SYNCHRONIZING USG ENGAGEMENT WITH QATAR ON

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DOHA 000329 NOFORN S/CT FOR SHARRI CLARK AND BRUCE AVERILL NEA/ARP FOR MATTHEW BLONG DOE/NNSA FOR OFFICE OF THE SECOND LINE OF DEFENSE U.S. COAST GUARD FOR ASSISTANT COMMANDANT FOR MARINE SAFETY, SECURITY, AND STEWARDSHIP E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2019 TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV ECON ETTC EAID EFIN EAGR ASEC KCIP, ENRG, QA SUBJECT: SYNCHRONIZING USG ENGAGEMENT WITH QATAR ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION REF: DOHA 214 Classified By: Amb. Joseph LeBaron, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Reftel is Post's review of the critical infrastructure in Qatar, which if destroyed, disrupted or exploited might have an immediate and deleterious effect on the United States. The following report is a description of Embassy Doha's interagency approach to engage GOQ entities in a synchronized fashion on this issue. -------------- The Stakes -------------- ¶2. (C) Qatar shares with Iran the largest non-associated gas field in the world. Qatar's portion contains an estimated 900 trillion cubic feet of recoverable natural gas, the third-largest gas reserves in the world. Qatar is also a modest, though growing, oil producer, with exports now approaching 800,000 barrels per day. U.S. energy companies have tens of billions of dollars invested in Qatar's oil and gas sector, which has helped make Qatar the largest exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG) in the world, providing significant LNG supplies to Japan, Korea, India, and Europe. In 2010, LNG exports to the U.S. will begin to a facility in south Texas, at which point Qatar will likely become the largest supplier of imported LNG to the United States. ¶3. (C) Qatar's increasingly important role as a world producer in the oil and LNG sectors and its concomitant high value as a potential terrorism target suggests a strong USG imperative to work with Qatari authorities to ensure the security of these energy installations. -------------- The Facilities -------------- ¶4. (C) Reftel describes the principal pieces of Qatar's energy infrastructure in greater detail. Briefly, there are three main energy-related industrial facilities in Qatar: -- Ras Laffan Industrial City (RLIC): Ras Laffan is primarily focused on the production of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG),gas-to-liquids (GTL) fuel, and petrochemicals. The scale of each aspect of the production process, including the LNG liquefaction "trains" and the tankers, is among the largest in the world. �00A;-- Dukhan Industrial City: Dukhan industrial city accounts for the majority of Qatar's oil production. Oil is pumped from both on-shore and off-shore wells in the Dukhan area. It is piped across Qatar to the port of Messaied for loading onto tanker ships. -- Messaied Industrial City and port complex: Messaied is the main shipping point for oil from Dukhan to the international market. U.S. and Coalition military equipment, munitions and bulk aviation fuel delivery to U.S. military in Qatar pass through Messaied. Messaied is also the location of most of Qatar's petrochemical facilities, producing fertilizer, fuel additives, lubricants, plastics and vinyl for domestic consumption and export. Construction has begun on what will be the world's largest aluminum production facility. Plans are also underway to construct the world's largest chemical derivatives plant and a major new oil refinery. -------------- Engaging the Qatari Government -------------- ¶5. (C) The magnitude of Qatar's energy infrastructure and its economic and strategic importance to the U.S., suggests that energy infrastructure security should be a priority for the USG. The GOQ, however, has long been reluctant to cooperate fully with the USG on this issue. There are a variety of reasons: the Qataris' proclivity for secrecy on sensitive issues of national security; their relative comfort dealing with private, commercial, security consultants who are bound by contractual relationships; and the lack of managerial capacity within Qatar Petroleum and the GOQ's various security agencies. ¶6. (C) Embassy Doha, however, now assesses that there is greater scope for cooperation with the GOQ on this issue - more than at any time over the past three years. To this end, Post has formed a DCM-led working group comprising Pol/Econ, DAO, GRPO, OMC Qatar, FCS, and RSO to lay the ground work for, and synchronize, engagement with the GOQ on critical infrastructure protection. Consistent with post's broader efforts to synchronize programs and activities across the interagency in Qatar, we call this the "Critical Energy Infrastructure Synchronization Group." CEIP is a subset of Critical Infrastructure Protection. All U.S.-Qatar engagement on this issue will be reviewed by this group, which will have responsibility for vetting USG proposals, ensuring consistency with other USG activities, and making recommendations to the Ambassador on particular initiatives. ¶7. (C) Post has identified the following four objectives for our engagement: -- (C) Increase the security of Qatar's energy installations: An attack on Qatar's energy infrastructure could have an impact on global energy market stability disproportionate to any actual damage to Qatar's oil and gas export capacity, as well as an impact on the risk calculations and investment decisions of energy companies. An attack could also have a substantial financial impact on the operations of major U.S. energy companies in Qatar. And, because Qatar is soon likely to become a supplier of LNG to the U.S., an attack could have a direct impact on U.S. energy security. -- (C) Deepen U.S.-Qatar security cooperation: Substantial cooperation on protection of energy infrastructure creates opportunities for the U.S. and Qatar to deepen our security cooperation, both military and law enforcement. This raises interoperability between U.S. and Qatari forces, increases the ability of Qatari forces to participate in regional exercises, and creates the potential for Qatari contributions to Coalition military activities. -- (S/NF) Gather intelligence: Cooperation on critical infrastructure protection brings with it opportunities to learn more about Qatari intentions and actions or inactions on counterterrorism efforts, relations with and perceptions of Iran, and internal GOQ decision-making. -- (C) Exploit commercial opportunities: An expansion of Qatari efforts to protect their critical infrastructure brings with it commercial opportunities, and we have a strong interest in ensuring that U.S. companies can pursue those opportunities. -------------- A Synchronized Approach -------------- ¶8. (C) Post is pursing a multifaceted effort that leverages the various agencies of the Country Team to engage Qatari officials and energy-related agencies. This will proceed on three tracks: ¶9. (C) Political/economic engagement, including cooperation between civilian USG agencies, including State, DOE, and DHS (Coast Guard). -- Numerous pieces of the USG play a role in developing CIP cooperation overseas. This includes the State-S/CT led CEIP program, Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Megaports initative nuclear detection and monitoring program, U.S. Coast Guard visits under the International Shipping and Port Security (ISPS) program, and Department of State Bureau of Diplomatic Security Anti-terrorism Training Assistance (ATA) program. -- Embassy Doha assesses that the GOQ continues to have a limited capacity to absorb all of the various initiatives or to accommodate the numerous USG officials seeking to visit Qatari energy installations. -- Embassy Doha also assesses that the GOQ will continue to rely upon private security consultants for advice and hardware as the CIP programs expand. Likewise, post believes the GOQ will not agree to cooperate exclusively with the USG on this issue. -- However, we believe the GOQ will be increasingly open to cooperation with the USG on certain aspects of their CIP efforts. For example, an "a la carte" approach to U.S. resources under the CEIP program would further each of the objectives described above. ¶10. (C) Military to military training and assistance with the Qatari Armed Forces and Ministry of Interior. -- The Qatar Armed Forces is actively considering implementation of a layered missile defense, a major objective of which is the protection of their energy infrastructure. There have been discussions of both the possibility of Qatari acquisition of Patriot PAC-3 missiles (as well as other systems),and a Qatari request for CENTCOM to deploy additional Patriot assets specifically to protect installations at Ras Laffan. -- Cooperation and training provided by the U.S. military and State/DS ATA to Ministry of Interior Coasts and Border Security Department and other uniformed security personnel. ¶11. (C) Development of commercial contacts with Qatar Petroleum and the Ministry of Energy. -- Many of the efforts to advise Qatar on infrastructure protection include specification of particular types of equipment and services. While the GOQ will resist efforts to explicitly link this advice to U.S. suppliers, Embassy Doha's Foreign Commercial Service office will nonetheless remain alert to opportunities for U.S. companies. In addition, the Embassy can offer to provide assistance on export controlled items and advocacy to U.S. suppliers. LeBaron