SCENESETTER FOR SPECIAL ENVOY MITCHELL'S APRIL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DOHA 000253

SIPDIS

FOR SPECIAL ENVOY MITCHELL FROM AMBASSADOR LEBARON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/13/2019
TAGS: PREL KWBG KPAL QA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SPECIAL ENVOY MITCHELL'S APRIL
20-21 VISIT TO QATAR

Classified By: Ambassador Joseph E. LeBaron, for reasons 1.4 (b, d).


1. (C) Embassy Doha welcomes your visit to Qatar. I look
forward to hosting you at my residence, while the delegation
accompanying you stays at the Sharq Hotel. We have requested
host-country meetings for you with the Amir and the Prime
Minister. You met with the PM in Washington earlier this
month, and you would be the first USG official, other than
General Petraeus, to meet with the Amir since the start of
the Obama Administration.

2. (C) We know that your focus is Palestinian-Israeli issues.
Accordingly, we have tailed our Scenesetter below to reflect
that focus. We begin, however, with what we believe to be a
necessary assessment of the U.S.-Qatar relationship.

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THE U.S.-QATAR RELATIONSHIP
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3. (C) The breadth and depth of Qatar's relationship with the
U.S. is impressive, especially for a country the size of
Connecticut, with about two million inhabitants, of whom only
about 225,000 are actually Qatari citizens.
-- Because it is so small and its energy resources so large,
Qatar now has an annual per capita income of over $60,000
(the highest in the world). Qatar's national revenues will
continue growing despite the global economic crisis, although
their upward trajectory will be moderated by a drop in
commodity prices.
-- Wealth has bolstered the country's political ambitions,
leading to Qatari foreign policy initiatives that too often
been at odds with U.S. objectives. Examples include Qatar's
relations with Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, and Syria.
-- Until recently, Qatar was not fully cooperative in
intelligence sharing and combating terrorism financing, which
also led to tensions with Washington.
-- At the political level, the bilateral relationship has
been cold, but it is improving. Prime Minister Hamid bin
Jassim has told us Qatar was to "close the chapter" of poor
political relations with Washington, and, as you know, he
recently visited Washington for a series of meetings with
senior Administration officials.
-- In contrast to the political relationship, the U.S.-Qatar
military relationship is solid. Qatar provides the U.S.
military exceptional access to two major Qatari military
installations, Al Udaid Air Base and Camp As-Saliyeh -- two
of CENTCOM's most important operating installations outside
of Iraq. Qatar charges us no rent, and in fact is funding
over $700 million in construction projects for the exclusive
use of the U.S. military.
-- The U.S.-Qatar economic relationship is vital. U.S.
energy companies have invested tens of billions of dollars in
the oil and gas industry here. Qatar, which holds the third
largest natural gas reserves in the world after Iran and
Russia, is expected to become in 2010 one of the most
important suppliers of imported liquefied natural gas (LNG)
to the U.S. market.
-- Our educational and cultural relationship with Qatar is
strong and growing. Qatar has committed itself like few
other Arab states to modernizing its educational system, and
has turned decisively to the United States for help. Qatar
has imported branch campuses of six U.S. universities,
including Texas A&M, Carnegie-Mellon, Weill-Cornell Medical
School, Georgetown, Virginia Commonwealth, and Northwestern.
At the elementary and secondary levels it is instituting a
U.S. model of charter schools.
-- Al Jazeera, the television network with an Arabic-speaking
audience of some 60 million, is based in Qatar and funded by
the State of Qatar. The network's coverage, particularly by
its Arabic service on issues important to the United States,
has long been an irritant in our bilateral relationship. We
nevertheless recognize the value of USG officials appearing
on Al Jazeera in order to ensure that official U.S. voices
are heard in the Arab world. Because it is funded by the
State of Qatar, Al Jazeera avoids reporting critical of
Qatar. In any event, its Arabic service remains an important
source of outreach to Arabic speakers around the world,
especially on Israeli and Palestinian issues. We are happy
to arrange an interview on Al Jazeera for you if you have
interest and your time on the ground in Doha permits.

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QATAR'S STRATEGY OF BALANCING COMPETING INTERESTS
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4. (C) SAUDI ARABIA: The Amir's family, the Al Thanis, have
ruled Qatar for more than 140 years. Given the small size of
Qatar and a desire to stay in power, the Al Thani family does
its best to stay on good terms with larger regional players,

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such as Iran and Saudi Arabia. The relationship with Riyadh
had been strained following perceptions in the Kingdom that
Al Jazeera's coverage of the Saudi royal family was
unflattering, leading the Saudis a few years ago to pull
their ambassador. However, a Saudi ambassador returned to
Doha a little over a year ago, and relations are generally
improving.

5. (S) IRAN: The Qataris deeply distrust Iran and oppose
that neighbor's nuclear weapons program. But sharing the
third largest natural gas reserves in the world with Iran
obliges the Qatari leadership to maintain a "working
relationship" with Tehran. As an example of the balancing
act Qatar plays with Iran -- and elsewhere -- Qatar will not
close the one Iranian bank serving Qatar, as we have asked.
Nor, however, will Qatar allow Iran to open additional banks,
as we expect the Iranians would like. Instead, in classic
Qatari fashion, the government announced it had granted
permission to the sole operating Iranian bank to open a
second branch -- on the same day former Treasury Secretary
Paulson visited Doha in June. Such behavior does not satisfy
either the U.S. or Iran, but it exemplifies how the Al Thani
leadership tries to maintain balance between competing
interests. (Think also of Qatar's relations with Iran
juxtaposed to the considerable U.S. military presence in
Qatar.)

6. (S) RELATIONS WITH BAD ACTORS: Qatar's contacts with
Hamas are consistent with the current Amir's stated desire to
have good relations and contacts with everyone, and his
belief that Hamas won in free-and-fair elections for the
Palestinian Legislative Council in January 2006. The Qatari
leadership also appears to calculate that maintaining
relations with bad actors such as Hezbollah and the Iranians
helps ensure Qatar's security by serving as an insurance
policy against attack -- a real concern given Qatar's hosting
of U.S. military personnel and the perception of this by
extremist elements in the region.

7. (S) RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL: Up until January, Israel
maintained a quasi-diplomatic presence in Doha. Qatar's
"freezing" of Israel's Trade Office presence occurred in the
wake of the failure by Qatar to achieve a quorum of Arab
leaders for an Arab League Summit aimed at addressing the
crisis in Gaza. The subsequent Doha Summit on Gaza, attended
by a large Arab and Palestinian contingent from the
rejectionist camp, voted to break off ties with Israel as a
protest over Gaza. Qatar acted immediately; Mauritania
later.

8. (S) The January Summit, held days before President Obama
took office, got the Qataris off on the wrong foot with the
new Administration. Senior Qatari officials have since made
clear their strong commitment to a continued strategic
relationship with the United States. We predict that Qatar,
which continues to tell the Israelis that bilateral contacts
are welcome, will look for an opportunity to reopen the
Israeli Trade Office. Having jettisoned their own policy of
maintaining overt good relations with Israel, however, Qatari
officials are no doubt hoping for a gesture by the Israelis
vis--vis the Palestinians that would allow Qatar to reverse
itself with dignity.

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THE TREND FOR INCREASED DIPLOMATIC ACTIVISM BY QATAR
-------------- --------------


9. (C) LESSONS FROM LEBANON: Qatar, led by the Amir and
Prime Minister, successfully mediated the Lebanese conflict
in June, to much acclaim in many parts of the region. In
doing so, the Qatari leadership reaffirmed its belief that
Qatar's policy of having open doors across the ideological
spectrum in the region was important to promoting stability
in the region. The parties to the Lebanese conflict were
brought to Doha and lodged in the Sheraton Hotel. Senior
Qatari officials, including the Prime Minister and Amir,
shuttled back and forth between various hotel rooms in a
coordinated effort to narrow the gaps between the parties.
The Amir, failing to convince Hezbollah to sign on to the
draft agreement that the other parties, in some cases
begrudgingly had accepted, called the Presidents of Syria and
Iran to ask for their help with Hezbollah's leadership. They
did, and we think Qatar's leaders drew three important
conclusions:
(1) A small state getting along with everyone can accomplish
what larger states (Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia in the
Lebanese example) cannot;
(2) Good relations with bad actors (in this case Syria and
Iran) can lead to tangible and beneficial results for the
region and the world; and
(3) Resolving the Lebanese conflict increased regional
stability and paid dividends for Qatar's own security and
global standing.

DOHA 00000253 003 OF 004



10. (C) EGYPT AND SUDAN: Qatar's success on Lebanon may have
encouraged its leaders to take issue publicly with Egypt on
its mediation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict during the
Gaza crisis. It is clear that President Mubarak remains
furious with the Qataris over their behavior in December, and
Egypt's bitterness is endangering Qatar's current
high-profile mediation initiative on Darfur, which is
supported by the U.S. (Special Envoy for Sudan Gration and
UN/African Union Mediator Djibril Bassole are currently
expected to visit Doha at the end of April; this would be
Gration's first trip to Qatar.)

11. (C) PALESTINIAN UNITY: Qatar's leaders will likely tell
you that they support the formation of a Palestinian national
unity government and Egypt's mediation efforts. In Qatar's
view, Egypt will not succeed in wringing concessions from
Hamas. A national unity government would, though, show more
flexibility. You can expect the Amir to make the case to
engage Hamas (Khalid Mish'al is a frequent interlocutor),
arguing that Hamas will spoil any agreement Israel makes with
the Palestinian Authority (PA) if it does not have a stake in
its success. It's not clear how supportive Qatar truly is of
Egypt when Cairo is undermining Doha on Sudan, but bad blood
between Egypt and Qatar will complicate your efforts to take
advantage of Qatar's ties with Hamas.

12. (C) MEDIATION, NOT MILITARY MIGHT: Considering Qatar's
wealth, its growing confidence in mediating disputes, and the
prestige that such involvement brings, we expect Qatar will
continue to carve out a regional diplomatic role for itself
in the coming years. A few of Qatar's initiatives have
foundered, including an effort to mediate a ceasefire between
the Yemeni government and the Shi'a Houthi rebels in the
north. Closer to your portfolio, a half-hearted attempt to
bring Hamas and Fatah rivals together also yielded nothing.

13. (C) Qatar, with a population of fewer than 250,000
citizens, will never be a military power. Having its sites
set on regional diplomacy and mediation is quite realistic,
however. Also, despite the global economic crisis, Qatar's
ample natural gas reserves should provide sufficient money to
invest in the global good. Improving stability through
mediation in a turbulent region where Qatar's military
resources are meager makes inherent sense. What resources
Qatar is putting into its military are aimed at providing
airlift capacity for humanitarian interventions. Qatar in
the coming months will take possession of U.S.-supplied C-17
aircraft, and it is well possible that Qatar may seek to use
those aircraft to bolster tangibly its diplomatic
initiatives, such as by supplying humanitarian needs in
Africa (including Sudan).

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FINAL THOUGHTS
--------------


14. (C) QATAR AS PARTNER: The Embassy views your visit as an
exceptional opportunity to help put the bilateral political
relationship on a positive trajectory after the Gaza debacle
at the start of the current Administration. The best way to
elicit a positive response from the Amir for what the U.S.
seeks is to make him our partner. By partnership, we do not
suggest a one-way street where we ask Qatar for money (as the
USG has done multiple times over the last year alone from
Afghanistan to Iraq to Kosovo). Obtaining Qatar's support
and money to advance the Israeli-Palestinian situation will
require making Qatar a stakeholder in an issue very near and
dear to the Amir.

15. (C) DEFINING A ROLE: Giving the Qataris a defined role
to play is the best way to bring them on board -- and keep
them from making mischief elsewhere. Qatar is a small state
with global ambitions, and it wants to be seen as a player.
When we have asked Qatar to help us -- for example in
interceding with the Libyans to put Lockerbie behind us at
the end of the previous Administration -- the Qataris have
been true to their word and worked our requests very quietly.


16. (C) MANAGING EXPECTATIONS: We know that giving Qatar a
mediation role in the Israeli-Palestinian would not go over
well with the rest of the region. The Qataris, more than
anyone, are aware that other Arab states speak ill of them in
Washington. The key is to give Qatar not a lead role in the
spotlight but a supporting role with behind-the-scenes
responsibility.

17. (C) IT'S ALL ABOUT THE AMIR: It is important to remember
that Qatar's policies -- such as talking to everyone, not
isolating Syria, and engaging Hamas -- come from the Amir.
Honor and respect are very important to him, and the Amir
very much wants to be seen as someone who abides by his
commitments. That is one reason why, having been asked by
Secretary Rice to help convince Hamas to participate in
Palestinian elections, he refused to cut off Hamas, following

DOHA 00000253 004 OF 004


its victory, from financial support. Rather than lamenting
that his sense of honor makes him hard-headed, we need to
channel his abiding sense of commitment and loyalty in ways
that help us.

18. (C) The Amir is also someone who wants to take action.
His frustration, if not anger, with Arab inaction in helping
the Palestinians led to Qatar's casting its lot with more
radical elements just before President Obama took office.
That was a lamentable departure from Qatar's normal behavior,
but tapping into the Amir's desire to bring a lasting and
equitable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is in
our strategic interest.

19. (C) The Amir has wealth and a vision to develop Qatar's
potential in education, science, and technology. Neither his
wealth nor his vision garners him respect. On the contrary,
one of Qatar's problems is that its neighbors envy what the
small state has at its disposal. The best way you can help
us take greater advantage of Qatar's vision and resources is
by tapping into the Amir's enthusiasm and energy and
harnessing them as resources that we as partners can leverage
together.

20. (C) GETTING THE MONEY: Qatar does not respond to our
numerous appeals for financial assistance because they don't
come from senior USG officials as part and parcel of a
bilateral strategic partnership. The Amir did not lead Qatar
to where it is today without defining targets and creating
stakeholders. He yearns to have the President reach out to
him and chart a course together based on cooperation,
commitment and trust.

21. (C) Qatar has money, but it spends it wisely, on the
whole. When Qatar assisted the victims of Hurricane Katrina,
it partnered with Habitat for Humanity and other partners on
the ground, endeavoring to make sure that every penny spent
went to the victims and not administrative overhead. This is
generally how Qatar approaches all foreign aid, and it's not
unlike how most Americans make decisions regarding charitable
giving. When it comes to financial support to the
Palestinians, expect your Qatari interlocutors to complain
that the PA (except for Abu Mazen and Fayyad) is corrupt and
that Qatar does not want to send money through the PA. It is
critical to address Qatar's assessment that its donations to
the Palestinians, if given through PA channels, will be
squandered.

22. (C) While the military, commercial and educational
relationships the U.S. maintains with Qatar are excellent,
the political relationship will take a concerted effort to
improve. But the opportunity for that is clearly there, and
building trust and a personal relationship with the Amir, and
giving him and his country a viable role as our partner, are
the surest paths to success.
LeBaron