TAJIKISTAN INITIAL INPUT TO AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN POLICY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000233 SIPDIS STATE DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/26/2019 TAGS: PREL PARM EAID NATO AF PK TI SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN INITIAL INPUT TO AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN POLICY REVIEW REF: (A) SECSTATE 14097, (B) DUSHANBE 103, (C) DUSHANBE 115, (D) DUSHANBE 154, (E) DUSHANBE 231 CLASSIFIED BY: TRACEY A. JACOBSON, AMBASSADOR, EXE, DOS. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) PolEcon Chief delivered Ref A points to Khusrav Nosiri, MFA Director for North America and Europe on February 20. Nosiri had no substantive reply at the time. On February 26 MFA North America Desk Officer Jamaluddin Ubaidulloev informed PolEcon Chief that the MFA had sent the points to the Presidential Administration for consideration, and that no reply would be immediately forthcoming. However, the Government of Tajikistan would provide input before the April NATO summit, he said. ¶2. (C) In recent meetings with General Petraeus and President Rahmon (Ref B),separate meetings Ambassador held with Rahmon and Foreign Minister Zarifi (Refs C and D),and meetings of TRANSCOM Admiral Harnitchek with Zarifi (Ref E),Minister of Transport Ashur, State Security Committee Chief Abdurahimov, and Customs Service Chief Zaripov, the input from the Tajik side regarding Afghanistan has been fairly consistent. Rahmon and his ministers have emphasized the need to stabilize Afghanistan in order for Central Asia to be secure, independent, and truly sovereign. They have repeated their willingness to help the United States, including with commercial shipments that could, as Rahmon said to General Petraeus, "potentially lead to more" cooperation in the future. They have also shown an increasing willingness to accommodate joint military training, although with caveats. ¶3. (C) Rahmon has emphasized that he is not averse to cooperation with Afghanistan, saying that Pakistan, not Afghanistan, is the "homeland of terrorism." He and Zarifi have said that the United States should do more infrastructure development between Afghanistan and Central Asia, especially building a new bridge across the Pyanzh, and building or contributing to the Dosti Jhum hydroelectric dam project, which could provide for agricultural needs in Afghanistan as well as power. They have also pressed for improvements to Tajikistan's rail and road infrastructure in connection with the Northern Distribution Network. ¶4. (C) Rahmon and Zarifi also seek assistance for major projects from other donors. They have said the United States should encourage the World Bank and other donors/investors to speed up construction of the Roghun hydropower station, which could produce excess power in the summer for sale sold to Afghanistan. In a meeting on February 20, Zarifi told Ambassador and TRANSCOM Admiral Harnitchek that the Tajiks had presented a list of proposed infrastructure projects to the European Union during Rahmon's recent visit to Brussels. "We cannot stabilize Afghanistan through military means alone; economic development is necessary and that requires infrastructure" Zarifi said. The Tajiks are proposing that allies build roads, railroads, dams for both hydropower and irrigation, and electrical transmission lines. Zarifi and Minister of Transport Ashur have suggested construction of an intermodal transit facility in Kholhozobod, and have repeatedly raised a request for construction of a bridge at Kokul (Ref B). ¶5. (C) Comment: The Tajiks clearly welcome the opportunity to help more on Afghanistan. However, in addition to their own interest in improvments to regional security, they see their cooperation as an instrument to gain support for infrastructure projects. Most of these projects would serve the additional purpose of reducing Tajikistan's dependence on Uzbekistan for transport and power, a goal that would improve regional stability and serve U.S. interests. ¶6. (C) Comment Continued: We should design our Afghan/Pakistan policy with attention to the fact that these countries exist in a broader region; that Afghanistan cannot be considered separately from Central Asia, especially Tajikistan, given transportation, linguistic, cultural and historical ties. Tajikistan can be a help or a hindrance to our efforts -- it DUSHANBE 00000233 002 OF 002 depends on the effectiveness of our engagement, both in terms of assistance and high-level political dialogue. End Comment. JACOBSON