PROMINENT FORMER OPPOSITION LEADER TURAJONZODA SHARES VIEWS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 000957

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/7/2019
TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREL KIRF KISL TI
SUBJECT: PROMINENT FORMER OPPOSITION LEADER TURAJONZODA SHARES VIEWS
ON KEY ISSUES, TAJIKISTAN'S UNCERTAIN FUTURE

REF: A. DUSHANBE 347

B. DUSHANBE 688

CLASSIFIED BY: Matt Purl, A/DCM, POL, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (C) Summary: On July 30, Embassy PolOffs and two DRL
representatives met with Hoji Akbar Turajonzoda, a charismatic
religious leader who was among the top leaders of the United
Tajik Opposition during Tajikistan's civil war. Despite his
continued harsh criticism of President Rahmon, Turajonzoda now
serves as a presidentially appointed Deputy in Tajikistan's
Majlisi Milli (upper house of Parliament),and was Deputy Prime
Minister from 1998-2005. Turajonzoda gave his views on recent
violence in the Rasht Valley, the status of religious freedom,
and the prospects for democratic reform in Tajikistan. He
predicted the government's actions to restrict Islamic religious
practice would increase religious extremism and political
instability in Tajikistan, and said the United States could do
its part to keep extremism in check by reaching out to Islamic
leaders across the country. End summary.



WHO IS HOJI AKBAR TURAJONZODA?




2. (C) Turajonzoda was the Qazi Qalon, the highest Islamic
authority in Tajikistan, from 1988-1991. During the Tajik civil
war from 1992-1997, he commanded the United Tajik Opposition
(UTO) primarily from Afghanistan and Iran, but traveled
extensively to several Arab Gulf States, Russia, Europe, and the
United States [Note: Turajonzoda's lifestyle and political
philosophy seemed heavily influenced by his time spent abroad.
A muted plasma screen TV tuned to Al-Jazeera news played
continuously during our meeting, and he repeatedly compared
Tajikistan's political environment to that of several other
countries. End note.] After returning to Tajikistan in 1998,
he served as Deputy Prime Minister for seven years. Upon his
resignation in 2005, he was chosen to serve as one of only eight
presidentially appointed Deputies in the Majlisi Milli. In this
position, Turajonzoda may revise drafts of laws from the Majlisi
Namoyandagon, Tajikistan's lower parliamentary house. His
appointment to the Majlisi Milli was reportedly the result of a
gentlemen's agreement between Turajonzoda and President Rahmon;
in exchange for the Deputy job, Turajonzoda agreed that he would
not challenge Rahmon for the presidency. Turajonzoda also
manages a personal business investing in local cotton farms.



RECENT CLASHES "NOT DOMESTIC PROBLEMS"




3. (C) On July 30, a meeting between Turajonzoda and State
Deprtment vistors from the DRl bureau began with a discussion of
recent armed attacks on police checkpoints in the Tavildara area
of central Tajikistan. Turajonzoda noted that no armed group
had made an official statement regarding its identity or
intentions, but asserted that several armed opposition groups
were currently operating near Tavildara. At least one of these
groups was comprised of militants from Afghanistan and Pakistan,
and another of former opposition fighters from Tajikistan's
civil war. Turajonzoda predicted that clashes would continue
for the foreseeable future, but expected there would not be
widespread support for the groups. Most Tajiks had painful
memories of the civil war, and feared any outbreak of violence.




4. (C) Turajonzoda dismissed two small explosions in Dushanbe on
July 26, as the work of Tajikistan's security service. He
believed the explosions were intended to demonstrate
Tajikistan's security relevance to Presidents Karzai, Zardari,
and Medvedev ahead of a summit of regional leaders in Dushanbe
last week.



TAJIKISTAN'S POLITICAL FUTURE




5. (C) Turajonzoda compared Tajikistan's current political
environment to other countries, particularly Egypt. Asked if
Rahmon would ever lose control of Tajikistan, Turajonzoda
replied, "Look at Mubarak." He explained that both leaders were
unpopular among their people, but maintained control over their

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populations by crushing any prospects for democratic transition.
He commented that democracy allowed India to avoid problems
with religious extremism [sic].




6. (C) Turajonzoda expressed doubt that democratic reform would
occur in Tajikistan. Similarly, a coup or revolution would not
change Tajikistan's political system; it would only result in a
"change of dictators." The only solution, he claimed, was for
the United Nations Security Council to mandate that world
leaders serve no more than 10 years, since "no one can become a
dictator in 10 years."




7. (C) Asked what he expected of Tajikistan's parliamentary
elections in February 2010, Turajonzoda shook his head and said,
"They are false." Still, he predicted the election would be
peaceful, since people are "afraid of mutiny" even if they hated
Rahmon. In response to a question about whether recent protests
in Iran over that country's presidential election might inspire
similar demonstrations in Tajikistan, Turajonzoda replied, "Iran
did not have a civil war." Referring to Mir-Hossein Mousavi,
President Ahmadinejad's primary contender in Iran's election, he
said such candidates would have been jailed or killed in
Tajikistan for inciting unrest.



"NO RESPECT FOR ISLAM"




8. (C) Turajonzoda had much to say about Tajikistan's new law on
religion (Ref A),which many observers have criticized as being
overly restrictive of religious practice and association. He
alleged that when the law was passed, the government secretly
instructed police not to enforce it strictly. The law was
intended to be a signaling mechanism, he said; to "let the world
know we are secular." According to Turajonzoda, most Muslim
leaders in Tajikistan are opposed to the idea of an Islamic
state and sought only the spread of Islamic ideals within Tajik
society. He criticized Rahmon for failing to understand this,
saying the President had "no respect for Islam."




9. (C) Pointing to frustration among the country's youth over
the lack of economic opportunity and an inability to express
themselves, Turajonzoda predicted that a growing number of Tajik
youth would become extremists. He cited the now-banned Salafi
movement as evidence that young people were beginning to turn
toward more conservative forms of Islam, calling them "youth
gone astray." He expects the situation to worsen as Tajiks'
violent memories of the civil war fade. By his estimation, the
possibility of an opposition-led coup would be much higher in
15-20 years. He did not specify whether such an opposition
would be Islamist or secular in nature.



VIEWS OF AMERICA




10. (C) Turajonzoda offered several warnings for U.S. policy in
Tajikistan. He predicted that if the Taliban was not defeated
in Afghanistan, instability would spread rapidly to Tajikistan.
He also noted that a growing number of Tajiks believed the
United States was insincere in its desire to promote democracy
here. "People only see things in two colors," he cautioned,
indicating that Tajiks would not take America seriously unless
it ceased support for Rahmon. Warning that it was unwise to
back "those who do not care about their people," Turajonzoda
asked why the United States had not been more forceful in urging
Rahmon to release Tajik opposition prisoners jailed during the
civil war.




11. (C) Overall, Turajonzoda expressed a positive opinion of the
United States. He praised America's attitude toward Islam and
religious freedom, saying at one point, "When I was in America,
I saw Islam. Here, I do not." He also praised the Embassy for
sending five Tajik imams to the United States in May under the

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IVLP (Ref B). According to Turajonzoda, such programs are the
best way to counter the threat of extremism and anti-American
sentiment in Tajikistan.



COMMENT




12. (C) Turajonzoda was forthcoming with his opinions, even on
potentially sensitive issues. Our meeting with him highlighted
his unique role in Tajikistan's opaque political system. He is
one of very few former opposition leaders to obtain multiple
presidential appointments after the civil war. Unlike the
others, however, he makes his dislike for Rahmon public. As the
"gentlemen's agreement" between Turajonzoda and Rahmon suggests,
Rahmon prefers to keep Turajonzoda in his government as a means
of restraining Turajonzoda's political clout. Though
Turajonzoda seems happy with this arrangement for now, many
Tajiks believe he may be biding his time and waiting for an
auspicious moment in which to seek the presidency himself.
QUAST