GOB ON MADAGASCAR DEMARCHE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 GABORONE 000371 SIPDIS STATE FOR AF/S, AF/E ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/2019 TAGS: PREL PHUM MA BC SUBJECT: GOB ON MADAGASCAR DEMARCHE REF: STATE 45783 Classified By: Ambassador Stephen J. Nolan for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Ambassador Nolan met with Botswana Foreign Minister Phandu Skelemani on May 11 to deliver reftel Madagascar demarche. Ambassador was accompanied by Pol/Econ Chief and Skelemani was accompanied by MFA Director for Europe and the Americas Mr. Nkoloi Nkoloi. Because Minister Skelemani traveled to Cuba for a Non-Aligned Movement meeting and Brazil, he was not available to meet sooner to receive our demarche. Skelemani offered useful insights and his opinion on how deposed President Ravalomanana remains "out of touch" to what has transpired and oblivious to SADC processes and procedures. Skelemani seemed to imply that use of the SADC brigade in Madagascar would be a non-starter. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Skelemani listened intently to the demarche points, but made no specific reply. However, he offered some interesting background information about the inner workings of SADC and comments on his views on Ravalomanana. First, Foreign Minister Skelemani noted that the SADC fact-finding delegation which was sent to Madagascar has returned but has not yet reported its findings. Per Skelemani, the delegation must first submit its report to the Organ Troika, then the Troika must process the report before calling a full SADC summit to make decisions on policy toward Madagascar. Skelemani said that he was not sure when a summit might take place, but he hoped to call SADC Executive Secretary Salomao later on May 11 to inquire. According to Skelemani, deposed Madagascar President Ravalomanana had been pushing SADC to hold a summit quickly, perhaps in Pretoria on May 10, but his proposal was not acted upon because the necessary preparatory work has not been completed, and there was no point having a summit if the leaders would not have accurate information from the SADC fact-finding team to consider. ¶3. (C) Minister Skelemani and President Khama both attended the May 9 inauguration of Jacob Zuma in Pretoria. Skelemani reported that Ravalomanana also attended the inauguration, and at the event he continued to lobby SADC leaders to urge them to hold a kind of impromptu summit on the margins of the inauguration, perhaps on May 10. According to Skelemani, former South African President Thabo Mbeki spoke to Ravalomanana during the inaugural celebrations and offered to bring him directly to President Zuma to push for an immediate SADC summit. Skelemani seemed surprised that Mbeki became involved, and it was not clear why he went out of his way to try to help Ravalomanana. Ravalomanana also approached President Khama in Pretoria to push for an immediate summit. However, Skelemani reports that Khama told Ravalomanana that it was not appropriate to have a summit yet, as SADC leaders would not have sufficient information to take any useful decisions or action. Foreign Minister Skelemani said that President Khama then approached President Zuma before Mbeki/Ravalomanana could reach him, and Khama reportedly told Zuma that there is no point in having a SADC summit until the report of Madagascar fact-finding team has been submitted and then processed by the Organ Troika. Also, Khama reportedly told Zuma that he should not disrupt his festivities (especially when he had so many VIP guests to attend to) with SADC business. Per Skelemani, Zuma agreed with Khama's points and later said "no" to Ravalomanana's request. ¶4. (C) Helpfully, Minister Skelemani said that SADC "must be pragmatic" and read the situation on the ground as it decides what to do about Madagascar. (Note: This seemed a clear signal that he personally agrees with the USG position-- though he did not come out and say he supports early elections or is against use of the brigade). Always legal-minded, the Foreign Minister noted that according to SADC's own protocols, they may not use their brigade without the express agreement of the African Union and the UN Security Council. He seemed to imply that this would mean the use of the SADC brigade in Madagascar would be a non-starter. ¶5. (C) Foreign Minister Skelemani complained repeatedly that Ravalomanana is out of touch, and that he "still believes he can just take a brigade and immediately be reinstated." Skelemani said that Ravalomanana "has no idea what is GABORONE 00000371 002 OF 002 happening on the ground, only knows what he sees on CNN, and is totally cut off, isolated." Skelemani also said that Ravalomanana seems to have no idea what the SADC protocols require, and that Ravalomanana believes that if President Zuma or the Swazi King agree to give him SADC troops, he can immediately return to Antananarivo and resume his presidency. Skelemani seemed shocked at this naivety and lack of understanding of SADC processes and procedures. ¶6. (C) The Ambassador asked the Foreign Minister whether he had heard anything about a letter from the Swazi King to President Obama or a proposed, Swazi-led SADC delegation to Washington to discuss Madagascar. Skelemani was not aware of either of these initiatives. NOLAN