US EMBASSY DOHA COUNTRY TEAM ASSESMENT FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L DOHA 000522 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2019 TAGS: PREL QA SUBJECT: US EMBASSY DOHA COUNTRY TEAM ASSESMENT FOR APPROVAL TO RELEASE LAIRCM FOR QATAR HEAD OF STATE AIRCRAFT Classified By: Charge d,Affaires Mirembe Nantongo, for reasons 1.4(A), (B),and (D). ¶1. (U) Summary: On 24 August 2009 the Government of Qatar (GOQ) re-submitted a Letter of Request (LOR) to purchase the AN/AAQ-24(V) Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasure System (LAIRCM) for Qatar Head-of-State (HoS) Aircraft. Embassy Doha Country Team concurs with the proposed acquisition of this system by the QEAF. ¶2. (U) The following country team assessment is provided in support of the GOQ request and answers mandatory questions required for all significant military sales and the required exception to national disclosure policy for Qatar. ¶3. (C) Why does Qatar want to purchase the AN/AAQ-24(V) system? Qatar desires LAIRCM to protect HoS aircraft from infrared missiles. GOQ operates in an unstable region of the world and its leaders often travel to countries where conflict, civil disturbance, and the proliferation of man-portable infrared missiles elevate the risk to civilian aircraft. The AN/AAQ-24 (V) is a proven technology specifically designed for large, slow-moving aircraft that automatically counters advanced IR missile systems with no action required by the crew. GOQ believes it is the most effective defensive system to counter any IR missile threat. ¶4. (C) How would these items affect Qatar's force structure and Qatar's ability to contribute to mutual defense or security goals? Although the AN/AAQ-24 (V) would be adapted to civilian-model aircraft assigned to the QEAF, the system would not materially affect Qatar,s force structure since those aircraft are civilian-model planes used solely for the transport of the Head of State, his son (the Heir Apparent), and the Prime Minister. The system would contribute to mutual defense and security goals in that its protection of key government personnel would contribute to the stability of an ally who for years has contributed to regional stability both through coordinated action with United States forces and through independent initiatives. Besides hosting U.S. forces on two of the largest U.S. military facilities in the Gulf, since 2005 Qatar has contributed to humanitarian efforts in Lebanon, Pakistan, and Yemen. Qatar and its key leaders have also served as mediators in conflicts in Lebanon, Yemen, and the Sudan. Though not always in line with U.S. policies, �A;Qatar,s actions often serve as a moderating force in a volatile region and bolster American strategic interests by promoting dialogue and the peaceful resolution of conflict. ¶5. (C) LAIRCM will contribute to U.S. and Qatar Defense/Security goals. Authorizing release of the system will support several USG regional strategic objectives. -- Deter and defeat adversaries -- Assure regional access -- Strengthen regional stability -- Build self-reliance of partner nation security forces -- Protect vital interests of the U.S. within the area of responsibility. Ultimately, sale of this system will help strengthen U.S. efforts to promote regional stability by enhancing protection of governmental leadership to a key U.S. ally. ¶6. (C) Justification for the type and quantity of articles or services requested: Qatar seeks to be able to protect HoS during travel outside the State of Qatar. Despite having between seven and eleven dedicated Emiri Flight civilian-model aircraft, Qatar is asking for LAIRCM on only a critical few aircraft. ¶7. (C) Anticipated reactions of neighboring nations: None. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait already have LAIRCM on their HoS aircraft. The Country Team does not anticipate adverse reaction from any of Qatar,s neighbors. ¶8. (C) Assessment of Qatar's ability to account for, safeguard, operate, maintain, and support the articles: QEAF will be able to maintain and operate this system and its components throughout its life cycle due to its strong economic base, institutional knowledge, and anticipated long-term financial stability. Additionally, future QEAF expansion includes a move to Al Udeid Air Base. Coexistence of QEAF and U.S. military assets at Al Udeid Air Base provides an ideal logistical support base for a QEAF LAIRCM. Even without a U.S. presence, our assessment is that the QEAF has the means to stand on its own with regard to operating the system. ¶9. (C) Training required either in-country or in the United States and the anticipated reactions resulting from the presence of U.S. trainers in-country: Installation and maintenance of the AN/AAQ-24 (V) system will likely take place in country, by and under the supervision of U.S. military and contract industry personnel. ¶10. (C) Possible impact of any in-country U.S. presence that might be required as a result of providing the article: Due to the large presence of U.S. personnel already in Qatar, the presence of any additional subject matter experts is not an issue. ¶11. (C) Source of financing and the economic impact of the proposed acquisition: Qatar's national defense budget will be the source of funding for this purchase. There will be no negative economic impact from this sale. ¶12. (C) Human rights considerations relevant to the proposed acquisition: There are no human rights considerations relevant to this acquisition. ¶13. (C) A plan for end-use monitoring for sensitive and advanced warfighting technology and the SAO's plan for compliance verification: GOQ has taken steps to address U.S. concerns over transfer of the technology and has promised to do &whatever it takes8 to meet U.S. export control requirements. QAF will require education on end-use monitoring program, as applicable. QAF will comply with end-use monitoring as outlined in chapter 8, DOD 5105-38-M, Security Assistance Management Manual, 3 October 2003, as necessary. OMC Qatar will fulfill its responsibility and ensure compliance with end-use monitoring requirements under the Golden Sentry program by conducting periodic accountability inventories and monitoring operational use and control during day-to-day military-to-military contact, when required. ¶14. (C) Recommendation whether the USG should approve transfer of the classified data and justification: The U.S. Government should approve transfer of this technology to the GOQ. Release of LAIRCM is in the best interests of both nations economically, militarily and politically. Qatar is a reliable military ally of the U.S. who shares many of our regional strategic interests. GOQ has legitimate concerns over the safety of its HoS aircraft and desires to protect its key personnel using technology already in use by other countries in the region. If GOQ is not allowed to purchase LAIRCM it will have a negative impact on interoperability with U.S. and coalition/regional forces, our security assistance portfolio, and future U.S. defense product acquisition. ¶15. (C) The Ambassador and the Country Team strongly support Qatar's request for the AN/AAQ-24(V)LAIRCM system. ¶16. (C) U.S. Central Command Endorsement: U.S. Central Command concurs with U.S. Embassy Qatar,s assessment regarding the release of LAIRCM to Qatar. Release of LAIRCM to Qatar will increase protection for the head of state of a strategically important nation and is in the interests of U.S. Central Command. U.S. Central Command anticipates no adverse regional, political, or military effects as a result of providing this capability to Qatar. Failure to approve release will result in a strain on our bilateral relationship. Nantongo