DUBAI CUSTOMS STOPS ILLICIT AIR CARGO SHIPMENT AS A RESULT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUBAI 000473 SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO; NEA/ARP/BMCGOVERN E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/3/2019 TAGS: ETRD KIPR EFIN ECON PREL AE SUBJECT: DUBAI CUSTOMS STOPS ILLICIT AIR CARGO SHIPMENT AS A RESULT OF DHS TIP DUBAI 00000473 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: Justin Siberell, Consul General. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On October 26, Dubai Customs acted on intelligence from Dubai-based DHS/ICE officials in seizing an in-bound air shipment originating in Canada containing what is believed to be dual-use nuclear technology slated for re-export from Dubai to an undetermined destination. This interdiction showcases Dubai CQtoms' willingness to act against the flow of illicit goods provided it receives timely and specific information. DHS officials have been working quietly with Dubai's Customs Intelligence Unit for several years to improve the unit's responsiveness to tips such as the one that led to this interdiction. This cooperation has recently been extended to the air cargo realm, making this seizure an important showcase of the benefits of this growing relationship. END SUMMARY. -------------- -- DUBAI CUSTOMS SNAGS ILLICIT CARGO WITH USG HELP -------------- -- ¶2. (C) On October 26, the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) Counter Proliferation Unit, working with DHS, tipped off local Dubai Customs officials that a shipment of controlled dual-use nuclear technology was in transit from Toronto, Canada to Dubai. This intelligence sharing is part of a larger program between Dubai Customs Authority and the USG to combat the illicit shipment of controlled and/or dual-use goods passing through Dubai. Canadian authorities developed information that Global Industrial Supply, a Canadian-based shipping company, attempted to procure pressure transducers and spinning rotor gauges from U.S. based MKS Instruments Company. Upon arrival of the air cargo shipment, Dubai Customs seized the package and are now analyzing its contents. Dubai Customs has informed us it will complete its analysis as quickly as possible in order to return the material to Canada. -------------- COOPERATION AND TRAINING KEY TO SEIZURE -------------- ¶3. (C) USG cooperation with Dubai Customs is still evolving. Its leadership continues to show interest in USG training opportunities. Recent programs have focused on upgrading local capacity to identify and interdict illicit cargo. DHS has been working to improve Customs' capacity to act swiftly in responding to real time tips and intelligence from not only USG sources, but any reliable intelligence. Abdulla Mohamed Al Khaja, Dubai Customs Intelligence Director, has been a key partner in facilitating enhanced customs enforcement training for his local agents, as well as expanding the lines of communication between the USG and the Customs Authority. ¶4. (C) As part of the training effort, Dubai Customs and DHS have been working together on upgrading Dubai Customs air cargo monitoring and inspection systems since August. The training has focused on bridging the significant technology and human intelligence gap at Dubai Customs. Dubai Customs' air cargo screening systems are viewed as sub-par when compared to systems present in developed countries; a concern for Dubai, as expanding air cargo handling is a key element of Dubai's longer-term development strategy. As an example, Dubai Customs officials still analyze all air cargo manifests by hand, and have not installed data mining technology to sift through the enormous volume of manifests and cargo shipment receipts that pass through its ports. Dubai Customs' Intelligence Director has conveyed a request through in-country DHS representatives for training on cargo inspection technology recently acquired by Dubai Customs. -------------- Comment DUBAI 00000473 002.2 OF 002 -------------- ¶5. (C) As a major transshipment hub, Dubai's capacity and willingness to identify and intercept illicit and dual use goods are key to USG counter-proliferation goals. We have seen excellent cooperation from the UAEG in interdicting Iran-bound vessels suspected of carrying items judged a proliferation risk. The October 26 seizure at the Dubai airport demonstrates that cooperation at the local level is also important to our counter-proliferation objectives. Continued capacity-building and real-time sharing of information are the twin pillars of this effort. END COMMENT SIBERELL