QATAR MFA MINSTATE UNDERSCORES STRATEGIC ALLIANCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DOHA 000085

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2019
TAGS: PREL KWBG KPAL QA
SUBJECT: QATAR MFA MINSTATE UNDERSCORES STRATEGIC ALLIANCE
WITH U.S.; DENIES STRATEGIC SHIFT TOWARDS THE RADICAL CAMP

Classified By: Ambassador Joseph E. LeBaron, for reasons 1.4 (b, d).

--------------
(C) KEY POINTS
--------------

-- MFA Minister of State Ahmed Al-Mahmoud (again) told
Ambassador February 2 there had been no strategic shift in
Qatar's approach towards the region, no tilt towards the
radical camp. Qatar still followed a strategy of broad
engagement throughout the broader Middle East, according to
Al-Mahmoud.

-- Qatar continues to support a two-state solution to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, he said. It has not backed away
from the Arab Peace Initiative.

-- Al-Mahmoud encouraged the U.S. to treat Qatar as a
strategic partner, engage its leaders in dialogue, and not
back the Amir into a corner.

-- Ambassador described to Al Mahmoud the rapidly rising
concern in Washington that Qatar's recent actions indicated a
decided tilt towards the more radical camp.

-- Ambassador also pointed out that Qatar plans to hold an
Israeli "war crimes" conference only a few days after an
annual forum on U.S. relations with the Islamic world. The
"war crimes" conference should be turned off. (Al Mahmoud was
unaware of the conference.)

-- Ambassador laid out the al-Jazeera feedback loop for
Al-Mahmoud: Qatar bankrolls Al Jazeera which then inflames
Arab public opinion which Qatar then uses to justify its
diplomatic actions. That's destabilizing and dangerous to
both our interests. (Al-Mahmoud made no substantive reply.)

-- Ambassador pressed for Qatar to send Gaza humanitarian aid
through the PA, not/not Hamas. Al-Mahmoud thought UN
channels would be more likely than PA channels (more on the
issue in septel).

--------------
(C) COMMENTS
--------------

-- Qatar appears to be vacillating, in practice if not in
policy, between its stance of broad engagement in the region
and a shift towards the radical camp. The fighting in Gaza
precipitated the vacillation.

-- To us, the most important thing Al-Mahmoud said was this:
engage with Qatar, and don't back the Amir into a corner.
That is studied advice from a high Qatari official
well-disposed towards the United States.

-- Given all the military, commercial, and cultural equities
we have here, there is a lot of ballast in the relationship,
producing quite a bit of equilibrium.

-- But the political relationship remains troubled, volatile,
and quite capable of significantly damaging these equities.


End Key Points and Comments.


1. (C) Ambassador expressed to Minister of State for Foreign
Affairs Ahmed Al-Mahmoud February 2 Washington's concern that
Qatar's hosting of the January 16 meeting on Palestine, at
which the Iranian President, as well as Hamas and PIJ
leaders, were present, signaled a tilt toward the radical
camp away from Qatar's traditional policy of maintaining a
broad range of contacts and open doors. Ambassador conveyed
that U.S. officials were surprised and confused because the
shift appeared to be strategic in nature. Hardening this
impression was Qatar's expulsion of Israeli diplomats and
closure of the Israel's trade office in Doha in the days
following the January 16 meeting.

NO STRATEGIC SHIFT
--------------


2. (C) Al-Mahmoud assured the Ambassador that there was "no
strategic shift" in Qatar's thinking. As proof he offered
that moderate Arab states such as Lebanon and Morocco
participated in the January 16 Doha meeting alongside the
radical elements about which the U.S. was concerned. The aim
of the meeting had always been to support the Palestinians in
Gaza. Al-Mahmoud said Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas
had made a mistake by not attending. Had he attended, the
"door would not have been opened for Palestinian radicals to

DOHA 00000085 002 OF 003


sit at the table." Al-Mahmoud added that it is essential for
the international community to listen to and deal with both
Fatah and Hamas.


3. (C) Turning to the closure of the Israeli trade office,
Al-Mahmoud underscored that Qatar chose to "suspend" its
relations with Israel over Gaza (claiming, oddly, that some
European countries had done likewise). He said his chief of
protocol had told the Israeli trade representative that
Israel's communications with Qatari officials would continue,
as would Israeli visits to Qatar. Relations, he stressed
again, had merely been "suspended." Al-Mahmoud said the GOQ
ultimately closed the office due to "much pressure within
Qatar" for the closure.

QATAR DOES NOT WANT TO LEAD;
PALESTINIANS ALWAYS CAME FIRST
--------------


4. (C) Ambassador said the U.S. does not want to see a new
division in the Arab world of moderates and radicals that
would set back the peace process between Israel and the
Palestinians. In recent weeks, continued Ambassador, the
U.S. observed Arab consensus in decline and coordination fall
at a time of critical humanitarian needs in Gaza. Making
matters worse, Qatar announced in mid-January that it would
host a conference on Israeli war crimes in Gaza. This
conference, scheduled to occur in mid-February days after the
annual conference in Doha on U.S. relations with the Islamic
world, poses a policy dilemma for the U.S. Participation in
the latter conference might not be well perceived once Qatar
concludes that event and opens the war crimes conference.


5. (C) Avoiding comment on the Israeli war crimes conference,
Al-Mahmoud rejected the idea that the Arab world is returning
to a "Cold War mentality." He said Qatar merely is looking
out for itself and cannot count on others to identify and
protect Qatar's interests. Al-Mahmoud challenged Washington
to take a critical look at "who is making statements of
division and reconciliation. Some countries want us to
follow them without thinking. This is not acceptable to us.
We will follow with the right but not the wrong," he
stressed. He added that Qatar is a small country and does
not want to be a leader of the Arab world.


6. (C) Emphasizing that the "Arab street" from the outset of
the incursion demanded a meeting of the Arab League to
address Israelis actions in Gaza, Al-Mahmoud said it would
have been better for the U.S. and its allies to have agreed
to a meeting early on. The alternative was that Iran would
call the shots, which is precisely what happened, claimed
Al-Mahmoud, when Tehran called for an Organization of the
Islamic Conference (OIC) summit on Gaza. The Amir countered
by inviting OIC countries to Doha. Al-Mahmoud added that
Senegal's President, as the head of the OIC, called on all
Arab leaders to attend the summit in Doha, even if there was
no quorum. To seek balanced representation, Qatar invited
Turkey, Iran, Indonesia, and Malaysia to participate as
observers alongside the Arab states.


7. (C) Even when the leaders of the Arab League did not come
in force to Doha -- and chose instead to address the Gaza
crisis at a previously scheduled economic meeting in Kuwait
-- Qatar did not balk. Qatar participated, because Qatar's
primary concern from the beginning was the Palestinian
people, said Al-Mahmoud. It was the Egyptians who prided
themselves in Kuwait on blocking the Arab League meeting in
Doha from occurring. Al-Mahmoud added that several Arab
leaders told the GOQ they would have liked to attend the
January 18 meeting but for "external pressure." Al-Mahmoud
said Qatar appreciates President Obama's statement that he
wants relations "of mutual interest and mutual respect." For
this reason, Al-Mahmoud encouraged the U.S. not to push Qatar
and its Amir into a corner. He reiterated that Egypt need
not have "taken credit for causing the Doha meeting to fail."

AL JAZEERA AN IMPROVEMENT OVER THE PAST
--------------


8. (C) Taking Qatar's point that much of what Qatar did in
January was in response to Arab public opinion, Ambassador
observed that Qatar nonetheless shaped and influenced Arab
opinion through the Al Jazeera satellite network. How, he
asked, does Al Jazeera's push for Arab governments to take a
harder line on Israeli actions in Gaza square with Qatar's
grand strategy of maintaining dialogue with all sides,
including Israel?


9. (C) Al-Mahmoud argued that it is impossible to control Al
Jazeera's broadcasts entirely. He considered Al Jazeera's
existence a sign of progress. Gone are the days, such as

DOHA 00000085 003 OF 003


when Iraq invaded Kuwait, that GCC governments withheld news
of the invasion from the people. The Arab world now has an
alternative to the BBC, and this is a sign of progress, said
Al-Mahmoud.

QATAR: ENGAGE HAMAS
--------------


10. (C) Ambassador urged Qatar to make generous pledges to
UNRWA and Palestinian civilians in Gaza. Ambassador also
pressed for Qatar to send Gaza humanitarian aid through the
PA, not/not Hamas. Al-Mahmoud said he believed, but could
not confirm, that Qatar's aid would go through UN mechanisms.
Al-Mahmoud said most important is getting the aid to the
Palestinian people. The advantage of the UN was that
"politics" would not block these chaQels.


11. (C) Continuing on the subject of politics, Al-Mahmoud
stated that holding elections in Gaza had been a mistake.
Noting that Hamas has shifted position from fierce
non-recognition of Israel to recognizing Israel within its
1967 borders, Al-Mahmoud opined: "If friends of the U.S. had
pushed Hamas to make the right choices (earlier) we would be
better off today." It is important, in Qatar's view, to get
Hamas on board with signing a peace agreement with Israel.
Isolating Hamas is a mistake and will not achieve this.


12. (C) Ambassador noted that Australia, Japan, Europe, and
the United States all consider Hamas to be a terrorist
organization. Israelis have not forgotten Hamas suicide
bombing operations against Israelis. Al-Mahmoud responded
that both Israel's "invasion of Gaza" and the suicide
bombings were wrong. He reiterated Qatar's commitment to a
two-state solution.
LeBaron