TAJIKISTAN - MANAGING AFGHANISTAN'S NEIGHBORS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000990

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/20/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL AF TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN - MANAGING AFGHANISTAN'S NEIGHBORS

REF: STATE 85136

CLASSIFIED BY: Matt Purl, A/DCM, POL, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (C) Summary: Tajikistan's leadership wants stability in
Afghanistan, and sees President Karzai as the country's best bet
to continue toward that goal. The Tajik government insists it
takes no sides in the election, and is not interested in
meddling in the ethnic power balance in Afghanistan.
Tajikistan's influence over events in Afghanistan is limited,
but it would use what influence it has to support a peaceful
outcome from the elections. Specific answers keyed to questions
posed in reftel are below at para. 7. End Summary.



TAJIKISTAN JUST WANTS PEACE AND QUIET, AND KARZAI




2. (C) A/DCM presented reftel demarche on August 19 to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Director of North America and
Europe Khusrav Nosiri (the Asia and Africa Director, who
oversees relations with Afghanistan, was unavailable). Nosiri
commented that Tajikistan supported "free and fair" elections in
Afghanistan, and that public opinion in Tajikistan was in favor
of a stable and united Afghanistan. He emphasized that ethnic
issues internal to Afghanistan did not matter to the people of
Tajikistan.




3. (C) A/DCM discussed the elections with Suhrob Sharipov, the
Director of the Tajikistan Institute of Strategic Research.
Sharipov also emphasized the importance of Afghan unity for
Tajikistan. Sharipov stated openly that President Rahmon wished
for Karzai's victory in the elections, and asserted that during
the recent quadrilateral summit in Dushanbe Rahmon had told
Karzai "you are my candidate." He predicted that there would
not be a second round of voting, and that if a second round were
to take place, Abdullah Abdullah would likely settle for a
position of power in Karzai's government rather than contest the
second round. Sharipov doubted that serious tensions between
ethnic groups would arise so long as both Afghan Tajiks and
government-allied Pashtuns continued to face the Taliban
insurgency; but the Tajik-Pashtun power balance would again come
to the fore when the war with the Taliban ended.




4. (C) Sharipov did think it possible that Abdullah Abdullah, if
he received more than 30 percent of the vote, might see himself
as strong enough to contest the validity of the election results
on the premise that he had been the real winner, and that this
might lead to violence. Noting that Northern Alliance leaders
had been based in Dushanbe for a long period when the Taliban
took control of most of northern Afghanistan, Sharipov said that
Tajikistan's leaders would use their personal contacts with
ex-alliance members to push for restraint.




5. (C) A/DCM also spoke with Ilhom Rahmatov, a retired senior
officer of the Russian FSB, who is of Tajik origin and who spent
much of his career in Afghanistan. His view was that Tajikistan
had little or no influence over the Tajik population in
Afghanistan, because the decades of isolation from Afghanistan
enforced by the Soviet Union had severed most family and
business ties that had existed earlier. Like official
interlocutors, he viewed Tajikistan's main interest in
Afghanistan as stability, with little interest in the ethnic
question. He also commented that continuation of the conflict
in Afghanistan was in the interest of Russia, China, Iran, and
India, as each country gained from the trouble the conflict
caused to its enemies or regional competitors.




6. (C) The British DCM met separately with Deputy Chairman of
the Committee for State Security General Gafarov on August 18.
She reported than when she asked Gafarov about the upcoming

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elections, he commented that Karzai was the only candidate with
a real chance to win the election, and that anyway "everyone
knows" that Karzai is "an American puppet."



ASSESSMENT OF INTERESTS AND INFLUENCE




7. (C) Following are answers to reftel's request:



A: Tajikistan's overriding interest is greater stability in
Afghanistan. Conflict in Afghanistan deters investment in
Tajikistan, keeps it dependent on Russia for security, massive
smuggling of Afghan narcotics undermines the rule of law in
Tajikistan, and Afghan extremist groups directly threaten
Tajikistan's military security. While Tajiks in Tajikistan
share a common language with Tajiks in Afghanistan, their
cultural and political views are still strongly
Soviet-influenced, and they tend to view all Afghans, regardless
of ethnicity, as drug smugglers, criminals, and terrorists. The
Government of Tajikistan is very interested in preventing a
return of the Taliban to power, and is sophisticated enough to
understand that this goal will not be served by any effort to
promote Tajiks over Pashtuns in the Afghan power balance.



More parochially, the Government of Tajikistan probably also
wants to see Karzai reelected because a democratic and peaceful
change of administration in the region would highlight the
shortcomings of Tajikistan's sham democracy - in short,
countries should not change their president, in the Tajik view.
Tajikistan will hold parliamentary elections in February 2010,
and does not need a troubling regional example of democracy
leading to actual change.



B: As our interlocutors emphasized, Tajikistan will use what
influence it has to urge restraint by Afghan political leaders
after the elections. Every analysis of Afghan politics we have
heard from Tajiks has come down to the basic view that Afghan
politics is clan- and tribe-based, that democracy in Afghanistan
is a sham, and that conflicts will be resolved by backroom
deals. So it seems likely that they will urge privately that
the candidates avoid any confrontation which could alienate
Afghanistan's foreign supporters, and find some accommodation of
each other. In public the Government of Tajikistan will endorse
a Karzai victory, and possibly remain silent if there is a
second electoral round.



C: If there is a second round, or any violence between the
factions contesting this election, the Government of Tajikistan
will be cautious in its public and private response, and will
likely be receptive to our advice, given the Tajik's desire to
shows themselves to be solid partners on Afghanistan. Their
efforts will be constructive, but of limited value.
QUAST