SIERRA LEONE STABILITY, PART I: POLITICS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 FREETOWN 000465 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF/W E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL SL SUBJECT: SIERRA LEONE STABILITY, PART I: POLITICS REF: A. FREETOWN 400 ¶B. FREETOWN 79 ¶C. FREETOWN 425 ¶D. FREETOWN 379 ¶E. FREETOWN 435 ¶F. FREETOWN 449 ¶G. FREETOWN 434 ¶H. FREETOWN 323 ¶I. FREETOWN 255 ¶J. FREETOWN 99 Classified By: Political/Economic Officer for reasons 1.4 (b/d) ¶1. (C) Summary: This cable is the first in a series of four that seeks to analyze Sierra Leone's current level of stability, and the threats and weaknesses challenging it. In the political realm, the country is already gearing up for the 2012 national, parliamentary, and local elections. Even though the national election appears to be the APC's to lose, the SLPP has started readying their troops for political battle, perhaps with the intent of reducing the APC majority in Parliament and on the local councils. Recent by-elections and Paramount Chief elections have received national attention because the political parties are expending significant resources on them in an effort to gain ground or prove their continued dominance in stronghold locations. At the same time, power-struggles within parties further expend energy and distract politicians from what should be their top priority - serving the people. Though politics has always been a tough business in Sierra Leone, maintaining some level of cooperation between the parties will be critical to help ensure a calm, peaceful election period. End Summary. -------------- APC: THE INCUMBENT -------------- ¶2. (C) The APC party has thus far handled its leadership role reasonably well, and the majority of citizens seem satisfied with what they perceive to be Koroma's achievements: notably, the continued provision of electricity in Freetown, the progress made on the Bumbuna hydroelectric project, and fighting corruption in an effort to re-brand the country. Though none of these are true "successes" - the electricity in Freetown is provided by expensive generators, Bumbuna is not yet operating and may never operate at full capacity or meet the demand for power, and corruption is fought on a case-by-base basis - Koroma's image remains that of a friendly, effective patriarch doing right by his people. Even scandals that had the potential to rock his administration, from an illegal contract with a Nigerian electricity provider to his alleged affairs, have done little to sway, let alone destroy, his pedestal. The recent Consultative Group meeting in London, which generated increased donor and investment interest, will also add luster. Koroma, as the incumbent, will be a nearly impossible man to beat in 2012, barring any hugely catastrophic and embarrassing incidents. ¶3. (C) While Koroma appears untouchable, his party brethren are cognizant of their own political mortality, and are angling for positions of greater authority either within the administration or the APC structure. It is here that the party flounders - internal intrigue, paranoia, and insecurity are hallmarks of all political parties in Sierra Leone, and the APC is no exception - leading the President's advisors to focus on rumor, innuendo, and their own self-interest rather than assist with governing the country. The recent incident in which the President used his military assistance to the civil power authority without consulting the National Security Council (reftel A) is a good example of how the insecurity of his underlings can undermine his ability to make good decisions. Koroma is not surrounded by a bevy of trusted people; from the criminal Attorney General who conspires to undermine him, to the Majority Leader of Parliament who sued him, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs who berates him, there is nearly no one to whom Koroma can turn for objective support and guidance. As a result, some of his decisions are erratic and impulsive, reflecting the atmosphere of tension and anxiety around him, rather than carefully-considered analysis. ¶4. (C) Koroma is saddled with an under-performing Cabinet, some of whom are personal friends and some of whom represent campaign promises and political debts made-good. Despite a reshuffle earlier this year (reftel B),there has been no obvious improvement in governance at the national level. Koroma is currently reviewing the ministers' performance contracts, perhaps with an eye to a second reshuffle either after the national budget is released in December, or in early 2010. A second reshuffle may have some positive impact, but party insiders say that the "sacred cows," including the FREETOWN 00000465 002 OF 003 Attorney General, are safe until 2012. Party stalwarts like the AG are seen as necessary allies for Koroma to win a second term, but may be expendable after that. ¶5. (C) This political reality - that Koroma will protect some of the criminally-minded cabinet members due to party politics - is a disappointment. Vice President Samuel Samsumana is known for corruption, and is currently a defendant in two civil suits in the United States for abusing his position and taking bribes (reftel C),but remains in place because Koroma believes he needs Samsumana to win the Kono vote. Koroma reportedly hates his VP, who was chosen for him by the party, but can only indicate his displeasure by firing Samsumana's underlings without consultation or notice. He may choose to remove Samsumana from the ticket in 2012, and replace him with another Kono ally, but appears willing to otherwise protect him from criminal investigations and scandals as much as he can. Koroma also protects the Minister of Fisheries and Marine Resources, Haja Afsatu Kabba, who reportedly received a bribe from the Taiwanese fishing company that owned the vessel seized in conjunction with the USCG in August (reftel D),and may have been caught on video accepting a bribe from another company as well (Note: She was also investigated by the Anti-Corruption Commission for procurement irregularities when she oversaw the energy ministry, but that investigation was allegedly shut-down by the President and she was moved to her new position in the reshuffle. End Note.). Besides a romantic relationship that reportedly existed between Koroma and Kabba, the APC have also said that she must be appeased because she was promised the VP position and tossed aside for Samsumana. While some scapegoats, such as the indicted Minister of Health and Sanitation, have lost their positions (reftel E),it appears that the money in your pocket and your standing in the APC hierarchy ultimately determine whether or not you have carte blanche to profit hugely and blatantly from your government position. The APC, despite claims of commitment to good governance principles, are increasingly showing a deeper commitment to the previous status quo of corruption and greed at the highest levels. -------------- SLPP: THE OPPOSITION -------------- ¶6. (C) Per reftel F, the SLPP has focused on discrediting the ruling party, rather than proposing alternative policies and solutions. The recent letter from party Chairman John Benjamin to President Koroma is just one in a long line of unsophisticated attacks that are too forward-leaning to be supported by facts: their history for finger-pointing and blame-gaming, which was in evidence following their dramatic loss of the presidency in 2007, persists. Their failure to advocate particular policy options is likely linked to the party's obsession with inter-party power struggles, leaving little energy left-over to propose legitimate alternatives to APC policies. Some within the SLPP executive are angling for a revision to the party constitution (reftel G),and many still believe that Benjamin will alter the revised constitution, which prevents party executive members from standing as candidates, to allow him to choose himself to run in the 2012 presidential elections. With this level of distrust and animosity within the party, perhaps it is unsurprising that the SLPP can be nothing more than a cantankerous and disorganized foe for the APC rather than a sparring partner bringing relevant issues to the fore. ¶7. (C) Despite their internal dramas, the party is still claiming some victories, albeit in their own stronghold: their candidate won a local council position in Bo in a November by-election by a landslide margin. The party is also trying to regain support from the international community, and recently created an external contact group to liaise with diplomatic partners. This group, though unlikely to be rebuffed, is also unlikely to be welcomed with open arms given their deliberate, regular, and targeted media attacks of post, UNIPSIL, and IMATT. The SLPP can not afford to further alienate such groups, but it will remain to be seen if they can re-direct their energies towards a more positive level of engagement. As a party, the SLPP has been unfocused and vengeful since the 2007 elections, and could only pose a real threat to the APC in 2012 if new leadership emerges and adopts different strategies. Still, the SLPP contributes negatively to the level of political discourse in Sierra Leone, which encourages similar bad behavior from their opponents. Like a cornered fighter, the SLPP approach to 2012 will probably be to swing wildly, often, and with as much force as possible - guaranteeing damage, but not necessarily to its opponents. -------------- FREETOWN 00000465 003 OF 003 PMDC: THE OPPORTUNIST -------------- ¶8. (C) The PMDC party continues to hold on by a thread, despite losing members to the APC and SLPP parties on a regular basis. Party Chairman Charles Margai seems to have enough hubris to make up for the losses (reftel H),but hubris alone won't propel the PDMC into a credible threat for the 2012 elections at any level; this is likely why he has begun encouraging his opponents to court him for his future support, even though he pledged at the PMDC party conference this year to support the APC again in a run-off situation. A November 25 article in a local paper highlighted a speech Margai gave in Pujehun district in which he said that voters should avoid both major parties because they "have failed the people of Sierra Leone in terms of good governance, transparency, and accountability." Though he criticizes both parties, his remarks are clearly designed to demonstrate to both the APC and SLPP that his support for the APC is fickle, and that he is essentially for sale. ¶9. (C) Margai is seemingly risking a great deal by tap-dancing between the APC and SLPP parties, especially when the APC reportedly bankrolled their conference and by-election campaigns. He is likely aware, however, that ultimately the APC needs his party to split the SLPP vote more than he needs their cash - the PMDC candidates are not strong in any district, but will continue to win at least some votes as long as they are on the ballot. If Margai's intent is not to win, but to profit, his strategy may work. However, his intent could also be to remind Koroma and the APC that they owe their success, in part, to the PMDC, and that political debts remain to be paid. This hypothesis may be proven if more PMDC members are selected for Cabinet positions in the expected reshuffle. ¶10. (C) The PMDC party is inherently the "Margai Party," and his self-interest will override the party's larger ambitions. Margai was angry earlier this year by the APC's reaction to the Dennis Sandy-Eddie Turay land scandal (reftel I),and his criticisms could be retribution for that. However, he could also be angling for a bigger piece of the political pie, including a prestigious appointment for himself in 2012. Margai is most likely to throw his support behind the party that appears poised to win, which means that he can flirt with the SLPP as much as he likes, but he's going home with the APC. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶11. (C) Party politics in Sierra Leone is an ugly business, with rivalries seemingly more important than governance. Though in recent years these rivalries have played out more rhetorically than physically, situations can quickly derail into acts of violence: the March riots (reftel J) show that inciting tension here is an easy process. While there is no immediate reason to expect such an incident to occur again in the near future, there is also no guarantee that it will not, despite the parties' mutual promise to behave themselves. What is perhaps the greatest ongoing concern in the political realm is that the two significant parties both behave erratically, irrationally, and personally, responding first and asking questions later whether they are addressing inter- or intra-party conflict. The ability to remain objective is exhibited by neither the insecure APC or the rudderless SLPP. It is easy, therefore, to understand why party followers - many of whom are illiterate and blindly support either the APC or SLPP along regional or ethnic lines - exhibit poor judgment as well. In a country where mobs are plenty and cool heads are few, it would take a very small spark to ignite the pervasive political tension into an uncontrollable fire. End Comment. FEDZER