THREE FACES OF TAJIKISTAN'S SUNNI LEADERSHIP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 000401

SIPDIS

STATE DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/18/2019
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KISL TI
SUBJECT: THREE FACES OF TAJIKISTAN'S SUNNI LEADERSHIP

REF: DUSHANBE 290

CLASSIFIED BY: Tracey A. Jacobson , Ambassador, EXEC, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (C) Summary: EmbOffs have reached out to more of Tajikistan's
imams to get their impressions of religious life in Tajikistan
and perceptions of the United States. The dissatisfaction
voiced by Tajikistan's increasingly popular independent imams,
as described in reftel, appears to be shared by many other
imams. The government, however, continues to perpetuate the
fiction that it can control what imams say and think. The imams
we met ranged from strict adherence to the government's policy,
to ignoring it. All of the imams share a common goal - to keep
the country stable. However, they express deep concerns about
the course the government has set. End Summary.




2. (C) From March 10-12, EmbOffs spoke to imams in Dushanbe and
in Sughd to expand on the issues we reported on in reftel.
Three imams emerged who probably typify the state of the Islamic
leadership in Tajikistan. One imam fully supports the
government's religious policy, and toes the line in the same way
that secular officials do. An independent imam ignores and, in
some cases, opposes the government's policy. A third imam
attempts to comply with government requirements, but also
recognizes the untenable situation he is in.



THE GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRAT




3. (C) Qobiljon Boev, the senior religious official at
Dushanbe's Central Mosque, is the prototype of the
government-compliant imam. In addition to his duties at the
mosque, he is a member of the Council of Ulamo and a relative of
the Council's Chairman. During a meeting with PolOff on March
10, he deferred excessively to the positive role of government
in religious life, invoking "his excellency President Rahmon"
multiple times. He said that "our government is our father, and
we are its children; if a child misbehaves, the father must beat
him."




4. (C) Boev gave PolOff details about how the government
attempts to control imams. For example, Boev and other Council
of Ulamo members prepare sets of sermons. They then send the
sermons to the Ministry of Culture, which in turn sends the
sermons to President Rahmon's Office. The presidential
administration and Ministry of Culture edit the sermons, and go
back and forth with the Council of Ulamo on which topics are
appropriate to discuss. Once the sermons are completed, the
Council distributes them to imams at all Friday praying mosques
in Tajikistan by e-mail, post or fax. Boev said that this
system was initiated by "his excellency," and that the sermons
generally cover the historical aspects of religious figures or
main tenets of Islam.




5. (C) Boev said most imams are happy to follow the Council's
guidelines because they are "not well educated, and they need
help writing sermons." Controls were necessary to prevent imams
from straying from acceptable topics: "As long as religious
figures do not touch sensitive issues, we will have no
problems." He said Tajiks have a positive image of the United
States, and that U.S. support for Israel is not an issue in
which Tajiks would interfere.




6. (C) As reported in reftel, the crowds at Boev's mosque have
declined over the years. Boev claimed that 7000 people - mostly
between 20 and 50 - regularly attended Friday prayers; during
trips to the mosque on Friday, however, EmbOffs never observed
anywhere near that number. Amongst those who regularly attend
Friday prayers is a group of Salafis. Boev fully supports the
government's ban on the group, and is aware that they come to
his mosque. He reasoned that it is not illegal for the Salafis
to pray; it is merely illegal for them to exist as a group.




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THE INDEPENDENT AND CHARISMATIC FIGURE




7. (C) In very stark contrast to Boev, Domullo Numonkhon, the
imam khatib of the Muhammad Iqbol Friday praying mosque in
Istravshan (Sughd Region),is typical of the type of independent
and increasingly popular imam we described in reftel. Numonkhon
took up his position in 1996, with about 500 followers. When we
visited him on March 11, he was supervising workmen putting the
final touches on a huge new addition to his mosque - a cavernous
building with space for 4000 worshippers. The crowds on Friday
spill into the street, and once his new building is finished, he
will start on yet another expansion that will double the
capacity of the mosque. Worshippers and local businessmen are
financing the construction, including the marble siding brought
in from Iran.




8. (C) Like the imams we described in reftel, Numonkhon is
committed to sidestepping - and in some cases fighting -
government restrictions. He has angered local authorities
because he "teaches people to think independently." Toeing the
government line is senseless because "people have access to
television or the internet, and they talk to each other." The
government "expects" him to report to the imam khatib of the
city's central mosque; in reality, Numonkhon has little if any
contact with him. Numonkhon did not dodge questions about the
United States' reputation like Boev did. Many Tajiks are upset
with the United States because of Iraq, Afghanistan and
Israel/Palestine, he said. The United States is a democracy
internally, but many suffer because of its foreign policy.




9. (C) The Embassy will be sending Numonkhon to the United
States on an International Visitor Leadership Program in May.
Local officials told him that they could not issue him a
passport, however, unless he shaved his beard. Numonkhon told
them that they could shave his beard "if you cut off my head."
The situation was resolved when Numonkhon allowed the officials
to use Photo Shop to crop much of his beard out of his picture.



THE RECONCILER




10. (C) We had anticipated that our meeting with Domullo
Safokhon, the imam khatib of the central mosque in Isfara, and
his deputy, Hoji Homidullo Karimov, would be similar to our
meeting with Boev. Isfara is one of the most religious parts of
the country, and imams at central mosques are more likely to toe
the government line. However, Safokhon and Karimov were
unusually frank with us. They tried to follow the guidelines of
the Council of Ulamo; they dutifully distributed pre-prepared
sermons to the district's nine Friday praying mosques.




11. (C) However, Karimov and Safokhon see themselves as
peacemakers, attempting to avert problems that could be caused
by the government's ill advised religious policy. Karimov said
"we know the government's restrictions are creating problems."
Referring to law enforcement officials' harsh methods to address
extremism, he said "we are creating terrorists." Virtually
every month, Safokhon brings imams and law enforcement officials
in Isfara together to discuss relevant legal and religious
issues. Karimov was skeptical about the future; as we were
leaving the mosque, he said the new religion law (septel) will
"cause instability."



HOLDING THE PLACE TOGETHER




12. (C) Comment: Talking to Boev was like talking to a
government official. He used broad characterizations to support
the government, and he either underestimated or willfully

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ignored the deep resentment that many imams feel toward the
government's religious policies. We were surprised that he was
so open when speaking with us; no government official would have
given us this kind of information. We assume that he was simply
not accustomed to speaking to foreign diplomats. While Boev was
probably correct when he said that many of Tajikistan's imams
were poorly educated, we think he was deluding himself that the
government actually controlled what all imams said and did. We
suspect that a large portion of Tajikistan's imams would agree
with Numonkhon, Karimov, and Safokhon, all of whom expressed
concern about the government's collision course with the
religious community. End comment.
JACOBSON