EMBASSY DOHA'S ANALYSIS OF QATARI PRIME MINISTER'S

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 DOHA 000429

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL KPAO QA EG IS SA IR SU
SUBJECT: EMBASSY DOHA'S ANALYSIS OF QATARI PRIME MINISTER'S
AL JAZEERA INTERVIEW

REF: A. DOHA 421

B. DOHA 362

C. DOHA 225

D. DOHA 96

E. DOHA 422

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(C) KEY ANALYTIC POINTS AND COMMENTS
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-- In a rare, 50-minute interview on June 24 on Al Jazeera's
Arabic news service, Qatar's Prime Minister, Hamad Bin Jassim
Al Thani, repeatedly described the United States as a
"friend." He called U.S.-Qatari relations "strategic."

-- For a small state normally cautious about aligning too
closely with any other country, such a public statement
designed to reach throughout the Arab world is bold. It is
another indication of Qatar's strong interest in upgrading
the bilateral political relationship with the United States.

-- That said, the Prime Minister's repeated emphasis in the
interview on Qatar's right to its own opinion is not only a
reaffirmation of Qatar's foreign policy approach to the
region. It is also a signal that Qatar intends to maintain
and pursue state and non-state relationships that others such
as the United States oppose, such as with Hamas, Hizballah,
and Iran.

-- Qatar's mediation efforts throughout the Middle East and
North Africa featured prominently in the Prime Minister's
remarks. These efforts reflect a small and vulnerable
country's acute dependence on regional stability as much as
they do an ideological stance or religious impulse.

-- But the Prime Minister spent the most time on Egypt. He
strongly criticized (unnamed) elements in the Egyptian
government. But, significantly, he did not criticize its
President. He set ambiguous terms for re-opening the Israeli
trade office.

-- Despite GOQ protestations to the contrary, Al Jazeera
remains one of Qatar's most valuable political and diplomatic
tools.

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COMMENT
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-- Prime Minister Al Thani's outreach to the United States is
a response to President Obama's energetic efforts to repair
the U.S. relationship with the Arab and Muslim worlds. The
U.S. Administration's newfound credibility in the Middle
East, bolstered by a tough stand with the Israelis over
settlements, has made the U.S. a more attractive partner for
Qatar and other Arab countries.

-- Beyond the President's historic speech in Cairo, other
reasons exist for the Prime Minister's remarks about the
United States in the interview. These include Acting NEA
Assistant Secretary Feltman's recent successful visit to
Qatar and the also recent and successful visits to Washington
by Qatar's head of state security and Attorney General. U.S.
Special Envoy for Sudan Scott Gration's close working
relationship with the GOQ on Qatar's initiative on Darfur has
likewise contributed. As also did the reclassification of
Qatar to the Tier 2 Watch List for Trafficking in Persons.

End Key Points and Comment.



1. (U) Further to Ref A, Embassy Doha offers the following
analysis and reporting on the Prime Minister's rare and
important interview on Al Jazeera about Qatar's foreign
policy in the region. The subjects covered in the interview,
if not the questions themselves, almost certainly were worked
out in advance. Thus the interview should be interpreted as
a carefully-considered move by Qatar to explain to the Arab
world and key members of the international community Qatar's
regional political and diplomatic policies.

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U.S.-QATAR RELATIONS
--------------


2. (C) Qatari Prime Minister (and Foreign Minister) Hamad Bin
Jassim Al Thani's June 24 interview on Al Jazeera Arabic
television network broached many of the country's most
controversial and active regional foreign policies. The
interview took place on "Bila Hodood" (Without Borders),one
of Al Jazeera's flagship programs, which covers political and
social issues in the confrontational style of its Egyptian

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host, Ahmed Mansour.


3. (C) The Prime Minister discussed Qatar's "strategic"
relationship with the U.S. with surprising candor and
explicitness, although his comments about the U.S. - Qatari
bilateral relationship occupied a relatively small part of
the program, and they occurred towards the middle of the
interview. Repeatedly referring to the U.S. as a "friend" of
Qatar, he expressed satisfaction with President Obama's
concerted effort to reach out to the Muslim world.


4. (C) Pointing to the U.S. administration's campaign to halt
Israeli settlement construction and resume Middle East peace
negotiations, the PM remarked that he has "great hope" in the
new administration. Notably, he asserted that Qatar will
help the United States to the greatest extent possible if it
is serious about resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. The
Prime Minister also expressed satisfaction that the political
dialogue and climate between his country and the United
States have recently improved.


5. (C) These remarks by the Prime Minister about the United
States represent fulsome praise for Qatar, a country that
historically has publicly downplayed its relations with the
United States and the American presence in Qatar. While it
hosts Al Udaid Air Base, one of the largest and most
important military facilities in the Middle East, Qatar's
desire to avoid the appearance of being a western outpost has
led the GOQ to minimize the visibility of its security
dependence on the U.S. In this context, the Prime Minister's
frank admission of a "strategic" relationship with the United
States is significant.


6. (C) After several years of strained relations, the Prime
Minister's comments are encouraging public sign that Qatar is
eager to mend political fences with the United States --
although not without an important caveat (see para. 7,
immediately below.) An upgraded political relationship with
Qatar could manifest itself in increased cooperation on
several fronts, from counter-terrorism and Middle East peace
to Iraq and Afghanistan, as highlighted in Ref B.

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Relations with Extremists
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7. (C) However, the Prime Minister remarked several times in
the interview that Qatar remains entitled to its own opinion
on regional and international issues, saying "(we) have our
own viewpoints, which no one can confiscate (read: dictate)."
The Prime Minister was adamant: Qatar has the right to speak
out and the right to pursue an independent policy line. The
subtext of this is that Qatar, despite its stated strategic
alliance with the United States, despite its membership in
the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Arab League, will not
abandon its independence of thought and action. To Embassy
Doha, the Prime Minister was signaling here Qatar's -- the
Amir's -- firm intention to maintain its engagement with, and
active support for, non-state actors such as Hamas and
Hizbollah regardless of international pressure.


8. (C) That said, there was a complete absence of any
explicit mention of Hamas, Syria, or Hizbollah Avoiding
these fault lines is consistent with the apparent intention
of the Prime Minister to reach out to the United States in
the interview, and to telegraph that intent quite publicly to
the Arab world and others. Because Qatar is unlikely to
abandon ties with these parties, mentioning these
relationships in the interview would only emphasize obstacles
in the way of improved U.S.-Qatari relations. Hamad bin
Jassim probably deliberately chose instead to speak in very
general terms about regional peace and stability.


9. (C) In a similar vein, Prime Minister Al Thani's brief
mention of Iran was characteristically muted and probably
calculated to avoid any appearance of Qatari bias vis--vis
the current protests.

-- (U) The Premier reiterated the Amir's position, stated
publicly on a state visit to Paris on June 23, that Iran's
stability is important for the Gulf region and expressed
confidence that Iran will "bypass" the crisis.

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QATAR'S MEDIATION PHILOSOPHY
--------------


10. (C) Taken as a whole, the Prime Minister's comments
reaffirm Qatar that has strategically chosen to present
itself as a valuable regional mediator, a role in which small
size is not necessarily a disadvantage. Such a role is also
in Qatar's acute self-interest. Tiny Qatar is acutely

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vulnerable to disruptions in the region; instability and
chaos greatly increase the possibility that its sovereignty
could be violated or its economic security undermined by its
two neighbors with hegemonic aspirations, Iran and Saudi
Arabia.


11. (C) The major exception to this regional approach is
Qatar's policies towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
During the Gaza war, Qatar acted in a way that inflamed,
rather than tempered, regional tensions. Recognizing the
damage that this approach caused at the start of the Obama
Administration, and in Qatar's relations with other Arab
states, Qatar's leaders set out to rehabilitate their
moderate image during the Arab League summit in Doha in March
2009 (Ref C).


12. (C) The Prime Minister's interview continued this effort.
The Prime Minister framed Qatar's Gaza involvement in terms
of Palestinian suffering. He chose not to justify Qatar's
actions in Gaza as promoting regional stability, a
justification he used when discussing other regional
disputes.

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DIPLOMATIC FREEZE WITH ISRAEL
--------------


13. (C) On Israel, the Prime Minister said Qatar would
re-open the Israeli trade office once the conditions that led
to this action were undone and Israel made efforts to improve
the plight of the Palestinians. (The office has been closed
since January, in the aftermath of the Gaza War.) With such
an ambiguous threshold for upgrading relations, Qatar appears
in no rush to restore ties with Israel, although contacts
between the two continue.

-- (U) The Prime Minister denied that Qatar sought to play on
the emotions of the Arab world when it closed the Israeli
trade office. Exasperated, he remarked that Qatar's Arab
brothers wanted the office closed when it was open, but they
want it open now that it is closed. He did not elaborate.

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RELATIONS WITH EGYPT
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14. (C) Knowing the clamor Qatar has caused in the region,
the Prime Minister addressed head-on Qatar's diplomatic
tensions with Egypt, which began with differences over
Israel's actions in Gaza earlier this year and quickly
degenerated into a media war between the two sides.

-- (U) Egyptian charges have recently included accusations
that Qatar helped plan Hamas' takeover of Gaza in the summer
of 2007 and Qatari complicity in Hizbollah's alleged plot to
stage attacks in Egypt.

-- (U) Qatari efforts to mediate conflicts in Sudan have come
under attack by the Egyptians, who argue that Qatar is
interfering in Egypt's sphere of influence.

-- (U) Responding to Egyptian allegations of interference,
the Prime Minister denied in the interview that Qatar worked
(unsuccessfully) with the French to buy the release of
Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit from his captors. He asserted
that Qatar was just responding to a request for assistance
from a friendly, non-Arab state. He maintained that Qatar
entered the negotiations only on the condition that the terms
of Egypt's mediation were upheld.


15. (C) The Prime Minister suggested that Egyptian
accusations were attempts by unspecified elements in Egypt to
distract the public from that government's domestic failures.
Dismissing Egyptian accusations as "ridiculous," he made no
visible attempt to reconcile with the Egyptians, beyond an
obligatory commitment to Arab Unity. The Prime Minister
continued with the practice of blaming unspecified elements
within the Egyptian regime for the rift, while expressing
admiration for Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak -- no doubt
to show an Arab leader respect and avoid the appearance of a
personality-driven feud. Contrary to all evidence, Hamad bin
Jassim denied that Qatar had tried to host a Gaza
reconstruction conference in Doha after the Gaza war began to
compete with one being held in Egypt (see Ref D). Knowing
that Egypt's role in advancing peace is important to the
United States, the Prime Minister was likely also addressing
his comments to an audience broader than officials in Cairo.


16. (U) Demonstrating Qatar's indifference to current
tensions, the Premier said the dispute would be resolved, but
he did not know whether it would take one day or ten years.


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-- (U) The Prime Minister said that he had a meeting with
Umar Sulayman, head of Egypt's General Intelligence
Directorate, which was mediated by Saudi Foreign Minister
Saud Al Faysal. While they "spoke on everything," they did
not agree on everything, he said.

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RECONCILIATION WITH SAUDI ARABIA
--------------


17. (C) The lengths to which Prime Minister Al Thani praised
Saudi Arabia in the interview merit further attention. They
reflect Qatar's calculation that it took tensions with other
Arab countries too far during the Gaza war, endangering its
strategy of maximizing its influence by preserving good
relations with all countries. At a time when Qatar does not
appear eager (and possibly able) to reconcile with Egypt,
Qatar probably believes it cannot afford to alienate the
other Arab powerhouse.

-- (C) The Prime Minister recognized that Saudi Arabia had
played a role in getting some Arab states to skip Qatar's
emergency summit on the Gaza war. But he argued forcefully
that differences with Saudi Arabia were confined to discrete
points of view, a reference, we think, to Iran, Hamas, and
the appropriate role of Al Jazeera in the region.

-- (U) The Prime Minister pointed to the two country's
resolution of the Khor Al Udaid maritime border dispute as
evidence of improving ties. He also used conspicuously warm
words to describe Saudi Arabia's contributions, calling Saudi
Arabia an important country and "the backbone of the GCC."

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THE DOHA AGREEMENT ON LEBANON
--------------


18. (C) In a positive sign for U.S. interests in Lebanon, the
Prime Minister indicated that Qatar would not insist that the
2007 Doha Agreement remain operative, echoing comments he
made in private to A/S Feltman (see Ref E).

-- (U) Commenting on Lebanese Prime-Minister designate Saad
Hariri's statement that the Doha Agreement is at an end with
the completion of the recent elections in Lebanon, the Prime
Minister remarked that the agreement was just for a "certain
phase."

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YEMEN
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19. (C) The Prime Minister, when discussing Qatar's role in
trying to mediate the Al-Huthi rebellion in Yemen, dismissed
Yemeni government accusations that Qatar funded the
rebellion. The Prime Minister maintained that his country
was a "fair broker" that helped forge an agreement that was
not honored for no fault of its own. In response to calls
from some in Yemen and the region for Qatar to reprise its
mediation role, the Prime Minister indicated Qatar's
reluctance by noting that he would advise the Amir not to
continue Qatar's involvement in Yemen. The Prime Minister
likely also calculated that bringing the issue into the open
would increase pressure on the Yemeni Government to return to
Qatar-led mediation.

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AL JAZEERA'S ROLE IN QATARI FOREIGN POLICY
--------------


20. (U) The Prime Minister broached the subject of Al Jazeera
and the "headaches" its has caused for the Government of
Qatar, from tensions with Saudi Arabia to contributing to the
current rift with Egypt.

-- (U) Asked about Al Jazeera, he joked that Qatar should
sell it, indicating Qatar was offered $5 billion for it at
one time. He added that the money might be worth more than
the headaches Al Jazeera has caused for the regime.


21. (C) Such statements must not be taken at face value as Al
Jazeera, the most watched satellite television station in the
Middle East, is heavily subsidized by the Qatari government
and has proved itself a useful tool for the station's
political masters. The station's coverage of events in the
Middle East is relatively free and open, though it refrains
from criticizing Qatar and its government. Al Jazeera's
ability to influence public opinion throughout the region is
a substantial source of leverage for Qatar, one which it is
unlikely to relinquish. Moreover, the network can also be
used as a chip to improve relations. For example, Al
Jazeera's more favorable coverage of Saudi Arabia's royal

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family has facilitated Qatari-Saudi reconciliation over the
past year.



LeBaron