SCENESETTER FOR SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE HOLBROOKE'S

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DOHA 000376 SIPDIS FOR SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE HOLBROOKE FROM AMBASSADOR LEBARON E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2019 TAGS: PREL EAID QA AF PK SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE HOLBROOKE'S JUNE 6-7 VISIT TO QATAR Classified By: Amb. Joseph LeBaron for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Embassy Doha welcomes your visit to Qatar. We have requested host-country meetings for you with the Amir, Hamad Bin Khalifa Al Thani, and the Prime Minister (also Foreign Minister),Hamad Bin Jassim Al Thani. ¶2. (C) We know that your focus is Afghanistan-Pakistan issues. Accordingly, we start with our thoughts on making Qatar a partner in Afghanistan-Pakistan issues. After that, we present a general assessment of the U.S.-Qatar relationship. -------------- -------------- AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN ISSUES AND MAKING QATAR A PARTNER -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) The Amir worries that Afghanistan is an uncontrollable area which will bog down the U.S. and others seeking to establish order. Your visit would be the first opportunity for him to hear personally on the new U.S. strategy, and to seek his advice as we move forward. ¶4. (C) The best way to elicit a positive response from the Amir for what the U.S. seeks is to explore his willingness to partner with us to achieve specific goals and objectives. It is important that we not simply ask him for money (as the USG has unsuccessfully done multiple times over the 12 months alone, from Afghanistan to Iraq to Kosovo). Obtaining Qatar's support and money to address the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan will require making Qatar a stakeholder. ¶5. (C) DEFINING A ROLE: We think that giving the Qataris a defined role to play is the best way to bring them on board. Qatar is a small state with global ambitions, and it wants to be seen as a player in regional politics and diplomacy. When we asked Qatar to help us -- for example in interceding with the Libyans to put Lockerbie behind us at the end of the previous Administration -- the Qataris worked our requests very quietly and effectively. ¶6. (S) We assess that a Qatari military contribution to Afghanistan is a non-starter. Senior military officials have told us recently their forces lack the equipment or expertise to deploy outside of Qatar. The Crown Prince ruled it out immediately, when SOCOM's commander raised it with him. ¶7. (C) Therefore, the best possible contributions Qatar could make would be through political channels (quiet diplomacy) or through humanitarian assistance partnerships. ¶8. (C) GETTING THE MONEY: Qatar usually does not respond to our numerous appeals for financial assistance because they don't come from senior USG officials as part and parcel of a bilateral strategic partnership. The Amir did not lead Qatar to where it is today without defining targets and creating stakeholders. He is eager to have the President and senior U.S. officials reach out to him and chart a course together based on cooperation, commitment and trust. ¶9. (C) Moreover, Qatar is frugal with disbursement of its financial resources. When Qatar assisted the victims of Hurricane Katrina through a $100 million contribution, it partnered with Habitat for Humanity and other partners on the ground, endeavoring to make sure that every penny spent went to the victims and not administrative overhead. This is generally how Qatar approaches all foreign aid, and it is not unlike how most Americans make decisions regarding charitable giving. When it comes to financial support for Pakistan, expect Qatar to want specific partnerships on the ground and not simply write a check to another government or organization. ¶10. (C) MFA officials have signaled to us in recent months their intention to give economic aid to Pakistan, though they also want the requests to come from, and first be coordinated with, Islamabad. In this regard, we understand from press reports that Pakistani Foreign Minister Qureshi met with Qatar's Ambassador to Pakistan and other GCC Ambassadors on June 2 to brief them on the ongoing Swat operation and pass a letter from the President of Pakistan asking for their support. ¶11. (SBU) REACH OUT TO ASIA: Most of the current and past Qatari aid to Afghanistan/Pakistan has been through Reach Out to Asia (ROTA),a NGO/charity founded by the Heir Apparent DOHA 00000376 002 OF 004 Shaykh Tamim and currently chaired by Shaykha Mayassa, one of the Amir's daughters. ROTA is also clearly influenced by and within the orbit of Qatar Foundation, a sprawling educational/social organization, with a multi-billion dollar endowment, controlled by the Amir's Consort Shaykha Mozah. ROTA was born in 2005 out of the Qatar Foundation's humanitarian response to the earthquake in Pakistan. It has since evolved into an agency responsible for educational development projects across South Asia and the Middle East, with particular focus on post-conflict environments. (We have proposed a meeting with ROTA officers to your staff). ¶12. (SBU) Despite the potentially large resources at their disposal, ROTA is very careful in disbursing money and Shaykha Mozah and Mayassa look for partnerships with established organizations which approach development "differently from the way the West has done it for the past five decades." One notable project for U.S. interests is that ROTA is currently working in Northern Iraq with Mercy Corps on improving the educational infrastructure and related activities. ¶13. (SBU) In Afghanistan, ROTA currently works with the Turquoise Mountain Foundation to provide literacy, primary education, and community development programs in Kabul's old city for women and children. On a national level, ROTA also plans to assist Afghanistan's Ministry of Education in achieving its five-year national education strategy. The organization is also looking for other opportunities in Afghanistan to serve the educational and economic needs of returnees. ¶14. (SBU) In Pakistan, ROTA partnered with the Qatari Red Crescent and Tider Pool (an Islamabad-based construction company) to build 10 permanent and 7 pre-fabricated schools in District Bagh following the 2005 earthquake. ROTA is currently conducting a needs assessment to determine the next step in rehabilitation of the schools in northern Pakistan. Its stated mission is to develop further activities for ROTA-reconstructed schools, such as teacher training programs and establishment of a vocational training center. ¶15. (SBU) AF-PAK EXPATRIATE COMMUNITIES IN QATAR. Finally, it should not be forgotten that sizable Afghani and Pakistani expatriate communities reside in Qatar. As of May 2009, there are about 83,000 Pakistanis living and working here, with probably a smaller number of Afghans. The Embassy of Pakistan has sought to galvanize aid from its community to help the IDPs from the fighting in Swat valley. (We have also proposed to your staff a meeting for you with the Afghani and Pakistani Ambassadors in Qatar, time permitting). -------------- THE U.S.-QATAR RELATIONSHIP -------------- ¶16. (C) The breadth and depth of Qatar's relationship with the U.S. is impressive, especially for a country the size of Connecticut, with about two million inhabitants, of whom only about 225,000 are actually Qatari citizens. -- Because it is so small and its energy resources so large, Qatar now has an annual per capita income of over $70,000 (one of the highest in the world). Qatar's national revenues will continue growing despite the global economic crisis, although their upward trajectory will be moderated by a drop in commodity prices. -- Wealth has bolstered the country's political ambitions, leading to Qatari foreign policy initiatives that are too often been at odds with U.S. objectives. Examples include Qatar's relations with Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, and Syria. -- Until recently, Qatar was not fully cooperative in intelligence sharing and combating terrorism financing, which also led to tensions with Washington. -- At the political level, the bilateral relationship has been cold, but it is improving. Prime Minister Hamid bin Jassim Al Thani has told us Qatar wants to "close the chapter" of poor political relations with Washington, and, as you know, he recently visited Washington for a series of meetings with senior Administration officials. -- In contrast to the political relationship, the U.S.-Qatar military relationship is solid. Qatar provides the U.S. military exceptional access to two major Qatari military DOHA 00000376 003 OF 004 installations, Al Udaid Air Base and Camp As-Saliyeh -- two of CENTCOM's most important operating installations outside of Iraq. Qatar charges us no rent, and in fact is funding over $700 million in construction projects for the exclusive use of the U.S. military. -- The U.S.-Qatar economic relationship is vital. U.S. energy companies have invested tens of billions of dollars in the oil and gas industry here. Qatar, which holds the third largest natural gas reserves in the world after Russia and Iran, is expected to become in 2010 one of the most important suppliers of imported liquefied natural gas (LNG) to the U.S. market. -- Our educational and cultural relationship with Qatar is strong and growing. Qatar has committed itself like few other Arab states to modernizing its educational system, and has turned decisively to the United States for help. Qatar has imported branch campuses of six U.S. universities, including Texas A&M, Carnegie-Mellon, Weill-Cornell Medical School, Georgetown, Virginia Commonwealth, and Northwestern. At the elementary and secondary levels it is instituting a U.S. model of charter schools. -- Al Jazeera, the television network with an Arabic-speaking audience of some 60 million and a potential English-speaking audience of 100 million, is based in Doha and funded by the State of Qatar. The network's coverage, particularly by its Arabic service on issues important to the United States, has long been an irritant in our bilateral relationship. We nevertheless recognize the value of USG officials appearing on Al Jazeera in order to ensure that official U.S. voices are heard in the Arab world and broader region. Crucially for your purposes, Al Jazeera is a leading source of information and analysis on Afghanistan and Pakistan issues for Arabic and English speaking audiences in the Middle East and South Asia. We have proposed to your staff an interview on Al Jazeera for you if there is time on the ground in Doha. -------------- -------------- THE TREND FOR INCREASED DIPLOMATIC ACTIVISM BY QATAR -------------- -------------- ¶17. (C) LESSONS FROM LEBANON: Qatar, led by the Amir and Prime Minister, successfully mediated the Lebanese conflict a year ago, to much acclaim in many parts of the region. In doing so, the Qatari leadership reaffirmed its belief that Qatar's policy of having open doors across the ideological spectrum in the region was important to promoting stability in the region. The parties to the Lebanese conflict were brought to Doha and lodged in the Sheraton Hotel. Senior Qatari officials, including the Prime Minister and Amir, shuttled back and forth between various hotel rooms in a coordinated effort to narrow the gaps between the parties. The Amir, failing to convince Hezbollah to sign on to the draft agreement that the other parties, in some cases begrudgingly had accepted, called the Presidents of Syria and Iran to ask for their help with Hezbollah's leadership. They did, and we think Qatar's leaders drew three important conclusions: (1) A small state getting along with everyone can accomplish what larger states (Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia in the Lebanese example) cannot; (2) Good relations with bad actors (in this case Syria and Iran) can lead to tangible and beneficial results for the region and the world; and (3) Resolving the Lebanese conflict increased regional stability and paid dividends for Qatar's own security and global standing. ¶18. (C) MEDIATION IN SUDAN: Qatar's success on Lebanon encouraged its leaders and other regional actors to look to Doha as a channel for mediating other regional disputes. For several months now, the Qatari Government has been working in tandem with the AU/UN Joint Mediation Team to seek a solution to the conflict in Darfur. U.S. Special Envoy for Sudan Scott Gration has visited Doha three times, most recently for an E6 (P5 plus EU) Envoys' meeting on Sudan, hosted by Qatar. The Qatari Minister of State for Foreign Affairs (the day-to-day official in charge of the Foreign Ministry, given HBJ's other duties) Ahmed Al-Mahmoud has assumed Sudan duties as almost his full-time job. ¶19. (C) MEDIATION, NOT MILITARY MIGHT: Considering Qatar's DOHA 00000376 004 OF 004 wealth, its growing confidence in mediating disputes, and the prestige that such involvement brings, we expect QatQ will continue to carve out a regional diplomatic role for itself in the coming years. ¶20. (C) Qatar, with a population of fewer than 250,000 citizens, will never be a military power. Having its sights set on regional diplomacy and mediation is quite realistic, however. Also, despite the global economic crisis, Qatar's ample natural gas reserves should provide sufficient money to invest in the global good. Improving stability in a turbulent region where Qatar's military resources are meager makes inherent sense to the leadership. What resources Qatar is putting into its military are aimed at providing airlift capacity for humanitarian interventions. Qatar in the coming months will take possession of two U.S.-supplied C-17 aircraft, and it is possible that Qatar may seek to use those aircraft to bolster tangibly its diplomatic initiatives, such as by supplying humanitarian needs in the region and beyond. Qatar also has plans to stand up a separate development arm within the Foreign Ministry. LeBaron