QATAR: MOD COS AL ATTIYAH ON IRAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DOHA 000675 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2019 TAGS: PREL MASS QA IR YM SUBJECT: QATAR: MOD COS AL ATTIYAH ON IRAN REF: A. SANAA 2029 ¶B. DOHA 538 DOHA 00000675 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Ambassador Joseph E. LeBaron, for reasons .4 (b, d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Qatari MOD Chief of Staff Maj Gen Hamad bin Ali Al Attiyah met with the Ambassador and U.S. Air Forces Central (AFCENT) Commander Lt Gen Mike Hostage on November 8. He accepted Gen Hostage's invitation to fly a C-17 sortie over Afghanistan, indicating he understood that onerous immigration and customs procedures were the genesis of this invitation. Al Attiyah wondered if the Houthi incursion into Saudi Arabia might not be a Houthi protest against Saudi support for Yemeni President Saleh, or even a message to KSA from Iran. Asked for his views on Iran, he expounded at length about Qatar's need to engage with the Iranians and its difficulties in doing so. The COS explained that Doha had to maintain an open dialogue because of the shared natural gas field and because &you have to know your enemy.8 He described the hardships faced by the population in Iran, and cautioned the U.S. about Tehran's proclivity to made a deal and then renege ) &that's their way.8 Qatari Emiri Air Force (QEAF) COS Brig Gen Mubarak Mohammed al-Khayarin, QAF Chief of International Relations BG Abdulla Juma,an Al Hamad, OMC Chief COL McQueen, and Gen Hostage's POLAD also attended. END SUMMARY. COME FLY WITH ME ) ON A C-17 -------------- ¶2. (C) The Ambassador introduced U.S. Air Forces Central (AFCENT) Commander Lt Gen Mike Hostage to MOD Chief of Staff Hamad bin Ali Al Attiyah on November 8. With AFCENT HQ now forward deployed to Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, Gen Hostage expressed his desire to work closely with the COS to resolve any issues that might arise at the base. He invited Gen Al Attiyah to fly on a C-17 air drop sortie together, and Al Attiyah accepted, joking that he would go so long as he didn't have to jump out with the cargo being dropped. (NOTE: With the many customs and immigration difficulties encountered by U.S. forces flying sorties from, or transiting through, Al Udeid, the ulterior motive for the invitation to Al Attiyah, and an anticipated follow-up flight for BG Abdulla Juma,an and an interagency team, is for them to experience first-hand the hassles our forces experience with each flight. In addition, we hope that seeing the mission over Afghanistan will give them a more direct stake in the prosecution of the war in Afghanistan. End Note.) When Lt Gen Hostage offered the follow-on flight for BG Juma,an and a broader interagency team, Al Attiyah vaguely acknowledged the difficulties U.S. forces have in adhering to Qatari procedures, demonstrating his understanding as to why the Qataris were being invited. GCC ARROWS OF THE GULF EXERCISE A SUCCESS -------------- ¶3. (C) BG Mubarak said he had just returned from the GCC Arrows of the Gulf exercise in Kuwait, which he found useful as a joint planning effort and joint exercise that included ground, air and naval forces. He provided no further details. AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ NEED MORE TIME -------------- ¶4. (C) Gen Al Attiyah asked how the U.S. was faring in Afghanistan and Iraq, and Gen Hostage replied that we were making progress in Afghanistan, but slowly, while our drawdown in Iraq was proceeding according to schedule. Gen Al Attiyah stressed that it would take a long time to resolve the problems in both countries. Until a more unified government could be formed in Afghanistan that included Tajiks and Pashtuns, including the Taliban, the current situation would continue. He emphasized that he did not want to see Iraq's parliament devolve into one that resembled Kuwait's, in which tribal interests and hunger for power trumped doing what was right to build the country. He thought Kuwait should be far better off politically than it was. Iraq was a young democracy that needed more time until all the sects and ethnicities understood they were all Iraqis and learned how to share power. In addition, Al Attiyah pointed to unhelpful meddling by Iran, Syria and Turkey in Iraq. YEMENI &LIARS8 -------------- ¶5. (C) Gen Al Attiyah said he thought the Yemeni Army had pushed the Houthi rebels across the Saudi border, although the border meant little to the tribe anyway (Ref A). But this time, he posited, the Houthis attacked the Saudi border post as a reprisal for Saudi support for Yemeni President Saleh. He also suggested that the Houthi attack could be a DOHA 00000675 002.2 OF 002 message from Iran to the KSA because the Saudis would not let the Iranians use the Hajj as a platform for anti-American demonstrations. The Ambassador pointed out that the GOQ had been involved in Yemeni peace talks for more than a year. &Nobody tells the truth, nobody wants to solve the problem; they just want to take from you,8 Al Attiyah exclaimed. The Yemenis who were actually working to solve the problem had told him that the representatives in Qatar were all &liars.8 IRAN: KNOW YOUR ENEMY, AND YOUR FRIENDS -------------- ¶6. (C) Lt Gen Hostage asked for Gen Al Attiyah's views on Iran. &It's not easy to deal with these people,8 the COS replied. His advice to the U.S., Iraq and others was to accept the fact that they would &reach agreement with you on something and then change their minds, and that's ok with them ) and then you get to start over.8 Policy-wise, Al Attiyah said Qatar had good relations with its problematic big neighbor, but this was a necessity for the sake of the shared natural gas field. Qatar and Oman were the only ones in contact with Iran; the other GCC countries had their own problems with Tehran. ¶7. (C) Referring to his own trip to Iran in July (Refs B and C),Al Attiyah said it was in exchange for the Iranian Defense Minister's trip to Doha. The Iranians wanted a deeper security relationship with Qatar, he related, &but we don't have too much interest.8 However, he noted that it was important to maintain contact and try to see what they have, both militarily and economically. He knew they would not show him much, to include their training facilities, but this was what he was asking for. Given Qatar's interests in the Gulf, he was particularly interested in Iran's naval college and training facilities, and he had asked to send a team to visit them, thus far without being given a date. Gen Hostage said he understood why it was important for Qatar to have a good relationship with Iran, but it was also important to know who your friends are. Al Attiyah responded by pointing to Qatar's problems with Saudi Arabia that still had to be worked on, but noing that Qatar had resolved its issues with Bahrin. As for Iran, if Doha was going to solve its problems with Tehran, &you have to know your enemy. IRAN: PROVIDING FOR THE MILITARY, NOT THE PEOPE -------------- -- ¶8. (C) Gen Al Attiyah reiterated that he wantd to see what the Iranian military has. It is a uge entity, but how accurate are its weapons? He again stressed that it was important to keep an open dialogue. &We'll see. We're not in a hurry,8 he commented. When he had visited Tehran, the talks had been good and the Iranians had listened to him, &but I don't know if they believed what we said.8 A lot was happening internally, and the post-election period was only the beginning. The next elections would be very different. Maybe the rural areas would be more open to opposition candidates. In the meantime, the COS said, goods were unbelievably expensive, especially on government workers, small salaries, and the Iranian government was not endeavoring to better people's lives. ¶9. (C) Sanctions would hurt the younger generation ) it would be interesting to see how they react, Gen Al Attiyah stated. He thought the youth just wanted to open up their country, and time might have a greater effect (than sanctions). If the situation were left as is, the reaction would come from within. People were forced to involve themselves in the black market and corrupt practices in order to survive. The government's focus on its military wasn't bringing in any foreign investment and the Iranian people were not very happy, he concluded. &It's a very poor country that doesn't want foreigners to visit and discover things that are not good for the government(. What they say is not reality.8 Other than the wealthy Mullahs and the senior levels in the Iranian Republican Guards Corps (IRGC) who controlled everything, even the lower levels in the military were not happy. ¶10. (U) General Hostage's staff prepared and cleared this cable. LeBaron