SIERRA LEONE: BROKER FOR REGIONAL STABILITY?

C O N F I D E N T I A L FREETOWN 000288

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF/W - JIM HUNTER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/22/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC SL
SUBJECT: SIERRA LEONE: BROKER FOR REGIONAL STABILITY?

REF: FREETOWN 409

Classified By: Ambassador June Carter Perry for Reasons 1.4 (b/d)


1. (C) Summary: Ambassador met July 20 with Foreign Minister
Bangura following President Koroma's travel to Conakry for an
aborted Mano River Union summit July 14. Minister Bangura
was defensive about the need for Sierra Leone to stay engaged
with coup leaders Dadis Camara despite ECOWAS, AU and
international approbation. We again, (see reftel),pressed
home the point that this illegitimate regime should not be
granted any credibility. The FoMin took the point but feared
that chaos in Guinea would destabilize the region. We note
the UK appears to have accepted the GoSL's position. End
Summary.


2. (C) After learning of the Mano River Union (MRU)
cancellation the night of my return (July 14) to post from a
TDY in the Department, we began to try to find out what had
occurred and I subsequently met with the Foreign Minister.
According to our information (and that of the UK's High
Commissioner),Gbagbo, Johnson-Sirleaf and Koroma were to
hold the MRU in Conakry because Dadis Camara was afraid to
leave for a meeting in Monrovia. At the last minute, after
Koroma had left for Conakry, the Ivoirian president said he
was afraid of the security situation in Guinea and Liberia's
Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, who had planned to fly with him, was
then left without transportation. Koroma arrived, the band
played and he was the sole head of state present with no
"leader" to greet him. He got back into the helicopter to
return to Freetown when Dadis arrived; the band played again
and the Sierra Leoneans (including FoMin) decided to stay
thinking they could "control" Dadis, according to Bangura.


3. (C) The FoMin and I met for about an hour July 20. I told
her that it was inappropriate to have bilats with the coup
leader; this message had been given to her before as noted in
reftel. We added that, furthermore, there had been specific
guidelines set out by ECOWAS and the AU regarding Guinea.
She protested saying that the GoSL feared Dadis was "crazy"
and that someone had to talk with him. I responded that was
the International Contact Group's (ICG) role. She asserted
that she had stayed in touch with Chambas/ECOWAS the whole
time and that body had agreed the region could collapse if
Guinea were to face another coup.


4. (C) Specifically, she indicated that Sierra Leone could
not handle 3 million refugees coming over the border and that
Koroma was also trying to obtain some agreement on the
troublesome Yenga frontier as well as on
narcotics/trafficking. She alluded to the fact that an
African leader talking to Dadis was more effective than the
Western (ICG) representatives doing so and even stated that
it was similar to Africans listening to and hearing U.S.
President Obama's message in a way they would not hear it
from a person who lacked African descent. (Ironically,
Sierra Leone's press is saying precisely because they haven't
"heard" Obama is "why" he won't visit "Salone.") The GoSL is
calling the Conakry visit "self preservation"; we are telling
them it violates the spirit of the ECOWAS agreement. FYI:
Bangura does not think Guinea will have an election until
2011, if then.


5. (C) Subsequently, I had breakfast (July 22) with British
High Commissioner Ian Hughes. The UK's view is malleable;
they see Koroma's bilat as an attempt to avoid regional chaos
and, while supporting the ICG, believe it is necessary to
take Sierra Leone's self-interest into account. They expect
further guidance from London but anticipate agreement with
their view on the ground.


6. (C) Comment: Although the final communique was sent to
the United Nations, it was not publicized as a major
international document here. Koroma is clearly hesitant to
take the bull by the horns fearing complete upset in Sierra
Leone which is facing internal dissent over media blackouts,
youth employment, and opposition pressure. Sierra
Leone-Guinea does not seem to understand it may be
compromising its own credibility in the process. End Comment.

PERRY