Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09DUSHANBE423
2009-04-08 13:37:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Dushanbe
Cable title:  

IS TAJIKISTAN'S ISLAMIC PARTY AT A CROSSROADS?

Tags:  PGOV PREL PHUM TI 
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VZCZCXRO2568
RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHLH RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHDBU #0423/01 0981337
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 081337Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0210
INFO RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0379
RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 000423 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/8/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM TI
SUBJECT: IS TAJIKISTAN'S ISLAMIC PARTY AT A CROSSROADS?

REF: 08 DUSHANBE 983

DUSHANBE 00000423 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: TRACY A. JACOBSON, AMBASSADOR, EXE, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 000423

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/8/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM TI
SUBJECT: IS TAJIKISTAN'S ISLAMIC PARTY AT A CROSSROADS?

REF: 08 DUSHANBE 983

DUSHANBE 00000423 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: TRACY A. JACOBSON, AMBASSADOR, EXE, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (C) Summary: Tajikistan's new religion law puts Tajikistan's
Islamic Revival Party in a difficult position. The party's
inability to influence either the legislative process or the
government's religious policy, calls into question its reason
for being. The party's silence on major issues challenges its
relevance. While the party ranks continue to grow, some wonder
whether party members will start questioning the party's
leadership. End summary.




2. (C) The Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan remains the
largest opposition party, and it is the only opposition party
that has representatives in Tajikistan's parliament (two members
of the lower house). However, recent events have challenged the
party's claims to relevance. The party was unable to prevent
passage of a restrictive religion law, and it has been unable to
influence government officials implementing the country's
religious policy. Party leaders have been quiet on electoral
reform, and were relatively passive in raising allegations of
fraud in a recent by-election in Dushanbe. For the second
straight year, party leaders did not exploit government missteps
during winter crises to boost the party's image or position.



THE RELIGION ISSUE




3. (C) In 2008, Islamic Revival Party Chairman Muhiddin Kabiri,
as one of the party's two parliamentary deputies, introduced his
own version of the religion law, as a counter-measure to the
government's controversial version (which was ultimately
adopted). Kabiri said at the time that his version of the law
was never submitted for discussion by the relevant parliamentary
committee; parliament was dominated by President Rahmon's
supporters, and the deputies were pressured into considering
only the government's version. On March 5, when parliament
passed the government's version - with little or no debate -
Kabiri was in Bishkek on a business trip.




4. (C) PolAssistant witnessed an exchange about this sequence of
events between Kabiri and Davlat Usmon, a former Deputy Chairman

of the party, at a social gathering on March 30. Usmon told
Kabiri that "it is high time for the party to be more active."
Usmon criticized Kabiri for not cutting his business trip short
and returning for the vote, at least as a symbolic act. Usmon
reminded Kabiri that Hoji Akbar Turajonzoda, one of the few
independent deputies in the upper house, cut short his trip to
Libya to add his voice in protest to the law. Kabiri responded
to Usmon by explaining that he had tried to work with the
Chairman of the lower house on the legislation without success,
and that his presence would not have prevented the law's
passage.




5. (C) In a private conversation, Kabiri said a public
discussion of the law could do nothing more than "complicate
social tranquility," and that if there were social disturbances,
the Islamic Revival Party would get the blame. He did not see
any way to change the government's religious policy, and he
thought it would be better for the party to position itself
between the government and the religious community, to try to
"soften or release tension between the two."




6. (C) During a March 31 conversation with PolOff, Abdullo
Rahnamo, a respected analyst at the Strategic Research Center
who was on the same trip in Libya with Turajonzoda when the
latter flew home to vote against the law, commented that the
passage of the religion law challenged the fundamental reason
for the party to exist. The essential purpose of the party is
to represent the religious community; "if the party cannot
protect the religious community, what does the party stand for?"




THE ELECTION ISSUE




7. (C) The religion law is not the only major issue facing the

DUSHANBE 00000423 002.2 OF 003


party. Parliamentary elections are set to take place in early
2010, and if a recent by-election for a parliamentary seat
representing one of Tajikistan's largest constituencies is any
indication, the future is not bright for a free and fair
process. In early February, the government claimed that a
member of President Rahmon's party received 91% of the vote to
the Islamic Revival Party candidate's 7%, and that turnout was
70%. International observers from the OSCE and the EU reported
numerous irregularities, and estimated that turnout was closer
to 10-15%. Just after the by-election, Hikmatullo Saifullozoda,
the Islamic Revival Party's spokesman, and Muhammadali Hait, the
party's Deputy Chairman, held a press conference, claiming
victory, complaining about the irregularities, and vowing to
challenge the announced results in court. A local court
rejected the party's claims, and the party has filed an appeal.




8. (C) In early March, PolOff hosted a lunch for Sughd regional
Islamic Revival Party representatives during a trip to Isfara.
The representatives were concerned about the by-election
results, and asked the U.S. Embassy to "tell the government to
pass a new election law" because they had no ability to do it
themselves. In responding, PolOff noted that the party had the
potential to take a proactive role in advocating for electoral
changes, as it has two parliamentary representatives, a
newspaper and public relations department, and a growing (and
significant) support base. One of the representatives argued
that Kabiri's plan was to grow the party ranks so that it could
compete in the 2015 elections. PolOff said that the party
representatives' comments were reminiscent of the government
line on reform - we need the international community to do it
for us, and we are working for the future. At that point, the
representatives turned their attention to Naimjon Samiev, the
party's Regional Chairman, who had been silent during this
exchange. The representatives started to ask probing questions
about what the party leadership was doing about the issues we
raised.



THE WINTER CRISIS ISSUE




9. (C) In past years, the Islamic Revival Party has not
exploited government missteps that contributed to chronic winter
crises, which have included blackouts across the country and
severe shortages of food. Post asked Kabiri about the party's
tactics in 2008, and reported in reftel that Kabiri was hesitant
to criticize the government during the crisis because it would
not have helped the situation. A reporter from the weekly
independent newspaper Farazh asked Kabiri a similar question in
early 2009; Kabiri responded broadly and generally, saying that
if the government did not improve its performance next year, the
party would respond.



IS THE PARTY RELEVANT?




10. (C) Comment: We have witnessed at least two instances in
which Islamic Revival Party members have questioned their
leadership about a relatively passive approach to major issues
affecting them. Davlat Usmon may not be the only person to
question the party's response to the religion law's passage.
During our lunch in Isfara, it appeared that Sughd party members
were questioning their leadership as well. Kabiri's comments
about this year's winter crisis add to the observations in
reftel about the course he has chartered for his party. His
refusal to capitalize on government failures during the winter
seem to be at odds with his role as the leader of Tajikistan's
main opposition party. President Rahmon has been fairly
ruthless in coopting, or even crushing, political challengers.
Kabiri is clearly reluctant to directly challenge him unless and
until he feels that his party is in a stronger position,
although, according to Kabiri, the party has a huge following
throughout the country. Kabiri is still unwilling to take risks
by taking a strong stand on major issues.




11. (C) Comment continued: The question is, how long will that
growing group of followers remain patient? The passage of the
religion law may bring this question to a head. In not taking a
strong vocal stand prior to the law's passage, the party has
opened itself up to questions about its relevance. Some party

DUSHANBE 00000423 003.2 OF 003


officials have recognized the need to do something.
Muhammadsharif Himmatzoda, the party's other parliamentary
representative, took the government to task for passing the law
in a recent article in the party's newspaper. Other party
members have been reluctant to discuss the issue, however. The
conventional wisdom has been that the Islamic Revival Party has
been the beneficiary of a growing religious population that is
increasingly frustrated with the government. Will the party
remain the political voice of religious Tajiks? End Comment.
JACOBSON