FRAUD SUMMARY - DUSHANBE, TAJIKISTAN

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 DUSHANBE 000413

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR CA/FPP AND SCA/CEN
FRANKFURT FOR RCO

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: CVIS KFRD CPAS CMGT ASEC TI
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - DUSHANBE, TAJIKISTAN

DUSHANBE 00000413 001.2 OF 004


Country Conditions


1. Tajikistan's continued poverty, high unemployment and
dependence on remittances from family members abroad result in a
significant number of working age Tajiks, mostly male, who seek
to leave Tajikistan for better prospects elsewhere. Until
recently, according to unofficial statistics, more than one
million Tajiks out of a population of seven million worked
abroad, primarily in the Russian Federation. However, in recent
months, the effect of the worldwide economic crisis on the
Russian economy as well as a December 2008 decree by the Russian
Prime Minister aimed at cutting quotas of foreign workers has
resulted in thousands of unemployed Tajik citizens being sent
back to Tajikistan. This portion of the population may be
expected to look for job opportunities outside of Tajikistan
beyond Russia. At the same time, living conditions in
Tajikistan have become even more difficult with rising prices in
rural areas as well as the major cities and another winter with
energy outages affecting the entire country. As the overall
economic situation in Tajikistan continues to deteriorate, there
is a concern that all of these factors may contribute to
increased fraudulent applications related to labor migration and
that the U.S. visa will be used as a means to seek a better
economic opportunities.


2. Fraud in Tajikistan is much more primitive compared to the
efforts of visa applicants in many other countries
(petition-based fraud, for example). We uncover most fraud
easily at the NIV window with a short interview. However, Post
sometimes encounters relatively sophisticated attempts, which
require follow-up investigations and further action by the Fraud
Prevention Unit or Regional Security Office. During the
reporting period, Post saw a case of apparent H1B fraud when a
Turkish school in the United States petitioned for a Tajik
teacher. After the applicant was found unqualified for the
position through the visa interview, further CCD research
uncovered numerous H1B visa refusals in Turkey from this same
petitioner. This petition was sent back to DHS for revocation.


3. When Post uncovers fraud, it is usually in connection with
tourist (B1/B2) or student (F1) visas. Discovery often occurs
during the initial application review or during the interview,
when it becomes apparent that the applicant does not intend to
fulfill the stated purpose of the trip and likely seeks either
to work illegally for a short time or to join relatives who have
already illegally immigrated. Applicants often submit false
employment and invitation letters in support of their
applications. Lexis/Nexis searches provide invaluable
information in this regard. Post has encountered fraudulent
applicants traveling in groups for various sporting events
(usually wrestling, arm wrestling or judo/taekwondo)in the
United States. One applicant admitted to paying $3,500 to be
included in the group; another who recently contacted post
following deportation by DHS had apparently overstayed by 18
months. Applicants in these groups are sometimes well prepared
for the visa interview and are often supplied with genuine
supporting documents as they sometimes accompany legitimate
travelers.

The majority of F1 visa applicants in Tajikistan wish to study
English as a Second Language (ESL) in schools or programs
preferably where large Tajik communities exist. Such places
include New York City; Lincoln, Nebraska; Denver, Colorado, and
more recently several schools in Miami and Los Angeles. Since
these applicants tend to apply to the same dozen schools in the
United States, post is interested in whether administrative
practices of such schools might facilitate non-compliance with
student visa status. Investigating one case, post requested an
applicant's transcripts from the Computer Professional Learning
Center (CPLC),a school that offers an ESL program, to clarify a
discrepancy between the SEVIS record and applicant's statements.
When the initial transcript provided conflicted with the timing
the student claimed she was in the U.S., the school responded by
sending a second transcript with data in line with the
applicant's statements. While there is no hard evidence of
fraud here, we are now monitoring this U.S. school closely. In
another case, anecdotal information has indicated that students
applying to a different school in New York City take advantage
of course hours that allow foreign students to work while
studying. In regard to these concerns, post highly values
recent DHS efforts to investigate further possible fraud trends
among Tajik students falsely claiming to attend ESL schools,
especially in New York.


4. Documents are generally untrustworthy in Tajikistan, with
signatures and seals often forged. The officer can detect many
of these documents by asking for supporting details about the
individual's work, economic situation and financial sponsorship

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or details of the proposed US travel. Document forgers can be
easily found in Tajikistan and provide fake job letters very
cheaply. However, not all fraudulent documents are necessarily
"fake." For a small bribe an applicant can have the appropriate
government official write out a real birth or marriage
certificate with false information, including all of the
appropriate seals. Data mismatches usually make this sort of
fraud easy to detect. Corrupt government officials continue to
thwart attempts to tighten the issuance and regulations of
national identity documents. Anti-corruption laws exist, but
enforcement and implementation remain elusive, and internal
controls on identity documents are lax.

NIV Fraud


5. Post began processing nonimmigrant visas in August 2006 and
has experienced continued growth in the number of applicants,
with the exception of the last quarter. The total number of
issuances and refusals in FY07 was 2,384 which grew to 4,022 in
FY08 and leveled off somewhat in the first half of FY09 (through
March 15) with 1,179 applications. Post's NIV refusal rate for
FY07 was only 39.3%. For FY08 it jumped to 48.8%. The refusal
rate for the first half of FY09 has been only slightly higher at
51.7%. It is important to take into account the fact that F1
students make up a disproportionate number of all NIV
applications. We have seen the percentage of F1s rise from 47%
of all applications in FY07 to 63% in FY08, and stay at about
57% for the first half of FY09.

Post completed its second validation study for F1s during the
period of 1 February 2007 through 22 August 2008. The results
are as follows:

Total Issued: 1282
In status: 923 (72%)
Out of status: 165 (13%)
Departed: 188 (15%)
Unable to determine status: 6

A full report on the validation study will be submitted in a
separate cable to the Department of State.


6. Tajik students often have trouble proving their ability to
fully finance their study in the United States. Post has sees
attempts to work around this by presenting suspicious letters of
support from sponsoring firms or organizations as well as
inflated bank statements. One indicator of fraud is bank
statements that show an even number such as exactly USD 9,000 or
15,000 in the account. Anecdotal evidence suggests that an
applicant can purchase such a statement for a hundred dollars;
the money will be deposited into the account, and will remain
there for approximately a month.


7. Post has encountered some instances of fraudulent
sponsorship letters provided by legitimate organizations and
NGOs. During this reporting period, post has had cases where
applicants presented documents on legitimate letterhead claiming
that a government office, private company or local NGO would
sponsor the full cost of an individual's English study in the US
- which made little sense in these instances. Follow up phone
calls usually reveal that employers who may even have signed the
letter don't really intend to fund such `training'. In other
cases, phone calls to official phone numbers provided on
company/organization letterhead reach a private party with no
relationship to the company or organization. A small positive
exception to the trend occurred when post discovered that one
international organization - ACTED - headquartered in Paris -
does sponsor specific employees for English courses abroad as
part of its employee incentive program.


8. Post processed its first ever Summer Work and Travel visas
last Spring and conducted its first validation study of all 86
Tajik J-1 visa recipients who participated in the 2008 Summer
Work and Travel Program. The validation study was based on
records of the students' return received from local implementing
agencies as well as ADIS information obtained by the Consular
Section.

The results of the validation study are as follows:

Visas issued - 86
Visas refused - 24
Returned from the U.S. - 58 (67 %)
Did not return from the U.S./Changed status -19(22 %)
Confirmed overstay - 9 (11 %)

In summary, of 110 SWT J1 Applications received at Post in 2008,
86 were granted visas while 24 were refused. Of these 86

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issuances, 58 applicants returned to Tajikistan after their
travel to the United States, 9 applicants are believed to have
overstayed (6 male and 3 female) and 19 applicants are pending
change to F1 status.

This current SWT season post anticipates a twofold increase in
applications compared to last year.

IV Fraud


9. Post accepts and processes a limited number of I-130
petitions(approximately one a month). Marriage fraud in
Tajikistan is not common, although we have seen some cases among
DV applicants. Tajik society is very traditional and is
generally not open to marriage to foreign citizens. In
addition, there are relatively few Tajik-Americans, eliminating
the types of marriage fraud found in connection with large
diaspora communities.

DV Fraud


10. DV fraud in Tajikistan echoes that of the Central Asian
region. Almaty and Tashkent have seen suspected sham marriages
in Tajik DV cases processed at those posts. Although it is
difficult to draw conclusions based on unreliable high school
equivalency documents, Tajiks fall roughly into two categories:
agricultural laborers from villages and the mountains (unlikely
to have earned a high school education) and city residents
(often have college degrees in addition to high school
equivalent education). Post has seen suspicious cases of
children added to a DV case after notification and before the
interview.

ACS and U.S. Passport Fraud


11. Post has not discovered any ACS or passport fraud in
Tajikistan. Due to the small American citizen community, the
Consular Officer and Embassy local staff are often personally
acquainted with resident Americans. Few Tajiks have U.S.
citizenship. Post has yet to issue more than five Consular
Reports of Birth Abroad per year, and many of the Americans
residents in Tajikistan have diplomatic or official passports.
Passports are rarely lost or stolen, and in the past few years
lost passports were usually returned within one week. There are
thirteen children currently registered with the Embassy born to
Tajik parents while in the United States (often as out-of-status
students). This is an area of concern for post.

Adoption Fraud


12. On May 3, 2006, Tajikistan changed its Family Code to
prohibit inter-country adoption of Tajik orphans. While couples
which consist of at least one Tajik citizen may be still allowed
to adopt, all other adoptions by non-Tajik citizens are
forbidden by Tajik law.

Use of DNA Testing


13. Post has not had need to require DNA testing of any
applicants.

Asylum and Other DHS Benefits Fraud


14. Post provides all assistance requested by DHS to verify
documents such as birth certificates or proof of
nationality/ethnicity, many of which have turned out to be
fraudulent. No concrete asylum or other DHS benefits fraud has
come to light in the past two quarters.


Alien Smuggling, Trafficking, Organized Crime, Terrorist Travel


15. Tajikistan is a source country for women trafficked through
Kyrgyzstan and Russia to the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.),
Turkey, and Russia for the purpose of commercial sexual
exploitation. Women are also reportedly trafficked to Pakistan
for the purposes of sexual exploitation and forced labor. Men
are trafficked to Russia and Kazakhstan for the purpose of
forced labor, primarily in the construction and agricultural
industries. Boys and girls are trafficked internally for various
purposes, including forced labor and forced begging. There have
been no reports of trafficking in persons from or through
Tajikistan to the Western Hemisphere.

Supporters of terrorist groups such as the Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan (IMU),the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU),al-Qaida, and
the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement remain active in Central
Asia, as do anti-Western, anti-semitic extremist organizations

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such as Hizb'ut-Tahrir. Members of the Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan have been arrested and convicted for organized crime,
murder and weapons charges in Tajikistan in the past.
Tajikistan is primarily a transit center for illegal terrorist
travel. Canada and Mexico do not have diplomatic representation
in Tajikistan, and EU consular officials have not reported any
use of fraudulent U.S. passports or visas to assist visa
applications to EU countries.

DS Criminal Fraud Investigations


16. The Regional Security Office and Consular Section maintain
a close working relationship. Fraud, as stated above, is
relatively simple. Post's fraud prevention manager, the
consular section chief, refers the occasional case to the RSO.
The RSO in turn conveys the disposition of each case to the
consular section chief. During the last year, the Regional
Security Office and Consular Section have cooperated on two
cases; one which had been opened by the local authorities
regarding a visa fixer, another between DHS and the Ministry of
Internal Affairs of the Republic of Tajikistan regarding visa
fraud and alien smuggling using F1 student visas. One case
concluded with an arrest and prosecution and the other case is
ongoing.

Host Country Passport, Identity Documents, and Civil Registry


17. Post continues to have serious concerns about both the
Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs'
capacity in terms of the security and accountability of the
passport issuance process. For example, physical presence of
the applicant is often forgone in applying for passports. All
Tajik civil documents should be scrutinized carefully. Post has
encountered cases in the past of previously issued applicants
having received new Tajik passports with identities to which
they had no legal claim.


18. Most Tajik elite have returned to using traditional names,
eliminating the Russian variants of surnames (the "-ev" and
"-ov" endings for example) and patronymics. Post continues to
be cognizant of possible name variations to recognize any fraud
such as visa reapplication under the 'new' name to avoid
discovery of adverse information or previous refusals.

Cooperation with Host Government Authorities


19. Document fraud is technically a criminal offense in
Tajikistan. In combating these crimes, the Tajik Ministry of
Foreign Affairs is at best an occasionally competent partner.
The MFA periodically informs us by diplomatic note about the
numbers of lost or stolen Tajik passports and also cooperates
with Post's requests for verification of civil documents (though
usually months later than requested). However, endemic
corruption, shoddy record keeping, and lack of prosecution for
document fraud limit the utility of cooperation.

Areas of Particular Concern


20. Despite the most recent drop in applications, in general,
post has seen a steady increase in NIV applications since visa
issuance began in 2006. This can be attributed to the low
living standards in the country as well as increased awareness
of the possibility of applying for a U.S. visa. Due to various
factors mentioned above, post anticipates that the number of
applicants will continue to increase overall in FY09, albeit
perhaps at a slower rate. Post is currently processing its
second year of Summer Work and Travel applicants in Tajikistan -
with higher numbers, and other programs such as au pair are
likely to follow. The continuing increase in applicants and
difficult living situation in Tajikistan will undoubtedly lead
to some rise in instances of fraud, and post does not discount
the possibility that more sophisticated methods may be used to
obtain visas fraudulently.


Staffing and Training


21. Consular Chief and Fraud Prevention Manager is Elisabeth
Wilson. Fraud Prevention FSN is Tahmina Dehoti. Tahmina Dehoti
has taken PC542 - FSN Fraud Prevention Workshop in Washington.
JACOBSON