QATAR'S UNBALANCED POSITION ON GAZA SETS BACK ITS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DOHA 000024 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2019 TAGS: PREL KPAL KWBG QA SUBJECT: QATAR'S UNBALANCED POSITION ON GAZA SETS BACK ITS EMERGING ROLE AS A REGIONAL MEDIATOR REF: MUSCAT 16 Classified By: Ambassador Joseph E. LeBaron, for reasons 1.4 (b, d). -------------- (C) KEY POINTS -------------- -- For reasons of political ideology and strategic positioning, Qatar has adopted a posture on the fighting in Gaza that will seriously undermine its effort to become an influential regional player. -- Ideologically, Qatar's Amir believes actions to undermine the democratically-elected Hamas government are wrong and to be actively opposed. (See paras. 5-8.) -- Strategically, the Amir is trying to position himself in the Gaza issue as a champion of Arab public opinion, even as the Al Thani ruling family shapes that opinion (indirectly) through its financial support and informal guidance to al-Jazeera. -- The Amir no doubt believes that Qatar has the strategic space to take the unhelpful, oppositional position it has in support of Hamas. Qatar hosts critically important U.S. military operations. It is the world's largest exporter of LNG. And it has, at least for now, overt relations with Israel (see septel). -------------- (C) COMMENTS -------------- -- In a later cable, we will send our suggestions on how we might get Qatar to change its regional approach. In short, we believe the USG will have to find a way to get to the Amir ideologically or strategically -- or both. -- We already know that, in the longer term, U.S. Special Envoy for Sudan Williamson's engagement of Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Al-Mahmoud on Darfur could be a model for engagement with Qatar. In the case of these two officials' sustained dialogue, the United States has had success shaping Qatar's approach on its mediation in Sudan. -- Meanwhile, Embassy Doha will continue telling our Qatari interlocutors that, if Qatar insists on maintaining its political relationship with Hamas, then Qatar's message to Hamas leaders should focus squarely on the need to adopt the Quartet conditions. End Key Points and Comments. ¶1. (C) Embassy Muscat's very useful cable (reftel) reports the Egyptian allegation that Qatar mounted a determined effort at the recent GCC summit in Muscat to get the GCC to formally endorse an emergency Arab League Summit to address the Gaza crisis. That allegation is almost certainly correct. In fact, as the Gaza crisis continues, Qatar's opposition to the position of the moderate Arab states on Gaza appears to be growing. -------------- WHAT IS DRIVING QATAR'S BEHAVIOR? -------------- ¶2. (C) Until recently, we could count on Qatar to seek good relations with virtually everyone. That was part of Qatar's strategy to become a regional diplomatic player uniquely postured to work with everyone across the ideological spectrum of the broader Middle East. ¶3. (C) Qatar maintained contact with states and non-state actors opposed by the moderate end of the Arab spectrum of ideology and policy. But it also maintained relationships with moderate regional groups and parties, with whom the USG and others share important interests. These include the parties to the Darfur crisis, with whom Qatar is actively involved in mediation. Now, however, Qatar appears to be losing its balance over the issue of Gaza. That will set back its goal of becoming an influential regional player. ¶4. (C) It is the Amir himself who is responsible for this change. Ideologically, he views Hamas through a very different lens than does Saudi Arabia or Egypt. He believes efforts to undermine or exclude a democratically-elected Hamas government are wrong and to be DOHA 00000024 002 OF 003 actively opposed. Perhaps equally important, in a regional strategic sense, he knows where Arab public opinion is on Gaza, and he is trying to position himself in the forefront of it. -------------- -------------- AMIR PRESAGED POSITION IN NOVEMBER MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) In a November 3 meeting with the Ambassador, Ambassador urged the Amir to stop Qatar's support for Hamas. In response, the Amir acknowledged the U.S. position, but he pointed out that Hamas came to power in elections that were deemed free and fair. ¶6. (C) Maybe, the Amir continued, the elections should never have been held. But they were. "How can I now turn my back on an elected government," he asked? Washington "knew Hamas would win and went forward with the elections all the same. This is not Qatar's fault." ¶7. (C) Ambassador reminded the Amir that Hamas, failure to renounce violence and to stand by commitments of previous Palestinian leaders were central to Washington's position. The Amir discounted this, noting that Hamas leader Khaled Mesha'al had told him Hamas would accept the 1967 borders with Israel, although not in the absence of an overall agreement. Mesha'al, said the Amir, worries that he will suffer the same fate as Arafat, if he makes such an announcement earlier. ¶8. (C) Referring back to the elections that brought Hamas to power, the Amir told the Ambassador, "We must find a way to have good relations (with the United States),but not at the price of our dignity. If Qatar is wrong and makes mistakes, we will deal those mistakes, but the mistakes must be ours to correct." -------------- STRATEGIC AIMS -------------- ¶9. (C) Qatar's current approach to events in Gaza reflects a strategic dimension closely associated with Qatar's national interest; or, to be more specific, with the ruling Al Thanis' interests. ¶10. (C) Strategically, the Amir appears to consider Qatar, including al-Jazeera, to be a champion of Arab public opinion. By extension, Qatar -- and, again, al-Jazeera -- is a representative to the world of the Arab point of view. Given Arab public opinion on Gaza, the Amir believes that his position on the fighting will increase Qatar's popularity and visibility on the Arab street. That, in turn, will contribute to domestic support for the ruling family and to more security in terms of regional threats. For Qatar and its ruling family, that is not just politics, it's survival. ¶11. (C) The Amir also appears to be frustrated by the reluctance of other Arab leaders to exercise leadership in finding a solution to the present crisis in Gaza. Especially when Arab public opinion, which the Al Thanis help shape indirectly through al-Jazeera, is so clear on the issue. While Palestinians are dying in Gaza, the Amir seems to believe, the Arabs are once again waiting for others -- notably the UN Security Council and the Quartet -- to take action. ¶12. (C) Beyond simple grandstanding, his desire to hold an Arab League Summit stems in part, we believe, from his calculation that, if the Arabs forge a common position, then they would have more leverage with Israel and the international community in securing significant, positive change for the Palestinians. ¶13. (C) Whatever the motivations for his actions, the Amir doubtlessly believes he has the strategic space to support the Syrian and Hamas version of the Palestinian cause in times of Palestinian-Israeli violence: -- Qatar is host to the U.S. military, in the thousands, at two Qatari bases critical to the U.S. war effort in Afghanistan and Iraq. He knows we will be loathe to seriously rupture our military relationship with Qatar and deny Qatar its strategic defense against Iran, Qatar's existential threat. -- Qatar is now the world's largest exporter of LNG, with growing revenues from that commodity. That positions the Al Thanis well during a global economic downturn that will DOHA 00000024 003 OF 003 severely affect Qatar's neighbors. -- The financial independence that comes from Qatar's energy wealth gives the Amir the capacity and freedom to use money amounting to billions as an international tool and lever. -- Qatar has overt relations with Israel. This allows the Amir to argue that his relationship with Hamas and Syria is, like his relationship with Israel, just part of a policy of talking to everyone. -- Qatar is host to, and funds, the Al-Jazeera Network. That allows Qatar to help shape Arab public opinion through a hot medium more graphic and vocal, and with greater regional reach, than anything its neighbors have. -------------- THE IRANIAN DIMENSION -------------- ¶14. (C) Qatar's detractors in the region often point to Doha's relationship with Tehran as lying behind Qatar's support for Hamas. We agree with them, at least in part. At its core, Qatar's relationship with Iran is rooted in Qatar's fear of Iran. ¶15. (C) We do not know the precise nature and extent of the Qatari-Iranian relationship. But we think Qatar believes it simply must maintain a peaceable, outwardly friendly relationship with Iran, if Qatar is to continue its exploitation -- at Iran's economic expense -- of the North Field. Qatar's North Field and Iran's South Pars field are part of the same mammoth reservoir of non-associated gas. Right now, Qatar extracts far, far more gas from that common field than does Iran, and Iran knows it. LeBaron