Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09DUSHANBE51
2009-01-13 07:31:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Dushanbe
Cable title:  

TAJIKISTAN'S - ABILITY TO RESEARCH OR FREEZE ASSETS OF SUSPECT TERRORIST ENTITIES

Tags:  EFIN KTFN PTER ETTC PREL PINR KCRM TI 
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VZCZCXRO5308
RR RUEHLN RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0051/01 0130731
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 130731Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1330
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0391
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0283
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0222
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000051 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EFIN, KTFN, PTER, ETTC, PREL, PINR, KCRM, TI

SUBJ: Tajikistan's - Ability to Research or Freeze Assets of Suspect
Terrorist Entities

REF: A. STATE 127070
B. STATE 131885

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000051



SENSITIVE

SIPDIS



E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: EFIN, KTFN, PTER, ETTC, PREL, PINR, KCRM, TI



SUBJ: Tajikistan's - Ability to Research or Freeze Assets of Suspect

Terrorist Entities



REF: A. STATE 127070

B. STATE 131885



1. (SBU) Summary: On January 8, Poloff met with Deputy Finance

Minister Shavkat Shohibov to discuss Tajikistan's ability to

investigate and freeze assets of entities, listed in reftels, that

have been identified as assisting in the proliferation of

technologies associated with weapons of mass destruction or the

financing of terrorist groups. Shohibov said Tajikistan lacked the

ability to effectively respond to these and other requests. End

summary.



2. (SBU) Shohibov explained that Tajikistan had no electronic system

by which state and commercial banks could investigate requests to

freeze assets of terrorist entities. Shohibov said most USG

requests went into a black hole; at best a small minority of

demarches prompted the government to sift through some paper records

and/or call banks to make basic inquiries. No computerized link

existed between the Ministry of Finance and any of the banks in

Dushanbe, except the National Bank, although even this connection

did not allow review of bank accounts to investigate requests.

Shohibov added that ideally, Tajikistan would have the ability to

track financial operations of targeted entities via a joint

classified Commercial Bank/National Bank/Ministry of Finance

computer system. The situation was made worse by the absence of

adequate links with banks outside Dushanbe. While the Ministry

maintained some telephonic communication with banks around the

country, it normally relied on printed reports from district

branches of the Ministry of Finance or local district authorities

for information, rather than an automated system of accounts

management.



3. (SBU) Shohibov said the Ministry of Finance would start working

over the next three years with the World Bank, British Department

for International Development (DFID),and European Union to develop

an interconnected, automated system of banking and finance in

country. He said the proposal for this system (which will be a part

of the National Concept for State Finance Management Strategy of

Tajikistan for 2009-2019) was nearing a final draft, and would be

submi
tted to the World Bank in next couple of months. Even if "only

60%" of the project is approved, Shohibov said, it would greatly

expand the government's ability to efficiently respond to Post

action requests. (Two years ago a group of World Bank specialists

conducted a study of tracking country-wide financing operations and

terrorism financing. This report is available upon request from the

World Bank.)



4. (SBU) Shohibov concluded that while the State Committee for

National Security (GKNB) received a copy of all Post requests to

freeze assets of entities of concern, very little joint work took

place. Shohibov said he was sure the GKNB used its own measures and

systems to investigate these identities, however, no information was

passed to the Ministry of Finance for action.



5. (SBU) Comment: Tajikistan's shortcomings in overseeing its

financial sector was manifested in the Mutual Evaluation conducted

by the Eurasian Group (EAG) of the Financial Action Task Force. The

ninth EAG Plenary Session reviewed the evaluation in Moscow in

mid-December, 2008. Essentially evaluated as failing in all major

categories, Tajikistan representatives initially denied any problems

and then claimed that Tajikistan could not comply with the forty

anti-money laundering (AML) recommendations or nine special

Qanti-money laundering (AML) recommendations or nine special

counterterrorism financing (CTF) recommendations without major

foreign donor assistance.





6. (SBU) These claims are more than a little disingenuous. It is

perfectly possible for the Government to do basic checks without

having some kind of integrated global database of all accounts. It

is unlikely any country has such a thing. All the banks have, or

should have, their own database, even if it is paper, of their

accountholders. An e-mail to a listserv of all banks, or even a

paper letter could ask them to check their account holders for

specific names. They could be required to respond, even in the

negative. It's not rocket science. Just because the Ministry can't

type a name into terminal and push a button to get an instant answer

does mean they are not able to request banks to check accounts and

get answers.



7. (SBU) In general though, it appear political will is lacking to

monitor financial transactions in a meaningful way. Notwithstanding

the recognized shortcomings, at least by the Tajikistani

representatives at the EAG meeting, the Parliament renewed the

amnesty of illegally or unregistered property until June, 2009 in

contravention of all the AML/CTF conventions to which Tajikistan has

acceded. End Comment.





DUSHANBE 00000051 002 OF 002





JACOBSON

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