TAJIKISTAN: MILITARY SUPPLY ROUTES AND BASE QUESTIONS SPARK

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 000345

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA AND PA/PR/FPCW

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL KPAO KDEM TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: MILITARY SUPPLY ROUTES AND BASE QUESTIONS SPARK
MEDIA WILDFIRES

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1. (U) Sensitive But Unclassified - Not for Internet
Distribution.


2. (SBU) Summary: The February negotiations with governments in
Central Asia over supply routes for coalition military
operations in Afghanistan put Western media on hair trigger
alert, so much so that otherwise responsible, fact-checking
organizations repackaged stories from erroneous Reuters and
Interfax wire reports. A "post mortem" of incidents in Dushanbe
shows how keen interest in a topic, combined with incompetent
reporting from a single source, can ignite a media fire
impossible to extinguish in the age of instant and global
communication. End summary.

Fateful Coincidence: Northern Distribution Network and Manas

3) (SBU) In early December the local stringer for Reuters asked
the embassy press office about NATO plans to find new supply
routes after attacks on truck convoys closed the eastern
Afghanistan supply route from Pakistan. Post referred the
reporter to comments made December 10 by Admiral Mullen,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. By December 22, State
had issued basic Northern Distribution Network (NDN) points
which are still valid: we are not seeking any new military
bases in Central Asia; we want diverse supply routes for
non-lethal cargo to support reconstruction and military efforts
in Afghanistan; in search of diverse options, we had started
reviewing commercial transit routes before the December attacks
on convoys. Coincident with the spike of interest in NDN, on
December 18 an anonymous source within the Kyrgyz Government
told Agence-France Presse (AFP) that the Kyrgyz were preparing
papers to close the base at Manas.

Let The Games Begin


4. (SBU) Fast forward through the New Year lull to Centcom
Commander General Petraeus' January 17 meeting with President
Rahmon. At a briefing with local reporters afterward, Petraeus
mentioned that he would send a team within the next couple of
weeks to discuss details of transporting commercial goods across
Tajikistan to coalition forces in Afghanistan. When asked about
closing the base at Manas, Petraeus said "we certainly have no
plans to change anything." Post's Web site had English and
Russian transcripts of his briefing online by opening of
business Monday, and a few scattered reports in the government
wire services accurately covered his brief comments.


6. (SBU) Imagine our surprise at the January 21 headline on a
local newswire story, "One More Bridge to Unite Tajikistan and
Afghanistan." Foreign Minister Hamrahon Zarifi that day had
announced at a press conference that the United States would
build a bridge in Tajikistan's Farkhor District, in addition to
the Nizhniy-Pyanj Bridge completed in August 2007. When asked
the week before by President Rahmon about a second bridge,
General Petraeus had said he "would like to help," but the U.S.
side needed to see the current bridge utilized to its full
potential. (Note: Currently, about 200 vehicles cross the
Nizhniy Pyanj Bridge daily, but it has a capacity of 1,000 per
day. End note.) In response to queries that followed and to
avoid an outright contradiction of the foreign minister's
comment, the press office issued a statement that "while the
embassy did not rule out the possibility of a second bridge, the
United States did want to see the current bridge utilized to its
full potential."

The Rush to be First - With Old News


7. (SBU) After the Ambassador's February 6 meeting with
President Rahmon about the upcoming visit by U.S. Transportation
Command to discuss transport routes, she found a phalanx of
local reporters waiting for her in the lobby of the presidential
administration. She relayed the highlights, that the president
had once again expressed Tajikistan's readiness to support the
transit of commercial goods to Afghanistan through Tajikistan
via truck or railroad and that a TransCom delegation would take
up the issue during their visit in the near future. In response
to a question about future military cooperation, the Ambassador
listed joint training, conferences, and infrastructure
development.


8. (SBU) Before the Ambassador was back at the embassy, the
press office phones lit up with calls from Japanese NHK TV, AFP
Moscow, ABC Islamabad, and CNN London, all wanting to confirm
information on the Russian Interfax wire, the Russian Kommersant
Web site, Reuters, and BBC TV quoting the Ambassador that
"?ajikistan was ready to provide an air corridor for cargo to
Afghanistan." Russkoye Radio was broadcasting that Tajikistan
had offered the United States a military base in Tajikistan to

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replace Manas. The press office went into manic counterspin,
issuing corrections in English, Russian, and Tajik, and calling
bureau chiefs to correct misinformation - no bases, no new
agreements about overflights (we have had permission for
overflights since 2001),and the "readiness" of Tajikistan to
allow overland transit of non-lethal cargo.


9. (SBU) The local Reuters stringer who had asked about NDN back
in December started the blaze with a misleading story that
"Tajikistan has agreed to offer its airspace for transport of
non-military NATO supplies to Afghanistan to help Washington
boost its transit lines in the region" because the imminent
closure of the airbase in Kyrgyzstan, had left the United States
"scrambling to find alternative supply routes for NATO forces in
landlocked Afghanistan."


10. (U) The Tajik media, which are careful to stay in sync with
the government, reported the facts correctly, citing sources
within the presidential administration. Being in sync with
their government, they mentioned the "necessity" of building
another bridge across the Pyanj River "taking into consideration
the needs of the international peacekeeping contingent in
delivery of non-military goods to Afghanistan through the
Central Asian region."

The Rush to be First - With Wrong News


11. (SBU) To downplay anticipation that an "agreement" might
result from Transcom Commander Rear Admiral Harnitchek's
February 20 working level meetings with Government of Tajikistan
officials, the press office issued a statement to media that
Harnitchek would consult with relevant ministries on next steps
in transporting commercial goods across Tajikistan to coalition
forces in Afghanistan. We also asked the MFA not to invite
media, but, there they were, staked out again, waiting for
Harnitchek and the Ambassador after their meeting with Foreign
Minister Zarifi. Harnitchek noted the productive meeting with
the foreign minister on commercial shipments of non-lethal goods
via highway and railroad across Tajikistan to Afghanistan, and
said "we have not reached any agreements" but hoped to move
forward in the near future.


12. (SBU) Within an hour Interfax was out in front with a report
that an agreement had been reached, and the calls started coming
in from international bureau chiefs in Istanbul, London, Moscow,
and Islamabad. The press office thanked everyone for calling
first and filing second, issued another statement of the facts,
then started tracking the source of the basing information.
Tajik TV reporters had Harnitchek on tape stating that no
agreement had been signed. Interfax has no reporter in
Tajikistan, so the author of its stories is unknown. Other
Tajik reporters told emboff the Reuters stringer contributed to
Interfax, but emboff has no way of confirming this.

Black PR or Incompetence?


13. (SBU) Comment: These incidents show what can happen when
discipline breaks down in the competition to be first to report
a hot topic. The Reuters report on "a new air corridor" filed
by Reuters' Tajik stringer was picked up without verifications
by BBC TV, AFP, and the Associated Press; they apparently took
for granted that Reuters had done the hard work of corroborating
facts. The Reuters reporter may have cracked under pressure
chasing the hot topic of the day to satisfy a highly competitive
international news wire. More troubling is how he got the facts
so wrong, when the Ambassador clearly stated, and other Tajik
journalists understood, that the issue was land routes. The
unprovable allegation that he wrote Interfax reports with the
same wrong information raises the possibility of deliberate
"black PR" to sow confusion about routes that support U.S. and
coalition operations in Afghanistan. The story on Russkoye
Radio about "bases in Tajikistan" that broke at the same
supports this possibility.


14. (SBU) Comment continued. Believing it better for
journalists to get the facts right than allow speculation to
fill the vacuum, the Ambassador actively engages the media, in
interviews with Tajik radio, TV, and newspapers; off-the-record
briefings with Western correspondents; at public ceremonial
events; and, the ever popular stake-outs. The value of this
engagement was borne out by the impact of her March 5 interview
in the local "Sobytia" ("Events") newspaper, a straight Q&A on
Tajikistan's 2010 parliamentary elections, the increase of
troops in Afghanistan, supply routes, and an affirmation that
the United States plans no new bases in Central Asia. Excerpts
and references appeared in the Central Asian News portal, AFP,
AP, Reuters, and the Iranian news agency, PressTV. For the time
being, she may have satisfied the demand for NDN news, since we

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have had no more queries, even though the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs provided the formal agreement two weeks ago. End
Comment.
JACOBSON