ECB'S EXIT STRATEGY AND REACTION TO GREECE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 FRANKFURT 003274 SENSITIVE STATE FOR EEB (NELSON, HASTINGS),EEB/IFD/OMA (WHITTINGTON),EUR/CE (HODGES, SCHROEDER) TREASURY FOR SMART, ICN (NORTON),IMB (MURDEN, MONROE, BEASLEY) AND OASIA SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EFIN ECON PREL GM SUBJECT: ECB'S EXIT STRATEGY AND REACTION TO GREECE FRANKFURT 00003274 001.2 OF 003 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: On December 8, European Central Bank (ECB) officials told a visiting Treasury delegation that the financial crisis will increase growth differentials among Eurozone countries, ultimately increasing pressure on the ECB to address imbalances. The ECB, however, remains committed to the idea that differentials must be resolved by national measures. Regarding Greece, the ECB sees it as isolated in the Eurosystem and under pressure to reform. It rules out an IMF program for Greece, planning instead its own European "IMF-style" program (albeit without financial support.) The ECB is also starting to gradually phase-out its generous supply of liquidity, without regard to individual countries' needs. The ECB officials further praised the establishment of the new European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB),noting that it will encourage closer interaction between central banks and national banking supervisors. End Summary. Growth Differentials and the Stability of the Eurozone -------------- 2.(SBU) The ECB expects economic activity in the second half of 2009 to improve unevenly with moderate growth rates in 2010 that remain subject to uncertainty. The differing national causes of the financial crisis among Eurozone members pose a challenge for the ECB, but will not threaten the European Monetary Union (EMU). The causes include: a collapse of trade because of an overly high export dependence (Germany),overdependence on the construction and housing market for growth (Spain),and a lack of wage moderation and fiscal discipline (Greece). Structural reforms are needed and the ECB will urge members to adopt concrete measures. But as Frank Moss, ECB's Director General for International and European Relations, opined, the "onus is on the national government," which should take adequate measures to restore competitiveness when faced with growth differentials. Doing so is "part and parcel of being in a monetary union." ¶3. (SBU) Nevertheless, different national policy responses pose a potential problem for the ECB, ECB Governing Board member Juergen Stark reported. The first ten years of the Euro worked better than expected, enabling the ECB to gain confidence. This good track record will help it tackle future challenges, including the long-lasting effects of the crisis, such as reduced levels of output and a lower potential growth rate. Higher growth and inflation differentials could tempt governments to pressure the ECB, potentially calling into question the central bank's independence. Currently, ECB bankers reported, countries suffering most from the Euro's appreciation already try to pressure the ECB. Any discussion of a potential break-up of the monetary union, however, is unfounded and according to Jens Dallmeyer and Barbara Boettcher-Meier of Deutsche Bank Research, primarily driven by "Anglo-Saxon" outsiders from the Eurosystem. They agreed that the next ten years will be more difficult for the ECB than the first. The challenge is "to ensure that the success story continues." Greece - A Special Case -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Greece was a frequent topic of discussion in the meetings, since Fitch had downgraded Greece's rating the day before from A- to BBB+, making it the only eurozone country to fall below an "A." ECB bankers saw Greece as a "peripheral" case. Its economic and fiscal position, "is and has been a disaster for years," Stark said. The country "lacks the strong institutions and political leadership necessary for maintaining fiscal control." Board member Stark pointed to the 100 percent increase of public sector wages, unreliable statistics, and an explosion of the country's deficit from four to twelve percent in just a few months. Furthermore, contrary to Ireland, whose crisis response has been exemplary and helped to restore the confidence of the markets, Greece has "done nothing so far." Even though it will be politically difficult for the Greek government to implement reforms given the fragile political situation, it has no choice: "They had fun. But now is the end of the party." Dallmeyer from DB Research concurred that disenchantment with Greece is very high. "I cannot remember a country ever as isolated in its peer group as Greece is now in the Eurosystem." ¶5. (SBU) The Greek problem, however, will be resolved within the Eurosystem. "We will accept the IMF inside the EU but not inside the EMU," Director General Moss said. Support from the IMF, Stark explained, "would be perceived as failure of the EMU project." Instead, the EU will put an "IMF-style program" without money transfers, which are prohibited under EMU rules, in place. The ECB is already working on developing the necessary program. "We can be FRANKFURT 00003274 002.2 OF 003 clearer on measures to be taken including concrete numerical objectives by how much the deficit must be cut during what time span and what kind of institutional reforms must be implemented," Stark said. While ECB officials ruled out financial assistance to Greece, Deutsche Bank economists Jens Dallmeyer and Barbara Boettcher thought some bilateral support may be possible to enable Greece to meet the conditions imposed. ¶6. (SBU) Greece has also been a prime beneficiary of the ECB's unlimited supply of liquidity and its broader definition of acceptable collateral. (Comment: As part of its so-called "enhanced credit facility" program initiated earlier this year, the ECB lowered the minimum rating requirement for assets from A- to BBB.) The ECB will return to the pre-crisis collateral requirements at the beginning of 2011, creating a serious risk to Greece if the other credit ratings agencies follow Fitch and downgrade the Greek sovereign to BBB+. This would create difficulties both for the Greek sovereign and for Greek banks, since the ECB would no longer accept Greek sovereign bonds as collateral. Additionally, when the first and quantitatively largest of the three one-year unlimited tender operations of the ECB expires in June 2010, assets that are now on the books of the ECB will be back on the balance sheets of banks and could cause problems. Moreover, Frank Moss stressed that the ECB doesn't take country-by-country considerations into account in its decision making. It is therefore "up to Greece to adapt, not the ECB," Francesco Papdia, ECB Director General of Market Operations, noted. Phase-Out Strategy -------------- ¶7. (SBU) The ECB will continue the gradual phase-out of extraordinary liquidity measures begun on December 3, but has no intention to change its monetary policy for the time being, Stark said. The ECB will fully satisfy the banks' refinancing needs until the end of 2009. When current tender operations expire, the liquidity will be taken out of the market automatically. The expiration of the first of the three one-year, fixed-rate tender operations poses a problem, because allowing the 442 billion Euros to expire would withdraw 75 percent of the liquidity injected into the market. The ECB instructed member states' central banks to issue warnings to their commercial banks to avoid an overreliance on central bank liquidity, but will still have to find a way to smooth the exit of that much liquidity at one point. ECB Director General Market Operations Papadia said that although the ECB will discontinue one-year operations, there will be a higher share of three-month operations than before the crisis. ¶8. (SBU) Papadia noted that in hindsight, the ECB's liquidity supply was too generous. Three one-year operations gave the banks too much of a sense of comfort instead of prompting them to address their underlying vulnerabilities. Key issues to reconsider for the ECB in the future will be: a) the tightening of the collateral requirements and b) the future role of rating agencies in the ECB's collateral framework. (Comment: currently only four Eurosystem central banks prepare their own ratings for bank loans- Germany, France, Spain, and Austria.) The ECB's dominant consideration on collateral is the protection of their position, i.e. the reduction of risk to the ECB. Frank Moss noted that cross-border crisis management and the streamlining of national deposit guarantee schemes are also considerations. ECB and European Systemic Risk Board -------------- ¶9. (SBU) While Frank Moss welcomed the overall new European regulatory architecture and the "creation of a common rule book," which he considered ECB's key achievement, he cautioned that the EU Parliament could further water down the reforms. The other challenge is to forge a common interpretation of the new rules. The European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB),Moss stated, will not have any real powers. It will only issue warnings and recommendations and keep an eye on the financial sector. However, it will offer a forum for closer interaction between national central banks and regulators. A decision on whether to set up the secretariat as a separate entity or to staff it with ECB personnel has not yet been reached. ¶10. Comment: Despite the financial crisis and current decreased rating of Greece, ECB bankers remained confident in the ability of the Eurozone to manage its imbalances within its own system. ECB bankers made it clear that the ECB will define the conditionality of assistance provided to Greece. Their prognosis that the next ten FRANKFURT 00003274 003.2 OF 003 years of the Eurosystem will actually be more difficult than the first ten raises questions for the future. ¶11. (U) This cable has been coordinated with US Embassy Berlin and cleared with US Treasury. ALFORD