TAJIKISTAN - AMBASSADOR'S INITIAL MEETING WITH FOREIGN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 001094

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/18/2019
TAGS: PREL TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN - AMBASSADOR'S INITIAL MEETING WITH FOREIGN
MINISTER ZARIFI.

REF: STATE 95019,

CLASSIFIED BY: Ken Gross, Ambassador, EXEC, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (C) Summary: In a 40-minute initial meeting, Foreign
Minister Zarifi complained to Ambassador Gross about
Tajikistan's lack of success in obtaining high-level meetings
with the USG, either in Washington or in Dushanbe. He also
pressed for a second U.S.-funded bridge to Afghanistan, for more
Northern Distribution Network (NDN) traffic to transit
Tajikistan, for the USG to purchase Tajik goods to supply forces
in Afghanistan, and for U.S. support in international financial
institutions. Zarifi summed up his view of bilateral relations
by saying that he perceived problems in an overall good
relationship, and that the underlying issue was that the U.S.
did not value and respond appropriately to Tajikistan's
consistent cooperation and friendship. Zarifi was non-committal
when the Ambassador inquired whether he would be able to present
his credentials to the President before he departs for UNGA on
September 20. End Summary.




2. (C) On September 18 Foreign Minister Zarifi received
Ambassador Gross, who handed him a copy of his credentials.
After this brief ceremony Zarifi opened the discussion with
compliments for previous U.S. ambassadors and the observation
that bilateral relations were excellent.



THERE ARE A FEW ISSUES, SIR




3. (C) Zarifi then added that he wished he had been able to get
high-level meetings in Washington on his upcoming visit to the
U.S. for UNGA, and said the lack of success in arranging
appropriate meetings had led him to cancel his trip to
Washington altogether. He urged the USG to respond quickly to
Tajik meeting requests as they arose during UNGA. More broadly,
he commented that while the USG gave much assistance to
Tajikistan, it did not support Tajikistan in the IMF nor in
providing high level meetings to Tajik leaders. Zarifi did not
understand the reason for U.S. resistance to Tajikistan's
interests in the IMF, and reluctance to meet at the head of
state level, since Tajikistan "always supported you in Central
Asia and never made problems for you." "We want our
relationship to adequately reflect what we do for you," he said.





4. (C) Zarifi compared Tajikistan's failure to get presidential
or secretary-level meetings with his relatively easy access to
European foreign ministers, with whom he had recently met in
Brussels. He said Uzbekistan enjoyed better access to
Washington leaders, despite having created major problems for
the United States in the region, and compared the construction
of the Termez - Mazar e Sharif rail line with the few trucks
which had transited Tajikistan as part of NDN. Kyrgyzstan too
benefited more from its support for Afghan operations than
Tajikistan did, including in contracts for Kyrgyz companies. He
urged the USG to buy water and boxed juice from Tajik producers.




5. (C) Ambassador heard out this litany and made several points
in reply. Thanking Zarifi for Tajikistan's support for Afghan
operations and for NDN, he said he had discussed local purchase
of supplies with General Petraeus, and that the USG was
considering ways to expand NDN activities.




6. (C) On the IMF, Ambassador noted that it was important that
Tajikistan clear up doubts among donors, and so it should share
the results of the audits of Barki Tojik, the National Bank, and
when completed, the Talco audit with donors and the public.




7. (C) Ambassador said the Obama administration would increase
high-level contacts with Central Asia. The Annual Bilateral
Consultations would be one means to do so, in addition to
President Rahmon's meeting with Secretary Clinton at UNGA.
(Zarifi interjected that he was "a little bit jealous" of the
Uzbeks for what he perceived as their better access in
Washington.)



DUSHANBE 00001094 002 OF 003



WHAT ARE FRIENDS FOR? IRAN AND AFGHANISTAN




8. (C) Zarifi noted Tajikistan's good relations with President
Karzai and with Tajik opposition figures in northern
Afghanistan, saying that the United States could make more use
of Tajikistan's cultural and political ties to Afghanistan. The
same held true with Iran, with which Tajikistan shared a common
language and close ties, but the USG did not ask Tajikistan to
help in these areas. The Europeans, on the other hand, did seek
Tajikistan's advice in dealing with Afghanistan. Ambassador
reminded Zarifi of the demarches delivered earlier in the week
(reftels),asking Tajikistan's help by remaining silent about
Afghan election results until the results were certified, and by
urging Iran to participate seriously in P5+1 talks.




9. (C) Zarifi replied that Tajikistan knew better than most
countries what should be done with Iran. He also commented that
in Afghanistan, President Karzai had received bad advice to
select General Dostum as one of his Vice-Presidential running
mates, as Dostum was useful only "for organizing war." Zarifi
suggested Uzbekistan had a role in this decision. He then
raised the request for a second U.S.-funded bridge to
Afghanistan, saying the U.S. did not understand how important
this would be to connect Afghan Badakhshan to the outside world.
Ambassador said the USG would continue to turn to Tajikistan
for advice and assistance with both countries. He asked Zarifi
to help make it as easy as possible to conduct joint training of
Afghan and Tajik border guards.



TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS




10. (C) Ambassador raised Trafficking in Persons (TIP),noting
that Tajikistan had barely avoided a Tier 3 ranking in 2009, and
that Tajikistan needed to take concrete measures to avoid Tier 3
next year. Forced labor in the cotton sector was a particular
problem, but he was encouraged by recent statements by the
Ministers of Agriculture and Education against requiring
students to pick cotton. Zarifi replied that Tajikistan was
doing much to fight TIP, the President was personally interested
in the subject and the Ministry of Interior was engaged too, but
Tajikistan needed more assistance in this area.



PEACE CORPS




11. (C) Ambassador also asked for Tajik high-level support to
bring a Peace Corps mission to Tajikistan, and said such a
mission would have long term benefits for both countries.
President Rahmon would need to make a request to the U.S. to
push this process along.



ELECTIONS AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM




12. (C) The U.S., OSCE, and others were concerned about the new
law on religion and how it could be applied, Ambassador said.
Tajikistan should review the law and see how it could be
adjusted to protect religious freedom without becoming an
instrument of oppression. The U.S. and other countries were
also very interested in the conduct of the February 2010
parliamentary elections. They were concerned by news that the
Government of Tajikistan had formally recommended against draft
electoral legislation that would have improved electoral
procedures in accordance with recommendations from the OSCE and
opposition political parties. The U.S. wanted to assist
Tajikistan to conduct the elections fairly. Zarifi only nodded.




13. (C) Ambassador concluded his remarks by noting that Annual
Bilateral Consultations would be a good opportunity to review
these and other issues with the attendance of other government
agencies. Zarifi said he looked forward to further discussions

DUSHANBE 00001094 003 OF 003


after he returned from UNGA on September 27.



CREDENTIALING WHEN?




14. (C) Ambassador asked that the MFA arrange his presentation
of credentials to take place before President Rahmon left for
New York on September 20, noting that it would be awkward if
Secretary Clinton met with Rahmon before Rahmon had received the
Ambassador in Dushanbe. Zarifi noncommittally replied that he
would "see what can be done." (Embassy had heard earlier in the
day from the Chief of Protocol that the credentials ceremony
would not take place until after Rahmon's return from UNGA; he
urged Ambassador to push Zarifi for an earlier date.)



COMMENT: IT'S PERSONAL, BABY




15. (C) Notable in this meeting was Zarifi's frustration with
his inability to get meetings with President Obama or Vice
President Biden, for himself or for President Rahmon, and his
perceived difficulty in getting a meeting with Secretary
Clinton. Zarifi returned to this theme several times during a
fairly short meeting, and seemed unconstrained by the presence
on either side of him of his senior staff, including
presidential daughter Ozoda Rahmonova. Rahmon meets with
visiting U.S. officials from the DAS level and up, and Zarifi's
comments on this status issue may well reflect Rahmon's sense of
being slighted too. It may also explain the delay in scheduling
the presentation of credentials to Rahmon. And it highlights
the importance in Central Asia of personal contacts between
government leaders and the sense of prestige they derive from
such meetings. In the case of UNGA, high-level meetings with
USG officials will help Tajikistan show its neighbors, and
Russia, that it matters too. End Comment.
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