TO WHOM DO TAJIKS LISTEN? MEETING THE IMAMS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 000290 SIPDIS STATE DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/4/2019 TAGS: PGOV PHUM KISL TI SUBJECT: TO WHOM DO TAJIKS LISTEN? MEETING THE IMAMS REF: (A) 2008 DUSHANBE 1523, (B) 2008 DUSHANBE 1490 CLASSIFIED BY: TRACEY A. JACOBSON, AMBASSADOR, EXE, DOS. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) Summary: As the Government of Tajikistan's credibility deteriorates and economic conditions worsen, Tajikistan's independent imams are becoming increasingly popular. These imams are attracting thousands of worshippers during Friday prayers, expanding their mosques, and enjoying a degree of popularity that no politician in the country can come close to matching, primarily because they openly criticize the government. The imams see themselves as protecting Tajik Islam against both the government and foreign influences. The imams tend to see the United States as hostile to Islam, their views colored by the Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine issues. Post has begun to identify and engage these imams in discussions about religious freedom and perceptions of the United States, including by sending some on International Visitors Programs (IVLPs). End Summary. WHO ARE TAJIKISTAN'S TRADITIONAL ISLAMIC LEADERS? ¶2. (C) The government's policy of tightly controlling religious activity is having the opposite of its intended effect (reftel A). Government attempts to control and restrict religious life have hurt government credibility, and strengthened the influence of traditional Islamic leaders. To identify these Islamic leaders, EmbOffs spoke to local experts, including Abdullo Rahnamo, researcher at the Strategic Research Center; Muhiddin Kabiri, the Head of the Islamic Revival Party; Hikmatullo Saifullozoda, the head of a local NGO and an IRPT official; Zafar Sufi, the editor of Asolat, a religious newspaper; and Abdughaffor Jamolov, the news editor of the Persian-language TV station Jahonnamo. The experts generally agreed on the most influential imams in the country, and we have started meeting with those they identified. ¶3. (C) On February 27, we met with Domullo Murodali, imam-khatib of the Ispechak mosque (Dushanbe); Rahim Nazarov (known as Mullo Abdurahim),imam-khatib of the Qazoqon mosque (Dushanbe); Hoji Abdurahmon, deputy imam of the Yakkachinor mosque (Dushanbe); and Mahmudjon Turajonzoda, who is affiliated with the Turkobod mosque (outside of Vahdat). On March 2, EmbOffs met with Mirzo Ibronov (known as Hoji Mirzo),the imam khatib of the Hiloli Ahmar mosque in Kulyob. Each of the mosques is a Friday praying mosque. All but one of the imams are in their 40s; Turajonzoda is 52. They generally received their religious instruction in Tajikistan, studying with well respected scholars. Domullo Muradali spent one year in Iran; Hoji Mirzo studied for five years in Pakistan. MOSQUES BURSTING AT THE SEAMS ¶4. (C) Each of the imams attracts thousands during Friday prayers. Mullo Abdurahim estimated that attendance for his sermons exceeds 3000; Hoji Abdurahmon and Hoji Mirzo attract 5-6000. Crowds at Turajonzoda's mosque are usually between 8000 and 12,000. The growth in attendance in recent years at these mosques has far exceeded the physical capacities. On Fridays, crowds spill over into the streets surrounding all of the mosques; the line of cars on the road to Turajonzoda's mosque is well over one kilometer long. Mullo Abdurahim said the number of people coming to his mosque on Fridays has tripled in the last two years. ¶5. (C) In contrast, the number of Friday visitors to the mosque most closely associated with the government - Dushanbe's Central Mosque - has steadily declined over the years. There are no longer overflow crowds to hear the sermons of Qobiljon Boev, the mosque's imam-khatib and nephew of the Chairman of the Council of Ulamo. Friday visitors are estimated to be 3-4000, about the same number who visit Mullo Abdurahim's mosque. DUSHANBE 00000290 002 OF 003 ¶6. (C) All of the mosques are undergoing major expansions to accommodate the crowds. Mullo Abdurahim took us on a tour of parts of his mosque that were under construction; the additions (including construction of another story) will at least triple the size of the mosque. Hoji Abdurahmon showed us around his newly renovated, three-story mosque with a colorful dome; he then showed us the adjacent building - equal in size to the one we were in - that also constitutes part of the mosque. Even with all of this space, crowds flow out into the neighboring streets; the mosque just bought the apartment building next door so it could expand. ¶7. (C) The money for these rapid expansions comes from small donations by mosque-goers and large donations by businesspeople. None of the imams we spoke to made any specific mention of funds received from foreign countries. Hoji Abdurahmon told us about a Kulyobi businessman living in Dushanbe who gave the mosque $300,000. His only stipulation was that no one know his identity; he did not want to get into any trouble with the authorities, especially the tax inspectors. WHO IS COMING? WHAT DO THEY HEAR? ¶8. (C) The crowds at the mosques are not limited to those living in the city; people come in from surrounding districts on Fridays to pray at the mosques. The imams' reputations have grown by word of mouth, but also electronically. Many people who attend Friday prayers record the sermons on their cell phones and then send the files to their friends and family. All of the imams told us that the vast majority of the crowds - as much as 95-98% - are men under the age of 30. ¶9. (C) The imams attributed their popularity to the fact that they are willing to "take risks" by addressing sensitive issues in their sermons. They incorporate current issues into their sermons, and they often criticize government officials. All speak about corruption, and offer practical advice to those deeply affected by it. Hoji Abdurahmon said that he once criticized the Prosecutor General's Office in his sermon. Prosecutors who were in attendance opened an investigation against him the next week. In another sermon, he criticized the work of the Dushanbe Economic Court. A judge on the court immediately stood up and shouted back at the imam. By contrast, the sermons of imams who are affiliated with the government often follow the "talking points" that are distributed by the Council of Ulamo, and focus more on the historical aspects of religious figures, as opposed to the religious issues that they raised. A FINE LINE BETWEEN RELIGION AND POLITICS ¶10. (C) The imams were careful to not delve too deeply into political issues. When pressed, however, they admitted that their duty to "tell the truth" had a political aspect. Mullo Abdurahim said "Islam is politics. To defend your rights is politics. All imams who respect themselves have a duty to speak out." ¶11. (C) The strength derived from growing numbers of followers has allowed the imams to disregard government attempts to control them. They mocked the Council of Ulamo's attempts to "suggest" themes for sermons. They all detailed instances when security officials brought them in for questioning, or ordered them to stop criticizing the government. They simply ignored these warnings, telling the security officials "if you don't like what I say, you should have me removed." DUSHANBE 00000290 003 OF 003 ¶12. (C) The imams see themselves as the bulwarks of Tajik Islam against both the government and foreign influences. For example, Turajonzoda said that government attempts to prevent the Salafis from gaining influence in Tajikistan (reftel B) would be as unsuccessful as the rest of its religious policy. The real reason why the Salafis would ultimately have little influence in the country, he said, was because traditional imams oppose them. IMPRESSIONS OF THE UNITED STATES? ¶13. (C) Mullo Abdurahim was the most open about his feelings toward the United States. His opinion has been defined by watching news reports about Iraq, Afghanistan and Israel/Palestine on European and Arabic satellite channels. He referred to the "Jewish oligarchy that guides U.S. foreign policy." While not all of the imams used such direct language, Hoji Mirzo commented that reporting on civilian deaths in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Palestinian Territories drowned out any discussion of the United States as a champion of democracy or protector of religious rights. MORE WORK AHEAD ¶14. (C) Comment: The followings that these imams have are larger than those of any politician in the country. Our visits corroborate prior observations that Tajiks - particularly young male Tajiks - are channeling their frustrations with the economic and political situation into intensified religious practice. The government will likely continue its ill-guided religious policy, and traditional Islamic leaders who oppose the government will become more popular. Neither we nor any of the imams we spoke to thought that violence or instability would occur in the near future. However, they agreed that Tajikistan cannot continue on its current path; government officials who have limited ties to the religious community cannot continue to implement a policy that restricts religious expression. ¶15. (C) Comment continued: Despite their negative comments about U.S. foreign policy, we presented the imams with copies of our Religious Freedom Report, and spoke to them about religious life in the United States. Each of the imams - with the exception of Turajonzoda - will be traveling to the United States on an International Visitor Leadership Program in May. We will continue to engage these leaders as a part of our political and public affairs work. End comment. JACOBSON