START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 001013 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/11/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VII): (U) PLENARY MEETING, NOVEMBER 9, 2009 REF: GENEVA 0976 (SFO-GVA-VI-037) Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-002. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: November 9, 2009 Time: 10:00 - 11:00 A.M. Place: Russian Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) The Russian side presented its response to the package proposal conveyed by U.S. National Security Advisor General Jones to the Russian Federation on October 28, 2009. (Begin comment: U.S. proposal was also conveyed to the Russian Delegation in Geneva on October 29, 2009 (REF A). End comment.) ¶4. (S) The Russian side accepted the U.S. proposals for an aggregate limit of 1600 deployed warheads and a "permit and count" approach to ballistic missiles in a non-nuclear configuration. The Russian side stated that it would drop its insistence for a third aggregate limit on non-deployed launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs if the U.S. side would accept the revised warhead limit of 1600 and the revised strategic delivery vehicle (SDV) limit of 550. ¶5. (S) The Russian side proposed an increase in the number of inspections from 10 to 16. They also asked that treaty prohibitions on conversion of ICBM or SLBM launchers to missile defense interceptor launchers and vice versa appear in the treaty text. Additionally, the Russian side refused to consider any special verification provisions pertaining only to mobile ICBMs, would not acknowledge any special difficulty in monitoring mobile ICBMs, refused a continued ban on the encryption of telemetry using procedures similar to START. Finally, they stated that the four converted Trident I SSGNs remain subject to additional on-going verification measures. Regarding counting rules, the Russian side also proposed that each deployed heavy bomber be attributed with one nuclear warhead. ¶6. (S) The U.S. side agreed to study the Russian proposal and prepare a response, but immediately characterized the 
Russian-proposed SDV limit of 550 as "not acceptable." The U.S. side noted that both sides were committed to completion of the work on the new treaty by December 5, 2009. The U.S. side also noted a difference still remained on the issue of a verification regime for road-mobile ICBMs, as well as differing views on the value of continuing the ban on encryption for flight tests for ICBMs and SLBMs. On a positive note, the U.S. side said that it was welcome news that Russia considered a larger quota on the number of inspections, but the increase was far below what was needed by the U.S. side. ¶7. (U) Subject Summary: The Focus of the Final Round; The Russian Counter-Proposal; U.S. Reaction; Two Important Dates; and, Russian Compromise Significant. -------------- THE FOCUS OF THE FINAL ROUND -------------- ¶8. (S) Amb Antonov opened the meeting by emphasizing the intention of the Russian Delegation to work constructively with its U.S. counterparts on the way forward to completing the new treaty by December 5, 2009. ¶9. (S) A/S Gottemoeller responded that the sides had entered the decisive and concluding round of negotiations and the U.S. side was ready for intensive work. She asserted that the United States was also looking forward to our Presidents signing documents on December 5th. Recalling a recent public statement by an unnamed administration official regarding the package presented by General Jones, she stated that the negotiations were headed to a conclusion based on "judicious compromise," and the United States was looking for an outcome in keeping with both nations' security interests. ¶10. (S) Antonov observed that the U.S. and Russian Presidents were scheduled to meet in Singapore on November 15, 2009, and commented that, if the negotiating teams were unable to resolve certain topics during the coming week, he was sure the political leaders would speed the talks to their resolution. -------------- THE RUSSIAN COUNTER-PROPOSAL -------------- ¶11. (S) Antonov presented the Russian counter-proposal to the U.S. compromise offer. He emphasized that the Russian side had worked very hard on the U.S. proposal to find the most positive aspects and to develop the other American ideas. He reminded the U.S. Delegation that the Russian side had proceeded in accordance with Russian national security interests, and stressed that the Russian counter-proposal had been confirmed and accepted at the highest political level. Finally, the Russian side had attempted to mirror the structure of the original U.S. proposal in framing its answer. Begin text (Russian Counter-proposal): Official Translation To be transmitted to the U.S. Side Document of the Russian Side November 9, 2009 Russian Counter-Proposals on the U.S. Proposed Package of Solutions of October 28, 2009, for Core Issues in the New START Treaty ¶1. Numerical limits on strategic offensive arms: - Limit on warheads: 1600 warheads. - Limit on strategic delivery vehicles: 550. - If such ceilings are established, the Russian side is prepared to abandon a separate limit of 600 on deployed and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers. - Counting rules shall be recorded in the Treaty that reflect a real picture of the deployed strategic offensive arms available to the sides and, in particular, of heavy bombers. The provision on counting one nuclear warhead for each deployed heavy bomber, which is a carrier of nuclear armaments, shall be included. ¶2. Non-nuclear ICBMs and SLBMs: The Russian side withdraws its demand for the inclusion of a provision in the new treaty banning deployed non-nuclear ICBMs and SLBMs. The Sides shall agree on the formulation in the Treaty to include all converted, existing, and newly developed non-nuclear ICBMs and SLBMs in the overall limit on strategic delivery vehicles, and to include their associated warheads in the overall limit on warheads established for each side. ¶3. The relationship between strategic offensive arms and missile defense: The Russian side agrees with the U.S. proposal on how to record the existence of a relationship between strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms in a package of documents, which will form future agreements (treaty, joint statement, and a unilateral statement of the Russian Federation) with two changes. - A requirement not to convert ICBM or SLBM launchers into interceptor-missile launchers of a missile defense system and vice versa throughout the entire duration of the Treaty shall be included in the Treaty text because it is directly linked to its subject matter; - The Parties shall include in the joint statement a provision on the intention to discuss the unique features of newly developed types of missile defense interceptors, which would distinguish them from existing ICBMs and SLBMs. ¶4. Mobile ICBM Verification Regime: The Russian side does not agree with the use of a limited number of verification measures that would apply only to mobile ICBMs and their launchers. The Russian side also does not recognize special difficulties in tracking these missile systems. ¶5. The ban on encryption of telemetry data for flight tests of ICBMs and SLBMs, using similar procedures to those contained in START, shall not be introduced. ¶6. The Russian side agrees to an increase in the number of inspection events for confirmation of the Treaty verification parameters (the number of deployed delivery vehicles and warheads) and inspections of non-deployed strategic offensive arms from 10 to 16. Additional verification procedures for the four "Ohio" class SSBNs, which are to be converted for non-nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles, shall be agreed upon. Within the framework of the annual quota, such procedures would confirm that the capability to deploy ballistic missiles is not being restored on these SSBNs. End text. -------------- U.S. REACTION -------------- ¶12. (S) Gottemoeller stated that the Russian counter-proposal contained some interesting items of a positive nature and some "not so interesting" items. She offered her initial concerns with the Russian counter-proposal. She noted that the U.S. offer presented in Moscow was a package deal. The Russian-proposed limit of 550 SDVs was unacceptable. The United States had proposed a compromise of 800 SDVs and, at this level, the Parties would not need a separate limit for non-deployed launchers. ¶13. (S) Gottemoeller agreed that the counting rule for heavy bombers was complicated and required further discussion. The Russian proposal to remove the ban on ICBMs and SLBMs in non-nuclear configurations was positive news. In terms of the interrelationship between missile defense and offensive strategic arms, she reiterated the U.S. position that this should be addressed only in the treaty's preamble. She noted that worthwhile discussion regarding this subject had begun at the heads of delegation level, and that this dialogue should continue. ¶14. (S) Gottemoeller noted that a difference still remained on the issue of a verification regime for road-mobile systems, as well as differing views on the value of continuing the ban on encryption for flight tests for ICBMs and SLBMs. On a positive note, she said that it was welcome news that Russia considered a larger annual quota on the number of inspections. -------------- TWO IMPORTANT DATES: NOVEMBER 15TH AND DECEMBER 5TH -------------- ¶15. (S) Antonov stated that his respect for Gottemoeller as a brave negotiator had increased because of her immediate response to the Russian President's counter-proposal. He offered that the Russian side was ready to work at all levels to resolve any differences and stated what was most important was to sign the new treaty by December 5th, as directed by the two Presidents. ¶16. (S) Gottemoeller replied that her instructions were also approved by the U.S. President, and noted some areas of common interest. First, the Presidents of both sides had repeated their intent that the new treaty would be signed by December 5, 2009. Second, both sides now had a precise mutual understanding where difficulties still remained. And, finally, the job of each delegation was to analyze what was required to resolve the existing differences and request instructions from their respective capitals. ¶17. (S) Antonov again reminded Gottemoeller that the Presidents would meet in Singapore on November 15, 2009, and Russian senior leadership would help resolve any issues that the delegations could not resolve. Dr. Warner noted the SDV limit did not correspond to how U.S. forces had been developed and would continue to be developed in the future. He noted the increase in the number of inspections in the Russian counter-proposal; however, the new number was still well short of that needed by the United States He said that heavy bomber counting rules remained a key issue and noted that the Russian side had officially tabled its support of attribution. This position had previously been discussed with the U.S. side on an informal basis. -------------- RUSSIAN COMPROMISE SIGNIFICANT -------------- ¶18. (S) Antonov stated any compromise in the number of inspections had to address the issue of the relationship of the compromise to the national security of both sides. The Russian side had considered this relationship when developing its decision to increase the number of inspections from 10 to ¶16. He noted that the Russian side had stated its concern with the U.S. approach to counting heavy bomber nuclear armaments several times during the previous negotiating session. As a result, the Russian side proposed to attribute only one nuclear warhead to each heavy bomber. ¶19. (S) Antonov emphasized the Russian counter-proposal to increase the inspection quota from 10 to 16 was a significant increase and that, although the Russian President had publicly advocated an SDV limit of 500, Russia had offered a compromise. He agreed to continue discussion on these issues, including talking to Gottemoeller about the offense-defense language, and recommended that the Russian counter-proposal be analyzed by the U.S. Delegation. ¶20. (U) Documents exchanged. - Russia: -- Russian Counter-Proposals on the U.S.-Proposed Package of Solutions of October 28, 2009, for Core Issues in the New START Treaty, passed to the U.S. side on November 9, 2009 in the original Russian with unofficial English translation. ¶21. (U) Participants: U.S. A/S Gottemoeller Amb Ries LCDR Brons Mr. Broshar Mr. Brown Mr. Buttrick Lt Col Comeau Mr. Connell Mr. Dean Mr. DeNinno Mr. Dwyer Mr. Elliott Mr. Hanchett Mr. Johnston Mr. McConnell Mr. Siemon Mr. Taylor Mr. Trout Dr. Warner Ms. Zdravecky Ms. Gross (Int) Dr. Hopkins (Int) Mr. Sobchenko (Int) RUSSIA Amb Antonov Mr. Koshelev Mr. Artemiev Ms. Chernyavskaya Ms. Fuzhenkova Col Ilin Mr. Ivanov Ms. Ivanova Mr. Kamenskiy Adm Kuznetsov Mr. Lobach Mr. Luchaninov Ms. Melikbekian Ms. Mursankova Gen Orlov Gen Poznihir Mr. Pischulov Col Ryzhkov Mr. Shevchenko Mr. Smirnov Ms. Vodopolova Mr. Vorontsov Col Zaitsev Ms. Evarovskaya (Int) ¶22. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS