed in the MOU and
updated with notifications, it would require monitoring many
areas not normally monitored for military equipment and
identifying individual equipment located with similar
equipment not covered by the treaty.

--------------
GUIDANCE REQUESTED
--------------


12. (S) The delegation requests that Washington evaluate the
proposal of revised procedures for the conversion and
elimination of mobile launchers for ICBMs and provide
guidance to the delegation on how to proceed.


13. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS