UPDATE ON TAVILDARA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 001016 SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DS/IP/SCA, DS/TIA/ITA, DS/T/ATA, S/CT CENTCOM FOR J5, SOCCENT J3, SOCCENT CEG DIA FOR DHO-2 E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/27/2019 TAGS: PTER ASEC TI SUBJECT: UPDATE ON TAVILDARA REF: A. IIR 6 947 0082 09 ¶B. TD-314/034252-09 ¶C. DUSHANBE 0617 ¶D. STATE 50245 ¶E. DUSHANBE 0631 ¶F. DUSHANBE 0664 CLASSIFIED BY: Necia L. Quast, Charge D' Affairs, EXEC, DOS. REASON: 1.4 (d),(g) ¶1. (U) On Sunday August 23, the Regional Security Officer and FSNI embarked on a journey southward to observe the Tajik/Afghan border area and then northward to Tavildara and the Rasht valley area to assess the security situation. Host nation police and military units recently wrapped up anti-terrorist operations in the Tavildara area. All travel was conducted in an embassy vehicle displaying diplomatic license plates. ¶2. (C) The RSO covered approximately 110 kilometers along the Tajik/Afghan border from the Shurobad area to the Darvaz area. The RSO negotiated two border police checkpoints and observed approximately six border guard foot patrols (roughly one three to four man foot patrol every 18 kilometers). The foot patrols did not appear to be tactical in nature due to a lack of dispersion among patrol members. Patrol members were equipped with AK-47s and in some cases binoculars. ¶3. (C) The RSO encountered little difficulty in negotiating border patrol checkpoints. The RSO was never requested to produce any identification documents or diplomatic credentials. ¶4. (C) The RSO was able to negotiate a checkpoint at the entrance to the city of Tavildara without undue hassle. The Tavildara entrance checkpoint was manned by uniformed Ministry of Interior Police. When requested by the MVD police, the RSO produced his Diplomatic Passport, Tajikistan Visa and Diplomatic Accreditation Card. The FSNI was asked to produce his passport which the MVD police subsequently registered. ¶5. (C) A cursory vehicle tour of the city of Tavildara revealed no sign of a police or military presence and very few people on the street. ¶6. (U) On August 18, the RSO hosted a representational event at a local restaurant. In attendance were Colonel Makhmadshoev Khurshed, Commander of OMON, and Lieutenant Colonel Dimitry Buriev, Deputy Commander of OMON (Militia Special Purpose Detachment). OMON directed recent counter-terrorist operations against purported IMU Islamic terrorists in mountainous terrain no more than two kilometers outside of the city of Tavildara. ¶7. (C) According to the OMON Commanders, ATA trained OMON snipers successfully engaged targets from as far away as 900 meters, even shooting one person between the eyes, with the AR-10(T) sniper rifle provided by the ATA program. The RSO was not able to elicit the exact number of casualties or the number of men that may have escaped, however it was implied that many were killed by OMON snipers. ¶8. (C) OMON Commanders requested night vision scopes and silencers for their AR-10(T) sniper rifles and additional training. They also pledged their assistance to the RSO in maintaining the security of the U.S. Embassy. ¶9. (C) Currently all official USG travel to Tavildara and the Rasht Valley is restricted. With the cessation of direct action DUSHANBE 00001016 002 OF 002 against targets in the area, the departure of host nation special police and military units from the area, and the RSO's first hand observation that the area has returned to normal, the RSO will recommend next week that the EAC discontinue the current travel restrictions on Tavildara and the Rash Valley. ¶10. (U) The point of contact for this and all security related information at Post is Regional Security Officer Erik Olerud. QUAST