QATAR: MOD COS AL ATTIYAH ON IRAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DOHA 000675

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2019
TAGS: PREL MASS QA IR YM
SUBJECT: QATAR: MOD COS AL ATTIYAH ON IRAN

REF: A. SANAA 2029

B. DOHA 538

DOHA 00000675 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Ambassador Joseph E. LeBaron, for reasons .4 (b, d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Qatari MOD Chief of Staff Maj Gen Hamad
bin Ali Al Attiyah met with the Ambassador and U.S. Air
Forces Central (AFCENT) Commander Lt Gen Mike Hostage on
November 8. He accepted Gen Hostage's invitation to fly a
C-17 sortie over Afghanistan, indicating he understood that
onerous immigration and customs procedures were the genesis
of this invitation. Al Attiyah wondered if the Houthi
incursion into Saudi Arabia might not be a Houthi protest
against Saudi support for Yemeni President Saleh, or even a
message to KSA from Iran. Asked for his views on Iran, he
expounded at length about Qatar's need to engage with the
Iranians and its difficulties in doing so. The COS explained
that Doha had to maintain an open dialogue because of the
shared natural gas field and because &you have to know your
enemy.8 He described the hardships faced by the population
in Iran, and cautioned the U.S. about Tehran's proclivity to
made a deal and then renege ) &that's their way.8 Qatari
Emiri Air Force (QEAF) COS Brig Gen Mubarak Mohammed
al-Khayarin, QAF Chief of International Relations BG Abdulla
Juma,an Al Hamad, OMC Chief COL McQueen, and Gen Hostage's
POLAD also attended. END SUMMARY.

COME FLY WITH ME ) ON A C-17
--------------

2. (C) The Ambassador introduced U.S. Air Forces Central
(AFCENT) Commander Lt Gen Mike Hostage to MOD Chief of Staff
Hamad bin Ali Al Attiyah on November 8. With AFCENT HQ now
forward deployed to Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, Gen Hostage
expressed his desire to work closely with the COS to resolve
any issues that might arise at the base. He invited Gen Al
Attiyah to fly on a C-17 air drop sortie together, and Al
Attiyah accepted, joking that he would go so long as he
didn't have to jump out with the cargo being dropped. (NOTE:
With the many customs and immigration difficulties
encountered by U.S. forces flying sorties from, or transiting
through, Al Udeid, the ulterior motive for the invitation to
Al Attiyah, and an anticipated follow-up flight for BG
Abdulla Juma,an and an interagency team, is for them to
experience first-hand the hassles our forces experience with
each flight. In addition, we hope that seeing the mission
over Afghanistan will give them a more direct stake in the
prosecution of the war in Afghanistan. End Note.) When Lt
Gen Hostage offered the follow-on flight for BG Juma,an and
a broader interagency team, Al Attiyah vaguely acknowledged
the difficulties U.S. forces have in adhering to Qatari
procedures, demonstrating his understanding as to why the
Qataris were being invited.

GCC ARROWS OF THE GULF EXERCISE A SUCCESS
--------------

3. (C) BG Mubarak said he had just returned from the GCC
Arrows of the Gulf exercise in Kuwait, which he found useful
as a joint planning effort and joint exercise that included
ground, air and naval forces. He provided no further
details.

AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ NEED MORE TIME
--------------

4. (C) Gen Al Attiyah asked how the U.S. was faring in
Afghanistan and Iraq, and Gen Hostage replied that we were
making progress in Afghanistan, but slowly, while our
drawdown in Iraq was proceeding according to schedule. Gen
Al Attiyah stressed that it would take a long time to resolve
the problems in both countries. Until a more unified
government could be formed in Afghanistan that included
Tajiks and Pashtuns, including the Taliban, the current
situation would continue. He emphasized that he did not want
to see Iraq's parliament devolve into one that resembled
Kuwait's, in which tribal interests and hunger for power
trumped doing what was right to build the country. He
thought Kuwait should be far better off politically than it
was. Iraq was a young democracy that needed more time until
all the sects and ethnicities understood they were all Iraqis
and learned how to share power. In addition, Al Attiyah
pointed to unhelpful meddling by Iran, Syria and Turkey in
Iraq.

YEMENI &LIARS8
--------------

5. (C) Gen Al Attiyah said he thought the Yemeni Army had
pushed the Houthi rebels across the Saudi border, although
the border meant little to the tribe anyway (Ref A). But
this time, he posited, the Houthis attacked the Saudi border
post as a reprisal for Saudi support for Yemeni President
Saleh. He also suggested that the Houthi attack could be a

DOHA 00000675 002.2 OF 002


message from Iran to the KSA because the Saudis would not let
the Iranians use the Hajj as a platform for anti-American
demonstrations. The Ambassador pointed out that the GOQ had
been involved in Yemeni peace talks for more than a year.
&Nobody tells the truth, nobody wants to solve the problem;
they just want to take from you,8 Al Attiyah exclaimed. The
Yemenis who were actually working to solve the problem had
told him that the representatives in Qatar were all
&liars.8

IRAN: KNOW YOUR ENEMY, AND YOUR FRIENDS
--------------

6. (C) Lt Gen Hostage asked for Gen Al Attiyah's views on
Iran. &It's not easy to deal with these people,8 the COS
replied. His advice to the U.S., Iraq and others was to
accept the fact that they would &reach agreement with you on
something and then change their minds, and that's ok with
them ) and then you get to start over.8 Policy-wise, Al
Attiyah said Qatar had good relations with its problematic
big neighbor, but this was a necessity for the sake of the
shared natural gas field. Qatar and Oman were the only ones
in contact with Iran; the other GCC countries had their own
problems with Tehran.


7. (C) Referring to his own trip to Iran in July (Refs B and
C),Al Attiyah said it was in exchange for the Iranian
Defense Minister's trip to Doha. The Iranians wanted a
deeper security relationship with Qatar, he related, &but we
don't have too much interest.8 However, he noted that it
was important to maintain contact and try to see what they
have, both militarily and economically. He knew they would
not show him much, to include their training facilities, but
this was what he was asking for. Given Qatar's interests in
the Gulf, he was particularly interested in Iran's naval
college and training facilities, and he had asked to send a
team to visit them, thus far without being given a date. Gen
Hostage said he understood why it was important for Qatar to
have a good relationship with Iran, but it was also important
to know who your friends are. Al Attiyah responded by
pointing to Qatar's problems with Saudi Arabia that still had
to be worked on, but noing that Qatar had resolved its
issues with Bahrin. As for Iran, if Doha was going to solve
its problems with Tehran, &you have to know your enemy.

IRAN: PROVIDING FOR THE MILITARY, NOT THE PEOPE
-------------- --

8. (C) Gen Al Attiyah reiterated that he wantd to see what
the Iranian military has. It is a uge entity, but how
accurate are its weapons? He again stressed that it was
important to keep an open dialogue. &We'll see. We're not
in a hurry,8 he commented. When he had visited Tehran, the
talks had been good and the Iranians had listened to him,
&but I don't know if they believed what we said.8 A lot
was happening internally, and the post-election period was
only the beginning. The next elections would be very
different. Maybe the rural areas would be more open to
opposition candidates. In the meantime, the COS said, goods
were unbelievably expensive, especially on government
workers, small salaries, and the Iranian government was not
endeavoring to better people's lives.


9. (C) Sanctions would hurt the younger generation ) it
would be interesting to see how they react, Gen Al Attiyah
stated. He thought the youth just wanted to open up their
country, and time might have a greater effect (than
sanctions). If the situation were left as is, the reaction
would come from within. People were forced to involve
themselves in the black market and corrupt practices in order
to survive. The government's focus on its military wasn't
bringing in any foreign investment and the Iranian people
were not very happy, he concluded. &It's a very poor
country that doesn't want foreigners to visit and discover
things that are not good for the government(. What they say
is not reality.8 Other than the wealthy Mullahs and the
senior levels in the Iranian Republican Guards Corps (IRGC)
who controlled everything, even the lower levels in the
military were not happy.


10. (U) General Hostage's staff prepared and cleared this
cable.
LeBaron