QATAR: BALANCING GEOGRAPHIC INTERESTS WITH IRAN,

C O N F I D E N T I A L DOHA 000442

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV IR QA
SUBJECT: QATAR: BALANCING GEOGRAPHIC INTERESTS WITH IRAN,
STRATEGIC INTERESTS WITH U.S.

REF: A. DOHA 416

B. DOHA 417

C. DOHA 432

Classified By: Amb Joseph LeBaron for reason 1.4 (b) and (d).

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(C) KEY POINTS
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-- Qatar has been one of the most highly public supporters of
President Ahmadinejad in the aftermath of the Iranian
election. The Amir, the Crown Prince, and the Prime Minister
all have congratulated Ahmadinejad and endorsed Iran's
"democracy."

-- The official visit by Ali Larijani, Iran's Speaker of
Parliament, to Qatar July 5th is just the latest sign of
Qatar's willingness to publicly support the Iranian regime.

-- Also, Major General Al Attiyeh, Qatar's defense chief of
staff, is now on a 4-day trip to Iran to hold discussions
with Iranian foreign affairs and defense ministers.
Embassy's high-level Ministry of Defense contacts say the
Chief of Staff was simply maintaining open communications and
a working relationship with Iranian military and civilian
leadership. Qatar's Chief of Staff also reportedly requested
that Iran's military and naval vessels remain clear of Qatari
oil and gas fields, a continuing issue for Qatar.

-- Interestingly, Al Jazeera apparently has become a
contested issue in the Qatar-Iran relationship. That is
surprising, since Al Jazeera provided only minimal coverage
of post-election events in Iran, at least compared to its
coverage of other recent regional conflicts, such as Gaza.

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(C) COMMENTS
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-- Qatar's public support for the Iranian regime adds an
important caveat to the recent public and private efforts by
Qatar's leaders to enhance strategic relations with the
United States (see refs B-C).

-- But Qatar's highly public rhetorical support for Iran
should also be seen as an expression of Qatar's strong desire
for a stable strategic environment and for a working
relationship with Iran that ensures Qatar's continued freedom
to exploit the two countries' shared gas field, the largest
non-associated gas field in the world.

-- Qatar's leaders do not see their active public support for
Iran as contradicting their self-described "strategic
alignment" with the United States. Rather, they see their
public expressions of support for Iran as a necessary hedge
to protect Qatar's vital economic interests.

-- A full Embassy analysis of Qatar's balancing act with Iran
is at the end of this cable (paras 8-14).

End Key Points and Comments.


1. (U) On June 14, just two days after the Iranian election,
Qatar's Amir Hamad Bin Khalifa Al Thani became one of the
first world leaders to publicly congratulate Iranian
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on his re-election, despite the
uncertainty and accusations of massive fraud. He later
followed up with a phone call.

-- The Crown Prince, Tamim Bin Hamad Al Thani, and the Prime
Minister also sent congratulatory cables to Ahmadinejad.


2. (U) Despite active opposition inside and outside Iran to
the conduct of the Iranian elections, Qatar's Amir kept up
his support for the legitimacy of the Iranian election. He
even praised the quality of governance in Iran.

-- On June 22, while on a state visit to France, the Amir
re-iterated his acceptance of the election results. He also
expressed his hope that stability would soon return to Iran,
which he described as not only an important country for
Qatar, but for the Gulf and the West.

-- At a press conference in Paris, the Amir spoke highly of
Iran's government, labeling it a "practicing democracy."

-- The Amir also reportedly pressed the issue of stability in
Iran with French President Nicholas Sarkozy, one of the
most forceful critics of the election.


3. (SBU) On July 5, Iranian parliamentary speaker and former

nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani paid an official
two-day visit to Qatar. He met with the Amir as part of a
visit to discuss bilateral and regional issues, with an
emphasis on economic cooperation between the two countries,
according to press reports.

-- According to a local Qatari press account, Larijani had
planned well before the elections to visit Qatar shortly
after the poll took place, but post-election unrest delayed
his visit.


4. (SBU) Larijani and the Amir were quoted in press releases
from their meeting warmly praising the other country's
foreign policies.

-- Larijani extolled Qatar's regional diplomacy, calling it
"active and effective." He proceeded to praise the
"brotherly country" of Qatar for the positions it has taken
on controversial issues, including the Israeli-Palestinian
issue and Lebanon.

-- The Amir reciprocated Larijani's warm words on the
Palestinian issue. He declared that resolving the
Palestinian issue is the biggest problem in the Middle East,
implicitly rebutting Israeli and Western assertions that Iran
presents the greatest danger to the region.


5. (SBU) Both men addressed Iran's contested elections, with
Larijani toeing the Supreme Leader's line and the Amir
re-stating his earlier endorsement of the election results.

-- Larijani said that the elections were "sheer proof of
democracy in Iran." He underlined the reported 85 percent
voter turnout, proudly proclaiming that such levels of
participation are not reached in the West.

-- The Amir summed up Qatar's attitude towards relations with
Iran by saying Qatar has no problem with Iran and "we
shall not allow anyone to create problems between us."


6. (C) Al Jazeera, the satellite television network heavily
funded by the GOQ, was almost certainly discussed during the
meeting between the Amir and Larijani, since the meeting was
also attended by Al Jazeera Chairman Hamad Bin Thamer Al
Thani.

-- (SBU) Al Jazeera's coverage of the Iranian election and
its aftermath has been scanty by comparison to other hot
topics in the region, such as Gaza.

-- (C) In an office call with the Ambassador on June 22 (see
Ref A),Al Jazeera's Director General Wadah Khanfar
attributed his network's sparse coverage of the election to a
difficult operating environment for journalists in Iran.

-- (C) While conceding that Iran had few objections to Al
Jazeera's election reporting, Khanfar asserted that Iran
"hates" the network for its coverage of Iraq. According to
him, Iran believes that AJ's reporting advances a pro-Sunni
agenda in Iraq.


7. (SBU) Meanwhile, on July 7, Qatar's Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces, Major-General Hamad Bin Ali Al Attiyeh
arrived in Tehran to begin the first stage of defense
discussions with the Iranian Defense and Armed Forces
Logistics Minister, General Mostafa Mohammad-Najjar.

-- The Chief of Staff subsequently met Iranian Foreign
Minister Manuchehr Mottaki, who said that military relations
between the two countries have a "special place" in the
relationship.

-- (C) High level Qatari Ministry of Defense officials
reported that the Chief of Staff was maintaining open
communications and a working relationship with Iranian
military and civilian leadership. Qatar's Chief of Staff
also reportedly requested that Iran's military and naval
vessels remain clear of Qatari oil and gas fields.

-- (C) The Chief of Staff mentioned to Ambassador in April
that he would probably be visiting Iran later in the year,
but he stressed that the USG should not read too much into
the visit. The visit would not be a signal that Qatar's
military policies towards Iran were changing.

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Analysis: Qatar's Iran Moves and its Signals to the USG
-------------- --------------


8. (C) The Amir's rapid recognition of the election results
reflects Qatar's need for a stable strategic environment and
his eagerness to stay in the good graces of the Iranian

establishment. Qatar's leadership most likely calculated
that a quick resolution to the election would result in a
more stable Iran, which the Amir has said is good for the
region as a whole.


9. (C) It is more difficult to parse the Larijani visit.
While Larijani was an early critic of the Guardian Council's
favoritism toward Ahmadinejad, he was a supporter of the
regime as the protests gathered steam.

-- (C) The Speaker's visit to Qatar may reflect just the
fulfillment of a previous commitment. In remarks made during
the visit, Larijani made a point of saying that his trip had
been scheduled to take place earlier, but had been delayed
due to the post-election turmoil.


10. (C) Whatever the time-line for the trip's planning, it is
noteworthy that the visit occurred while Qatar is making
a serious effort to upgrade its political relationship with
the United States.

-- (C) In an interview with Al Jazeera (ref C) and in private
discussions with the Ambassador, Prime Minister Hamad Bin
Jassim Al Thani stressed that his country has a "strategic
relationship" with the U.S. He also proposed a "strategic
dialogue" to Acting A/S Feltman during his recent trip to
Qatar, emphasizing that "we are working toward one end" (ref
B).


11. (C) The dichotomy between Qatar's public support for Iran
and its stated intent to be strategically aligned with
the United States is not in Qatar's eyes a contradiction, but
a necessary balancing act.


12. (C) As Assistant Foreign Minister Bou'aynayn told
Ambassador July 8th, Qatar's policy toward Iran has not
changed. Qatar's policies towards Iran are "the same before
the (Iranian) election as they are after the election," he
said. Qatar remains close to the United States on "the
nuclear file" and other regional issues.


13. (C) While emphasizing that the elections are an internal
Iranian affair, Al-Bou'aynayn said Qatar has a common border
and vital interests that are impacted by Iran. That
geopolitical fact requires Qatar to maintain proper ties with
its neighbor. The Assistant Minister underscored that Qatar
has no problem having a dialogue with the United States that
includes the issue of Iran.


14. (C) Nevertheless, even as Qatar may privately share many
of the same views and concerns on Iran as the United
States, the USG can anticipate that Qatar will be careful not
to antagonize the Iranian regime. The pattern of
Qatar's public support for the post-election regime is a
strong indication of that fundamental policy.

-- (C) Qatar's relationship wit its much larger neighbor
must be seen through te prism of its long-term, strategic
economic intrests. Qatar shares the world's largest
non-assoiated gas field with Iran -- the North Field andSouth Pars gas
field. Qatar's security and prospeity depend
primarily on continued access to thatfield. That access, in
turn, depeds significantly on Doha maintaining a positive
relationship with Tehran.

LeBaron