MINSTATE AL-MAHMOUD COMMENTS ON HOW TO ADVANCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DOHA 000690

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2019
TAGS: PREL KPAL KWBG QA
SUBJECT: MINSTATE AL-MAHMOUD COMMENTS ON HOW TO ADVANCE
MIDDLE EAST PEACE

Classified By: Ambassador Joseph E. LeBaron, for reasons 1.4 (b, d).

--------------
(C) KEY POINTS
--------------

-- Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Ahmed Al-Mahmoud
told Ambassador November 24 that Qatar and the United States,
as strategic partners, seek the same strategic goals in a
Middle East peace. However, the two sides differ in some of
their approaches towards those shared goals.

-- Al-Mahmoud said Qatar supports Hamas in part because it
won the Palestinian parliamentary elections in 2006,
elections in which Qatar had "pushed Hamas" to participate --
at the specific request of the United States and other
governments.

-- Al-Mahmoud said Qatar also supports Mahmoud Abbas and does
not want him to resign.

-- Ambassador briefly explored with Al-Mahmoud how Qatar and
the USG might form the same kind of constructive relationship
and reinforcing approach on the peace process that they have
on Darfur, an approach strongly welcomed by Al-Mahmoud, the
GOQ point man on Darfur.

-- On a possible POTUS-Amir meeting, Ambassador and
Al-Mahmoud agreed that such a meeting needed to be thoroughly
discussed and prepped by both sides, so that there were no
missteps, misunderstandings, or miscues during such a crucial
meeting.

End Key Points.


1. (C) In a November 24 meeting with Ambassador, Minister of
State for Foreign Affairs Ahmed Al-Mahmoud presented Qatar's
thinking on advancing peace between Israel and the
Palestinians. He noted that Hamas won the Palestinian
elections. As such, "in this region we do not see them as a
terrorist organization." Even though Qatar and U.S. policies
on Hamas differ, Al-Mahmoud stressed that Qatar and the U.S.
are of one mind in support of peace. Qatar and the U.S., for
example, share the goal that Mahmoud Abbas stay on as head of
the Palestinian Authority.


2. (C) Al-Mahmoud offered that Abbas resigned because the
international community is talking, but taking no action.
Israeli settlement activity has not fully stopped, and the
results on the ground are not changing. "The U.S. asks the
Arabs to do 1, 2, 3 -- but no one makes demands of Israel."
Al-Mahmoud reiterated that Qatar and the U.S. share the same
objectives, but not necessarily the same procedures in
reaching them. Noting that Hamas participated in the 2006
Palestinian parliamentary elections and won, he said it was
impossible for Qatar to isolate them as terrorists after "we
pushed them to participate."


3. (C) Ambassador asked if Al-Mahmoud thought it would be
possible for the United States and Qatar to develop common,
or at least mutually reinforcing, steps toward the strategic
goal they share: a resolution of the Arab-Isareli issue.
"Yes," replied Al-Mahmoud, "if we work together." He
reminded Ambassador that in the past Qatar encouraged the
U.S. to support Shaykh Sharif in Somalia. The U.S. and Qatar
at the time did not see eye to eye. Now, though, the U.S.
has come around and supports Shaykh Sharif, noted Al-Mahmoud.



4. (C) Ambassador observed that he arrived in Qatar during a
period of tension in the bilateral political relationship,
but "we found a way to work together constructively on
Darfur." Ambassador underscored all the good that Al-Mahmoud
personally had achieved by working with Special Envoys for
Sudan Williamson and (now) Gration. Bearing this in mind,
Ambassador asked how Qatar and the U.S. work might work
together now on the Palestinian problem.

5. (C) Al-Mahmoud responded, in effect, that the best way was
stepped up engagement within the political relationship.
Qatar's Prime Minister, Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani, had met
with Secretary Clinton on the margins of the Forum for the
Future in Morocco. More meetings, more consultations, were
the key.


6. (C) Al-Mahmoud attributed the problems in the relationship
to a lack of communication. The Bush Administration
"isolated us" and did not want to discuss aims or procedures.
The previous Administration, he continued, chose to listen
to others in the region about Qatar's motives and policies
and not discuss concerns with us directly. "As I've told
you, we want a strategic relationship for now and the

DOHA 00000690 002 OF 002


future."


7. (C) Ambassador asked if there were differences of opinion
among Qatar's senior leaders on the strategic relationship
with the U.S. Al-Mahmoud said in response, "We definitely
all want better relations."


8. (C) Turning to an eventual meeting between President Obama
and the Amir, Ambassador said any such meeting would need to
be worked out in advance. Al-Mahmoud agreed, observing that
Qatar had some very bad experiences after opening up its
strategic relationship with the U.S. and did not want a bad
meeting.


9. (C) Al-Mahmoud, noting that Qatar postponed a GCC Foreign
Ministers' meeting to help make the Forum for the Future a
success, said Qatar wants to help the U.S. with the burden of
advancing peace between Israel and the Palestinians. We know
that President Obama and the U.S. are sincere in wanting
peace. However, Al-Mahmoud said "negotiations without
preconditions sound good," but the reality is that continued
Israeli settlement activity does not set the stage for
productive talks. The King of Jordan is under pressure; all
of us are under pressure, said Al-Mahmoud.

LeBaron