COKE, TOKES, AND INEPT FOLKS: CAN SL STAY TOUGH ON DRUGS?

S E C R E T FREETOWN 000270



SIPDIS



DEPARTMENT FOR AF/W (JHUNTER),INL/AAE (KGOLDSTEIN)

EMBASSY ACCRA FOR DOJ/DEA (JBREEDEN)

EMBASSY BRUSSELS FOR DOJ/DEA (TSCARANTINO)

DOJ FOR DEA/OS/OSE (MCMANAMON/LENARTOWICZ)

DOJ FOR DEA/OS/OSE/CNTOC (WBROWN)

AFRICOM FOR CNT (CROSS)



E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2019

TAGS: SNAR, PGOV, PREL, SL

SUBJECT: COKE, TOKES, AND INEPT FOLKS: CAN SL STAY TOUGH ON

DRUGS?



REF: A. FREETOWN 113

B. FREETOWN 152

C. FREETOWN 222

D. FREETOWN 2008 INCSR REPORT



Classified By: Political Officer Amy LeMar for reasons 1.4 (b/d)



1. (S/NF) Summary: On the anniversary of the now infamous

plane landing, the salient question facing the GoSL and

interested stakeholders is: where are we now? What lessons

were learned from the biggest narcotics case in the nation's

history? Is Sierra Leone - police, judiciary, government -

better prepared now to handle the narcotics problem than they

were one year ago? Post's assessment, though not entirely

bleak, is also not entirely positive. Overcoming significant

capacity issues, endemic corruption, and what appears to be

inevitable inertia will make it hard to push for significant

pro-activity, despite the political will we now know exists,

in real terms, at the highest level of government. Though

Sierra Leone will hopefully never become a safe haven for

narcotraffickers and other transnational organized crime, it

remains an easy place for intelligent, well-funded criminals

to set up shop and take advantage of the country's overall

destitution. As the GoSL struggle to find their footing in

the wake of the intensity and excitement surrounding the

cocaine case, the USG must also decide how to capitalize on

the somewhat unexpected leadership role we have assumed on

this issue. No longer occupying a token seat at the

stakeholder's table, we have a voice and influence with

regards to how Sierra Leone addresses narcotics in terms of

policy and interdiction. In the face of competing priorities,

can we afford to give this opportunity the attention it

needs? In the face of rising instability in the sub-region,

can we afford not to? This report serves as a scene setter

for upcoming USG narcotics-related visits, and is divided

into the following sections: Case Update; GoSL/Donor Actions

and Intentions; Operations and Intelligence; Policy Issues;

Outlook and Opportunities (Comment). End Summary.



--------------

CASE UPDATE

--------------



2. (U) The cocaine case has moved into the appeals phase,

with six of those convicted on April 20 (reftel B) filing

motions with the Court of Appeal (Ahmed Sesay, Hassan Karim

Mansaray, Chernor Momodu Bah, Mohamed Musa Kamara, Ibrahim

Mohamed Manley, and Alimamy Kabia). These six individuals

were found guilty of Conspiracy (Count V),and were sentenced

to five years' imprisonment, plus fines ranging from Le

150,000,000 to Le 300,000,000 (USD 50,000 to USD 100,000).

Kamara received a Le 50,000,000 (USD 16,667) fine and 3

years' imprisonment. As reported in reftel A, conspiracy was

the hardest count of the indictment to prove, with even

Justice Browne-Marke stating during the trial phase that he

hadn't found the Public Prosecutor's case compelling.



3. (SBU) Sesay, as expected, submitted the most grounds of

appeal, stating that the judge erred in law and in fact with

regards to the weight and evidence adduced before the Court,

and for failing to raise the constitutionality of

retroactively applying the new National Drugs Control Act

(NDCA) to the Supreme Court for decision-making. The appeals

grounds also question the Justice's determination that alibis

provided by Defense witnesses were inauthentic. The others'

grounds simply stated the judge was wrong to convict the

defendants, because the proof against them regarding the

conspiracy was circumstantial. Sesay is asking that the

conviction be overturned or to have the sentence reduced. The

others are presumably asking for the same. According to

contacts, the appeals will not be heard before the Court

until 2010.



4. (S/NF) Reportedly, the others failed to appeal because

they could not afford it. Patrick Moriba Johnson and Sadjo

Sarr allegedly failed to appropriately "thank" their trial

attorneys, who in turn "lost interest" in assisting with an

appeal. The remaining foreigners (George Aritstizabel

Archilla, Victor Manuel Araujo Lastreto, Julio Cesar

Morales-Cruz, and Yeimy Fernandez Leandro) failed to file

because they still owe their attorneys for their trial

services. Post conservatively estimates that the attorneys



are owed between USD 60-75,000. Information from sources

suggests that the foreigners are comfortable, and have access

to cell phones. Leandro is of particular interest to Sierra

Leonean intelligence, which requested UK assistance with

phone records (Note: As of July 6, UK/SOCA had not provided

help. End Note). USG assistance would also be welcome; Post

can provide further details on the scope of this request, DEA

interest depending.



5. (C) Post suspects that the appeals will be found to have

at least some merit, and will result in either reduced or

reversed sentences. Our analysis suggests that Browne-Marke

chose to take a hard-line during the trial, possibly at the

behest of the Sierra Leonean Executive Branch, but that he

left enough room in his judgment for this hard-line to be

softened or reversed. The media did not follow the appeals

with the same rabid attention as the case itself, and it

would be possible to change the initial decisions without

creating an uproar. This may have been the agreement made

with Sesay, long believed by Post to be the scapegoat for

more influential people, and it is within the realm of

possibility that he will become a free man within the next

year. It is difficult to ascertain how that could impact the

others, but given that Sesay filed independently, he could

have his conviction overturned in isolation.



6. (U) With regards to assets seized over the course of the

investigation, the Cessna continues to garner the most

attention. The Registrar of the Law Court announced on May 7

that the plane had been valued at USD 100,000 by the Director

of Civil Aviation. When questioned about the low valuation,

sources claimed that "modifications" made to the plane were

the cause. Less than a month later, the Procurement Unit

received three sealed bids for the plane, but a declaration

of ownership has yet to be made. An auction to sell the

seized vehicles remains to be scheduled.



--------------

GoSL/DONOR ACTIONS AND INTENTIONS

--------------



7. (C) The Joint Drug Interdiction Task Force (JDITF)

continues to solidify, and will become operational in August.

Though its development has been slow, the involvement of key

stakeholders, interest from donors, and recognition of the

need for such a group has saved it from falling victim to the

usual lethargy. The JDITF structure has not changed since its

conception in January, 2008: it has an Integrated

Intelligence Group (IIG),Enforcement and Investigation Group

(EIG),and Prosecutions Group. The IIG consists of

representative from the Office of National Security (ONS),

Central Intelligence and Security Unit (CISU),Forces

Intelligence Unit, and the Special Branch and Criminal

Intelligence Service of the Sierra Leone Police (SLP). The

EIG is comprised of officers from the SLP's Operations

Support Division and Criminal Investigation Department. The

Prosecutions Group, involving attorneys from the Department

of Public Prosecutors, has not officially been brought into

the fold, but will be in the coming months.



8. (C) The roles and responsibilities of the IIG and EIG are

somewhat self-explanatory: the IIG will gather intelligence,

while the EIG will conduct interdiction operations. The IIG

will also follow trends and provide policy recommendations to

the larger JDITF management structure, and coordinate with

external units, such as Immigration, the National Revenue

Authority, Anti-Corruption Commission, Bank of Sierra Leone,

Joint Maritime Committee, and the Airport Authority. The EIG

will not be completely reliant on the IIG for intelligence,

and is expected to generate and share its own.



9. (C) In April, the management framework for the JDITF was

established, and is expected to be approved by the National

Security Council Coordinating Group in July. A high-level

Advisory Committee, consisting of the Minister of Internal

Affairs, National Security Coordinator, Inspector General of

Police, and RSLAF Chief of Defense Staff, will provide

guidance and also report on JDITF activities to the

President. The Advisory Committee will liaise with the JDITF

Management Committee, which includes the SLP Assistant

Inspector General for Operations, Director-General of CISU,

RSLAF Joint Forces Commander, Director of the National Drug



Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA),and the Director of ONS'

Serious Organized Crime Coordinating Group (as Secretary to

the Committee). The Management Committee is expected to be

the "brains" of the JDITF, and will provide general

supervision and identify sources of funding for operations

and training. Donors are called "Partners" within the

framework, and are limited to one representative each from

the UN, U.S. Embassy, UK/SOCA, and UK/DFID. The Partners

regularly participate in Management Committee meetings.



10. (C) With the creation of the various committees, the

JDITF intends to sing a formal MOU with all agencies

involved. A draft of the MOU is being reviewed by various law

departments, but could be signed as early as August. The

agencies already acknowledge acceptance of their roles and

responsibilities, but want to formalize it as quickly as

possible. The MOU will hopefully give the Management

Committee legal standing to request budget support for the

JDITF (see Policy Issues section).



11. (C) Concurrent with policy and management decisions, the

EIG is being formed. The "first cut" of 60 SLP/OSD officers

were selected by SLP leadership, and are currently undergoing

a 5-week UN-sponsored training. The training covers the

gamut, from legal frameworks to operational planning. Of

these 60, 20-30 are expected to be dropped: the EIG will

ideally consist of 30 officers, with a small cadre also

available on an as-needed basis. A source told PolOff that

each candidate was vetted, but the scope of the vetting is

unclear. The UN's Narcotics Advisor is pleased with how the

training is progressing, noting that nearly all are quick

studies and eager to be involved. This training will shortly

go on hiatus to enable some JDITF enforcement members to

participate in DoD-sponsored 2-week surveillance training,

and a Defense Institute of International Legal Studies

(DIILS) counter-narcotics course. Following the USG training,

the UN course will resume until early August: a "graduation"

will follow, during which President Koroma is expected to

officially launch the JDITF.



12. (C) While the new structures and training are positive

developments, moving beyond the talking phase and into action

will be more difficult to achieve - not because of lack of

will, but more because of inexperience. The Partners are

pushing the Management Committee to have a planning session

as soon as possible, to outline operations for the EIG to

undertake following graduation. The EIG is no longer meant to

be merely reactive, as reported reftel D, but will become

pro-active under the Committee's direction. Immediate

activities will probably involve marijuana farms in the Bo

and Kenema areas, and will provide good opportunities for the

officers to practice their skills as well as generate

positive publicity. Plans are also in place for the EIG to go

up-country and to border areas to develop relationships with

the Local Unit Commanders (LUCs),and possibly provide some

training to SLP and Immigration officers. The Management

Committee has been reminded that training can be lost if

skills aren't regularly used, and some pressure is now being

place on the IIG and the intelligence section of the EIG to

generate leads for operations.



13. (S/NF) Against this backdrop, donor interest in the JDITF

continues to grow. The USG, besides training already

identified, will be providing some tactical equipment in the

near future. Further support is pending an interagency

assessment in September, but Sierra Leone has been slated to

receive increasing amounts of INCLE funding in FY09, 10, and

11. The UN, though the United Nations Development Program, is

also providing equipment. Though the UK has yet to provide

funding, their Justice Sector Development Program recently

agreed to include an evidence storage facility in the new ONS

building they are constructing; the lock-up should be

available for use in December. Though material support is

useful, especially to a task force that currently has no

direct government financing beyond that given by contributing

GoSL agencies out of their own budget support, the Partners'

greatest utility has been in the area of technical assistance

and encouragement. Keeping members focused on the bigger

picture is sometimes necessary when meetings get mired in

currently inessential details. Also, identifying the

necessary steps for creating and supporting the JDITF has

been crucial for organizational and visionary purposes.







14. (S/NF) Some of this pragmatism is hard to maintain in the

face of interest from countries and donors not resident in

Sierra Leone. The Partners' position has been to push the

Management Committee to, at least in part, assess its own

needs for moving forward. This has been a challenge, however,

because donors have sent assessment teams who appear to want

to fit their project model to a Sierra Leonean context,

rather than understand the context and create the model. A

proposed UNODC project, for example, includes a number of

already-conducted activities. A sub-regional

UNODC/DPKO/UNOWA/INTERPOL partnership project, hoped to be

implemented in Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia, and

Guinea Bissau, also contains unnecessary or duplicative

activities. The former UNODC proposal will be partially

funded by the Dutch government to the tune of USD 1.4

million. The sub-regional project, which has a larger

transnational organized crime focus, is budgeted at just

under USD 50 million. This project is also expected to

receive at least partial funding.



15. (S/NF) When queried by PolOff regarding the proposals'

generic tone and the inclusion of inappropriate activities,

representatives responded that such issues will be ironed out

in the second and even third round of assessments. The core

Partners (USG, UN, DFID) have privately shared concerns about

this approach, especially when juxtaposed against the Sierra

Leonean culture that makes it nearly impossible for them to

say "no." The need for donor support is so great that Sierra

Leoneans will take whatever is provided with little

questioning or input, destroying the opportunity to ensure

that donor dollars spent here will add value. Hence, the

constant call for the Partners to the JDITF to conduct their

own strategic planning exercises that would enable them to

point donors in the right direction (Note: PolOff insisted

that the Management Committee determine their own needs for

the DIILS training. The result is a curriculum that will fill

in the gaps left by previous training. End Note). An

up-coming mid-July visit by representatives of the Italian

Government will give them a chance to practice being in the

driver's seat. The Italians expect to contribute USD 300,000

to the JDITF as part of a sub-regional project that will also

include Guinea Bissau, Senegal, and Mali.



16. (S/NF) One should not interpret the above as a complete

dismissal of all donor-suggested activities: the proposals do

contain some excellent ideas that could propel interdiction

and prosecution efforts forward. These activities, though,

are sometimes buried in a largely inappropriate logistical

framework. They also often fail to acknowledge the realities

on the ground, which is that the GoSL is aware of their own

needs, but not always effective at relaying them. In the race

to be an active participant in combating the West African

transshipment trend, it is easy for donors to rush into

easily-prescribed plans or generate assessment after

assessment that result in no tangible action. It is also

easy, unfortunately, for the GoSL to allow this to happen.



--------------

OPERATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE

--------------



17. (S/NF) Per reftel B, the proliferation of marijuana

cultivation is being viewed as a national security threat. As

the country's most valuable cash crop, marijuana production

is increasing to the detriment of subsistence farming. In

Moyamba District, for example, intelligence reports suggest

that individual marijuana farms span between 5 and 12 square

miles. Local Unit Commanders feel powerless to stop the

cultivation because RSLAF, Paramount Chiefs, and even SLP

officers are frequently involved. LUCs also lack operational

funding for staff and equipment: across the SLP, lack of

funding for fuel constrains patrols and activities (reftel C).



18. (S/NF) Emboffs recently met with intelligence contacts to

discuss their focus. Sources reported that cocaine

trafficking continues, but on a smaller scale because of the

attention garnered by the court case. They noted that there

continues to be considerable movement across the Sierra

Leone-Guinea border. They have their sights on Belgian,

Belarusian, and Dutch nationals, and are hoping to pass

information to the EIG in a few months. Sources promised to



share further information with PolOff in the near future, and

expressed interest in working with the DEA on joint

initiatives, if possible.



19. (S/NF) Intelligence contacts remain extremely focused on

Gibrilla Kamara (aka GK). Their information has pinpointed a

hideaway in Conakry, from which he rarely ventures out. They

believe that his resources are rapidly diminishing. When

asked, sources stated that they are unaware of a relationship

between GK and Guinean heavy (and current Minister of

Presidential Security) Claude Pivi. Emboffs were told that

the GoSL wants GK extradited as soon as they can corroborate

his physical location through other sources (Note: Source

requested USG assistance with this, and will provide the

address in Conakry soonest. Post will pass on to relevant

agencies for possible action accordingly. End Note).

Surprisingly, the GoSL is considering asking Senegal's

President Wade to negotiate the extradition with Guinean

junta leaders. When asked why President Koroma may use a

third-party, source responded that Wade has more pull with

Dadis. That said, source also acknowledged that Wade's son is

believed to be heavily involved in narcotics trafficking, and

that the GoSL may prefer in the end to use their own

bilateral channels.



--------------

POLICY ISSUES

--------------



20. (C) The passage of the National Drugs Control Act 2008

(NDCA),was a significant step for the GoSL, since the draft

legislation had languished with limited attention since 2006.

However, problems exist within the Act that could hamper

current enforcement efforts by creating a turf war between

JDITF core members and the newly created National Drug Law

Enforcement Agency (NDLEA).



21. (S/NF) The NDLEA was created by the passage of the NDCA,

and was the brain-child of Kande Bangura. Bangura is the

brother-in-law of the Minister of Internal Affairs, and

reportedly begged for the position of Sierra Leone's "drug

czar." Sources have reported that the relatively low-level of

drug activity until recently meant that Bangura traveled to

UNODC, INTERPOL, and ECOWAS conferences, cobbling together

the NDCA from other countries' legislation. Bangura is not

well-regarded by members of the security sector, who noted

that few of them had seen, let alone commented on, the draft

NDCA before it was pushed through. That Bangura used the

cocaine case and need for quick, more stringent legislation

to his benefit is a surprise to no one: contacts have sniffed

that he created a "mini-fiefdom" where he could "play at

being a big, important police officer." The obvious tenor of

these comments is that he has not been accepted, nor will be,

by the high-ranking officials in Sierra Leone's security

sector, despite his familial relations.



22. (C) Bangura, however, can not be discounted. The NDCA has

given him actual power beyond that which his brother-in-law

can provide. The NDLEA's responsibilities, by law, include

"coordinating all drug-related regulatory, enforcement, and

prosecution functions; developing and implementing the

national drug control strategy; and enforcing and duly

administering the provisions of the Act including receiving,

investigating, or referring to the appropriate authority, any

complaining of a suspected or alleged offense under this

Act." It also puts the NDLEA as the lead with regards to

policy, demand reduction, and international cooperation. In

reality, however, the NDLEA has not been empowered (possibly

by design) to carry out its functions. As reftel D notes, the

Agency's operating budget this year was USD 125,000, which

has not gone far towards staffing, equipping, and

operationalizing the Agency. The NDLEA's Executive Director

has the right to second officers for enforcement purposes,

but this has not been exercised.



23. (S/NF) In discussions with the Management Committee about

the presence of the NDLEA and its mandate, which seemingly

supersedes that of the JDTIF, members were initially

dismissive. The NDLEA's lack of budget, in their minds, made

it an agency in name only. Many stated that Bangura would

continue to focus on publicity campaigns about the dangers of

drugs, and leave the JDITF to handle the "important issues."







Their obvious dislike for Bangura notwithstanding (Note:

Bangura is, indeed, a self-important blowhard. End Note),

their analysis that he will stay out of their way has so far

been proven accurate. This trend, however, may not continue -

particularly with the increase in donor interest. The donor

funds have thus far been focused on the JDITF, and Bangura

could start demanding a piece of the pie. While informally

Bangura is allegedly on-board with the JDITF taking the lead

on the issue for now, plans could change once Bangura becomes

fully aware of what he stands to gain by pushing for a total

enactment of the law.



24. (S/NF) PolOff has consistently raised policy issues, such

as those surrounding the NDLEA, with the Management

Committee. Stressing the need to formalize an agreement with

Bangura and the NSCCG regarding the JDITF's responsibilities

versus the NDLEA's, PolOff particularly pointed to the issue

of funding: namely, that the NDLEA receives government

support while the JDITF does not. Though the contributing

agencies, such as the SLP and the ONS, fund the JDITF now, it

is a strain on their already overtaxed resources. They have

also not received an increase or additional allotment of

funding to support their JDITF activities. For the JDITF to

maximize its effectiveness, as well as demonstrate

sustainability to donors, it needs direct government support.

Though taking funds away from the NDLEA's work on demand

reduction is not ideal, there needs to be formal recognition

that the Agency is not and currently can not support its

expected functions. An official delineation reflecting the

realities of the situation is required to clarify who is

doing what and accordingly receive funding. This poses a risk

that Bangura demand the JDITF to be housed in his agency, but

his political capital is small enough that such a move is

highly unlikely. Continuing to ignore the 600 pound NDLEA in

the room is no longer feasible for the JDITF, which needs to

be formally established in the policy arena, as well as

operationally.



25. (C) As reported reftel D, the law poses other problems.

Primarily, it is weak on asset seizure and forfeiture, and

barely addresses offenses by bodies corporate. The NDCA in

particular fails to address commercial carriers, despite

intelligence and arrests identifying their complicity in

trafficking in and out of Sierra Leone. Strengthening the law

will be an important next step for the GoSL, but could take

two years or more without external assistance, based on past

precedent.



--------------

OUTLOOK AND OPPORTUNITIES (COMMENT)

--------------



26. (S/NF) Though the past year has seen some improvements

with regards to addressing narcotics, particularly in the

area of awareness and political will, there is still a great

deal of work to be done before the GoSL will be able to

enforce laws and repel transnational organized crime

independently. The structures, however, are slowly starting

to gel, particularly for the management and standard

operating procedures for the JDITF. The law, though flawed,

is a vast improvement on its predecessor and was used to

successfully convict 15 of the cocaine defendants. Building

on these nascent efforts, Sierra Leone is putting itself into

position to make proactive efforts to interdict narcotics.

The country will be unable to do this, though, without

long-term strategic technical and operational support. The

SLP have limited funding and capacity to deal with regular

crime, and the issues that plague them will also plague

counter-narcotics attempts. It is critical that we manage our

own expectations of what can and can not be accomplished in

the most impoverished country in the world. That said, we

should not ignore their efforts simply because they are

effected at a snail's pace. Supporting specialized activities

while at the same time investing in the enormous process of

rebuilding a dilapidated judicial structure is likely the

best way to keep Guinea Bissau's fate from befalling Sierra

Leone.



27. (S/NF) Collectively, the GoSL is supportive of

counter-narcotics efforts. This support is driven by the

President and his closest advisors. It is likely, however,

that senior members of the government have profited from the







drug trade and have a vested interest in slowing cooperation.

For example, Assistant Chief of Defense Staff Komba Mondeh,

who is not known to be involved in criminal activities but is

angry over a visa issue, recently advocated in the NSCCG for

U.S. participation on the JDITF to be eliminated. It is

likely that the traffickers expelled into USG custody will at

some point implicate some GoSL representatives. Despite this,

the fact that the expulsions occurred indicates that

authorities intent on greater counter-narcotics cooperation

and collaboration currently have the upper-hand.



28. (S/NF) In this climate, there are opportunities for the

USG to increase our involvement and influence. Though Post

has a congenial working relationship with British

counterparts in Freetown, agendas do not always coincide. The

U.S. will likely never share the same measure of closeness

that exists between Sierra Leone and the UK, but signs

indicate that the GoSL is starting to chafe somewhat at what

is increasingly being viewed as "interference" in security

issues. The SLP have privately indicated their frustration

with SOCA's intense presence and direction during the cocaine

investigation, noting that their interest seemingly

disappeared as soon as the case ended (Note: The in-country

SOCA representative does not attend JDITF meetings. End

Note). Though the case would have been badly mishandled

without SOCA guidance, the impression was left that their

interest stemmed form their own desire for intelligence,

rather than altruism. When PolOff recently asked the

Management Committee what they would do if another plane

landed tomorrow, the response was "Call you." The members of

the JDITF are cognizant that they can't manage alone in the

face of another major bust, and are increasingly aware that

the USG is an ally and partner. Given the instability in

Guinea, cementing a robust relationship with the Sierra Leone

counter-narcotics agencies would give U.S. agencies an

important in-road in this part of the Mano River Union.



29. (S/NF) In terms of programming, the USG could contribute

in a number of key ways, the most successful of which will

likely involve long-term human capital investments. Short of

having a DEA Country Attache, DEA TDYs or multi-year OPDAT or

ICITAP programming would go a long way towards establishing

needed relationships and trust at the working level.

Stakeholders agree that short-term training and equipment

provision is helpful, but does not guarantee retention and

implementation of newly-acquired skills, nor that resources

will be used effectively. Hands-on advisors would be

best-placed to problem shoot, reinforce techniques, guide

operations, and push for pro-activity. Though more expensive

than others types of programming, technical advisors would

have greater value-added in terms of furthering our bilateral

and unilateral interests. Other donors, particularly through

UN programming, will continue to pour money into projects

that are more output- rather than impact-focused. The USG

could support such efforts, but may miss an opportunity to

deepen ties here by doing so. Post looks forward to

discussing programming ideas with the inter-agency team in

September.



30. (S/NF) Sierra Leone is a tiny country in a difficult

neighborhood. There are numerous positive indicators that

democracy and good governance are here to stay, though

addressing endemic corruption still presents a challenge.

With this relatively positive framework in place, and the

good will generated by the successful expulsions in April,

doors are now open to the USG to help shape counter-narcotics

policy and enforcement in a country where narcotrafficking,

money laundering, and organized crime in general is on the

rise. Though perhaps the progress made one year after the

fateful cocaine plane bust seems marginal compared to what

other countries can achieve, in this context, even these

small steps must be viewed as a tremendous success that can

be built on. The question before the USG is how we might

contribute to those efforts: Post posits that significant,

expeditious contributions will have a long-term, positive

multiplying effect. End Comment.

FEDZER