ASD VERSHBOW'S MEETINGS IN QATAR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DOHA 000502 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/09/2019 TAGS: PREL MASS QA XF ZP ZR YM IR JO LE SUBJECT: ASD VERSHBOW'S MEETINGS IN QATAR Classified By: Amb Joseph LeBaron for reason 1.4 (b) and (d) (C) SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) During their July 20-21 visit to Qatar, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for International Security Affairs, Ambassador Alexander Vershbow, and State Political-Military (PM) Assistant Secretary Andrew Shapiro held meetings with Qatar's military Chief of Staff, Major General (MG) Hamad al-Attiyah and the Crown Prince Tamim bin Hamad al Thani. MG al-Attiyah and the Crown Prince tried to assure the Assistant Secretaries that Qatar used the Chief of Staff's visit to press Iran to respond to U.S. offers of engagement and to dismiss as "rubbish" Iranian efforts to blame the election crisis on U.S. and UK special services. The U.S. affirmed displeasure with Iranian behavior, and said the U.S. would not tolerate Iranian pursuit of nuclear weapons. ASD Vershbow suggested now was the time for Qatar to distance itself from Iran and its proxies and urge Iran to end its destabilizing behavior. ¶2. (C) MG al Attiyah and the Crown Prince repeated the Qatari position that they felt the need to engage all their neighbors and that Qatar could perhaps influence Iranian behavior through its engagement. MG al-Attiyah also expressed disappointment that the Large Aircraft Infrared Counter Measure (LAIRCM) system is not available to be installed on Qatar's recently purchased C-17 aircraft. ASD Vershbow said he would look into the issue further and that a formal response from the SecDef would be forthcoming. The Chief of Staff also said no decision had been made on fulfilling an earlier U.S. request to provide funding for the refurbishment of Jordanian tanks being provided to Lebanon. When ASD Vershbow requested that Qatar use its good offices to help the U.S. in Yemen and induce a change in Hamas's behavior, the Chief of Staff expressed irritation that U.S.-Qatar friendship did not extend to issues of importance to Qatar, such as LAIRCM. END SUMMARY U.S.-QATAR RELATIONSHIP -------------- ¶3. (C) U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for International Affairs Vershbow and Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs Shapiro, joined by Ambassador, met July 20-21 over dinner and in a separate office call with Chief of Staff (COS) Major General Hamad al-Attiyah. The U.S. visitors thanked the COS for Qatar's continued hospitality and support and for hosting our presence at both Camp As Sayliyah (CAS) and Al-Udeid Air Base (AUAB). C-17 PURCHASE -------------- ¶4. (C) BG General al-Malki (Commander of the Fighter Wing and Chairman of the Transport Committee) informed ASD Vershbow that the first C-17 was on schedule for delivery and would depart California on August 11 with an ETA at AUAB O/A August ¶15. In addition, BG General al-Malki mentioned his disappointment at the delay of the pilot training program, which will further delay the aircraft from becoming operational. In response, ASD Vershbow reassured him that USG would work to resolve the issue. ¶5. (C) COS al-Attiyah expressed his concern to ASD regarding the C-17 LAIRCM. The COS stated that he was greatly disappointed over USG disapproval of Qatar's application for LAIRCM. Al-Malki pointed out that other nations had acquired the system and that Qatar's exclusion added to his frustration. The COS said he did not want to elevate the matter to Qatar's civilian leadership. He believed that Qatar's leaders would question the benefits of the U.S.-Qatari military relationship if the concern were to be raised. ¶6. (C) ASD Vershbow responded that a letter would be forthcoming from SECDEF explaining that Qatar would be receiving the same aircraft as received by the United States Air Force (USAF). Vershbow further clarified that the LAIRCM was an additional add-on, for which transfer to Qatar had been disapproved. Vershbow recommended that Qatar pursue other options, noting he was unaware that other nations had access to the LAIRCM system for transport aircraft. ASD Vershbow said he would look into the matter, adjust the SECDEF letter as necessary and respond formally to the GOQ. COS and al-Malki stressed Qatar's desire to use aircraft jointly with the U.S. and Coalition Forces. IRAN -------------- DOHA 00000502 002 OF 003 ¶7. (C) ASD asked the COS to recount his visit to the Islamic Republic of Iran. COS briefed that his first visit to Iran was short in duration. The Qatari delegation praised President Obama's Cairo Speech while in Iran and urged the Iranians to take steps to avoid isolating themselves internationally. Further, the Qataris suggested that the Iranians seek engagement and rapprochement. ASD Vershbow said this was the right message, and those who have contacts with Iran should use every opportunity to persuade Iranian leaders to end their destabilizing behavior. ¶8. (C) ASD Vershbow reiterated the need for Iran to take steps to convince the international community that it was not pursuing a nuclear weapons capability, and to end its support for Hamas, Hizballah, and other extremist groups. He said we understand why Qatar, because of its close proximity and its economic and political ties to Iran, felt the need to engage with Iran. Qatar should help the Iranians to avoid a conflict with the U.S. and the international community, remarking that "friends do not let friends drive drunk." ¶9. (C) COS al-Attiyah responded that while Iran expresses a desire privately to change its behavior, these could be meaningless platitudes. The COS reiterated that the GOQ opposes any Iranian pursuit of a military nuclear capability, noting that it would destabilize the region. COS further suggested that the USG continue its own dialogue with the Islamic Republic. COS al-Attiyah closed the discussion by making clear that, with respect to Iran, "while we're neighbors, we're not friends." He summed up his recent visit to Tehran as an overture to maintain open channels of communication with Iran. LEBANON -------------- ¶10. (C) ASD asked if the GOQ had a response to an earlier request to the Prime Minister by Secretary Gates to help fund the transfer of 55 M1A1 tanks from Jordan to Lebanon. COS said he was aware of the request, but that no decision had been made. He added that he had discussed the issue during a recent CHOD conference with Jordanian and Lebanese representatives. HAMAS -------------- ¶11. (C) ASD Vershbow raised Qatar's ties with Hamas, and told the COS that Hamas needs to be encouraged to rejoin the Palestinian Authority and the Peace Process. He added that there should be "no blank checks, no checks at all," for Hamas. ASD suggested that Qatar was in a position to influence Hamas; if Qatar helped bring about a change in Hamas's behavior, it could enhance the U.S.-Qatar strategic relationship. COS undertook to relay that message to the Amir and Crown Prince. While the COS underscored that Qatar wants a good relationship with the U.S., he noted there were times when USG decisions sent a different signal, such as the USG's decision on LAIRCM. COS al-Attiyah rhetorically asked, "Are we friends or not?" YEMEN -------------- ¶12. (C) ASD Vershbow asked if Qatar, or the GCC as a whole, would be renewing efforts to help solve the troubles in Yemen, citing Qatar's previous mediation efforts. COS al-Attiyah responded that GOQ had engaged Yemen in the past, but noted that maintaining productive dialogue is difficult, given Yemen's economic plight and decentralized tribal society. The COS added that the GOQ was unsure how Yemeni President Saleh plans to curtail the violence there. He also noted that there is little military cooperation between the Qatar Armed Forces (QAF) and Yemen, but that he would make the GOQ leadership aware of the ASD's interest. The COS said that the GCC had earlier presented a "unified package," but its efforts in Yemen had failed. COS al-Attiyah recommended that this subject be addressed at the Manama Dialogue in December. NSS and CIP -------------- ¶13. (C) ASD commended the COS on the upcoming CENTCOM-GOQ-Naval War College effort to develop a National Security Strategy. Qatar and others in the region need to place more emphasis on Critical Infrastructure Protection, added the ASD. COS al-Attiyah agreed and said he was looking forward to this effort. (Note: OMC Qatar will escort an interagency Qatari delegation back to Tampa August 11-13 to DOHA 00000502 003 OF 003 begin this process.) CLOSING REMARKS -------------- ¶14. (C) COS ended the discussions by stating that he valued the U.S.-Qatar relationship. The GOQ was committed to the friendship forged between the two nations, he said. COS said he is looking forward to the P4 visit and expressed his desire to invite the P4 to his beach house as schedules permit. COMMENT -------------- ¶15. (C) Qatar clearly registered its disappointment in not receiving LAIRCM for its C-17. We believe this could fester into an open wound in the vital U.S.-Qatar security relationship. The Chief of Staff is particularly sensitive about the issue, since Qatar's senior leadership (the Amir and Crown Prince) holds him responsible for maintaining a close and productive U.S.-Qatar military relationship. However, given the Qatari leadership's perception of the Chief of Staff's inability so far to get LAIRCM, senior leadership may start to question the Chief of Staff's assurances about the strength of the U.S.-Qatar military relationship. End Comment. ¶16. (U) This cable was cleared by Assistant Secretary of Defense Alexander Vershbow. LeBaron