SIERRA LEONE STABILITY, PART III: SECURITY SECTOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 FREETOWN 000471 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF/W E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2019 TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL PINS SNAR KCOR SL SUBJECT: SIERRA LEONE STABILITY, PART III: SECURITY SECTOR REF: A. FREETOWN 465 ¶B. FREETOWN 466 ¶C. FREETOWN 34 ¶D. FREETOWN 393 ¶E. FREETOWN 424 ¶F. FREETOWN 462 ¶G. FREETOWN 400 ¶H. FREETOWN 435 FREETOWN 00000471 001.3 OF 003 Classified By: Political/Economic Officer Amy LeMar for reasons 1.4 (b/ d) ¶1. (C) Summary: This cable is the third in a four-part series (reftels A/B) that highlights risks to Sierra Leone's stability. Given recent events in the sub-region and Sierra Leone's own blighted history, the ability of the security sector to maintain peace is an ongoing, critical concern. While capacity and budgeting issues are well-documented (reftel C),expected shake-ups in the civilian arm of the security apparatus could pose a new threat to their efficacy, with leadership changes anticipated in the Office of National Security (ONS),Sierra Leone Police (SLP),and the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC). Agencies here often succeed or fail based on the actions and integrity of their leaders; the potential for Sierra Leone to backslide into instability is high if the coming period of transition within ONS, SLP, and the ACC is not properly managed. This could be particularly deleterious as the country sets its sights on the 2012 elections. End Summary. -------------- ONS: THE OFFICE WE CAN'T AFFORD TO LOSE -------------- ¶2. (SBU) ONS, the umbrella agency that provides policy and intelligence direction and oversight for the security sector, is arguably the most important civilian agency in the security apparatus. Led by Brigadier (Rtd.) Kellie Conteh, who serves as the National Security Coordinator (NSC),ONS is responsible for managing the country's most important security concerns, including intelligence-gathering, maritime security, and international liaising and negotiation on relevant issues. ONS benefits from significant UK support, which funds operational costs (including salaries). It has a robust recruitment progress, relying on recommendations generated from current ONS personnel and talent-spotters, plus multiple examinations and interviews. As a result, ONS has a relatively high-quality, well-educated team, which they can afford to compensate accordingly. ¶3. (C) ONS has a reputation for integrity, and many attribute this to Conteh's leadership. While ONS has a strong fraternal network among its personnel, corrupt officers are not protected: one recent example was the conviction of an ONS intelligence officer who played a significant role in the Perez narco-trafficking organization. While the salary supplements from the UK no doubt help, even the lower-ranking ONS officers cite Conteh as the reason the office is relatively impenetrable to criminal and political pressure. Despite his success, or perhaps because of it, Conte has begun complaining of burn-out, and expressing his desire to leave his position. A UK contact close to Conteh indicated that he intends to leave in 2010, to allow a new NSC to settle-in before the elections. ¶4. (C) Conteh's departure will undoubtedly impact ONS, particularly since there is no one waiting in the wings prepared to replace him. The Deputy, Christopher John, is an APC political appointment, placed within ONS as the party's watch-dog. John does not have the skills or reputation required to take over Conteh's position, and will likely continue on as Deputy indefinitely (Note: John has reportedly angled for the Inspector General of Police position, but is unlikely to receive that appointment. End Note.). The UK, who intend to continue to heavily invest in ONS until at least 2012, would like to see an outsider brought in - someone known to have a strong backbone, with a willingness to serve in the position apolitically. Dr. Christiana Thorpe, the National Election Commission Chairperson, was identified as an example of someone with the intellect to quickly absorb the issues, as well as the demonstrated fortitude to withstand political pressure. People like Thorpe, however, are hard to find and retain in Sierra Leone, and Conteh's shoes will be very difficult to fill. ¶5. (C) The ramifications of Conteh's departure are vast: ONS officers have anecdotally said that they will leave their positions if he goes; Conteh's military background gives him legitimacy with the Ministry of Defense, and helps prevent military encroachment of civilian authority (Note: This has been a burgeoning problem in recent months, per reftel D. End FREETOWN 00000471 002.3 OF 003 Note.); and APC designs to use ONS as a party instrument could come to fruition without his push-back. The latter point is the most troubling, especially leading into the election period. The APC party executive has made numerous quiet requests for ONS' intelligence arm, the Central Intelligence and Security Unit (CISU),to gather damaging information regarding their rivals, as well as bury the corrupt practices of APC members. Losing or ceding its independence to the ruling party would make ONS ineffective and dangerous. ¶6. (C) Though aware of the risks, Conteh can't be convinced to stay: besides burn-out, the opportunity cost to him of turning down international positions is high. The UK is attempting to meet all needs by creating a position for him in their new security sector reform program. Conteh will become the President's "Special Advisor" on security issues, and be paid entirely by the UK. This will at least keep Conteh in the country, and will hopefully counter-balance any inadequacies in the replacement NSC. It will also provide some necessary oversight for CISU, which will likely lose its Director General, Abdullai Mustapha, in 2010 as well. As with Conteh, Mustapha has been a strong agency head, with numerous contacts across the country and sub-region. His Deputy, Gabriel Moni, is a political appointment like John, put in his position to keep an eye on CISU, rather than substantively contribute to its mission. CISU has capable junior officers, but none are yet ready to make the leap into senior positions. Without Mustapha, who indicated fatigue as being a top reason for moving on, it is unclear how CISU will continue to operate - he is very much a one-man intelligence force, who delegates minimally. Again, there is strong potential for political interference, which is particularly problematic for an organization responsible for guiding the military and police intelligence arms. ¶7. (C) Conteh and Mustapha were both hold-overs from the Kabbah administration, and new appointees would no doubt feel compelled to repay political favors for their selection. President Koroma demonstrates a lot of faith in both men, who are the best antidote to the poison spread by the advisors who gain from inciting the President's concerns about his political rivals. The outlook is bleak for ONS if appropriate replacements cannot be found: without effective ONS oversight, the varied self-interests within the larger security framework will come to the fore, likely bringing with them greater levels of corruption, dissent, and operational ineptitude. -------------- SLP: A Weak (and Weakening) Link -------------- ¶8. (C) Per reftel E, Inspector General of Police, Brima Acha Kamara, was on leave in the UK for medical treatment. Many feel Kamara has outlived his usefulness, and his departure was accompanied by rumors that he may be placed on indefinite leave to enable a dignified (but forced) departure from the IG position. Assistant Inspector General Francis Munu was initially selected to be Acting IG during Kamara's absence, but correspondence to that effect was recalled by the President, who instead chose AIG Morie Lengor. Kamara's return hints that he has a bit more to go in the position, and perhaps the rumors were planted as a bit of "encouragement." If Kamara is actually forced out, Lengor is by far the best man for the job, but Munu, as an APC supporter, is more likely to fill the position in the long-term. ¶9. (C) Regardless of who sits in the IG position, they will be challenged by endemic corruption, poor management of limited resources, and a legacy of impunity. Police at all levels are known for taking kick-backs, and must pay into a larger system by sharing their "fees" with their supervisors. Even Kamara, who is known to demand USD 250.00 in advance of meetings with local businessmen, is expected to share his take with former IGs, Deputy IGs, and the Police Council. Many cite the poor compensation for officers, relative to ONS, as the reason (and even justification) for police corruption, and few are caught or disciplined. Several recent cases of police impropriety, however, put a spotlight on the issue: 3 SLP officers stationed at Lungi Airport were arrested the week of November 23 for corruption and narcotics possession (reftel F),while 4 other SLP officers have been arrested for providing weapons to those responsible for the recent spate of armed robberies (reftel G). In the former instance, the three officers arrested a Nigerian on suspicion of cocaine trafficking. After he expelled 26 capsules of cocaine, the officers took 16, likely with the intent to sell them. They were arrested after the Nigerian's statement did not correspond to the officers' report. The latter case FREETOWN 00000471 003.3 OF 003 involved the Assistant Superintendent responsible for the SLP's Mobile Armed Response Unit within the Operations Support Division, and three underlings. They provided police weapons to those individuals currently being prosecuted for armed robbery. The Assistant Superintendent is a known associate of wanted drug trafficker Gibrilla Kamara, and was likely taking directions from an APC henchman (unnamed), whose involvement in the case was reportedly quashed by the Attorney General. ¶10. (C) These incidents, as well as others throughout the year, have damaged the SLP's image. This makes it easier for others, notably the military, to consolidate their own power by assuming some civilian policing activities, which undermines the police at a time when they need reform and support to enable them to take on their security responsibilities for the election. Without honest and visionary leadership, the SLP will continue to be the weakest link in the security sector, with little hope of improvement before 2012. -------------- ACC: LOSING GROUND? -------------- ¶11. (C) The ACC has made great strides since Abdul Tejan-Cole became Commissioner and the 2008 revised legislation passed. Recent high-profile cases (reftel H) prove that at least some of the "big fish" are up for grabs. Post has learned, however, that Tejan-Cole is leaving his position in December to take an unknown job in South Africa. His Deputy, an APC selection, will assume the helm for an indefinite period. The reasons for Tejan-Cole's seemingly sudden departure are currently unknown, but rumored to be linked to his refusal to investigate his good friend, Foreign Minister Zainab Bangura (Note: Bangura has been fingered for possibly using her position to profit from a donation of rice from the Indian Government. High-level contacts have indicated that there is credence to the rumors. End Note.),and frustration at the machinations that delayed his indictment of the former Ministry of Health. The latter incident appeared to demonstrate that the ACC's independence from the Ministry of Justice is only accurate in the technical, rather than practical, sense. ¶12. (C) Regardless of the reason, Tejan-Cole is a huge loss for the ACC, which he completely reformed and re-built after his appointment. The UK recently gave an additional two million pounds to the Commission to support operational costs, and did so in part because of their faith in Tejan-Cole: without his leadership, and with no acceptable replacement in sight, the UK contribution could be for naught. -------------- -------------- COMMENT: THE RAMIFICATIONS OF A LEADERSHIP VACUUM -------------- -------------- ¶13. (C) The pending loss of three effective leaders in the civilian security sector highlights some of the inherent problems plaguing the system: over-reliance on a few individuals; a shallow (if not non-existent) pool of possible successors; and political interference that places party "spies" in deputy positions and prevents the promotion of effective leaders. Conteh's, Mustapha's, and Tejan-Cole's departures ought not pose such a great threat to the legitimacy of their respective officers; the fact that they do highlights the immaturity of the security sector in Sierra Leone. Further, Kamara's likely firing should be an opportunity to increase SLP legitimacy, but probably will not, demonstrating the limited independence afforded to entities that should be apolitical. With Guinea a continued source of anxiety, and political tension already rising in advance of the 2012 elections, this is a critical time for civilian authorities in terms of preparation and instilling confidence. With a void in terms of judicious counsel, President Koroma may be forced to seek advice from a group of self-interested people with a still undeveloped sense of pragmatic responsibility: his own party. End Comment. FEDZER