NAKHEEL DEBT DEAL WEIGHS ON DUBAI'S ECONOMIC RECOVERY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DUBAI 000380 SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO; NEA/ARP/BMCGOVERN E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/14/2019 TAGS: ETRD KIPR EFIN ECON PREL AE SUBJECT: NAKHEEL DEBT DEAL WEIGHS ON DUBAI'S ECONOMIC RECOVERY DUBAI 00000380 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: Justin Siberell, Consul General. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The upcoming USD 3.5 billion Sukuk debt repayment for Dubai-based real estate mega developer, Nakheel Properties Inc., is the hot topic in financial circles. The odds are high that Abu Dhabi, vis-`-vis the UAE Central Bank, will intervene to cover the debt, raising hopes for Dubai's economic health. The spotlight on Nakheel has also brought back to the forefront scrutiny of the Dubai government's slow response to the economic crisis and its own questionable solvency. Observers are using the handling of Nakheel's debt both as a marker of Dubai's economic health and its ability to handle difficult financial transactions in a reasonably transparent manner. END SUMMARY. -------------- NAKHEEL IN THE SPOT LIGHT -------------- ¶2. (C) A subsidiary of the government controlled Dubai World and, with Emaar, Dubai Inc.'s most notable real estate developer, Nakheel Properties' financial hardships over the last year have become almost synonymous with the economic down-turn in Dubai. (Note: Nakheel is, among other projects, behind Dubai's signature, and costly, "Palm" Islands. End Note.) The real estate developer's plight has sparked considerable interest among international investors who tend to see Nakheel's uncertain future and potential default on its USD 3.5 billion Sukuk debt repayment in December 2009 as a benchmark for Dubai's economic prospects. The developer is believed to be insolvent, as real estate values and income from its Dubai based properties have plummeted by as much as 50 percent since this time last year and the easy credit which fueled its growth has all but dried up. ¶3. (C) Recent interest in Nakheel stems from a USD 3.5 billion Sukuk bond (i.e. Islamic bond) the company issued in 2006 to fund its massive property developments in Dubai and global buying binge. The Sukuk bond came with a standard guarantee by Nakheel to buy back the bonds outright at the time of maturity (December 2009) and pay out any accrued profits to investors. The Sukuk bond entitled creditors to a debt ownership stake in the company, with the potential for a higher payoff with asset appreciation and incremental rents paid by Nakheel. The Sukuk bond, although structured similarly to a normal bond, explicitly does not allow interest to be accrued on the debt and complies with Islamic Law. Since Nakheel is a subsidiary of government owned Dubai World, investors expected at the time of issuance that all debts would be backed by Dubai authorities. -------------- ABU DHABI TO THE RESCUE -------------- ¶4. (C) While the Dubai government will almost certainly come to the aid of Nakheel, it will likely do so primarily with funds from the USD 10 billion it received from Abu Dhabi as a result of the UAE Central Bank's partial purchase of its 20 billion bond offering last spring. Dubai Ruler, and UAE Vice President, Mohamed Bin Rashid al Maktoum told reporters September 8 he was "not worried" about covering looming debt payments, a comment that sent Nakheel's sukuk bond to a one-year high at 102 cents on the dollar, largely on the supposition that it reflects Dubai's ability to rely upon Abu Dhabi to continue bailing out its ailing parastatals. Nakheel alone will swallow a substantial chunk of the cash Dubai received from the first tranche of funds from the bond offering. ¶5. (C) A bailout on this scale would also mark a pivotal point in the federal government's, and ultimately Abu Dhabi's, intervention in Dubai's economy and could be a prelude to additional, more extensive bailouts, according to Paul M Koster, CEO of the Dubai Financial Services Authority. In fact, Nakheel's parent company, Dubai World, is purported to have an estimated USD 60 billion in debt (various sources put Dubai's total debt around USD 80 billion, but many believe it is DUBAI 00000380 002.2 OF 003 significantly higher - we have heard as high as USD 150 billion). Also there is significant market pressure for Abu Dhabi to continue to finance any potential future bailout, particularly since exposure to excessive Dubai debts of this scale may push the cost of borrowing up across the UAE. (Comment: One financial insider told Ambassador that Abu Dhabi is already paying a higher premium because of the market's expectation that it will ultimately foot the Nakheel bill. And lastly, what concessions Abu Dhabi might demand from Dubai in return, remains a matter of intense speculation as little hard information exists. End Comment.) -------------- NAKHEEL DEAL TRANSPARENCY: LITMUS TEST? -------------- ¶6. (C) A Nakheel bailout would be a significant benchmark for transparency for the Dubai authorities, according to Martin Kohlhase, an Assistant Vice President at Moody's Investor Service in Dubai. If a deal is struck, the markets will have a better sense of the direction Dubai plans to take in the near and medium-term restructuring of the economy. A wholesale bailout backed by Abu Dhabi through Central Bank infused dollars, rather than an orderly sale of Nakheel, could indicate a tightening grip on Dubai Inc. entities. On the other hand, although now very unlikely, a negotiated debt restructuring and possible sale of Nakheel would represent increased transparency and reliance on the market. Smart money feels that Dubai with the help of Abu Dhabi will do a wholesale bailout of Nakheel in December and will continue to cover its still outstanding debt load, which could make up a sizeable portion of its parent company's (Dubai World) estimated USD 60 billion debt. According to Paul Bagetelas, Managing Director of The Carlyle Group's Middle East division, the Dubai authorities remain reluctant to enter serious discussions with private investors who are keen to buy out ailing government or ruling family affiliated companies such as Nakheel. -------------- NAKHEEL HURT BY DUBAI's SLOW RESPONSE -------------- ¶7. (C) Koster explained to econoff in a recent meeting that criticism over Dubai's slow response to the economic crisis and its devastating effects on Nakheel remains high. Early bailout dollars for Nakheel would have been a boost of confidence for the ailing real estate developer and been used to repurchase a sizeable chunk of its Sukuk bonds in the open market where they are traded. In February 2009, Nakheel's Sukuk bond prices dropped to as low as 63 cents on the dollar, offering an almost 40 percent discount to the initial offering price. Many believe that Nakheel could have substantially lowered its current debt load if it had bought some of its bonds back at a discount and realized the gains resulting from the recent price recovery. Nakheel bonds were trading close to 90 cents on the dollar prior to MBR's comments noted above. -------------- NAKHEEL'S FOREIGN OWNERS IN THE DARK -------------- ¶8. (C) Foreign bank participation in the potential restructuring of Nakheel's debt obligations is cloudy at this point, particularly since so few details have been released by authorities. Many of these banks, who own 70 percent of Nakheel's Islamic bonds, continue to rationalize losses on their significant loan portfolios, especially since real estate values have plummeted by as much as 50 percent since this time last year. Banks remain unsurprisingly skeptical about adding to the already huge debt load in Dubai by increasing lending again or, in the case of Nakheel, making substantial concessions in any potential debt restructuring plan. Koster believes, however, that many foreign creditors would come to the table if the DUBAI 00000380 003.2 OF 003 Government of Dubai requested their help in restructuring Nakheel's debt. Koster explained that these creditors, largely banks, want to continue to do business in Dubai without fear of government backlash if they refuse to renegotiate their terms. -------------- NAKHEEL SHEDS FOREIGN ASSETS FOR CASH -------------- ¶9. (C) Despite investors, bankers and creditors being largely in the dark about how Nakheel's December debt obligations will be met, the company has been very publicly attempting to shed or monetize many of its non-performing assets possibly to generate funds for this purpose. In late August, Nakheel raised USD 160 million from the sale of its position in Australian based real estate company, the Mirvac Group at an 80 percent loss. Additionally, Nakheel hastily prepared a deal with South Africa to allow its mega cruise ship, the Queen Elizabeth II (QE2),to dock in Capetown and begin operations as a floating hotel. The QE2 was purchased for USD 100 million in 2007 and has since sat idle off the shores of Nakheel's Palm Islands. Other high-profile busts for Nakheel include its USD 375 million Miami Fontainebleau Resorts purchase and the still unutilized World Islands development that have not shown any return to date. Nakheel is now more commonly known for its growing stable of non-performing assets and ballooning debt load rather than as the master builder of Dubai. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶10. (C) The Government of Dubai's handling of the Nakheel debt repayment will no doubt continue to generate significant interest in and out of Dubai as the Emirate's economic future seems very much linked to it. Dubai has significant ground to cover in order to win back much needed confidence from a largely skeptical international market. A reasonably transparent Nakheel deal may offer Dubai that opportunity. But ultimately, this issue will boil down to Abu Dhabi's willingness to continue bailing out Dubai and, if so, what demands are made in return. A further erosion of Dubai's traditional independence vis-`-vis Abu Dhabi is possible, but the specifics are far from clear. END COMMENT. SIBERELL