SLA/UNITY PLEDGES COOPERATION TO ACHIEVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DOHA 000282

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PHUM QA SU
SUBJECT: SLA/UNITY PLEDGES COOPERATION TO ACHIEVE
CEASEFIRES WITH GOS AND JEM

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(SBU) KEY POINTS
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-- Special Envoy for Sudan Scott Gration encouraged a
delegation of SLA/Unity members in Doha April 28 to help him
resolve the big isQ in Sudan by starting first with
bringing security and ending human suffering in Darfur.

-- The delegation responded by pledging full cooperation,
noting that two cease-fires are needed: one between the
Government of Sudan and the rebels and another between JEM
and other rebel groups.

-- The delegation said it would take back to its leaders in
Sudan early May dates for a return to Qatar for more
mediation but thought the dates too early.

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(SBU) COMMENTS
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-- SLA/Unity's urgent interest in Doha indicates three
important new trends: (1) JEM is increasingly hostile to any
armed group that does not acquiesce to their leadership and
control; (2) SLA/Unity is reaching out to Darfur Peace
Agreement signatory, Minni Minawi, and Fur hold-out leader
Abdelwahid Nur, in an effort to create a counter to JEM's
grab on other armed groups; and (3) SLA/Unity's hurried
outreach to the Doha process, AU/UN Chief Mediator, and the
U.S. Special Envoy indicates concern that they and others
have in the increasingly likely scenario that Darfur could be
ruled by JEM (the "Hamas of Darfur" as SLA/Unity called them)
and the fear in which the lead up to the rainy season and
JEM's final assault on other non-signatories will bring.

End Key Points and Comments.


1. (SBU) In an April 28 meeting with members of SLA/Unity in
Doha (Uthman Bushra, Mahjoub Hussein, Sayyed Charif Jar
an-Nabi and Fathi Uthman),Special Envoy for Sudan Gration
(joined by Ambassador, S/USSES Deputy Tim Shortley and P/E
Chief Rice) introduced himself as the U.S. envoy "for all of
Sudan and its needs." These include water, sanitation,
health care, and food. To this end, the Special Envoy (SE)
noted he was working to bring back NGOs following their
expulsion by the Government of Sudan (GOS). He said he had
succeeded in having the GOS tone down its rhetoric on "spies
and thieves" in the ranks of the opposition.


2. (SBU) Nothing, however, noted SE Gration, would be truly
fixed before there is security on the ground. Thus, it is
imperative to incentivize a cease-fire by providing
reconstruction and development that increases progressively
the longer the cease-fire lasts. Solving the humanitarian
problems while we work on larger issues is also imperative.
Finally, SE Gration encouraged the SLA/Unity to finalize a
cease-fire agreement with the GOS and other opposition groups
in early May.


3. (SBU) The delegation responded by expressing its desire to
cooperate fully and end the fighting and suffering in Sudan.
SLA/Unity has conditioned its participation in a cease-fire
on the return of the NGOs, so the group was pleased to learn
of the progress in that area. "We are suffering and very
much want peace" but ask that the NGOs not be from the Arab
League, Q the delegation members.


4. (SBU) CEASE-FIRE: SLA/Unity lamented that its membership
was "fighting in the north" with Khalil Ibrahim. This was
"not good, as we should all be working against the GOS."


5. (SBU) Asked whose participation in a cease-fire would be
critical to its success, the interlocutors told SE Gration
that SLA/Unity, Khalil Ibrahim's JEM, Abdul Wahid's SLM/AW
and their supporters have the weapons and, thus, must be
drawn in if the cease-fire will work.


6. (SBU) SE Gration said he was committed to raising money
from private donors to incentivize development in areas where
armed groups maintain the cease-fire. Groups like SLA/Unity
would be able to program reconstruction and development
investments in areas under their control within broad
categories such as education, health, and agriculture.


7. (SBU) The Special Envoy stressed that a cease-fire needs
to be established quickly and collective monitoring measures
put in place. SLA/Unity and other groups opposing the GOS
need to be part of monitoring the cease-fire. With a

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cease-fire established, said SE Gration, we will be able to
lay the groundwork for economic development and the creation
of prosperity that is sorely needed in Darfur.


8. (SBU) The SLA/Unity delegation responded by underscoring
the need for two separate cease-fires in Darfur. One between
the GOS and the rebels, and another between the rebels and
JEM. The delegation added that SLA/Unity accepts to work
with SE Gration toward a cease-fire and appreciates U.S.
willingness to do right by Sudan.


9. (SBU) SE Gration asked SLA/Unity to take action by
returning to Doha May 4-5, under an expected Government of
Qatar invitation, to move forward on power sharing and the
future status of Darfur. The delegation said it would
consider this request but thought the May 4-5 deadline too
early.


10. (SBU) FUTURE OF SUDAN: SE Gration stressed that he does
not want to see Sudan break apart. A cease-fire is sorely
needed, as well as steps toward lasting security and viable
economic development. While it sounds hard, SE Gration
encouraged SLA/Unity and other opposition groups to take the
decision to "disarm and then do it fairly." He said he would
push this in discussions in Chad and elsewhere in the region.



11. (SBU) UNAMID: Asked what the role of UNAMID should be
in Sudan, SLA/Unity members noted that UNAMID soldiers do not
protect "our civilians 100 percent," and are not coordinating
with us. European soldiers would be preferable. The members
added that "forces need to be in areas where there is no
government control."


12. (U) SE Gration has cleared this message.

LeBaron