UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 DUBAI 000408

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR CA/FPP; CAIRO FOR RCO; POSTS FOR FRAUD PREVENTION UNITS; DEPT FOR KCC

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC AE
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, SEPTEMBER 2009

REF: 08 State 74840


1. Country Conditions

Fraud at Embassy Abu Dhabi and Consulate General Dubai is low.
Concern about visa fraud in the UAE is generally limited to visa
applications from Third Country Nationals (TCNs) living in or
visiting the UAE. UAE citizens ("Emiratis") are a minority in
their own country, comprising less than 20 percent of the
population. South Asians, mainly Indians and Pakistanis, make up
50 percent of the population. The next largest expatriate ethnic
groups are Filipinos (19.6 percent), Arabs from other parts of
the Middle East (13 percent) and Iranians (2.5 percent.)

Expatriate workers (many from high fraud countries) are the most
likely to perpetrate general NIV fraud. Organized fraud efforts,
such as document vendors or visa "touts," are uncommon in the
UAE.
Most IV applicants are Iranian and fraud is at times evident in
fiance (K), and employment (E) visa applications. Both posts
face
the challenging task of verifying information provided by Iranian
applicants in visa interviews. For example, family relationships
are evidenced by documents Post views as susceptible to fraud.
Neither post has viable means to regularly verify the
authenticity
of documents and information presented by Iranians and,
therefore,
relies heavily on the personal interview - and staff's knowledge
of Iranian culture and procedures - to determine application
validity.

The UAE is a major regional and global transportation hub, and
with
this comes the potential to become a transit point for alien
smuggling (particularly to Europe), travel of imposters,
production
of false documents, and other classic types of travel/immigration
fraud.

Airline and immigration officials note a number of male fide
passengers routinely attempting to transit the UAE, but report
very
few passengers carrying fraudulent U.S. documents. This may
change
as the UAE's two major airlines (Dubai-based Emirates and Abu
Dhabi-based Etihad) expand their direct service to the U.S. Both
airlines, along with several U.S. carriers also offer daily
direct
service between the UAE and USA. There are p

lans for greater
aviation links in the future.

Both Posts in the UAE (Embassy Abu Dhabi and Consulate General
Dubai) adjudicate a significant number of Iranian applicants.
Approximately 50% of the total NIV workload in Dubai and 80% of
the
total IV workload in Abu Dhabi is Iranian. Consulate General
Dubai
is the primary global NIV application point for Iranians
resident in
Iran. Embassy Abu Dhabi is the second largest post for
processing of
Iranian immigration cases. General discontent with the Iranian
political regime and continued increase in unemployment rates and
inflation continues to drive desire for Iranians to migrate.
Post
anticipates a continued increase in both immigrant and
nonimmigrant
Iranian visa applications, with a concurrent potential for
increased
fraud.



2. NIV Fraud - Abu Dhabi and Dubai

There is generally little fraud associated with applications from
UAE citizens. Among the expatriate community that applies for
visas,
detected fraud efforts are generally unsophisticated and include
questionable bank statements, letters of employment, etc. Posts
do
not rely on such documents and do not 221-g applicants
specifically for them. If an applicant cannot clearly establish
entitlement to the visa, posts make use of Section 214(b).
Photo-substituted documents are very rare. In general, detecting
Iranian visa fraud in NIV cases sees remains complicated by the
lack of direct knowledge of Iranian documents and systems.
Concern about security and technology transfer issues add to our
overall vigilance.

The majority of posts' NIV fraud is with H and L employment
visas.
With numerous technical companies based in Dubai and a large

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expatriate population, Dubai continues to interview a
significant
number of H and L applicants. Typically, applicants submitting
fraudulent employment-based applications rely more on job
experience
than education to qualify for the visa. Through a combination of
checking documents, verifying job experience, close questioning
of
applicants, and the use of other resources (including assistance
from
KCC), posts routinely detect cases of false work letters and
overstated qualifications. Fraudulent letters typically are
unsophisticated, with applicants presenting several
fresh-looking
experience letters (looking much newer than the dates indicated)
with scanned company logos. Many of these letters are discovered
to
be fraudulent through post research and job verification.

Although both posts have had no specific reports of domestic
servant
abuse or trafficking in the A3 (Domestic Servants of Diplomats),
G5
(Domestic Servant of Government Official) or B1 (Temporary
Visitor
for Business) categories, we remain vigilant to potential abuse
of
these visa categories.

To date, neither post has noticed a change in levels of NIV
fraud due
to the change in economic situation and increase in
third-country
nationals emigrating from the country. This does, however,
remain a
concern and is being watched for by the anti-fraud
investigator.



3. IV Fraud - Abu Dhabi and Dubai

Immigrant visa fraud is not prevalent but is at times found in K
(fianc) petitions, E (employment-based) applications, and F
(family-based) petitions. In fianc petitions, proof of a true
relationship is often difficult to ascertain. Some of these cases
involve Iranian fiances who speak only Farsi engaged to Americans
who speak only English. There are often significant
discrepancies in
age between the applicant and the petitioner, even as much as 20
to
30 years. Applicants often provide generic "couples photos",
usually
taken outside of Iran, to provide evidence of a relationship.
Legitimate fianc cases nearly always include numerous photos from
the engagement party, which is held in Iran and includes extended
family. The majority of Iranian K-1 petitioners obtained U.S.
status
through marriage to an American. Frequently, those marriages
lasted
only the time needed to obtain LPR status. Petitioners have also
often been married numerous times and sometimes have already
petitioned for one or two previous fiancs (or spouses) from Iran.
Abu Dhabi continues to see numerous Internet relationships,
first-cousin
relationships and relationships with large age differences.

Abu Dhabi has seen a number of fiance visa cases involving
Iranians which
raised concerns about "marriages of convenience," perhaps
involving
exchange of money, entered into for the sole purpose of
immigration.
In these cases, consular officers discovered during interviews
with
the Iranian fiance that a close American citizen relative -
often an
uncle or aunt residing in the same U.S. city as the petitioner -
was
responsible for introducing an American (who is most often not
Iranian-American) to his/her relative in Iran and suggesting
marriage. This appears to be well outside the practice of a
simple
"arranged marriage", which post accepts as a norm within Iranian
culture and frequently legitimate, particularly when the
petitioner
is Iranian-American. The Iranian-American matchmaking relative is
also yabwQ8ing enters the U.S. on a K-1 visa causing several
other siblings
to subsequently find their "soul mates" in the U.S., usually
through
the family of the original sibling's petitioning fiance or
through

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personal profiles posted on the Internet and in Internet chat
rooms.

Post occasionally receives e-mails from disgruntled K-1
petitioners,
relaying stories of their fiance arriving in the U.S. and shortly
thereafter either leaving them or meeting and marrying someone
else.
Often these e-mails from USC K-1 petitioners request the Embassy
to
take action against their fiances who were issued visas.

In addition, every year post returns several K-1 (fiance)
petitions
to DHS for review after determining that the couple had already
married. This issue is particularly prevalent with Iranian
applicants. Iranian couples engage in religious ceremonies in
Iran
(which are legal marriages in that country) and then apply for
fiance visas. Determining if a couple is already married is very
difficult. Interviewing officers depend on the personal
interview,
but we realize that some applicants may be successfully
concealing
these marriages. These already married K-1 petitioners often
claim
that their U.S. lawyers advised them to petition as a fiance
because
"the process is quicker." The existence of "temporary marriage
contracts" in Iran is also problematic as they are treated as a
legitimate marriage just as a "normal" marriage.

Employment-based IV petitions are also watched closely for fraud.
Abu Dhabi is receiving a steady stream of E-3, "specialized
skill" visa
applications. It is often difficult to verify that the Iranian
applicants possess the claimed work experience. Frequently the
applicants are "self-employed" and thus can state that their
experience matches the experience required in the employment
petition. Contacting previous employers in Iran is time-consuming
and ineffective. In many cases, the businesses have closed or the
current manager has no record of the applicant's employment. At
times, the petitioner is either a family member or a close
friend of
the petitioner. Post has also seen cases of the U.S. business
misrepresenting the services it offers in the petition to justify
the need for hiring the Iranian employee. The personal interview
is
of great importance in these cases.


At times, falsified Iranian documents have been submitted to
support
an application. The applicants had different birthdates listed on
their original petition and in their birth certificates (Shenas
Namehs). Of particular note is that the Shenas Namehs provided
were
new (duplicate), and were not the original document provided at
birth. The birth date on the original document made the
individual
over 21 years of age whereas the new birth date made the age of
the
applicant under 21. The birthdates were intentionally changed so
that the applicant would qualify for the visa. Post is not clear
what Iranian identity authorities require to issue a duplicate
Shenas Namehs. Post notes that "unmarried" sons and daughters of
LPRs/AmCits have also submitted duplicate Shenas Namehs. Post
suspects that in many of these cases, the applicant is married
and
has obtained a duplicate Shenas Nameh to conceal their marriage
data
so that they qualify for a particular visa class. Post has
discovered that the applicants were in fact married. Post later
sees petitions from American Citizens, who immigrated to the
U.S. as
"unmarried sons or daughters," for a spouse and children from
that
same period of time.

Dubai does not process immigrant visas.



4. DV Fraud - Abu Dhabi and Dubai

All DV applicants in the UAE are TCNs - often from high-fraud
countries including Bangladesh, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen.
Conoffs
and LES have worked with fraud officers in Dhaka, Lagos, and
other
posts to authenticate documents, particularly birth certificates
and
education credentials. The most common reason for a DV

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application
to be disqualified is failure to include names of all family
members
at the time of the original application.

Dubai does not process diversity visas.



5. ACS and Passport Fraud - Abu Dhabi and Dubai

The American Citizen Services unit does not generally encounter
U.S.
passport fraud. Both posts are vigilant about possible false
citizenship
claims and forwards all CRBA applications of children born in
Iran
to U.S. Embassy Bern for adjudication.

Consulate General Dubai encountered one case of possible
imposter U.S.
passport fraud at post during this period. A Nigerian citizen
came to
apply for a passport for her toddler AmCit child. The Consular
Officer
questioned the identity of the child with the woman as well as
the
authenticity of the documents presented in support of the
application.
In addition, the mother lied about the passport used by her
daughter
to travel from Lagos to Dubai. RSO questioned the mother and was
not
able to resolve the issue. Post did not issue a passport and
instead
referred the mother to apply at Embassy Lagos. Post alerted
Embassy
Lagos to the case.

Individuals regularly appear at both posts requesting
authentication of educational documents from diploma mills and
unaccredited institutions located both inside and outside the
United
States. Often the unaccredited certificates or degrees have been
duly accredited at the state level and bear the authentication
seal
of the U.S. Secretary of State. We continue to receive
educational
documents that were accredited by the District of Columbia even
though the college or university is not located there.
Educational
documents accredited in a state different than the state of
issue is
a useful fraud indicator because this often implies that the
document was rejected in the state listed on the diploma (i.e.,
Florida), so the individual submitted the document to DC for
accreditation.

Third country nationals often submit these documents as UAE labor
and immigration law requires them to provide evidence of their
expertise and education in a particular field. The
authentication
process only certifies "the genuineness of the signature and
seal or
the position of a foreign official" and does not verify the
validity
of the document. However, the UAE government and local companies
often presume that the Embassy seal is a verification of the
document's content and the subject's qualifications.

CA/OCS/PRI has confirmed that the Embassy is under no obligation
to
authenticate these documents bearing the seal of the Department
of
State. Both posts use U.S. Department of Education and Council
for
Higher Education databases to verify accreditation of educational
institutions and refuse to authenticate documents from
non-accredited institutions.



6. Adoption Fraud - Abu Dhabi and Dubai

Abu Dhabi adjudicates very few local adoption cases. Adoption
per se does
not exist under Sharia law in Islamic countries, including the
UAE.
A court may only grant guardianship. The Department has advised
that
guardianship does not carry the same status as adoption for
purposes
of U.S. immigration, and thus post may only issue IR-4 visas for
children whose adoption will be finalized in the US.

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Post does see several IR-4 visa applications originating from
Iran
each year and expects to see more Iranian-based adoption
requests in
the future. Adjudicating such cases is relatively difficult since
U.S. legal requirements for completing an adoption and Iranian
legal
proceedings and documentation for guardianship do not easily
collaborate. Post again stresses the challenge of authenticating
Iranian documents, especially provincial documents which are
often
more local in nature and vary from the standard documents
normally
submitted for visa adjudications or for adoption cases in other
countries. The potential for fraud exists. Post is working with
other posts, such as Ankara, to ensure consistent adoption
processing.

Dubai does not process adoption cases.



7. Use of DNA Testing - Abu Dhabi and Dubai

Abu Dhabi has rarely had to request this for determinations of
relationship in IV cases or for CRBA/passport determinations.

DNA testing is available in Dubai. It is typically used to
establish
paternity when necessary for a Consular Report of Birth Abroad.
No
new ACS cases involving DNA Testing were recorded during this
period.



8. Asylum and Other DHS Benefit Fraud - Abu Dhabi and Dubai

Abu Dhabi processes Visa 92 (asylum) cases, which are not
usually found
to be fraudulent from the perspective of the consular officer's
responsibility to determine the family relationship. However,
based
on interviews with the applicants, it appears that in many cases
the
underlying basis for the original asylum claim was likely to have
been false. For example, post receives following-to-join visa
requests based on successful asylum claims by Iranians who had
reportedly converted from Islam to Christianity, claiming
persecution in Iran. Interviews with following-to-join family
members often result in disclosures that the "conversions" were
not
real. Often the interview reveals that the applicant has very
little
knowledge of the conversion and answers frequently appear to be
coached. Post advised the Department and DHS/VSU about such
concerns
and continues to complete Visas 92 processing per Department
guidance. DHS/VSU has advised that they have reported our
concerns
to appropriate DHS offices and established an internal dialogue
about the phenomenon.

Dubai does not process any refugee or asylum cases.



9. Alien Smuggling, Trafficking, Organized Crime, Terrorist
Travel
- Abu Dhabi and Dubai

As Dubai and Abu Dhabi emerge as major airline transportation
hubs
between Europe, the U.S., Africa, the Middle East, South Asia,
and
East Asia - and with growing networks of direct flights to many
locations in those regions - there is and will continue to be an
expected increase in the level of fraudulent travel through the
country. Over 80 percent of the UAE population is composed of
TCNs
and there are direct air links to almost every corner of the
world,
including service to at least eight U.S. cities.

While there are no known major networks in the UAE itself, both
Abu
Dhabi and Dubai are popular transit points for fraudulent
travelers
(most frequently transiting to Europe.) It is unlikely that UAE
nationals will become involved in the fraud industry; rather,
this
will more likely arise from within the TCN communities that see
opportunities to assist persons entering the UAE illicitly or
transiting to other parts of the world.

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10. DS Criminal Fraud Investigations - Abu Dhabi and Dubai

Neither post has an A/RSO-I for investigations. However, there is
a strong relationship between the consular section, RSO, and the
DHS
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Visa Security
Unit(DHS/ICE/VSU).
All offices at post mutually support one another in maintaining
the
integrity of the passport and visa processes.



11. Host Country Passport, Identity Documents, and Civil
Registry -
Abu Dhabi and Dubai

UAE immigration authorities knowingly issue passports to UAE
nationals born outside the UAE that incorrectly show their place
of
birth to be in one of the country's seven emirates. The UAE
Government instituted this practice to combat discrimination in
administering the UAE law against dual nationality. The
decision to
allow this practice is usually attributed to the former President
and father of the nation, Sheikh Zayed. In 2002, boths posts
consulted
with the Department, which determined that these passports are
not
valid travel documents under U.S. law and can therefore not be
used to
travel to the United States. Generally, bearers of such
passports
are qualified visa applicants with legitimate travel plans to the
United States. As well-intended as this UAE government policy
may
be, it nonetheless complicates efforts to identify UAE
nationals who are potential security threats to the United
States or
have other visa ineligibilities.

The UAE otherwise has modern, professional and secure nationality
and identity documents and well-established procedures for
obtaining
and maintaining vital civil records, at least for those born
within
the last 30 years. Given that the modern state of the UAE only
came
into existence in 1971, it is more difficult to rely on any
documents created before that date. However, almost all records
on
individuals and their families are now updated and established.
UAE
passports are ICAO compliant, and since they are valid for 5
years,
Post has no particular problems with older versions of the UAE
passport.

The UAE has also launched a mandatory national identity card
program
for all residents of the UAE. Several hundred thousand Emiratis,
starting with those in the armed forces and the police, now have
such cards. The identity card is scheduled to be mandatory for
all
residents - Emirati and TCN alike - by 2010. The ID cards carry
all
biometric data and fingerprints on an electronic chip and are
intended to eventually be used as driver's licenses, for banking
purposes, for residency status verification, and more. More
information on the UAE national ID card can be found at the
Emirates
Identity Authority's website at
http://www.emiratesid.ae/mainenglish.html.

In 2003, the UAE began implementation of iris scanning at its
airports for certain nationals. Individuals who are deported from
the UAE, or are the subject of travel bans, are enrolled into the
iris-scan lookout system prior to their removal/departure from
the
UAE. At time of entry into the UAE, travelers of certain
nationalities are required to undergo iris scanning, and over
30,000
persons have been intercepted using the new technology. Iris
scanning is also being deployed at land border crossings, and is
currently active on the Omani border.



12. Cooperation with Host Government Authorities - Abu Dhabi
and Dubai

Generally, both posts have a good working relationship with the

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host
government including cooperation on fraud issues as they arise.
The
UAEG, however, remains unresponsive to the serious passport
place of
birth concerns described above in paragraph 11.



13. Areas of Particular Concern - Abu Dhabi and Dubai

Mission UAE again highlights the known inadequacy of the UAE
passport in
regards to true place of birth for UAE nationals born outside the
UAE. (See paragraph 11.)

A primary concern in IV and NIV work with Iranian applicants
remains our limited ability to verify Iranian documents and
information provided in interviews. Mission UAE relies on
"Shenas Namehs"
to confirm names, birthdates, marriages, divorces, and other
data.
Posts have seen several cases in which duplicate Shenas Namehs
are
submitted to verify identity. In many cases, Posts have found
that
the duplicate document does not retain the same data as the
original and that opportunities exist for altering data.

With no USG presence in Iran it is difficult to conduct research
to
verify suspicious information or documents. Both posts are
concerned about
fraud in Iranian cases and sees the potential for abuse (with
possible security ramifications) of the U.S. immigration process.
Mission UAE is working on improving our knowledge of Iranian
documents. We
are working with the Swiss Embassy in Tehran, our counterparts
from
other missions with presence in Iran, and with colleagues from
other
U.S. Missions that handle Iranian visa work to gather Iranian
legitimate documents and analyze valid trends. Despite efforts
made
approximately 4 years ago to gather Iranian documents, neither
post has
had a set on documents against which to verify Iranian claims.
Efforts are being made through the Swiss and the British
Embassies
to gather valid and current Iranian documents.

Mission UAE suspects that the Iranian community has caught on
that
working for the Government of Iran often results in a delay of
visa
issuance. Additionally, we suspect local Iranian travel agencies
(which facilitate Iranians visiting the UAE, including
accommodations in Dubai and transportation to Abu Dhabi)
informally
brief applicants on what to expect and say during visa
interviews.
Most recently, Mission UAE is working with CA/VO/L/C (the State
group
responsible for clearing Security Advisory Opinions) to clarify
guidelines for the use of Security Advisory Opinions for Iranians
with previous government and/ or military experience.



14. Staffing and Training - Abu Dhabi and Dubai

Abu Dhabi does not have any dedicated fraud prevention staff.
Visa
team members - LES and officer alike - look for fraud on a
case-by-case basis. When the possibility of fraud is suspected,
Post works to investigate that case. With an Iranian- American
IV
Chief and 3 Iranian LES staff, much IV fraud work can be done in
native language and by investigating original sources in Iran.
The
DHS Visa Security Unit provides excellent assistance on fraud
prevention matters and provides training to our consular staff,
UAE
immigration, and others for the detection of fraudulent
documents,
travel, imposters, DHS database reviews, and the whole range of
fraud issues.

Dubai has one full-time LES NIV anti-fraud investigator who
investigates petition-based visa cases. Post also has one
American
Citizen Services assistant who has participated in FSI
anti-fraud
training.
SIBERELL