STRONG REACTIONS TO OPEL/MAGNA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 FRANKFURT 001487 STATE FOR EEB (NELSON) AND EUR/CE (SCHROEDER) LABOR FOR ILAB (BRUMFIELD) TREASURY FOR ICN (KOHLER) AND CARR SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ECON EFIN ETRD ELAB GM SUBJECT: STRONG REACTIONS TO OPEL/MAGNA REF: BERLIN 664 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: On May 31, just a day before GM filed for bankruptcy, the tug-of-war for the car manufacturer Opel broke loose, resulting in a deal for Austro-Canadian car supplier Magna to take over Opel from GM and the German federal and state governments pulling together EUR 1.5B in immediate bridge financing. Reactions in Frankfurt's district, which includes Opel's headquarters and a Kaiserslautern plant, are quickly dividing into two distinct camps - those that support the deal and the survival of Opel (the "Merkel" position) and those that sharply criticize the deal as being too costly for taxpayers and possibly financially ill-advised (the "zu Guttenberg" position). In addition, contacts voiced general concern to outright anger over government rescue packages and how they are determined, a debate that has been long simmering, but through this deal, has now intensified. End Summary. REACTION FROM THE CENTER - OPEL HEADQUARTERS, RUESSELSHEIM, HESSE ¶2. (SBU) In ConGen Frankfurt's conversation with current Opel CEO, Hans Demant, Demant complained that the most recent negotiations had been conducted "without participation" of himself and other Opel executives. Management was simply informed that the German government had chosen Magna after the fact. (Note: On June 3, Magna made its first decision for the new company and announced that Demant would be replaced by GM-Europe head, Carl-Peter Forster, as CEO of the new independent entity.) Despite this, Demant stated that out of the three serious bidders, management had always preferred either Magna or Ripplewood, a financial firm, to Fiat, primarily because Fiat did not want to maintain a long-term relationship with GM. Demant stated it is "hard to imagine a complete break from GM after being together such a long time." (Note: The current deal would give controlling interest to Magna, Sberbank (a Russian bank), and Gaz (a Russian auto manufacturer),but leave GM with 35 percent.) He sees additional advantages to the fusion with Magna including access to developing markets, especially Russia. ¶3. (SBU) Demant expects facilities in Ruesselsheim will remain relatively intact with only limited workforce reductions. The future for the Kaiserslautern plant is murkier, with the plant having already considered job reductions for months and uncertainty about what components or motors will continue to be built there. Without being able to officially confirm the information, Demant stated the headquarters for the new independent entity would certainly be in Germany, indicating it would be in Ruesselsheim. Demant communicated that the EUR 1.5B bridge should last through the end of the year, by which time the final Magna deal will have to be in place, as "there will not be any additional credit forthcoming." That said, he expressed management's strong desire to complete the transaction sooner rather than later. REACTIONS FROM "OPEL STATES" - RHINELAND-PALATINATE AND HESSE ¶4. (SBU) Reactions in Rhineland-Palatinate (R-P) over the Magna/Opel deal are mixed. R-P is directly affected, since it is home to a major Opel plant in Kaiserslautern with over 3500 employees. From the very beginning, R-P Minister President Kurt Beck (SPD) has favored Magna over Fiat. After the decisive talks in Berlin, Beck as well as Alfred Klingel, chairman of the works council at the Kaiserslautern plant, welcomed the planned takeover by Magna. Beck attacked Econ Minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg's idea for a planned insolvency, stating that insolvency would greatly limit chances to save all the Opel plants in Germany. Beck expects that no more than 280 jobs will be eliminated in Kaiserslautern, most of them via attrition. R-P government, where the SPD has an absolute majority, approved EUR 100M of the EUR 1.5B bridge funds. On the flip side, the R-P FDP, until 2006 the coalition partner of the R-P SPD, sharply criticized the Opel deal. R-P FDP chief and member of the Bundestag, Rainer Br|derle, doubts that the concept will help Opel survive and fears that taxpayers and Opel employees will get stuck with the bill in the end. ¶5. (SBU) Contrary to R-P, the Hesse government and opposition parties are in general agreement concerning Opel, with even the FDP voting to support Hesse's share of the bridge financing (EUR 447M). In an uncommon statement for the Liberals, Hesse FDP caucus chief Florian Rentsch called the financing an "historic result," describing his party's perspective as a mix of optimism and skepticism and clarifying that this funding should be an "exception." Other Hesse government contacts expressed relief that Magna will be Opel's partner, believing this constellation ensures Ruesselsheim will remain Opel's headquarters. Addressing criticism of the Magna/Opel deal's financial underpinnings, the Hesse State Chancellery strongly disagreed with a calculation recently published FRANKFURT 00001487 002 OF 002 in Handelsblatt, a German economic newspaper, which priced the Magna deal as 5 times more expensive than an insolvency. Contacts underscored that this calculation only takes into account short-term costs and that once "automobile sector jobs are eliminated in Germany, they will not return." Although the Hesse government has the opposition's support, SPD Hesse caucus Thorsten Schaefer-Guembel recently pointed out that if the state was prepared to take a direct share in Opel anyway, the problem could have been solved a long time ago. Beyond Opel, the Chancellery confided that Minister President Roland Koch(CDU)also profited from the negotiations by raising his profile with U.S. Treasury officials, whom he hopes to visit in the U.S. in June. BYSTANDERS? BADEN-WUERTTEMBERG AND SAARLAND ¶6. (SBU) Baden-Wuerttemberg (B-W)is struggling with problems of its own in the automotive sector (Porsche) and does not have any direct Opel operations, however, this does not mean that B-W is at all a disinterested party. Reactions from B-W are actually quite vehemently against what people see as "selective" government intervention. B-W Minister President Guenther Oettinger (CDU) has always favored insolvency for Opel and has compared the direct involvement of the Grand Coalition to "the bursting of a dike." There is considerable bitterness within the B-W State Chancellery over Chancellor Merkel's engagement in the Opel takeover and her hesitation to help Porsche with its own financial problems. (Note: Porsche applied this week for EUR 1.75B in government loans.) This feeling is also reflected in the private sector. Helmut Baur, board member of the national Association of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs),blamed federal support of large enterprises for negatively impacting many SMEs in B-W and stressed that in the Stuttgart region alone, there are 13 times as many jobs at stake in financially troubled SMEs than in Opel and Arcandor put together. (Note: German department store operator Arcandor has 86,000 employees and recently applied for EUR 650M in state aid.) "Nobody cares about their problems," Baur said. Alexander Bonde, member of the Greens caucus in the Bundestag and Green spokesperson on budgetary issues, also criticized the Opel solution. Bonde stressed that he does not have a "good feeling" about this deal and is concerned that the risks are not evenly distributed between the federal government, private investors and the German taxpayer. ¶7. (SBU) Saarland also does not have any direct Opel operations, but is nevertheless affected by the automobile sector crisis, as Ford is Saarland's biggest employer. Contacts at Ford were reluctant to provide any direct reaction to the Opel/Magna news, stating only that they did not see the federal support as providing an unfair competitive advantage to Opel, as has been theorized in the media. Instead, contacts boasted that Ford will not ask for capital injections or a guarantee by the state and that during the crisis, Ford has increased its market share in Germany (despite overall lower car sales). Saarland politicians have been similarly tight-lipped, with the exception of FDP Saar caucus chair Christopf Hartmann, who remarked that with state aid for Opel, "a new line has been crossed." ¶8. (SBU) COMMENT: The Magna/Opel deal has brought into sharp relief a clear dividing line that runs throughout Germany, affecting not only states that have a direct stake. Clearly in the run-up to the federal elections, ruling parties and coalitions have stepped in line with the position encapsulated by Chancellor Merkel's comment, "There was no other political solution." The opposing camp, made up not only of opposition parties, but also of Econ Minister zu Guttenberg himself, has become increasingly aggressive, highlighting the overall cost of the deal and questioning behind the scenes whether such a deal made under such time pressure will be sound, referring to the old adage "If you want it bad, you get it bad." The ripple effect of the government's intervention in a private (non-financial) enterprise has also unleashed concern and bitterness in the broader economic community. All of the states in Frankfurt's district are following with great interest the additional funding requests, such as those from Porsche or Arcandor. In the end, both camps - those for and against, are also waiting to see what a final agreement for Opel will look like, each hoping it will validate his position. What most contacts do agree on is that we have not yet read the last chapter of this story. End Comment. POWELL