Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09GABORONE372
2009-05-13 14:01:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Gaborone
Cable title:
SADC: "DRIVE-BY DEMARCHE" DELIVERED
VZCZCXRO3415 PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHRN DE RUEHOR #0372 1331401 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 131401Z MAY 09 FM AMEMBASSY GABORONE TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5759 INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0401 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0216 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0422
C O N F I D E N T I A L GABORONE 000372
SIPDIS
STATE FOR AF/S, AF/E
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2019
TAGS: PREL PHUM SADC MA BC
SUBJECT: SADC: "DRIVE-BY DEMARCHE" DELIVERED
REF: A. GABORONE 371
B. STATE 45783
Classified By: Ambassador Stephen J. Nolan for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L GABORONE 000372
SIPDIS
STATE FOR AF/S, AF/E
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2019
TAGS: PREL PHUM SADC MA BC
SUBJECT: SADC: "DRIVE-BY DEMARCHE" DELIVERED
REF: A. GABORONE 371
B. STATE 45783
Classified By: Ambassador Stephen J. Nolan for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary: After a solid week of calls and letters to
the SADC Secretariat in Gaborone requesting a meeting with
the SADC Executive Secretary, Ambassador Nolan was fortunate
to make a rare sighting of the elusive Dr. Tomaz Salomao May
13 at a meeting and luncheon for resident Chiefs of Mission
hosted by the Nigerian High Commission. (Salomao only
returned Monday May 11 from his latest travels.) Though
Salomao arrived late and slipped out of the event before
lunch was served, Ambassador Nolan managed to buttonhole
Salomao and deliver the demarche. As the meeting concluded
and the diplomats retired to an adjoining room for lunch, the
Ambassador engaged Salomao as he was leaving, and with a copy
of a non-paper in hand, he managed to deliver a "drive-by
demarche" to him in the parking lot. He briefed Salomao
regarding the USG's concerns about the need for
internationally supervised elections in 2009 and discouraged
unhelpful talk about use of the SADC Brigade in Madagascar
(Ref B). End Summary.
2. (C) Dr. Salomao made no substantive response to the
demarche and did not provide any new information regarding
SADC's views on an election timeline for Madagascar. He did
however indicate that SADC needs to be "pragmatic" in
resolving the Madagascar situation. The Ambassador told
Salomao that he would still like to have an office call with
him soon to follow up on Madagascar and other pending
business, and the Executive Secretary agreed in principle
with this idea, but suggested no concrete time for such a
meeting.
3. (C) The Ambassador also spoke briefly with the Mozambican
High Commissioner about Madagascar and SADC's actions to
resolve the political crisis there. The High Commissioner
said that it is important that SADC align its policy more
closely with that of the African Union and do all it can to
promote dialog in Madagascar. He also indicated that SADC
has informally told Ravalomanana that use of the SADC Brigade
is out of the question. He reiterated the sentiment of
Botswana's Foreign Minister (Ref A) that Ravalomanana is "out
of touch" and said that Mozambique supports new elections in
Madagascar "the sooner, the better."
4. (C) Comment: Obtaining meetings at SADC, whether with
technical experts and department heads or the Executive
Secretary is often a frustrating and time-consuming process.
SADC officials travel frequently, do not return
calls/letters/emails, and seem incapable of sharing
information with or delegating actions to their subordinates.
For instance, Embassy officers (FO, POLE, and OSC) have been
unable to pry any response or information out of SADC in
response to the January 2009 Presidential Declaration on
security cooperation with SADC. Though several hundred
people work at the Secretariat headquarters less than a mile
from our Embassy, it generally feels like no one is home at
SADC. Various GOB officials have privately made the same
complaint to us -- though Botswana is a member state and
hosts the Secretariat, the GOB frequently feels ignored or
stonewalled by Secretariat staff, which they regard as
ineffectual anyway. Despite these hurdles, we will redouble
our efforts to engage the Secretariat on this and other
important issues. We would also recommend, however, that any
urgent peace and security issues be brought to the attention
of all regional SADC capitals, especially those of the Organ
Troika, to assure that USG messages reach the real decision
makers in timely fashion. End Comment.
NOLAN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR AF/S, AF/E
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2019
TAGS: PREL PHUM SADC MA BC
SUBJECT: SADC: "DRIVE-BY DEMARCHE" DELIVERED
REF: A. GABORONE 371
B. STATE 45783
Classified By: Ambassador Stephen J. Nolan for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary: After a solid week of calls and letters to
the SADC Secretariat in Gaborone requesting a meeting with
the SADC Executive Secretary, Ambassador Nolan was fortunate
to make a rare sighting of the elusive Dr. Tomaz Salomao May
13 at a meeting and luncheon for resident Chiefs of Mission
hosted by the Nigerian High Commission. (Salomao only
returned Monday May 11 from his latest travels.) Though
Salomao arrived late and slipped out of the event before
lunch was served, Ambassador Nolan managed to buttonhole
Salomao and deliver the demarche. As the meeting concluded
and the diplomats retired to an adjoining room for lunch, the
Ambassador engaged Salomao as he was leaving, and with a copy
of a non-paper in hand, he managed to deliver a "drive-by
demarche" to him in the parking lot. He briefed Salomao
regarding the USG's concerns about the need for
internationally supervised elections in 2009 and discouraged
unhelpful talk about use of the SADC Brigade in Madagascar
(Ref B). End Summary.
2. (C) Dr. Salomao made no substantive response to the
demarche and did not provide any new information regarding
SADC's views on an election timeline for Madagascar. He did
however indicate that SADC needs to be "pragmatic" in
resolving the Madagascar situation. The Ambassador told
Salomao that he would still like to have an office call with
him soon to follow up on Madagascar and other pending
business, and the Executive Secretary agreed in principle
with this idea, but suggested no concrete time for such a
meeting.
3. (C) The Ambassador also spoke briefly with the Mozambican
High Commissioner about Madagascar and SADC's actions to
resolve the political crisis there. The High Commissioner
said that it is important that SADC align its policy more
closely with that of the African Union and do all it can to
promote dialog in Madagascar. He also indicated that SADC
has informally told Ravalomanana that use of the SADC Brigade
is out of the question. He reiterated the sentiment of
Botswana's Foreign Minister (Ref A) that Ravalomanana is "out
of touch" and said that Mozambique supports new elections in
Madagascar "the sooner, the better."
4. (C) Comment: Obtaining meetings at SADC, whether with
technical experts and department heads or the Executive
Secretary is often a frustrating and time-consuming process.
SADC officials travel frequently, do not return
calls/letters/emails, and seem incapable of sharing
information with or delegating actions to their subordinates.
For instance, Embassy officers (FO, POLE, and OSC) have been
unable to pry any response or information out of SADC in
response to the January 2009 Presidential Declaration on
security cooperation with SADC. Though several hundred
people work at the Secretariat headquarters less than a mile
from our Embassy, it generally feels like no one is home at
SADC. Various GOB officials have privately made the same
complaint to us -- though Botswana is a member state and
hosts the Secretariat, the GOB frequently feels ignored or
stonewalled by Secretariat staff, which they regard as
ineffectual anyway. Despite these hurdles, we will redouble
our efforts to engage the Secretariat on this and other
important issues. We would also recommend, however, that any
urgent peace and security issues be brought to the attention
of all regional SADC capitals, especially those of the Organ
Troika, to assure that USG messages reach the real decision
makers in timely fashion. End Comment.
NOLAN