CONFIDENCE WANING IN CORRUPT POLICE LEADERSHIP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 FREETOWN 000424 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF/W (JHUNTER) E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/28/2019 TAGS: ASEC PGOV SNAR SL SUBJECT: CONFIDENCE WANING IN CORRUPT POLICE LEADERSHIP REF: A. FREETOWN 99 ¶B. FREETOWN 109 ¶C. FREETOWN 374 ¶D. FREETOWN 393 Classified By: Political/Economic Officer Amy LeMar for reasons 1.4 (b/ d) ¶1. (C) With the President seemingly placing greater civilian security authority in the hands of the military due to an increase in crime (reftel D),the Inspector General of Police (IGP) is currently facing significant criticism both within and outside of government. Brima Acha Kamara, a hold-over from the Kabbah administration, could be placed on mandatory leave as early as this week, according to a high-level security contact. Assistant Inspector General (AIG) Francis Munu, currently overseeing criminal investigations, is the most likely person to be named Acting IG. ¶2. (C) Throughout his tenure, Kamara has been a largely unpopular figure: he was chosen by former IG Keith Biddle, a UK citizen who helped oversee the restructuring of the security sector following the war, in large part because of his reputation for being a strong-willed enforcer who would command discipline at a time when it was needed. However, the police force evolved and expectations changed, and Kamara is showing signs that he is no longer the right man for the job; he is neither a politician nor a strategist, and maintaining security through brute force is now unacceptable. Recent incidents, including the March riots, pipeline explosion, and Lungi shootings (reftels A, B, and C respectively),have generated significant bad press for the SLP, and Kamara frequently shoulders the majority of the blame. He has been criticized for the recent increase in armed robberies, though a recent SLP Executive Management Board meeting was interrupted by the President, who apparently told Kamara that he "still has faith in him." ¶3. (C) Kamara is known for corruption, though most contacts have noted that he is careful in his exploitation: he is known for staying out of high-profile money-makers, like narcotics, because it would attract too much attention. However, his machinations have become increasingly bold and ill-advised, perhaps a reflection that his judgment is slipping as the calls for his resignation are becoming louder. On October 16, the SLP/JDITF conducted a bust of three cannabis farms on the Western Peninsula. The operation had been discussed in two security forums: the Integrated Intelligence Group, and the National Security Council Coordinating Group. One of the arrested farmers told SLP officers that he had been tipped-off about the operation several weeks prior to the bust, and Kamara later called the officer in charge to ask that the individual be released from custody because of political pressure from local parliamentarians. The officer deferred to his commanding officer, AIG Morie Lengor, who informed the IG that there is significant evidence against the accused, and that court charges would be filed. Some suspect that the IG himself warned the targets of the operation, though the leak could have come from a number of agencies. ¶4. (C) Kamara was expected to depart Freetown for the UK on October 26, where he is due to receive an award and get medical attention for a recurrent illness. Responding to a direct question from the RSO on his rumored replacement, Kamara said that he hadn't left Sierra Leone in over three years and was using the trip as a vacation, and would return to work November 27th. There is a strong possibility, however, that the President will use this trip as an opportunity to put Kamara on indefinite leave and replace him with AIG Munu. President Koroma has used this tactic previously, which generally limits controversy, gives the person time to "reflect" (while continuing to draw a salary), and leads, ultimately, to a voluntary resignation. ¶5. (C) The ascendance of Munu will have grave implications for the SLP and the larger security framework: Munu is intelligent, but does not have a strong grasp of strategic issues. Contacts claim that he is burned-out from his years in SLP leadership, and post interaction with him has been unimpressive. With the most likely alternate candidate, Oliver Somasa, in Nairobi on an AU rotation, Munu is the only successor that remains for the IG position. Most believe that he would fail miserably in providing dynamic leadership, focus on his own self-interest, and kowtow to political and military will. ¶6. (C) Comment: The SLP continues to experience a leadership crisis. With the best talent plucked for external rotations, and the politics surrounding their return (as a general rule, individuals just returning from special assignments will not FREETOWN 00000424 002 OF 002 be promoted for several years),a vacuum of competency, efficacy, and integrity exists. Kamara has been balanced on the edge of the ax for some time, and his recent actions and perceived failures may very well push him over the edge into redundancy. This could prove dangerous, however, due to Munu's lack of skill, and the SLP's worsening relationship with a military showing definite interest in expanding its mission. While Kamara is neither a saint nor a paragon of policing, he holds firm against military pressure and his leadership helped to ensure that the 2007 elections did not dissolve into chaos and violence. As we move into the 2012 elections, the question must be asked: are we better off with the devil we know, rather than the one we don't? End Comment. FEDZER