SCENESETTER FOR A A/S JEFF FELTMAN'S JUNE 16-18

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DOHA 000393 SIPDIS EMBASSY MANAMA PLEASE PASS TO A A/S FELTMAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/14/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV QA SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR A A/S JEFF FELTMAN'S JUNE 16-18 VISIT TO QATAR REF: DOHA 362 Classified By: Ambassador Joseph E. LeBaron, for reasons 1.4. (b, d). ¶1. (C) Embassy Doha welcomes your visit to Qatar. We have confirmed a meeting for you with the MFA Minister of State, Ahmed bin Muhammad Al Mahmoud, and he will host a lunch in your honor. Also, the MFA informed us today that the Prime Minister is returning from the United States (where he has been undergoing medical treatment) to meet with you. He will want to hear all you can tell him about the proposal for a bilateral strategic dialogue. He will want to know your thoughts about a meeting between the Amir and POTUS at the UNGA. It is possible that you will meet the Crown Prince, but that is still far from certain as we write this. ¶2. (C) We have also scheduled a coffee with influential Qataris at the Ambassador's residence, followed by a dinner that evening, also at the Residence, with thoughtful, articulate, members of the expatriate community. ¶3. (C) Our scenesetter below addresses the main subject areas of what we understand to be he main focus of your visit: the proposal for a .S.-Qatar Strategic Dialogue (including "jump-strting" the U.S.-Qatari relationship based on your recent discussion with former Senator Mitchell) a coordinated approach to development Assistanc; Lebanon and Syria; the Iranian elections; and l Jazeera. -------------- (S) STRATEGIC DIALOGUE -------------- ¶4. (S) We understand the sub-IPC of June 11 looks to you to accentuate the positive aspects of the bilateral relationship (notably military, education, and commercial) while demonstrating a commitment to dialogue to narrow the differences. Your visit here would then help establish benchmarks to guide the level at which a dialogue takes place. ¶5. (S) Senior GOQ officials will look to you for a USG response to the Prime Minister's suggestions (reftel). Should you meet with the PM (who is currently in the U.S. for medical treatment),he is the ideal interlocutor for this discussion. Dennis Ross clearly told the PM in May that Qatar would be judged by its actions. HBJ expected as much, but he may not be prepared to hear that the commencement of a high-level dialogue is contingent upon Qatar's changing its behavior (support for Hamas, Hezbollah, PA budgetary �A;support),since he believes Qatar's hosting of the U.S. military presence speaks volumes for how Qatar lines up with the U.S. versus Iran. ¶6. (S) Setting preconditions for a strategic dialogue (e.g., identifying ways that Doha can "demonstrate its sincerity"), would echo what Qatar believes to have been a rude and dismissive treatment by the OVP six years ago in response to an overture by the Amir to repair the relationship. Six years later, in the view of the Amir -- and ours -- that relationship is still strained. If word of the precondition gets back to the Amir, further deterioration in the relationship is possible, especially in diminished counter-terrorism cooperation, stepped-up negative Al Jazeera coverage and comment, and a resurgence in operational tensions in the mil-mil relationship. -------------- (C) DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE -------------- ¶7. (C) The GOQ has indicated its willingness to partner with the U.S. on specific developmental projects. Qatar does not, however, respond well to global appeals for assistance (unless tied to relief for the victims of a natural disaster). The Qataris look to us to propose specific projects on a bilateral, partnership basis to which they could contribute. It is important to note that Qatar rarely writes checks for assistance. In the case of Hurricane Katrina, for example, Qatar's Embassy sent personnel to the devastated area and determined that a partnership with Habitat for Humanity was the best way to keep down administrative costs and ensure that as much of Qatar's assistance as possible reached the victims. ¶8. (C) This explains, in part, why Qatar resists the idea of providing budgetary support directly to the Palestinian Authority. The Amir does not believe the money will reach its intended beneficiaries, despite the good intentions of DOHA 00000393 002 OF 003 Mahmoud Abbas and Salim Fayyad. When Speaker Pelosi made a pitch to the Amir over dinner for such assistance in May, he said no such assistance was in the offing. There are, no doubt, political reasons for this approach, since Qatar's significant, continuing assistance to Hamas has been widely reported in classified traffic available to you. ¶9. (C) Special Representative Holbrooke earlier this month told the Crown Prince he did not come to Doha to say "Where is the check?" Rather, he came to establish a dialogue of mutual respect where we have a strategic symmetry. Policies and coordination will logically proceed, he explained, in accordance with the views of Qatar and other partner countries. ¶10. (C) Holbrooke told Tamim the important thing is that for the first time the United States is having an extended, serious strategic dialogue with Gulf countries and not embarking on a fundraising mission. (Holbrooke essentially repeated these comments to the press, albeit with respect to the Gulf countries writ large, in a June 10 briefing.) -------------- (C) LEBANON AND SYRIA -------------- ¶11. (C) Qatar considers its June 2008 mediation of the Lebanese presidential election impasse an unmitigated success. This success, in the Qatari view, would not have been possible had the Amir not been able to pick up the phone and jaw bone "bad actors" such as Syria and Iran. Indeed, it was Qatar's success on Lebanon that led it to embark on its current, more ambitious endeavor to mediate the disputes in Darfur. ¶12. (C) Because Qatar increasingly views itself as a mediator (parties from the Philippines to Mauritania have approached Qatar for its mediation services),it shies away from public pronouncements on disputes that it potentially might mediate. With respect to Lebanon, it is unlikely that the Qataris will pick sides (certainly not publicly) given that Qatar might be asked to mediate again on Lebanese issues in the event that such mediation is warranted. ¶13. (C) Thinking back to Qatar's self-described success in Lebanon, the Qatari leadership drew the lesson that engaging with a wide array of actors (Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran) can pay rich dividends. In general, the Amir holds the view that Qatar should engage with everyone. He does not subscribe to the notion that isolating parties changes behavior. On the contrary, he believes that only through engagement can you influence friends and enemies alike. ¶14. (C) When it comes to Syria, the GOQ believes that the road to peace in the Middle East in part goes through Damascus. For this reason, it is vital to engage the Syrians, in Qatar's view. Our lack of engagement with Damascus, in the Qatari view, contributed to Syria's increased alignment with Iran. They welcome our increased engagement with Syria. Bringing Syria back to the Arab fold is desirable, in the Qatari view, and this goal will not be realized absent dialogue and engagement. -------------- (C) IRAN -------------- ¶15. (C) The Amir and Crown Prince both communicated, immediately, their congratulations to the Iranian President on his re-election. Your meetings will be the first opportunity to engage GOQ officials on the freeness and fairness of those elections. Regardless of how senior Qatari officials view the legitimacy of the election outcome, in this area and so many others, Qatar will almost certainly publicly criticize Iran. Too much is at stake: literally trillions of dollars in future revenues for Qatar from its shared natural gas field under the Gulf. ¶16. (C) Some in Washington hold the view that Qatar supports Hezbollah and Hamas at the behest of Iran. Others, concerned by Qatari contributions to terrorist groups, question whether Qatar aligns itself with our strategic orientation on extremism. Senior Qatari officials bristle at the notion that Qatar has the same aims and objectives as Iran. Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Al-Mahmoud, for example, told Ambassador in one conversation that Qatari officials quietly try to persuade the Iranians that supporting the education and development of the Iranian DOHA 00000393 003 OF 003 people (in the context of what the Amir has done in Qatar) is the best way to secure Iran's future. Al-Mahmoud and others will vehemently deny that Qatar is an agent of Iran, and they point to the U.S. military presence as evidence of where their true allegiance lies, while admitting that Qatar must retain a "practical relationship" with Iran to secure the natural gas on which Qatar stakes its survival. -------------- (S) AL JAZEERA -------------- ¶17. (S) The Prime Minister has told the Ambassador that he is willing to instruct Shaykh Hamad bin Thamer Al Thani (who oversees Al Jazeera) to engage with U.S. officials in an "intelligent way" on Al Jazeera's coverage. However, the Prime Minister made clear that progress in improving the overall political relationship in a bilateral strategic dialogue must come first, given the sensitivity of Al Jazeera and its importance to Qatar. There are ample precedents for a bilateral dialogue on Al Jazeera as part of improving bilateral relations. Tunisia, Saudi Arabia and most recently Jordan have all benefited from such a dialogue in recent months. LeBaron